University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
Spring 2011

Patterns of Science: Developing Knowledge for a World
Community at Unesco
Perrin Selcer
University of Pennsylvania, pselcer@mail.utexas.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Selcer, Perrin, "Patterns of Science: Developing Knowledge for a World Community at Unesco" (2011).
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 323.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/323

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/323
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Patterns of Science: Developing Knowledge for a World Community at Unesco
Abstract
In the aftermath of World War II, many internationalists diagnosed the fundamental cause of international
conflict as humanity’s failure to realize the ideals of a world community grounded in global political
institutions and common values. To prevent an apocalyptic third world war, internationalists affiliated with
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco) identified two ways science
could engineer a peaceful and prosperous world community: “technologically, by changing the material
conditions of life, work and production; and intellectually, by changing the way in which men think.”
Grounded in archival research in four countries, “Patterns of Science” explores both strategies through
studies of Unesco’s environmental and social sciences programs. Environmental scientists emphasized
the need to balance nature’s books by adapting the pattern of natural resources exploitation to the
requirements of global population growth. They conceived of scientifically guided development as a
moral equivalent of war that could unite an international army for the conquest of nature. Social scientists
stressed the importance of reforming parochial cultural patterns to construct “the defences of peace in
the minds of men.” By facilitating intercultural understanding, social scientists would help nations realize
the ideal of “unity in diversity.” The goal of both strategies was to produce objective global knowledge that
would make the world scale real—“in the minds of men” as well as for politicians and planners. “Patterns
of Science” reveals how internationalist scientists attempted to navigate the politics of the cold war,
decolonization, and bureaucratic rivalries through case studies that demonstrate the interaction of
international, national, and local scales. These cases range from the Los Angeles School District’s
implementation of a “Unesco program” during the height of McCarthyism to the establishment of a
university chair of race relations in Southern Rhodesia, and from an arid lands research program that
pitted “men against the desert” to the production of a Soil Map of the World. Although often mired in
controversy or dismissed as naïve, Unesco’s work produced an international community of experts and
global social and environmental knowledge that proved crucial to the emerging imperative for sustainable
development in the early 1970s.
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ABSTRACT

PATTERNS OF SCIENCE
DEVELOPING KNOWLEDGE FOR A WORLD COMMUNITY AT UNESCO
Perrin Selcer
M. Susan Lindee
In the aftermath of World War II, many internationalists diagnosed the fundamental
cause of international conflict as humanity’s failure to realize the ideals of a world
community grounded in global political institutions and common values. To prevent an
apocalyptic third world war, internationalists affiliated with the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco) identified two ways science
could engineer a peaceful and prosperous world community: “technologically, by
changing the material conditions of life, work and production; and intellectually, by
changing the way in which men think.” Grounded in archival research in four countries,
“Patterns of Science” explores both strategies through studies of Unesco’s environmental
and social sciences programs. Environmental scientists emphasized the need to balance
nature’s books by adapting the pattern of natural resources exploitation to the
requirements of global population growth. They conceived of scientifically guided
development as a moral equivalent of war that could unite an international army for the
conquest of nature. Social scientists stressed the importance of reforming parochial
cultural patterns to construct “the defences of peace in the minds of men.” By facilitating
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intercultural understanding, social scientists would help nations realize the ideal of “unity
in diversity.” The goal of both strategies was to produce objective global knowledge that
would make the world scale real—“in the minds of men” as well as for politicians and
planners. “Patterns of Science” reveals how internationalist scientists attempted to
navigate the politics of the cold war, decolonization, and bureaucratic rivalries through
case studies that demonstrate the interaction of international, national, and local scales.
These cases range from the Los Angeles School District’s implementation of a “Unesco
program” during the height of McCarthyism to the establishment of a university chair of
race relations in Southern Rhodesia, and from an arid lands research program that pitted
“men against the desert” to the production of a Soil Map of the World. Although often
mired in controversy or dismissed as naïve, Unesco’s work produced an international
community of experts and global social and environmental knowledge that proved crucial
to the emerging imperative for sustainable development in the early 1970s.
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1
Introduction
The opening line of the United Nations Charter invoked the moral authority of
those who had suffered unspeakable wrongs: “We the peoples of the United Nations
determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind…” If the United Nations Organization
represented the realization of a grand internationalist vision, its idealism was a reaction to
the insanity of the battles of the Somme and Ypres, Stalingrad and Okinawa, not an
expression of innocence. In fact, despite the allusion to popular democracy in the
Preamble’s first words, the twenty-nine substantive chapters of the Charter were “based
in the principle of the sovereign equality” of member states—except, of course, that they
simultaneously institutionalized the ultimate authority of the great powers in the Security
Council. In other words, the UN was intended to organize the existing international order,
not create a new world order. Similarly in the economic sphere, the Bretton Woods
institutions were designed to facilitate and stabilize the international financial system, not
fundamentally transform it. And yet there is no denying the utopian strains in the dream
of a world without war.
This idealism, still anchored in the harsh reality of “the great and terrible war”
that had just ended, was given full expression in the Constitution of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (Unesco),1 which declared that “a
peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments
would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of
the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail,
1

During the period of this study, the organization’s acronym was officially written Unesco (not UNESCO).

2
upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.” The only realistic foundation for
an enduring peace was a world community—a world in which “We the peoples of the
United Nations” represented not merely a rhetorical flourish but the deeply felt affiliation
of world citizens. This study explores the efforts of scientists, civil servants, and activists
affiliated with Unesco to use science to build a peaceful and prosperous world
community during the quarter-century following World War Two.
Postwar internationalists were acutely sensitive to the charge of idealistic naiveté
from realists, and many acknowledged the futility of international political cooperation to
transcend power politics. Instead of the explicitly political United Nations Organization
in New York, these intellectuals pinned their hopes to the UN specialized agencies,
which relied on expert knowledge to solve mundane problems like hunger (the Food and
Agriculture Organization—FAO), disease (World Health Organization—WHO) and
illiteracy (Unesco). By engaging nations in their border-crossing projects, these
functional agencies would quietly erode national and bureaucratic boundaries and thus
“overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies,
in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually
integrated,” as the British political scientist David Mitrany put it. For proponents of this
strategy, termed functionalism, the explicitly apolitical quality of science was a powerful
political resource.2
2

David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago, 1966), 96. The title essay in this collection was
originally published in 1943, although Mitrany dates the origins of his “functionalist” theory of
international organization to 1932. On functionalism, see Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State:
Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, 1964); Craig Murphy, Global Institutions,
Marginalization, and Development (London, 2005), in particular chapters 3 “The Dialectic of Liberal
Internationalism” and 4 “The Promise of Democratic Functionalism”. On science as a political resource,
see Yaron Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy
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As the UN specialized agency with jurisdiction over science, Unesco had a
particular interest in elaborating how science could be mobilized as an instrument of
progressive global social and political reform. In 1950, Unesco’s Natural Sciences
Department published the first issue of Impact of Science on Society, a journal dedicated
to what contemporaries called the social relations of science. “Science impinges on
society in two main ways,” the inaugural editorial began, “technologically, by changing
the material conditions of life, work and production; and intellectually, by changing the
way in which men think.” The intellectual impact of science might ultimately prove “far
more important to humanity than its contribution to material welfare,” but “in the present
state of the world it [was] not practical politics to envisage the spreading of the scientific
attitude to mankind as a whole.” Before they could be expected to adopt the scientific
attitude, the “starving millions” had to be fed (and the working millions afforded leisure
time).3
Neither critics nor supporters were likely to accuse Unesco of following the
dictates of “practical politics,” however. In fact, Unesco’s mandate to cultivate the
intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind fit awkwardly with the logic of
functionalism. Replacing irrational, parochial patterns of thought with a “critical sense”
and “objective attitude” was the fundamental task—a world citizen was a scientific
citizen.4 In practice, Unesco pursued both the technological and the intellectual strategies

(Cambridge, 1990); Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public
Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the
Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
3
Anon, “The Impact of Science on Society,” Impact of Science on Society 1: 1 (Apr.-June 1950), 1-2, 1.
4
Unesco, In the Classroom with Children under Thirteen Years of Age: Towards World Understanding V
(Paris: Unesco, 1952), 53.
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for using science to develop a prosperous and peaceful world community, but a
commitment to the intellectual strategy for improving the world—to intervening “in the
minds of men,” as its Constitution put it—was deeply embedded in the organization’s
institutional culture.
For many participants in Unesco’s program, the technological and the intellectual
approaches were complementary; both were a means of eroding political boundaries in
order to facilitate the peaceful integration of the world community. The technological
approach focused on society’s base; by guiding the development of the planet’s natural
resources, science promised to build the stable economic foundation on which a world
community could be built. The intellectual approach targeted the superstructure; by
providing a universal epistemology that enabled diverse peoples to collaborate, science
would accelerate the development of common values and norms. But the two approaches
pulled in opposite directions, too. The technological strategy purposefully eschewed
controversial political questions to focus on practical problems that crossed borders. In
contrast, the intellectual strategy directly confronted emotionally charged prejudices and
rigid political ideologies with the deliberative rationality of science. Most importantly,
the technological approach depended on an elite core of cosmopolitan experts; whereas
the intellectual approach attempted to foster a popular community of world citizens.
Rather than directly contradictory, these two strategies for effacing community
boundaries existed in constant, potentially productive tension. Analyzing how civil
servants and experts managed this fundamental tension in practice is a major task of this
study.

5
Neither of these strategies was new in 1945, but they existed in a new world—or
at least, internationalists insisted that they did. The Second World War had obliterated the
old balance of power and demonstrated the apocalyptic consequences of a third war. As
President Truman told a UN conference a month after ordering the atomic bombing of
Japan, “Let us not fail to grasp the supreme chance to establish a world-wide rule of
reason.” The rule of reason was the goal, but the key to achieving it was recognizing the
urgency and opportunity of the unique historical moment for a fresh start. The
contemporary insistence on the novelty of the new world order enhances the importance
of situating the moment in historical perspective.5
For the architects of the United Nations, the stakes in breaking with the past were
high; the past was the League of Nations and the League was perceived as a failure. And
yet even contemporary observers recognized that the United Nations was a product “of
continuous evolutionary development” and a direct descendent of the League of Nations;
thus the first article of the new journal International Organization was titled “From
League of Nations to United Nations.”6 Recently, Mark Mazower has again drawn
attention to the UN’s close correspondence to the League in order to illuminate the UN’s
ideological foundations in the ideals of British imperial internationalism. Imperial
internationalism has an oxymoronic ring to it now, but this largely reflects the history of

5

Truman quotation in Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United
Nations (New York: Random House, 2006), 46. The whole speech is reproduced in the appendix of
Stephen Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 2003). On the founding, see also Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of
the U.N. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). On the bomb and the postwar internationalist moment,
Paul S. Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age
(New York: Pantheon, 1985), 1-105.
6
Leland M. Goodrich, “From League of Nations to United Nations,” International Organization 1: 1 (Feb.
1947), 3-21, 4.
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the UN, which turned out to be an important facilitator of the triumph of nationalism over
imperialism. In fact, key intellectuals of international organization like Jan Smuts and the
classicist Alfred Zimmern were also key intellectuals of liberal imperialism. For this
school of thought, the League and then the UN were means of shoring up the machinery
of international cooperation between civilized nations and thus stabilizing the world order
so that European imperialists could perform their lofty civilizing missions in the
backward territories.7
The Commonwealth, which distinguished the white dominions from the colonial
possessions, provided a model for this layered international structure, in which it also was
embedded. But for Zimmern and other imperial internationalists the Commonwealth was
even more important as an ideological resource; it represented, in theory, an international
community founded in intellectual and moral solidarity. A similar cultural conception of
a cosmopolitan French empire inspired key French international intellectuals like René
Cassin.8 The connections to Unesco’s philosophy were direct. Zimmern, for example,
was a key figure in Unesco’s predecessor organization, the League of Nation’s affiliated
International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, and was briefly slated to be the first
Director-General of Unesco. As Glenda Sluga has shown, his replacement, the biologist
Julian Huxley, was also a committed imperialist with essentially Victorian sensibilities.
Huxley saw the organization’s role as both fostering a world culture rooted in scientific
7

Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United
Nations (Princeton, 2009); Frank Trentmann, “After the Nation-State: Citizenship, Empire and Global
Coordination in the New Internationalism, 1914-1930,” in Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and
Transnationalism, c. 1880-1950, Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann, eds. (New York:
Palgrave, 2007), 34-53.
8
Glenda Sluga, “René Cassin: Les Droits de l’homme and the History of Human Rights” in Stegan
Ludwig-Hoffman, ed. The Twentieth Century History of Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009).
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humanism and helping European empires with their noble civilizing mission. This was an
essentially antinationalist internationalism, which viewed the fragmentation of empires as
detrimental to the goal of integrating the world community. The concept of a world
community had deep roots in the ideals of imperialism.9
Mazower draws a sharp distinction between spiritual-psychological world
community internationalism and what Zimmern derided as “gas and water
internationalism.”10 As I have suggested, however, there was no necessary contradiction
between the intellectual and technological strategies. But it is true that postwar
internationalists were less enamored with international law and ethics than they had been
during the interwar years (and Zimmern was certainly ill-disposed towards science). They
were more project-oriented. Typical in this respect, international scientific cooperation
underwent a transformation from relatively informal associations that held periodic
congresses in the interwar period to project-oriented organizations with permanent
secretariats after the war.11 To a certain extent, Unesco fit this pattern, too. Although it
9

Mazower, “Alfred Zimmern and the Empire of Freedom,” No Enchanted Palace, 66-103; On the
Commonwealth and the League, see also Peter Mandler, “The Impact of War on Democracy,” in The
English National Character: The History of an Idea from Edmund Burke to Tony Blair (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2006), 143-163. Glenda Sluga, “UNESCO and the (One) World of Julian Huxley, Journal
of World History 21: 3 (Sep. 2010), 393-418. On Huxley, imperialism and Unesco, see also Peder Anker,
Imperial Ecology: Environmental Order in the British Empire, 1895-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2001).
10
Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 80. In fact, Mazower mistakenly describes Huxley’s appointment as
Director-General as a victory for a program of rather boring international scientific exchange. But Huxley
was a walking controversy who, influenced by his sometime collaborator H. G. Wells, believed that
enduring peace depended on the mental adaptation of the human race. (Other than God, it is hard to find
many things Huxley did not believe in.) See also, John Toye and Richard Toye, “One World, Two
Cultures? Alfred Zimmern, Julian Huxley and the Ideological Origins of UNESCO,” History 95: 319 (July
2010), 308-319. Cf. Julian Huxley, UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy (Paris: UNESCO Preparatory
Commission, 1946); H.G. Wells, The Outlook for Homo Sapiens: An unemotional Statement of the Things
that are happening to him now, and of the immediate Possibilities confronting him (London: Readers
Union and Secker & Warburg, 1942).
11
Frank Greenaway, Science International: A History of the International Council of Scientific Unions
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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continued the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation’s tradition of elite
intellectual exchange, it focused more resources on practical problems like illiteracy.
Unesco’s other institutional predecessor is revealing here. This was the wartime Council
of Allied Ministers of Education. Initiated by the British Board of Education, CAME
focused on sharing information, coping with the difficulties of wartime schooling, and
planning for the postwar reconstruction of educational systems. Delegates to the
Conference of the United Nations for the Establishment of an International Organization
for Education and Culture, held in London in November 1945, synthesized a French
proposal to revive the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation and a rival U.S.-CAME
proposal. The compromise was symbolized by the agreement to locate the Secretariat in
Paris and appoint a British Director-General.12 It is tempting here to identify the
intellectual elite approach with the past or the French and the technological project-based
approach with the new or Ango-American, but neither distinction can be sustained.
Instead, it was characteristic of Unesco and of the historical moment that no possibilities
had been eliminated.
In any case, “gas and water internationalism” also had deep imperial roots.
Zimmern’s dismissive comment suggests the origins of functionalism in International
Public Unions like the International Telegraphic Union or the Universal Postal Union that
emerged in Europe during the second-half of the nineteenth century (and which became

12

The story of Unesco’s founding has been told many times. For a general overview see, H. H. Krill De
Capello, “The Creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,”
International Organization 24: 1 (Winter, 1970), 1-30. Fernando Valderrama, A History of Unesco (Paris:
UNESCO Publishing, 1995), 19-32; “D’une société des esprits à la creation de l’UNESCO,” in 60 ans
d’Histoire de l’UNESCO (Paris, 2007)57-99.
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UN specialized agencies).13 These mundane international organizations focused on
international standard setting; by facilitating trans-border flows of information and goods
they became indispensable institutions that performed mundane governance operations at
the international level. But functionalism also called for bold border-crossing projects
designed to increase agricultural productivity, harness the power of rivers, train workers,
and enhance public health. In fact, the social and economic development of
“underdeveloped” countries quickly became the raison d’être of the specialized agencies.
As a vast literature details, the intellectual roots of development were firmly planted in
the colonial civilizing mission—a phrase which captures the tight relationship between
the technological and intellectual approaches, between the material and the moral.
Science and technology were both a means and a measure of civilized progress.
Decolonization only reinforced the imperial connection; UN agencies replaced colonial
institutions and colonial experts became international experts.14
The unexpected speed of postwar decolonization suggests that, in some respects at
least, contemporaries underestimated the historical rupture of the Second World War. Yet
despite claims to novelty, the institutions and ideas that constituted the United Nations
13

Paul S. Reinsch, Public International Unions: Their Work and Organization: A Study in International
Administrative Law (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1911); Leonard Woolf, International Government (London: G.
Allen & Unwin, ltd., 1916); Craig Murphy, The International Organization for Standardization (ISO):
Global Governance through Voluntary Consent (London: Routledge, 2009).
14
Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and the Ideology of Western
Dominance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican
Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997);
Fredrick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on
the History of Politics and Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Joseph Morgan
Hodge, Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, Dharam Ghai, and Frederic Lapeyre,
UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004);
Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: from Western Origins to Global Faith (London: Zed Books,
1997); Amy Staples, The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization,
and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2006).
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System were inherited from the imperial past. Decolonization, therefore, was a painful
yet empowering experience for Unesco and other international organizations. A process
that Unesco contributed to almost inadvertently, it fundamentally transformed the
organization. As this study shows, decolonization tested the depth of the convictions of
many internationalists—it made the question of just who ought to be included in the
world community unavoidable.
Of course, when the United Nations System was established, the British Empire
was no longer the preeminent world power. With Europe struggling just to make it
through the winter, Britain deep in debt and reduced to rationing, Japan in submission,
and the devastated Soviet Union turned in upon itself, the United States’ extraordinary
monopoly of economic and military power translated into global hegemony. At its
founding, popular enthusiasm for the UN in the United States was overwhelming—as
Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley point out, the 1944 election provided a “clearcut mandate for American participation in the United Nations,” as isolationist incumbents
from both parties were tossed out of office.15 And as the opening words of the UN
Charter (“We the peoples”) made explicit, the United States provided a model for the
organization of the international community. Like imperial internationalism, American
internationalist aspirations had been vested in the League of Nations, of course. But while
the UN’s boosters might want to dissociate it from the League, the reputation of
Wilsonian liberalism retained much of its luster—the League’s weakness could be
blamed on Wilson’s failure to win Senate ratification for American participation rather
than the quality of the ideas. It is symbolically appropriate that Smuts and the American
15

Hoopes and Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the U.N., 164.

11
geographer Isaiah Bowman, both key players at the Paris Peace Conference a generation
earlier, collaborated in writing the Charter’s famous Preamable. Given the evolutionary
development of intergovernmental organizations, however, the fact of U.S. power was
more consequential than the relative influence of related intellectual traditions. Five
powers had a veto, but American resources underwrote the system.16
American hegemony was not uncontested, of course. Already by 1947 the Cold
War had hardened, and the U.S. and Soviet government’s primary concern quickly
became how to use UN agencies in the global ideological conflict. Unesco, with its
mandate to intervene in the minds of men, occupied particularly valuable turf in a war for
hearts and minds. Being the battlefield was not necessarily rewarding for the
organization, but it does make its history revealing of important shifts in international
relations policy.17
Although the Soviet Union did not join Unesco until after Stalin died, U.S. policy
makers still found navigating Unesco treacherous. In the early years, the United States
contributed nearly forty percent of the budget, and so enjoyed a sort of de facto veto, but
Unesco was an organization of member states and the U.S. voice was just the loudest of

16

G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after
Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s
Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). Of course,
the roots of development doctrines are as obvious in American international relations as European
imperialism; Cf. Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America’s
Civilizing Mission (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006).
17
On the cultural cold war, see Illya Gaiduk, “L’Union Soviétique et l’UNESCO pendant la Guerre
Froide,” in 60 ans d’Histoire de l’UNESCO (Paris, 2007), 281-286; Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of
Europe Since 1945 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 197-225; Bernard S. Morris, “Communist
International Front Organizations: Their Nature and Function,” World Politics 9: 1 (Oct. 1956), 76-87;
Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956 (Manchester, 1995);
Frances Stonor Saunders Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London, 1999); Giles
Scott-Smith & Hans Krabbendam, The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960 (London: F.
Cass, 2003).
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dozens. Then, too, Americans were of many voices regarding the value of Unesco. Most
dramatically, the organization got caught in the crossfire of rabid U.S. anticommunism,
which caused fundamental changes in the organization’s character and mission. But part
of the difficulty with using Unesco to wage an ideological campaign was inherent in
American liberal internationalism. In terms of international cultural relations, the
diplomatic historian Frank Ninkovich describes the dilemma as “how to use intellectual
freedom as propaganda without turning it into propaganda in the process.”18 This
dilemma is analogous to the challenge of using the apolitical reputation of science as a
political resource, and both ultimately stem from the self-denying quality of liberal
ideology (that is, liberalism denies that it is ideological).19
Like decolonization exposed the contradictions of imperial internationalism, the
Cold War revealed the ideological foundations of American liberal internationalism—and
tested internationalists’ true commitment to its principles.20 In this study, I examine

18

Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 176.
19
On Soviet and American ideologies, see in particular Odd Arne Westad, “The Empire of Liberty:
American Ideology and Foreign Interventions” and “The Empire of Justice: Soviet Ideology and Foreign
Interventions,” in The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8-72. On the UN as an alternative path in U.S. foreign
relations, see Jessica Wang, “The United States, the United Nations, and the Other Post-Cold War World
Order: Internationalism and Unilateralism in the American Century,” in Ellen Schrecker, ed., Cold War
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international scientific programs to see how scientists, civil servants, and activists
negotiated the interwoven tensions of decolonization and the Cold War to cultivate
transnational communities and produce knowledge.21
Although my subject is the co-production of international institutions and
international science, this is emphatically not an institutional history of Unesco or even a
history of its science programs.22 Indeed, many of the Natural and Social Sciences
Departments’ most notable accomplishments (and disastrous failures) go unmentioned,
while considerable space is devoted to projects that would appear trivial from the
perspective of a standard institutional history.23 My interest is in the ideals, theories, and
practices of science in that abstract space that is everywhere and nowhere, the
international, not in Unesco per se. Unesco was part of a complex network of IGOs,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), national government agencies, and
universities.24 It was a key institution in this network, but its roles were usually defined as
coordinating, catalyzing, and facilitating. Although Unesco Headquarters in Paris is the
common node connecting the diverse transnational networks delineated in the individual
chapters, at times it appears as a peripheral node; the main action unfolds in the field or
Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2000).
21
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even in another UN specialized agency. The common thread that unites the six chapters,
and which defined my criteria for selecting projects, is the purposeful use of science to
develop a world community. This thread, however, is composed of many thematic
strands. In what follows, I introduce the five most important of these strands:
epistemology; science fictions; bureaucracy and boundaries; cosmopolitanism; and
scales.
Epistemology
The great promise of science in the international community was that it could
provide a universally accepted way of determining the truth. Although this did not
automatically equate to a community of shared interests and identity, it would provide a
solid foundation for mutual understanding and collective action. Producing objective
knowledge was a particularly tricky proposition in the international community, however,
for the very reason it would be so valuable. As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison remind
us, “Objectivity is always defined by its more robust and threatening complement,
subjectivity.”25 Objectivity required a community whose members saw the world from
the same perspective, recognized the same patterns in the world’s complexity. The
production of objective knowledge could not be separated from the production of an
international community. Whereas Daston and Galison eschew the “remote causes” of
political and social forces in their history of objectivity, however, these were part of the
immediate context of science in the UN System. Epistemologies in the international
community were theories of knowledge and of social and political reform.
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The intellectual and technological strategies for using science to develop a world
community were associated with different epistemological theories and practices. I
explore the intellectual approach’s epistemology through projects connected to Unesco’s
Social Sciences Department. I call it the view from everywhere.26 It emerged out of the
vibrant interwar interdisciplinary field of social psychology and manifested the praxis of
“action-research,” in which social research became a form of group therapy.27 Experts
themselves were supposed to be transformed through international cooperation. The view
from everywhere attempted to turn the problem of subjectivity into a means of achieving
objectivity by operationalizing internationalists’ most cherished concept, unity in
diversity. By coordinating the perspectives of experts who represented distinct national
cultural patterns in interdisciplinary research projects, it sought to produce a synthetic
international perspective. This notion of perspectives converging through participation in
transnational networks resonates with recent work in constructivist international relations,
especially Margaret Keck and Kathryn Skikkink’s justly influential Activists Beyond
Borders.28 Chapter One places these ideas in historical context and analyzes social
scientists’ attempts to establish the institutional infrastructure of the view from
everywhere.
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I investigate the epistemology of the technological strategy, which I call the view
from above, through the Natural Sciences Department’s environmental sciences program.
In the postwar international scientific community, the view from above was closely
associated with holistic ecological thinking and the norms of natural resources
conservation. Where the view from everywhere attempted to synthesize diverse cultural
perspectives, the view from above struggled to suppress the judgment of observers in the
field through standardization. It was based in a faith in the unity of nature. The natural
world was one world, but on this solid base, humans had constructed a patchwork of
cultural, economic, and political structures that did not conform to natural boundaries. A
unified world science was necessary to develop a global view from above that would
reveal the underlying natural patterns to which a world community must be adjusted. In
Chapter Three, I examine a series of international conservation conferences to reveal the
norms and logic of the view from above, as well as map the emerging network of
international organizations with an interest in conservation.
For historians of science, the view from above is quite familiar, and has become
closely associated with imperialism and the oppressive hubris of the high modern state,
especially through James Scott’s compelling Seeing Like a State.29 But if this study has a
single overarching argument, it is that epistemologies do not have politics; that is,
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epistemologies are inherently flexible and so do not determine power relations.30 In
practice, the epistemic virtues (to borrow a phrase from Daston and Galison) of the view
from everywhere and the view from above did not exist in isolation but were in constant,
potentially productive tension.
Science Fictions
One implication of my argument regarding the non-determinative nature of
epistemologies is that deciphering the political implications of the view from everywhere
and the view from above requires analyzing how they played out in practice. Chapter
Two follows the view from everywhere into the field by exploring the popular response
to Unesco in the United States, focusing especially on a controversy over a Unesco
Education for International Understanding Program in the Los Angeles School District
during the height of McCarthyism. Chapter Four analyzes the view from above in
practice through a study of the Natural Sciences Department’s Arid Zone Program,
which, in the context of Malthusian projections of overpopulation, was dedicated to
producing the knowledge necessary to increase the carrying capacity of deserts. These
chapters also introduce the theme of science fictions, to borrow a phrase from Donna
Haraway.31
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To work together for a common cause, people need a shared vision of the
future—as democratic theorists assert, utopias (and dystopias) are quite practical things.32
The fiction animating the Education for International Understanding program was the
fiction of a world community itself. In fact, because the intellectual strategy for
producing a world community depended upon intervening in the minds of men,
persuading citizens to believe in the world community could become the means and the
end—the line between analysis and exhortation blurred. But the “soft” fiction of a world
community competed with harder nationalistic narratives that, although just as
preposterous, did not acknowledge their fictional basis.33
Fictions were equally important to providing a common mission for participants
in the Arid Zone Program. Scholars of agricultural development describe how
development narratives, provide diverse participants with a common framework for
making sense of overwhelmingly complex issues. Environmental scientists themselves
have described the development narrative that energized the Arid Zone Program as the
“myth of desertification.” This myth was the ultimate expression of an environmental
declensionalist narrative with deep cultural roots.34 It warned that “man’s” abuse of the
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land through exploitative or careless agricultural practices threatened to turn fertile fields
into barren deserts. The catastrophic consequences of desertification, the narrative
contended, were heightened by explosive population growth; in fact, the future depended
on “reclaiming” desert lands to keep nature’s books balanced. The myth of desertification
provided a compelling reason for member states to support Unesco’s environmental
sciences program, which was particularly appealing to governments since it justified state
intervention in peasant agricultural practices. Although the word “myth” is meant to
expose the narrative of desertification as fictional, it is more important for signaling the
religious undertones of the Arid Zone Program, and of international development
missions more generally.35 The fiction of a world community and the myth of
desertification both sought to foster the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.
Bureaucracy and Boundaries
Studies of the United Nation Organizations tend to focus on the act of creation
and debates between powerful member states. The political scientists Michael Barnett
and Martha Finnemore point out that these emphases reflect an assumption that IGOs are
merely the agents of states; therefore, the actions of UN agencies amount to the sum of
their member states’ interests.36 But UN agencies are bureaucracies, and as such develop
their own independent bureaucratic cultures and interests. Indeed, the actions of the UN
specialized agencies reflected turf battles between these organizations as much as the
Thomas and Nicholas J. Middleton, Desertification: Exploding the Myth (Chichester, UK: John Wiley &
Sons, 1994).
35
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pressures of international politics. The insights of organizational theory inform my
analysis of the UN bureaucracy, especially Daniel Carpenter’s The Forging of
Bureaucratic Autonomy, which argues that agencies can win a significant capacity for
independent action by earning a reputation for technical competence and building robust
coalitions of supporters.37 Unesco’s reputation for competence was decidedly mixed, but
there is no doubt that the agency pursued bureaucratic autonomy by engaging other
international organizations, government agencies, and influential experts in its program.
In fact, since a core internationalist objective was building the international institutional
infrastructure that would make world government possible, expanding the organization’s
mandate and capacity was, in a sense, the mission of the organization.
Conceiving of Unesco as independent actor, however, risks reification. In fact,
these were complex organizations with competing internal interests. The political
scientists Thomas Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, and Richard Jolly usefully identify three
layers of UN organizations: member states, institutionalized in the General Conference
which negotiated the program and budget; the Secretariat, composed of international civil
servants who executed the program; and consultative NGOs, advisory committees, and
international experts.38 In practice, the boundaries between these three UNs were
extremely porous. Indeed, one of my arguments is that the porosity of these boundaries
was part of an osmotic theory of reform; flows of individuals, ideas, and norms across the
37
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boundaries of the three UNs—and thus between international and national
organizations—would accelerate the integration of the international community.39
As this last point suggests, bureaucratic boundary work of the kind Thomas
Gieryn has compellingly theorized was at the center of scientific practice in the
international community.40 Since the view from above stressed the interdependency of
everything, a program that began in one functional sector—e.g., nature protection—could
easily end up with an interest in another area—e.g., soil conservation. In the functional
organization of the UN System, therefore, bureaucratic turf battles manifested as contests
over agencies’ areas of competence. For the technological strategy, the boundary between
basic and applied science was particularly important; by alternately reinforcing and
blurring this boundary, the Natural Sciences Department was able to establish its
competence in aspects of the environmental sciences that the Food and Agriculture
Organization attempted to claim as exclusively its own. More importantly, much of the
reform potential of the view from above depended on substituting ecological boundaries
for political boundaries on the map of the world. Because reserves of natural resources
crossed political boundaries and were unevenly distributed between nations, their rational
conservation and utilization required—and could facilitate—international cooperation.
Chapters Three and Four develop these points in depth.
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The most fundamental boundary work was maintaining the boundary between
science and politics, which was particularly fragile in the work of the Social Sciences
Department. Bureaucratic autonomy depended on the functional agencies’ claim to be
nonpolitical, technical organizations. Yet Unesco’s attempts to cultivate world citizens or
the Race Program (discussed in Chapter Five) made this distinction difficult to maintain.
Several scholars have analyzed episodes in the politicization of Unesco, inevitably
concluding that the organization was already political, which implies that some sort of
pure knowledge, uncorrupted by politics, was possible.41 As a historian of science, I
begin with the assumption that the boundary between science and politics is a social
construct that is always subject to renegotiation. But just because it was socially
constructed does not mean it was not “real.” This basic assumption is particularly
important in this study because the nonpolitical reputation of science was understood as a
political resource by my historical actors.
Cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolitan identity is at the center of this study in two distinct but related
ways.42 First, cosmopolitanism as an internationalist project; the cultivation of world
citizens (a literal translation of the Greek word) was a primary goal. Second, international
civil servants and experts were supposed to embody world-mindedness; working for a
UN agency, their job required them to see the world from an international perspective (or
41
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at least try to) and place loyalty to the international organization above loyalty to their
home nation. The sense that international experts exemplified the qualities that lay
citizens ought to emulate reflected the mid-twentieth century conviction (among
scientists at least) that the scientific community represented a model for a democratic
society.43
The theory of world citizenship that Unesco promoted was a classic vision of
cosmopolitanism: loyalty to the world community did not supplant loyalty to nation but
rather was the outermost ring of a concentric circle of loyalties, beginning with the
family, school, and city, and expanding to include nation and even, perhaps, one’s
religious community and ethnicity. Yet in the aftermath of two nationalist world wars,
this project did include an element of antinationalism and was explicitly antiracist.
Chapter Two (on the world citizenship movement during McCarthyism) and Chapter
Five (on an attempt to establish a university Chair of Race Relations in Rhodesia) explore
how these challenges to deeply held affiliations—and exclusive privileges—provoked
vitriolic backlashes. Ultimately, the political opportunity structures open to a postwar
intergovernmental organization included space for antiracist but not antinationalist
projects.
The cosmopolitan character of the international civil service was critical to the
theory of world community, but I am equally interested in cosmopolitanism as a lived
43
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experience, as “a way of being in the world.”44 How strongly felt were civil servants’ and
experts’ affiliation to this amorphous international community? How did national
rivalries, Cold War and Arab-Israeli tensions, for instance, affect relationships between
members of the international scientific community? What was it like to be an expert in a
completely unfamiliar country? In fact, the erratic migratory patterns of international
experts, traveling from country to country on technical assistance missions doled out
from an agency in the metropole, resembled the careers of colonial experts and
bureaucrats, and studies of imperial transnationalism inform my analysis.45
Scale
In a study of the purposeful attempt to construct a world community, the question
of scales, especially the much discussed relations of the global to the local, is
unavoidable. The intellectuals I write about grappled with this question, of course. I most
intensively explore the intellectual history of efforts to reconcile the global and the local
in Chapter Six, a study of the making of the FAO-Unesco Soil Map of the World. This
project was a critical episode in the postwar construction of a global environment in
which it became commonsense to think of global population, global health, global
hunger, global biodiversity, global forest cover, global soil erosion, and a global
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climate.46 It reveals the hard work that was required to make the world scale meaningful,
as well as the tenuous connections of the global environment to local realities.
But the relationship of the global and the local also poses a pressing
methodological problem for any transnational history. Although I do think world history
and global meta-narratives make vital contributions to historiography, my solution here
has been more modest than attempting even a global history of Unesco’s sciences
programs.47 Instead, I tell stories (nonfiction, of course) about particular projects. Some
of these stories stay within the fuzzy boundaries of the international scientific
community, which I define as the network of actors that I have reconstructed from the
historical archive. Far from representing the global, this international community was
relatively small (with many fewer members than a large town), even if geographically
dispersed. Other stories follow projects from Unesco’s headquarters into the field. They
investigate the relationship between the international community and local communities.
In particular, these stories illuminate the way competing representations of the
international community have been used in local political conflicts. International politics
structures all of these narratives, but it is mediated through the international bureaucracy
or domestic social and political tensions. This methodology results in a patchy,
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fragmented history, but it is my contention that it better reflects postmodern reality than a
comprehensive, seamless narrative arc would.
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Chapter One
The View from Everywhere
Disciplining Diversity in post-WWII International Social Science
“True,” he replied. “And for a while it achieves what one expected of it. But
freedom is really another word for subjectivity, and there comes a day when it can
no longer stand itself, despairs at some point of the possibility of being creative on
its own, and seeks protection and security in objectivity. Freedom always has a
propensity for dialectic reversal. It very quickly recognizes itself in restraint, finds
fulfillment in subordinating itself to law, rule, coercion, system—finds fulfillment
in them, but that does not mean it ceases to be freedom.”48

In the late-1940s and early-1950s, experts associated with Unesco’s Social
Sciences Department (SSD) consciously sought to create a scientific way of knowing that
would bring unity to diversity. This project depended on a novel system of international
disciplinary associations modeled on the American Social Science Research Council.
Like the SSRC, the new system idealized interdisciplinarity. The new international
associations were intended to equitably share the power of technical knowledge to
improve social welfare and to create transnational affiliations that cultivated loyalty to an
emergent world community. Social scientists also saw them as a means of determining
truth in the international community, a particularly difficult problem in the realm of
social knowledge. In the international associations, scholars would represent national
perspectives but share a common technical language. By coordinating these diverse yet
disciplined perspectives in interdisciplinary projects, the SSD hoped to produce what I
call a “view from everywhere.”

48

Adrian speaking in the grip of a migraine in Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German
Composer Adrian Leverkun as Told by a Friend, translated from the German by John E. Woods (New
York: Vintage Books, 1997 [1947]), 203.

28
In an important sense, the view from everywhere resembled the God’s-eye “view
from nowhere” that the natural sciences attempted to manufacture.49 Like the view from
nowhere, it was an impossible ideal that sought to transcend partial perspective. Yet
while detachment from particular values characterized the view from nowhere, the view
from everywhere depended on deep engagement with particular values. International
social science was, and was intended to be, value laden. And while the view from
nowhere promoted a universal scientific perspective, the view from everywhere claimed
to represent diverse national points-of-view. It was, after all, embedded in an
international political order that idealized inclusive representation. As Lorraine Daston
and Peter Galison point out, objectivity is always defined in contradistinction to the
problem of subjectivity.50 But in this strategy, the challenge of multiple subjectivities was
an opportunity to achieve a more perfect objectivity. Coordinating the view from
everywhere was an attempt to operationalize the core value of the advocates of world
community: unity in diversity.51
Soliciting diverse perspectives proved easier than synthesizing them into a unity.
As agents of the international community, the experts and civil servants who worked for
intergovernmental organizations aspired to represent an international perspective, but
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each was still a product of a particular cultural pattern. Coordinating the view from
everywhere was thus a demanding practice. As much as transnational institutions, it
demanded mature, humble, world-minded personalities. The SSD’s goal of cultivating an
international community of cosmopolitan social scientists was a version of the midtwentieth-century conviction that the rational scientist was an exemplar of the democratic
citizen and that the scientific community manifested in microcosm the appropriate norms
of a democratic polity.52 Yet before scientists could offer themselves as models for world
citizens, they had to shed their own nationalist blinders. Guided by the burgeoning field
of human relations, internationalist social scientists attempted to manage the tension
between diversity and unity through “action-research” in group dynamics that
simultaneously discovered and produced the conditions in which cooperative interpersonal relations thrived. In this therapeutic approach to social reform, intersubjective
acuity was as important as statistical acumen; objectivity merged with empathy.53
Unesco’s reliance on the tools of social psychology to construct (as the agency’s
constitution put it) “the defences of peace” in “the minds of men” was an international
example of what Ellen Herman has described as the infusion of psychological rationality
into the political culture of the postwar United States—the ascendance of the “therapeutic
state.”54 Whether they were political scientists like Walter Sharp, sociologists like Stein
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Rokkan, or self-identified social psychologists like Otto Klineberg, most of the key
figures in the internationalization of social science shared the common mid-century
enthusiasm for the theories and practices of social psychology. In fact, the SSD’s early
program reflected the agenda of the U.S. Society for the Psychological Study of Social
Issues more than the SSRC. But social psychology was a cannibalistic discipline best
understood broadly. Culture and personality research; survey research, community
studies and opinion polling; psychiatry; the avant-garde of political science and public
administration—all of these fields interacted to produce social psychology.55
The notion of a “therapeutic state” can carry antidemocratic connotations, and by
the mid-1950s, the sort of interdisciplinary social psychology promoted by Unesco was
likely to be classified under the behavioral sciences or incorporated into modernization
theory, fields that have earned invidious reputations as quintessential Cold War social
sciences. But as the historian David Engerman has observed, experts also deployed these
forms of social knowledge in attempts to soften America’s overwhelming military and
economic power.56 Although featuring many of the same characters, this story of
American social scientists’ attempts to intervene in the development of the international
community is very different from the standard narrative that describes them as servants of
55
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American power. The project to construct a view from everywhere may not have
appealed to U.S. foreign policy elites as much as the reductive universalism of the
“mandarins of the future,” but it certainly engaged the imaginations of many of the
generation’s best and brightest.57 U.S. social scientists who participated in Unesco’s
program in the late 1940s and early 1950s often intended to remake the world in an
American image; but they were convinced, like their overseas colleagues, that a healthy
world community also depended on reforming American culture.
For the architects of the postwar international bureaucracy, European empires
provided a similarly ambiguous model. As Mark Mazower has shown, leading
internationalist intellectuals such as Jan Smuts and Alfred Zimmern not only drew moral
inspiration from the ideals of British imperialism, but also viewed first the League of
Nations and then the UN as a vital complement to colonial order and the
commonwealth.58 Elites from countries that had experienced colonial rule and liberal
American internationalists, however, tended to define the new international system in
contradistinction to empire. At its founding, the UN System appeared designed to
preserve the imperial status quo, yet surprisingly quickly it became a catalyst of
decolonization. In an important sense, however, decolonization only deepened the
relevance of the imperial model; under the guise of development, the UN specialized
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agencies took over the colonial civilizing mission. The shift from European
reconstruction and reconciliation to developing the new nations of what would become
the Third World fit awkwardly with Unesco’s mission to build the defenses of peace in
the minds of men. But the change in geographic focus also added urgency to the pursuit
of the view from everywhere; the liberal democratic ideology of international institutions
required incorporating the perspectives of non-Western nations. For the SSD, producing
unity out of this diversity provided a daunting but potentially productive challenge to the
universality of science itself.
Unesco had the dubious reputation of being the most idealistic organization in the
UN System. In the sixty-odd years since it was founded, the world has failed to conform
to the organization’s ideals, but the pursuit of these ideals shaped the international
scientific community. This paper begins by describing the creation of a network of
international associations designed to reform European social science and integrate the
North Atlantic intellectual community. Next, it explores the shift to internationalization
as a component of technical assistance to underdeveloped nations and the tensions this
generated between the twin commitments to unity and diversity. Finally, it analyzes the
practice of action-research to reveal the cultural values and personality traits international
organizations were supposed to cultivate. For the experts and civil servants who engaged
in Unesco’s program in the postwar period, overcoming the world crises of the twentieth
century required a new way of knowing grounded in new institutions. Their attempt to
discipline diversity in order to provide the objective knowledge necessary for an
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integrated world community illuminates tensions inherent in the mobilization of science
for social and political reform.
Institutionalizing North Atlantic Social Science
When the United Nations was founded, the inequitable international distribution
of power was the most obvious obstacle to democratic world government. The postwar
cohort of internationalists believed that the anarchic disorganization of the young world
society led to war. In the final analysis, peaceful progress only could be achieved through
a world state. In the short term, however, the potential of a world state was a threat more
than a goal. The Soviet Union’s explicit objective was world communism, but for many
internationalists, including Americans, the combination of U.S. military and economic
strength, ignorance of foreign cultures, and immaturity in international affairs constituted
a more realistic threat than international communism.59 The fight of the “free world”
against fascism helped legitimate the American federal system of liberal democracy as a
model for a future world polity. Yet because the United States was the only major power
to emerge materially stronger from World War II, it threatened to fill a global power
vacuum. The concentration of political and economic power in the United States was
paralleled in the intellectual sphere, where the influx of European refugee intellectuals,
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the sheer scale of the university system, and unmatched financial resources threatened to
turn scientific internationalization into Americanization. The United States thus presented
internationalists with a paradox: it was at once a model for the international community
and a threat to it. The view from everywhere was, in part, a result of social scientists’
confrontation with this paradox.
Despite the risk of Americanization, and in order to mitigate it, the hard work of a
relatively small number of elite American and European social scientists both inside and
allied with the SSD produced a system of international associations that institutionalized
the United State’s disciplinary structure on an international scale. Given the practical
obstacles they encountered, this was quite an accomplishment. Budgets were always
tight. States and publics were reluctant to waste money on intercontinental travel to
conferences on, as Graham Greene parodied them, “The Intellectual and the Hydrogen
Bomb.”60 Moreover, social scientists started from a much weaker institutional base than
natural scientists—there were few international unions to reconstitute. Most importantly,
there was no international social science to organize. National traditions, where they
existed, rarely conformed to disciplinary norms across national boundaries. Social
science as a collection of discrete yet interdependent disciplines was an American
invention, although one that Europeans had profoundly influenced. Outside the United
States, the number of professionally employed social scientists in a given field usually
could be counted without resorting to one’s toes. For internationalist social scientists,
these impediments only reinforced the need for international institutions; social science’s
provinciality, its lag behind natural science and technological development, prevented
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experts from guiding the adjustment of cultural values and social structures to the new
realities of a global industrial society.
Social scientists were typical of the era in their enthusiasm for creating
international organizations. In the first few postwar years, a bewildering number of
specialized agencies affiliated with the UN through formal agreements both with the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and with each other: the International Labor
Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health
Organization (WHO), Unesco, Economic Commissions for Europe, Asia and the Far
East, and Latin America (ECE, ECAFE, ECLA), International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), World
Meteorological Organization (WMO), International Refugee Organization (IRO), and
Universal Postal Union (UPU). Many of these agencies had precedents (e.g. for Unesco,
the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation) or were survivors (e.g. the ILO)
from the interwar period or even earlier (e.g. the ITU). In addition, an assortment of
reconstruction and regional IGOs and a bumper crop of INGOs joined the expanding
international sphere.61 Internationalists hoped this new system would prove to be the
embryo of an effective international government; internationalist social scientists
believed this international government would require internationally produced social
knowledge.
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Unfortunately, the proliferation of new international organizations threatened to
turn the international community into an illegible alphabet soup of acronyms, thus
making a mockery of the dream of transforming the anarchic wilderness of states into an
efficient world community. In 1947, American political scientist Walter Sharp expressed
the anxiety of many experts over the “perfect ‘rash’ of meetings” (3,000 annually for the
strictly U.N. organizations alone) that swamped international civil servants and experts.
“What has been happening, from the institutional point-of-view,” Sharp wrote, “is a
largely unsystematic sprouting of machinery, multi-level and highly complicated as to
structure. While this may be taken as an indication of vigorous initiative in an effort to reorganize the shattered war-torn world on some sort of cooperative basis, the loose and
decentralized character of the emerging ‘system’ inevitably produces ‘wheels within
wheels.’” Many experts, including U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie, called for a
moratorium on new international agencies.62
Unesco was the most energetic catalyst of new international organizations. Public
administration expert Charles Ascher quoted a member of the Arts and Letters staff: “We
looked over the international field in the arts and saw that there was a gap—no
international organization in the theatre; so we decided that there ought to be one.”63 In
1947, Unesco had already granted consultative status to sixty-nine INGOs and thirty
organizations performed contract work. By 1954, 125 organizations had consultative
status with Unesco, fifty-eight contracts were signed, and Unesco was represented at 130
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meetings convened by INGOs. In 1950, the Secretariat bragged that not even the
Economic and Social Council, let alone other specialized agencies, had as many INGO
affiliates.64 The logic worked like this: Unesco would set up INGOs in the areas of
education, science, and culture that would then provide Unesco expert advice and to
which the Organization would contract out much of its program. Outsourcing research to
INGOs was particularly important to the SSD because it was difficult for an IGO to assert
anything significant about society without alienating some member state.
In addition, the new INGOs intrinsically accomplished one of Unesco’s chief
missions, creating transnational communities. In the words of Director-General Jaime
Torres Bodet, “The development of this world network of institutions and associations
specializing in the various branches of intellectual co-operation is, for Unesco, both an
end and a means.”65 For the intellectuals engaged in the transnational associations, the
institutional development of Unesco also was both an end and a means. Experts moved
between IGOs, INGOs, universities, foundations, state bureaucracies, and semigovernmental organizations. The boundaries between institutional types in the
international sphere were porous.66 Indeed, a sort of osmotic theory of reform was one
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way international organizations promised to spread norms appropriate for a world
community.
At Unesco, the natural sciences provided the organizational model for
international cooperation. For the first Director of the Natural Science Department, the
British Biochemist Joseph Needham, renewing and expanding the network of
international scientific unions disrupted by the war was certainly an end in itself.
Needham had spent the war years directing the Sino-British Science Co-operation Office
in Chongqing, and joined Unesco in large part to help strengthen science in “the
periphery.” During his brief tenure, Unesco became the sole patron of the reconstituted
International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU—pronounced ick-sue), which set a
precedent by taking offices at Unesco House on Avenue Kléber in Paris. ICSU, founded
in 1919 as the International Research Council, was a federation of international scientific
unions, which were in turn a federation of national associations.67 Needham not only
advocated Unesco sponsorship of the ICSU, he also coordinated the formation of new
unions. In a typical move, he advised scientists organizing an International Society for
Cell Biology to affiliate through the ICSU’s International Union of Biological Sciences,
which it ultimately did since “U.N.E.S.C.O. [had] undertaken to provide certain financial
and other facilities…to those international societies which are affiliated to [ICSU].”68 In
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the ideal model, in return for its subventions, Unesco would request research from ICSU,
which would farm out the work through the proper disciplinary unions, which in turn
would draw on their national member associations. The metaphor that guided the
reconstitution of ICSU was the gear works of a clock, not Sharp’s “wheels within
wheels.”
Both the Cultural Activities Department and the SSD followed the Natural
Sciences’ lead. In 1947, the General Conference resolved to “encourage” setting up an
International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies “similar to the International
Council of Scientific Unions,” and the ICPHS was incorporated in Brussels in 1949 as a
federation of six international scholarly organizations.69 Social scientists, ever conscious
of insidious lags, were eager to catch up to both the natural sciences and humanities in
international organization. They did not even have disciplinary association to federate. 70
The SSD itself suffered from disorganization due to lack of steady leadership until 1950
when the dynamic Swede Alva Myrdal (Gunnar’s wife) moved from the UN’s Economic
and Social Council in New York to Paris to take over the department. Still, with its
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administration handled by a rotating series of American academics on leave, the SSD set
about “stimulating” the creation of the missing international associations. By the end of
1949, the IEA (International Economic Association), ISA (Sociology), IPSA (Political
Science), and ICLA (Comparative Law) had joined the alphabet soup under Unesco
auspices, and each was provided a $3,000 annual subvention.71 In October 1952, the
International Union of Scientific Psychology joined these four associations to convene
the Provisional International Social Science Council (ISSC), which ideally would
collaborate closely with the Humanities Council “since it is impossible to draw a strict
borderline between the Social and Humanistic Sciences.”72 Like the International Council
of Scientific Unions, the ISSC was given an office in Unesco House. This new
institutional structure was the framework on which the view from everywhere would be
constructed.
It was a fragile framework. The first issue of Unesco’s International Social
Science Bulletin identified the major weakness (one the associations and the journal itself
were meant to ameliorate): “It rapidly became evident that the very expression ‘social
science’ meant widely different things in different countries or, if [social science
disciplines] did exist, had significance and content totally different from that attributed to
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them elsewhere.”73 For many European intellectuals, the “social sciences” belonged with
the humanities, and social knowledge should not be arbitrarily divided between, for
example, politics and economics. Furthermore, Americans’ obsession with empirical
validity merely resulted in the pointless accumulation of data.74 Nevertheless, Unesco
institutionalized the social sciences as a separate department following an American
vision of social science that looked to the natural sciences as an epistemological and
institutional model.
The frenetic founding of international associations also institutionalized the
disciplinary structure of U.S. social science in the international community. The
International Comparative Law Association acknowledged the Latin emphasis on juristic
studies rather than the American notion of political science, but the ISSC was modeled on
the American Social Science Research Council (SSRC). In the SSRC social knowledge
was differentiated into specialties that corresponded to university departments, but then
the disciplines were integrated through interdisciplinary research projects. The goal was
to produce empirically validated useful knowledge that enhanced methodological and
theoretical sophistication. The influence of American social scientists is nicely
symbolized by the first presidents of the ISA, IPSA, and IEA: friends and colleagues at
the University of Chicago Louis Wirth (sociology) and Quincy Wright (political science),
and Gottfried Haberler of Harvard (economics). That Wirth was born in Germany and
Haberler a native Austrian is equally illustrative. One reason American social science
was acceptable as a transatlantic standard was that its development had been decisively
73
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shaped by Europeans, particularly Germans whose continental influence before Nazism
also had been profound.
Indeed, some European social scientists enthusiastically endorsed American
social scientific norms. A memo speculating on the possibility of an international
conference on the “role of scientists in world affairs” expressed a commonplace of the
SSD: “In Europe the social scientists have a tradition very different from the one in the
[United] States. More than is generally realized, they have to be convinced of the
possibility of really using the social sciences as a tool.”75 This was written by a Dutch
sociologist. After spending much of the 1930s and the war in the States, many European
scholars embraced an American social science that they had helped create.76 Max
Horkheimer, back in Germany after having relocated the Frankfurt Institute in New York
and California during Nazi rule, hoped the SSD could “dispel part of the emotional
clouds, which in Europe usually surround social and political problems,” and asserted
that the “keen insight into the life-processes of modern society” necessary for democracy
“can be fomented only, if sociology becomes in Europe, what it has become in America
for a long time: the substantial part of every curriculum of higher learning, particularly at
the universities.” Social scientists tended to agree on the differences between American
and European social science, but nationality did not determine which style one preferred.
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Adopting an American institutional model for social science appealed to an influential
subset of European intellectuals.77
For the most part, however, it was not Europeans who initiated the formation of
the international associations—it was Americans with their ardent faith in voluntary
groups. A letter from sociologist Robert C. Angell, on leave from the University of
Michigan to head the SSD’s Tensions Project, to the President of the SSRC, Pendleton
Herring, sheds light on the dilemma this posed. The SSRC was the official liaison to the
SSD; it was charged with referring American experts to Unesco, coordinating SSD
activities in the U.S., and providing advice to the SSD. Angell wrote to “Pen” about his
Unesco colleague Otto Klineberg’s efforts to stimulate an international association for
social psychology—a key postwar objective of the U.S. Society for the Psychological
Study of Social Issues, of which Klineberg was a past-president:
There are already three organizations that are pretty close to this one in their
interests... Furthermore, social psychologists are very heavily concentrated in the
United States to the point that an international organization would be made up of,
perhaps, three-fourths Americans. Finally, the pattern of Unesco-sponsored
international groups is a federal one, and to date international organizations [sic.—
must mean national organizations] in the field of social psychology are almost nonexistent. Otto has agreed to talk this matter over further with social psychologists at
home, but I thought you might like to consider it in a broader perspective.78
Already in 1949, concern was shifting from an absence of international associations to
redundancy, U.S. dominance, and an international sphere in danger of collapsing due to a
void at the national level. That Angell appealed to Herring at the SSRC to mediate this
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dilemma underscores the problem; in the ideal organizational chart of the international
bureaucracy, the SSRC ranked below the SSD. But in reality, the SSRC was far better
established and connected—to universities, foundations, and the U.S. government.79
What most dramatically differentiated American social science was not its
constantly invoked empiricism (which was also seen as a British characteristic) or its
instrumentality, but its institutional success. An International Sociological Association
evaluation described Unesco’s role as accelerating the institutionalization of the social
sciences, a process most advanced in the United States with the “greater nations” of
Europe lagging behind and essentially non-existent elsewhere.80 The structure of
American social science was less a product of the rational organization of knowledge
than a result of the startling expansion of American higher education. In 1950, the United
States was home to 1,800 colleges and universities with 2.6 million students. Despite its
own postwar student boom, Great Britain had 85,000 students in 18 universities. The
combined number of teaching posts in sociology, social psychology, and social
anthropology in Egypt, France, Great Britain, India, Mexico, Poland, and Sweden was
141. In the United States, a survey of the American Sociological Association revealed
that “74 percent of the 2,148 [members] whose occupation was known were teaching in
‘colleges’ or universities.” As Unesco’s survey commented, the teaching of social
sciences in the U.S. had “reached a scale beyond all comparison with that found in other
79
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countries.”81 The continuing expansion of the U.S. university system, in which
undergraduate education underwrote research careers, encouraged a degree of
specialization unmatched elsewhere.82 More than epistemological disputes, these
differences of structure and scale obstructed the internationalization of social science.
While the American academic system quantitatively out-produced the European
system, the Continental university structure effectively established intellectual stars and
academic barons.83 In a working paper for the first meeting of international associations
called to plan a survey of social science in higher education, the SSD singled out France
and Italy as falling below the “Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian” pedagogic standard. But
after pointed comments from the meeting’s chairman, French Secretary of the
International Political Science Association Jean Meynaud, this comment was expunged
from the published report. The well established scholars representing these countries
showed little inclination to copy “Anglo-Saxon” blueprints for remodeling the structures
in which they were quite comfortable.84
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Behind-the-scenes maneuvers over the nomination of delegates to the ISSC
Executive Council illuminate how social scientists tried to limit yet capitalize on
American power. The Secretary of the International Sociological Association, Norwegian
Stein Rokkan, wrote to Morris Ginsberg (London School of Economics) and George
Davy (University of Paris), the vice presidents of the ISA charged with selecting
delegates to the Council, urging them to select an American: “There can be very little
doubt that the future of the proposed International Social Science Council will depend
very much on the close co-operation with the American SSRC, the Foundations and the
active research centers and organizations in the United States.” He endorsed Arvid
Broderson who was strategically placed in New York at the New School for Social
Research and, as a former director of the SSD, already familiar with the machinery of
international social science. To make the nomination palatable, he pointed out that
Broderson, a Norwegian, could be seen as representing Scandinavia. He copied the letters
to Alva Myrdal, the Director of the SSD, noting the “embarrassing position” this
lobbying put him in and hoped she could apply more direct pressure.85 American
resources were both needed and resented by many of those participating in a putatively
“world” organization.86
Precisely because U.S. scientists already had access to a strong national
organizational apparatus tied to the big American philanthropies and universities, the
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international organizations were more important to Europeans.87 While Americans were
presidents of international associations, this was largely a ceremonial office; the more
operationally important position of secretary went to Europeans. That close to eighty
percent of participants in the International Sociological Association’s four World
Congresses in the 1950s, all held in Western Europe, were European may understate
American influence (consistently around fifteen percent of attendees) but does reflect the
general geographic bias of the international associations.88
In the late-1940s, the internationalization of social science was predominantly a
North Atlantic enterprise aimed at harmonizing American and European intellectual
traditions. As John Krige has argued in the context of postwar natural sciences,
Americans “tried to reconfigure the European scientific landscape,” but they succeeded
in enrolling “an enfeebled Europe…in a hegemonic postwar American project” because it
was “coproduced hegemony.”89 Europeans selected and adapted components of the
American social science model, a model that itself was a product of transatlantic
exchange. When the project to internationalize the social sciences followed UN technical
assistance missions outside the West, the greater cultural diversity strained the discipline
necessary to sustain the view from everywhere.
Diversity and Discipline
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In addition to the potential of American imperialism, there were the actual
European empires. Many internationalists defined the democratic political order of the
UN through opposition to empires. With the first wave of decolonization in Asia, the
advent of the UN’s Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, and the intensification of
the Cold War (which undermined hopes of ideological reconciliation and added urgency
to development programs), Unesco’s locus of reform shifted from Europe to the
“underdeveloped” nations of what soon would be labeled the Third World. The
incorporation of non-Western nations into the international social science community
posed critical but potentially enriching challenges to the viability of the view from
everywhere.
Newly independent states joined UN Organizations with alacrity because
membership signified formal political equality; the idea of the UN as the antithesis of
empire became reality. Yet while political structures underwent this radical change, the
developmental mission through which imperial powers had increasingly sought to
legitimate colonial rule became the raison d’ être of the UN specialized agencies.90 Since
economic development programs were experiments in planned social change that
inevitably confronted political, cultural and social factors, social scientists claimed that
planning depended on comprehensive social knowledge. The advance of the social
sciences in underdeveloped nations, therefore, was a prerequisite for democratic
development; without experts, how could underdeveloped countries participate in rational
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planning? To distinguish their work from imperialism, the specialized agencies devised
institutional structures that foregrounded inclusive democratic decision making. The
democratization of science was an attempt to use knowledge to share power.
The problem of assuring balanced national representation was acute. Even most
European countries did not have disciplinary organizations in the social sciences, and so
national associations and social science councils around the world “spontaneously”
formed to participate in the new system.91 Since they were intended to internationalize
knowledge production, the legitimacy of the international associations rested on their
national diversity. Organizers went to great lengths to assure balanced “geographic
distribution.” Myrdal insisted on keeping an Indian on the International Political Science
Association Executive Council despite his inability to attend meetings.92 As in the UN,
the legitimacy of the international associations rested on apparent equality of
representation even when power clearly was not equally distributed.
The main activities of the international associations were holding world
congresses, performing contract research for the SSD, developing dictionaries to define
technical terminology, and managing clearinghouse services such as compiling
bibliographies, abstracts, and international directories of experts.93 The SSD’s program in
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the internationalization of science worked closely with analogous programs in the other
departments and was broadly representative of similar activities in other specialized
agencies and major foundations. A SSD proposal to prepare “International Manuals in the
Social Sciences” described the ultimate goal of this work: “Their principal value would
be that, if widely used in universities…, they would provide future representatives and
negotiators from different countries with a common basis of facts and vocabulary,
thereby immensely facilitating international understanding and agreement.”94
International negotiation required diplomats with a common vocabulary and mutually
accepted facts and figures. For professional experts, however, the bar was far higher. The
view from everywhere required the transnational practice of a common discipline, which
depended on vibrant professional communities at the national level.
The first major research project of the international associations targeted the
structural basis of social scientific inequality: a coordinated survey of university social
science teaching in regionally representative or influential countries. These surveys
provided the data necessary to guide educational reform in social scientifically
underdeveloped countries into the “proper curricula” of the “Anglo-Saxon and
Scandinavian” countries.95 After the reports came in, twenty social scientists from eleven
countries met at Unesco to formulate “proposals for the development and improvement of
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social science teaching.” These included the “the creation of social science faculties
composed of departments each covering a distinct branch of the sciences”; the inclusion
of the social sciences in general education as part of training for citizenship;
recommendations on qualifications for professorships and diplomas; and “in view of the
importance of value judgments in the field of social sciences[,]…‘a systematic study of
value judgments and of the relations between questions of fact and questions of value
should be included in the teaching of the social sciences.’”96 The project was an ideal
type of SSD activity: the SSD coordinated the work of the international associations
which used national members to produce comprehensive, comparable surveys that led to
recommendations for a standard set of reforms. In typical social science fashion, the
reforms called for more social science. More important than the recommendations was
the act of performing the surveys. For example, by cataloging the absence of teaching
posts in social psychology in several countries, surveys reinforced the categories of a
certain form of social science—for the first time, some states now lacked social
psychologists.97
At its inception, the project was primarily concerned with European standards, but
the focus quickly shifted to the South and East. Instead of remodeling French and Italian
departmental structures, the project held a series of regional roundtables—each chaired
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by a European—in South Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. National
representatives compared their inadequate systems to the models described in the surveys
of Europe and America in order to devise recommendations to submit to their own
governments. Twenty “underdeveloped” states submitted requests for technical assistance
to modernize their teaching.98 For a department that struggled to find a vocation in the
regime of economic development, this was a welcome opportunity. The gaze of the SSD
was now fixed on the periphery; a program begun as an effort to harmonize North
Atlantic traditions and modernize Europe would be remembered twenty years later as
“implanting the social sciences” in the Third World.99
Yet, as Meynaud later reflected, the change in focus came at a cost: “The need for
ensuring a ‘balanced’ geographical representation—a need arising chiefly from the
structure and policy of the institution responsible for financing the organizations
concerned [i.e. Unesco]—has led many International Associations to admit to
membership certain national bodies as to whose scientific qualifications they can cherish
no illusions.” Because the international associations paid “less attention to problems
directly concerning the most advanced associations…[the advanced associations] have
not always perceived what practical advantage could accrue to them from the
establishment of an International Association.”100 When internationalization was scaled
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up from a transatlantic project to include Latin America, the Middle East and Asia, the
differences between North Atlantic nations became blurred; they were now identifiable as
“advanced.”
In the newly independent nations, Unesco was clearly filling the vacuum left by
the dissolution of colonial administrations, and it often drew on the same expertise. For
instance, the SSD sent Dutch sociologist A.N.J. den Hollander to Indonesia in 1950
during the violent consolidation of independence. His mission was to survey the state of
the social sciences, assess the potential for technical assistance, and inquire into
extending the international associations to the new nation. Not surprisingly, den
Hollander reported a mixture of vague enthusiasm, disorganization, overwhelming
material shortages (e.g. books), and pointed suspicion of a Dutch emissary.101 On top of
these practical challenges, it remained to be seen whether non-Western intellectuals could
be incorporated into a view from everywhere while maintaining the particular points-ofview that, in aggregate, promised a legitimately international perspective.
Efforts to internationalize disciplines were in constant tension with one of the core
values of the view from everywhere: diversity. This often was not subtle. After
participating in a seminar to train young social scientists from France, Sweden, Australia,
and India to perform comparable community studies in their native countries, social
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psychologist Adam Curle wrote to Klineberg that although the Indians “seemed to
understand the scientific points [he] was trying to make, they were in a peculiar way
twisting them out of context to fit into a mode of thought which basically derived from an
alien culture rather than from a shared scientific training.”102
From the Asian perspective, the problem could be that social science itself was a
Western idiom. In a working paper on the use of textbooks at the Delhi Roundtable on
the Teaching of Social Science, Irat Husain Zuberi, Vice-Chancellor of Rajshahi
University in East Pakistan, wrote, “The main difficulty in translation of textbooks is that
the Social Structure of countries in Asia is so different in many cases that the
assumptions of Sociologists which are based on their observation of societies in Europe
and America are not valid here.” He continued, “Concepts in Western textbooks like
‘City’, ‘Family’ etc. do not assume the same significance for Eastern students as they
would for a Social Scientist in the West.” He concluded that there was an “urgent” need
for “textbooks which are not a translation or adaptation of Western textbooks but are
conceived and written by men belonging to Asiatic socio-economic and cultural life.”103
A severe critique of the universality of social science, this argument also could support
the rationale of the view from everywhere.
The Indian delegate to a 1948 SSD meeting on Techniques for Changing Mental
Attitudes made this point explicitly. Ashfaque Hussain expressed “dissatisfaction with
Unesco” because it was, “unfortunately for itself and for the world, too much of a
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Western organization.” “The Unesco secretariat,” he continued, “consisting as it does
overwhelmingly, if not almost entirely, of Western people, is unable to take any but a
Western view of things.” But Hussain also took exception to Klineberg’s “apologetic and
disapproving reference to ‘Unesco imperialism’.” He said, “My own personal feeling is
[Unesco is] not sufficiently ‘imperialistic’; the more there was of Unesco ‘imperialism’
[the less] there would be of other imperialisms.”104 Hussain’s blunt assessment makes
clear why balanced geographic distribution became a moral and epistemological
imperative in the international community. The scientific method did not give scientists a
privileged view from nowhere; Western experts could not but express a Western
perspective.
In fact, social scientists hoped internationalization would rescue social science
just as much as internationalized social science would rescue the international
community. International social science was vital to producing valid knowledge because
it was expected to make genuine comparison possible. One of many calls for the
formation of an International Institute of the Social Sciences declared, “The comparative
method may well do for the social sciences what controlled experiment has done for the
natural sciences.” This optimism regarding the potential of comparative studies to reveal
human nature and the laws of social behavior was tempered by warnings such as Wirth’s
to the First World Congress of Sociology that the comparative methods themselves did
“violence to the [social] phenomena” by tearing them from “their peculiar historical,
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geographical, and situational contexts.”105 Despite Curle’s exasperation, he encouraged
the Indians to use their knowledge of Bengal as Bengalis to adapt psychological tests and
the categories of social surveys to fit the local cultural milieu. By cultivating an
international class of experts that could study phenomena in their native habitat and in
their own terms, social science would develop a richer repertoire of more authentic cases,
and perhaps from these develop a truly comparative method.
In the logic of the view from everywhere, an expert’s capacity to legitimately
represent a community was based in part on his or her membership in that community.
For programs coordinated by an agency that represented member states, this community
was, on first cut, defined by the nation. The UN’s federal model of international
organization coincided with and was predicated on the spread and strengthening of nation
states.106 But the degree to which states truly represented nations in the UN varied
tremendously; in important respects, IGOs may be profoundly undemocratic institutions.
Similarly, social scientists could never truly represent their national cultures. When the
concept of cultural patterns had been elaborated in the interwar period, it was
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conventional practice to note that multi-class societies (i.e., industrial nations) could not
be identified by a single cultural pattern. Indeed, access to an integrated, coherent cultural
pattern was a justification for ethnographic studies of “primitive” societies. Before the
war, these cautions were often ignored in practice, and the need for national unity in a
conflict between nations further eroded the qualifications.107 But the warnings against the
reification of national culture were on point. Did the Indians Curle trained (Bengali elites)
speak more authentically for their research subjects (low caste squatter refugees from
post-partition violence in East Pakistan) than Swedish (or, for that matter, Gujarati)
researchers could?
The pursuit of the view from everywhere outside the North Atlantic exposed the
tension between spreading a disciplined way of knowing and representing the diversity of
worldviews. Yet this very tension was what might make possible the cultivation of
experts who could represent the international community.
The Ideal of Two-Way Traffic
Ultimately, an objective view of social phenomena could be obtained only by
synthesizing the perspectives of observers molded by diverse national cultures. An
International Political Science Association statement justifying its own existence
explained that “students of politics combine fact-finding with value judgment” and
“every scholar takes his problems and guiding concepts from his own environment.” It
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continued, “Frequent contacts between political scientists of different countries would
stimulate awareness of these factors,” thus allowing scholars to “distinguish between the
analysis of verifiable facts and the formulation of value judgments.”108 Yet another
proposal for an international institute described how the process of international
collaborative research was a means of “transcending [the] disparity of cultural
perspectives.”109 An International Sociological Association report emphasized the “the
unique opportunity implied in [Unesco’s] supra-national position” to “contribute in a
decisive way…to the promotion of attitudes of international loyalty among social
scientists.”110 Whereas national patrons cultivated social scientists’ patriotic loyalties, an
international organization could develop a cadre of experts whose international loyalties
produced an intercultural perspective. This was the ideal of the view from everywhere
that the SSD strived to coordinate.
Some sense of social scientists’ commitment to the value of international
patronage can be seen in the energetic lobbying of Myrdal. On a junket in the U.S. to gain
support for the Institute, she wrote to the Director-General that she deliberately ignored
suggestions to seek foundation support. This was because of her “very strong
conviction—a kind of ‘Unesco pride’— that only if and when we are assured of
government support for the centre would the time be opportune to seek outside financial
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aid.” She reported that Margaret Mead had advised her that “inter-personal and intergroup relations” as they related to “war and peace” were the “Leitmotif of the Ford
Foundation” and support for the international institute might be possible under its new
initiative in the “behavioural sciences.” But “a gift from this Foundation…would make
the centre theirs rather than Unesco’s, and American rather than international.”111
Ironically, while the Central Intelligence Agency secretly supported the purportedly
nongovernmental Congress for Cultural Freedom and laundered funds for psychological
research through foundations, for an IGO money from the U.S. government (which
contributed over a third of the Unesco’s budget) was actually less tainted by its American
origins.112 Although Unesco’s program in the internationalization of social science could
seem like Americanization, for Myrdal and her colleagues, it was more a way of
internationalizing American resources.113
For Myrdal, the essential contrast between the American and Unesco approach
was the spirit of cooperation. In a mission report on a 1953 trip to India to “consult
governmental authorities and scientific experts” on plans to establish a research institute
on “the human and social implications of technological change,” Myrdal confronted the
problem of the overwhelming scale of U.S. initiatives. She reported that the U.S.
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government was investing $50 million and the Ford Foundation $6 million in community
development schemes, while Unesco’s entire budget for 1953 was $9 million and the
SSD’s $540,642—the American expert the SSD hired to test the waters for the new
institute worked with an $8,000 budget. This only made the proposed institute more vital
because “an international institute, providing for systematic comparisons and also for
stimulating co-operation of an international staff, would be very different from the oneway traffic of cultural influence, which remains typical of the Ford enterprise.”114 For the
SSD, technical assistance should broaden the perspective of the international
community—alter the very terms in which development was measured and influence the
attitudes of international experts—as much as provide the technological base for
economic take off.
The norm of reciprocity was promoted in Unesco’s bureaucratic culture all the
way down to the recruitment of experts for technical assistance missions. Guidelines for
selecting experts emphasized that “objective measurements can never replace personal
valuation based on observation” because “even an impressive paper record of degrees and
experience gives little data about the personal attitudes which often have as much to do
with an expert’s success as professional competence.” The ideal expert should “have
humility, patience and adaptability unrelated to specialized abilities,” and be “willing to
learn as well as teach.”115 Such considerations appear obvious, but the emphasis on
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character over expertise is far from the image of the interchangeable technical expert who
was just “expected to follow rules.”116
The SSD sought to help technical assistance experts embrace this open-minded
approach to their experience in strange lands. One of the department’s first attempts to
spread awareness of “human and social factors” affecting development was the
production of a manual, contracted to the World Federation for Mental Health, “designed
to interpret the ‘non-mechanised’ peoples to those applying the new technologies in their
midst.”117 Cultural Patterns and Technical Change, edited by Margaret Mead and one of
the SSD’s best selling publications, explained to inexperienced international experts how
“changed agricultural or industrial practices, new public health procedures, new methods
of child and maternal health care, and fundamental education, can be introduced so that
the culture will be disrupted as little as possible.” To mitigate damage to individuals’
mental health, preserve the integrity of local cultures, and increase the likelihood that
new technologies would be adopted successfully, it was “desirable to strip these technical
practices of as many extraneous cultural accretions (from the lands of origin) as
possible.” Not only should the local population participate in the planning and
implementation of projects, but every technical assistance mission ought to “consist of
members of more than two cultures” (i.e. more than the cultures of the TA experts and
the TA recipients). Representatives of a third culture could “maintain a certain
objectivity” and mediate conflicts “between, for example, Indonesian and American, or
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Burmese and Dutch, value systems—[which] may become frozen.”118 Technical
assistance here was imagined as a sort of cross-cultural therapy. It was a delicate art, with
the potential to degrade diversity but also to readjust both modern and traditional
parochial cultures to the reality of a multicultural environment.
This faith in cross-cultural collaboration was the leitmotif of Unesco. In an article
titled “Technical Assistance: A Two-Way Traffic,” in the agency’s popular journal the
Unesco Courier, American author and public intellectual Pearl S. Buck wrote, “In the
contact that is now inevitable between the peoples of Occident and Orient the greatest
change will come in the Occident. It will not be so visible, at first, as the change in the
Orient. A refrigerator is a monstrously visible thing, but the change in a man’s attitude
toward life is far more important and powerful.”119 In a report to the Director-General,
Angell expressed his hope that U.S. engagement in Unesco’s development program
would adjust American values: “If the American people could be led to see their
responsibility to the world as similar to the responsibility which certain American states
have taken toward the rest, this might produce a more constructive attitude toward the
U.S. role in the world.”120 Despite the anti-nationalist spirit of international scientific
institutions, for the American social scientists who participated in the SSD’s programs—
among the trend setters in their fields, including the quintessentially Cold War behavioral
sciences—loyalty to the United States and to the international community were
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complementary, not contradictory. Indeed, the long-standing cosmopolitan metaphor of
expanding circles of loyalty beginning with the family and, as an individual matured,
enlarging to include ever larger communities (school, neighborhood, town, state, nation
and finally, in a better future, the world community) was fundamental to internationalist
social scientists. Virtuous loyalty, therefore, demanded tempering American power with
international understanding.121
Unesco did not have a monopoly on the ideal of the two-way street. In fact, as
Nicole Sackley has shown, the experts advising the American-sponsored Indian
community development schemes that Myrdal dismissed as mere “one-way cultural
traffic” echoed many ofthe values she and Buck articulated. The SSD advised University
of Chicago anthropologist Milton Singer on his and Robert Redfield’s “Comparative
Civilizations” project, which had objectives and methods that closely resembled much of
the department’s own early program.122 And when John D. Rockefeller III visited Japan
in 1951 to advise the U.S. Department of State on cultural relations policy, he made the
“concept of the two-way street” the centerpiece of the report. He warned against cultural
“imperialism,” which “would in the long run be as unfortunate for ourselves as Japan.”123
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Indeed, as Engerman has argued, from elementary school pen pals to graduate school
area studies programs, a “cosmopolitan agenda . . . would guide American postwar
thought”.124 While more than “Unesco pride” justified Myrdal’s claim that traffic flow
was more balanced in the UN agency’s programs, what is significant here is that the ideal
was part of mainstream thinking.
The Technology of International Conferences
The Technical Assistance Department guidelines doubted that character could be
taught, but the SSD did engage in bureaucratic therapy in its International Collaboration
Project. Directed by College of the City of New York professor of government Walter
Sharp (whose alarming “Progress Report” on the specialized agencies fretted over
“wheels within wheels”), the project’s objective was to “encourage and assist the study
by social scientists in all Member States of the problems arising within their respective
scientific fields in relation to the contemporary development of positive international
collaboration.”125 Sharp was a veteran of FAO, WHO and UNRRA, so he knew well the
challenge he was taking on.126
The most important element of this project was a rather bland sounding study of
the “technique of international conferences.” In fact, it was seen as breaking ground in a
“pioneer field” that promised methodological innovation, theoretical insight, and
practical application. It required an interdisciplinary research team led by a political
scientist and social psychologist in consultation with cultural anthropologists,
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psychiatrists, jurists, and international officials to probe the “group dynamics” of “this
involved area of human relations.”127 To coordinate this ambitious study of the factors
that determined a conference’s success, Sharp tapped the resources of the emerging
international social science community. He toured Scandinavia, visited the WHO and
U.N. offices in Geneva, and stopped off in Brussels before heading to London. There, a
conversation with Dr. Elliot Jaques of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations was
particularly productive.128 Jaques suggested holding a “conference on conference
method” that “with the advice of a team of social psychologists, undertake to study
itself—as a ‘guinea pig’ situation.”129
Solipsistic as this proposal might seem, it was not an anomaly. In 1950,
psychiatrist John Rickman suggested Unesco sponsor “a conference of what happens in
the conference itself,” even at the risk that this would “wreck” the conference—and
perhaps the organization.130 The introspective stance of these proposals reflected the
conference study’s therapeutic approach to transforming the dynamics of human
relations. The study was based on the assumption that conferences represented microcultures that patterned human behavior. Transforming their environments could cultivate
more open-minded, rational personalities capable of constructive inter-personal relations.
In this theory of social reform, it was those with power who most required therapy; they
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determined whose point-of-view was represented. The action of social research was
intended to change the attitudes of both experimenters and subjects.
After these meetings with European social scientists and similar meetings in the
United States, conferences of experts in Paris and New York developed a “systematic
plan” of research. Small teams of experts would perform “action-research” in the field to
observe “in depth” the “pathology” of conferences. “Participant-observers” would
“participate freely” in the planning of conferences in order to understand each meeting
within its peculiar “life history.” They would “feed back” their findings to the conference
both to improve the chances for its success and, by changing the experimental situation,
evaluate hypotheses. At a basic science level, such studies were grounded in and could
contribute to the psychological theory of group dynamics. Pilot studies were made at
meetings of the UN Human Rights Commission, the Economic Commission for Europe,
and at the WHO General Conference.131
The research program for improving international collaboration resembled group
therapy, but for Sharp, a political scientist, this was not a retreat to psychology, but rather
an embrace of it. In a “Memorandum of instructions” to his assistant early in the project,
Sharp wrote, “In my opinion, the psychological aspect of the problem should receive
major emphasis in the proposed study.”132 Rensis Likert, Director of the University of
Michigan Institute for Social Research, traveled to Paris with plans for an intensive social
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survey of Unesco in order to improve morale and efficiency.133 Political scientist Charles
Ascher, who acted as a “participant-observer” while Executive Officer for Program,
ended his study of program making in the organization—which included descriptions of
the office layout of the Majestic, biographies of key leaders, analysis of changes in
organizational structure, and blow-by-blow summaries of Board meetings—with a plea
that only by developing the quality of “selflessness” in the agency’s leadership could it
devise a work plan that would evoke “loyalty not only within the Secretariat but
throughout the world.”134
Although particularly pronounced at Unesco, with its mandate to intervene in “the
minds of men,” the conviction that social psychology could rationalize the international
bureaucracy was widespread. Brock Chisholm, the psychiatrist Director-General of the
WHO, speculated that if the International Collaboration Project’s pilot studies of
conferences were developed into a long term research program, they “might well be
recognized by future generations as the most important research begun in this century.”
For Chisholm, the studies “demonstrated that social science participation through an
action-research approach can strengthen the more mature world-minded attitudes.”135
Representatives of the Carnegie Endowment, Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation,
and the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique were interested enough to
participate in a three day meeting to evaluate the International Collaboration Project’s
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findings.136 In fact, the SSD contributed to but did not initiate or organize the ultimate
incarnation of this mode of research/reform: a 1948 International Congress on Mental
Health in London.
The International Committee for Mental Hygiene billed the congress as the third
in a series and the occasion for the official founding of its successor organization, the
World Federation for Mental Health. The first International Conference on Mental
Hygiene had been held in Washington, D.C. in 1930 and the second in Paris in 1937, but,
like nearly all international professional associations, the International Committee for
Mental Hygiene had essentially dissolved during World War Two. The collective insanity
of the war added urgency to the Mental Hygiene Committee’s mission, however. The
third international congress counted Clement Attlee and Anthony Eden its patrons, as
well as the director-generals of the WHO, Unesco, and FAO (the inimitable Sir John
Boyd Orr). Participants constantly evoked the world historical importance of this
“experiment in the mutual understanding of human problems.”137
The intellectual mobilization for the war also provided a model for the
organization of the International Congress. To explain the most innovative aspect of the
congress, psychiatrist and member of the Tavistock Institute Jack Rees, who served as
chairman of the congress, described the “the experience some of us had had in the Armed
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Forces during the war, where the effectiveness of discussion in small groups was
convincingly demonstrated.”138 Interdisciplinary “discussion groups,” consisting of, for
example, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, teachers, pediatricians, and clergy,
met in the year preceding the international meeting to study particular aspects of the
congress’ overarching theme, “mental health and world citizenship.” The discussion
groups sent reports of their work to the organizers and participants were kept apprised of
each other’s work through nearly monthly installments of a conference Bulletin. An
interdisciplinary International Preparatory Commission comprised of leading intellectuals
(and supported by a Unesco contract) synthesized the 351 reports from discussion groups
(representing the participation of some 5,000 individuals), and this statement became the
basis for presentations at the International Congress. “Thus in the Congress,” Rees wrote
in the Preparatory Commission’s first Bulletin, “… every speaker will as far as possible
be presenting, not merely personal opinion, but the result of careful group discussion
from multiple disciplines and from many nations.”139 The elaborate organization of the
congress was designed to produce the view from everywhere.140
And, of course, the experience of participation in the discussion groups and the
congress was understood as more important than the content of the reports. A discussion
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group convener affiliated with the New York City Veterans’ Service Center reported that
his “‘test tube’ group” seemed to reflect the basic problems of people and nations.141
Indeed, some “groups found their subject matter in the analysis of their own group
dynamics and relationships, using the Commission as a research laboratory.”142 In line
with this discovery, one volume of the congress’ proceedings was dedicated to the
presentations, and one volume to the meetings “history, development and organisation.”
The International Preparatory Commission provided a foreword to its synthetic statement
that described the challenges and rewards of working across disciplinary and national
boundaries: “[International and interdisciplinary] tensions may possibly have been more
severe than in other groups, because they were engendered by strong personalities of
considerable standing in their own profession and country holding clearly differentiated
views which they were able to defend with unusual verbal facility. When once a group of
this kind arrives at a common basis upon which to work, this represents an achievement
of considerable significance.”143 The value of the labor was in direct proportion to the
intensity of the tensions worked through.
Predictably then, the International Preparatory Commission regretted that nonWestern perspectives were virtually unrepresented at the Congress, which, in fact, was
demographically dominated by British and especially American participants—1,110 and
333 attendees respectively out of a total of 2,062. Americans were even more prominent
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in the working groups leading up to the conference, with 205 out of 351 groups (Great
Britain counted 67.)144 One summary report ended by going on “record that genuine
regret was felt that our Russian friends had not come to this family meeting, at which so
many political problems were dealt with scientifically and not, as so often happens,
scientific problems dealt with politically.”145 The process of the elite social scientists in
the International Preparatory Commission was held up as a model for the other
participants, and the international cooperation manifested in the congress was celebrated
as an example for the world.
The quotations that graced the opening page of the program suggested the
ultimate objective of the International Congress on Mental Health. These were excerpts
from the constitution of the WHO, which proclaimed health “a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being” that was “fundamental to the attainment of peace
and security and…dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and states,” as
well as the oft-cited lines that the poet Archibald MacLeish had inscribed in Unesco’s
preamble, “Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the
defences of peace must be constructed.” Indeed, the World Federation for Mental Health,
which the Congress inaugurated, was established with the explicit goal of facilitating the
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work of the WHO and Unesco. The International Preparatory Commission’s statement
described the urgent need to “face the problems of better education for life with another”
in order to “avert the calamity of a third world war.” Predictably, it determined that “the
security of each rests on a two-fold allegiance, to his country and to the community of the
world.”146 The goal was to produce world citizens.
But if the fundamental assumption of the congress was that peace depended on
cultivating world citizens, it did not follow that wars began in the minds of men. In fact,
the experts criticized mental health professionals’ traditional obsession with the
“problems of individual maladjusted persons” and overemphasis on the role of parents.147
Instead, as anthropologists’ studies of diverse cultures had proven, the “political, social,
economic, legal and religious organisation of the community and specific institutions
such as the family, the school and the factory” patterned the human personality. On the
other hand, the social scientist could learn from psychiatrists that even when dealing with
“large scale social-economic political and legal problems, he is concerned with human
beings, personalities with all their hopes and fears, their urgencies and aspirations.” In his
closing remarks to the congress, the psychiatrist and chairman of the International
Preparatory Commission Lawrence Frank described this ambition as the crossfertilization of the “clinical and the statistical.”148 The point of rehearsing the rather
abstract, perhaps even banal, social theory that undergirded the conference (and with
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which social constructivist readers should feel quite comfortable) is to avoid the common
mistake of dismissing these activist intellectuals as bourgeois psychological determinists.
“Intrapsychic” determinism was precisely what the congress was organized to refute. In
fact, since the minds of men were patterned by cultural traditions and socio-economic
structures, building the defenses of peace in them required targeting specific social
institutions for reform.
In one of many breathless pronouncements at the International Congress on
Mental Health, Frank compared the “new dynamic theory of man-society” to the
revolutionary development of quantum mechanics in physics, and warned that its
potential power was “no less significant or difficult to use wisely than nuclear energy.”149
Instead of radioactive atoms, however, the reaction that would produce a world
community called for a critical mass of world citizens. Reaching this critical mass,
another member of the International Preparatory Commission reported, depended on the
ability of cosmopolitan intellectuals—the avant-garde of world community—to arouse “a
new sense of responsibility for mental health considerations on the part of many others,
e.g. architects, policemen, plumbers, income-tax officials.”150 This was the promise of
action-research: to turn civilians into citizen-scientists; to inspire everyone to pursue the
view from everywhere.

149

“Remarks by Lawrence K. Frank,” 21 Aug. 1948, 613.86 A 06(41-4) “48”, International Congress on
Mental Health, London August 1948, Unesco.
150
J. C. Flugel, 21 Aug. 1948, 613.86 A 06(41-4) “48”, International Congress on Mental Health, London
August 1948, Unesco.

74
Conclusion
If the UN Organizations were the institutional embryo of a liberal democratic
world polity, there was little doubt that the gestation would be measured in human
generations. The task of international experts was to build the circulatory system that
would enable the threatened UN embryo to grow: power and knowledge would flow
through arteries and veins that connected UN Organizations to capillary networks within
nations to nurture the world community, the only environment in which an international
government could thrive. The impossibility of the metaphor—an embryo feeding its
womb—is apt. But this is the central problem of institutionally based social reform: to
create an institution that functions in a world it is meant to transform.
INGOs were both a means and an end because they were a way to provide the
world community with an international perspective from which to determine goals and
evaluate policy options. At the same time, they fostered cosmopolitan intellectuals whose
identification with a transnational group superimposed loyalty to the international
community on national loyalties. The federal model of the international associations
mimicked and emerged out of the liberal democratic political structures of the UN. It was
justified by the conviction that representative government required representative
knowledge production.
With the rise of development as the overriding mission of the specialized
agencies, the SSD’s program in international collaboration morphed from a project aimed
at harmonizing North Atlantic cultural relations to developing the social sciences in the
Third World. Because the normative ethos of technical assistance was tutoring
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underdeveloped countries in order to accelerate their evolution into industrialized
nations—the one-way traffic Myrdal complained of—it is easy to miss the essential point
of how much of the flurry of postwar international organizing was designed to manage
the problem of power, particularly American hegemony, in a democratic world order.
American resources and initiative fueled the institutionalization of the social sciences, but
Europeans guided its progress. And almost as soon as they were formed, transnational
associations followed the economic development missions of the specialized agencies
into the Third World. The rationale was to share the power of knowledge production in
order to avoid a prejudiced imperial perspective.
According to this epistemological imperative, truth emerged from the process of
international collaboration. Unesco’s function was to coordinate the perspectives of
intellectuals who represented national cultures in order to construct a synoptic view of the
world community, and thus provide the knowledge necessary to integrate diversity in an
interdependent world. Coordinating the view from everywhere was a demanding practice,
especially since representatives of the international community were also products of
their own national cultures. Social scientists were keenly aware of this dilemma. They
believed the success of institutions depended on the personalities who carried out their
functions. Unesco policy emphasized the character of international experts, and the SSD
performed action-research to enhance their inter-subjective faculties. Only diplomats who
negotiated in good faith and civil servants who worked with integrity could collaborate
productively. Only experts capable of intercultural collaboration were in a position to
provide the knowledge on which a world community depended.
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In this mode of research, the boundary between participant and observer was
intentionally blurred, and the experiment was group therapy as a form of social reform.
Researchers hoped to cultivate new values appropriate for a world community through
the experience of international collaboration. In the absence of a mature world
community, no individual could see the view from everywhere; it emerged only out of
cooperative interpersonal relations. This vision may appear quaintly myopic given the
power of factors external to IGOs to determine an organization’s success. But the work
was performed by experts who believed in the potential of international cooperation; to
assume the experiment’s inefficacy was to assume the failure of the United Nations.
Objectivity is always a matter of degrees. Just because it, like world peace, was an
impossible ideal, does not mean it was not worth pursuing. The pursuit was half the point.
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Chapter Two
Behind the Burlap Curtain
The Social Psychological Treatment of International Tensions
“It would seem that common sense and reason ought to find a way to reach agreement in
every conflict of honest interests. I myself think it our bounden duty to believe in such
international rationality as possible.” William James, The Moral Equivalent of War
A decade into the global economic depression and on the brink of the century’s
second total war, the bulletin of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
published the findings of a critical experiment into the fundamental causes of violence
and social cohesion. In “Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created
‘Social Climates,’” the German Jewish émigré psychologist Kurt Lewin and two
American colleagues organized “clubs” of ten year-old boys that engaged in crafting
activities under three different “philosophies of leadership:” authoritarian, democratic and
laissez-faire. Under authoritarianism, the adult club leader determined all matters of
policy, dictated each step of an activity one at a time so that the “future always remained
uncertain,” and personalized all praise or criticism. In contrast, the democratic club
decided all policy—including a “group goal” and teammates—through discussion and
together sketched the steps necessary to achieve their objective. The democratic adult
leader participated as “a regular group member in spirit” and tried to be “‘objective’ or
‘fact-minded’” in praise and criticism. Finally, the laissez-faire social climate was
essentially leaderless; the boys were simply given crafting supplies and left to their own
devices. To extract data from the experimental situation, the scientists set up field posts
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“behind a low burlap wall in a darkly shaded area” where they “seemed ‘not to exist at
all’ as far as the children and leaders were concerned.”151
From behind the burlap curtain, the scientists observed the “total behavior of the
group.” Their findings reflected the fact that the experiment was performed at a moment
of crisis for both socialism and liberalism, which had been discredited by Stalin’s
atrocities and the collapse of free market capitalism. The social psychologists, therefore,
defined democracy in opposition to the threat of totalitarianism, but also to the bankrupt
ideology of laissez-faire. Four out of five authoritarian clubs experienced extremely low
incidence of aggression with the fifth quite high, while four democratic clubs scored at a
mid-range between two wildly aggressive laissez-faire clubs and the “apathetic”
autocracies. The researchers succeeded in provoking two “wars” (mostly paper ball
artillery battles) between clubs. Their interpretation showed that autocracies were
bimodal, either hyper-aggressive or apathetic; laissez-faire groups were chaotic and
unproductive; and democracies experienced a healthy level of aggression, which
prevented the repression that led to violence or apathy in autocracy, and the fullest
creative productivity. Crouching behind the burlap curtain, the experimenters occupied a
position that was both detached from and a part of the social field they sought to
understand and adjust.152
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The implications of the experiment were profound. The determinate factors that
patterned aggressive behavior were: tension, restricted space of free movement, rigidity
of group structure, and style of living (culture). While the authors cautioned, “one must
be careful of making too hasty generalization, perhaps especially in the field of political
science,” “it would be wrong to minimize the possibility of generalization” because
“what happens depends by and large upon [the situational] pattern and is largely although
not completely independent of the absolute size of the field.”153
The problems with conflating paper ball fights between ten year old boys and
total wars between nations are manifold, of course.154 Indeed, one of the major objectives
of this chapter is to show how interactions and disjunctures between metropolitan,
national, and international scales changed the means and ends of international
cooperation. The chapter begins by analyzing aspects of the Unesco Social Sciences
Department’s Tensions Affecting International Understanding project and the Education
Department’s Education for International Understanding program in order to reveal the
theory and practice—or, more precisely, the theory of practice—that guided “education
for world citizenship” in the international community. Then it surveys the enthusiastic
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participation in and vitriolic reaction against Unesco in the United States. Finally, it
focuses on a particularly significant controversy over a “Unesco program” in the Los
Angeles School District. Lewin’s “determinate factors” only become meaningful with
concrete historical analysis of conflicts at well defined scales.
But whatever its success in revealing the determinants of intergroup violence and
productive solidarity, “Patterns of Aggressive Behavior” does illuminate the theory and
practice of the reformist social scientists affiliated with Unesco. For one thing, it would
be wrong to diagnose Lewin et al. as suffering from a severe case of naiveté. Lewin left
Germany in 1933 at his first opportunity despite a veteran’s exemption from the antiSemitic Law to Restore the Professional Civil Service, warning a colleague that the
“deprivation of Jews’ rights…[would] doubtless be carried through to the end in the
schematically thorough manner of the Germans.”155 Similarly, postwar internationalists
were not ignorant of modern civilization’s potential for evil. As much as an expression of
technocratic confidence inflated by social scientists’ contributions to winning the war, the
social reformers’ designs for a world community united by its diversity responded to the
traumas of fire bombs and food shortages, racial genocide and the possibility of atomic
holocaust.
Instead of naiveté, Lewin’s experiment and postwar theories of world community
should be read as what they clearly were: passionate arguments in defense of democracy.
As the University of Chicago political scientist Quincy Wright wrote in another seminal
study of the causes of violence, the 1942 tome A Study of War, “Fictions, while necessary
in the natural sciences, are the essence of the social sciences. The social scientist must
155

Quoted in Ash, “Cultural Contexts,” 201.

81
create a structure of assumptions and use a language which is at the same time symbolic
and emotive. Unless he can establish his assumptions by successful propaganda, it is
hardly worthwhile to make hypotheses or to investigate their validity.”156 Early in the
Cold War, self-consciously hard realists routinely accused soft idealists of “wishful
thinking.” Wright’s frank observation implies that this condescending dismissal was as
much a rhetorical device designed to establish assumptions about the power-maximizing
behavior of nations as were internationalists’ appeals to recognize the reality of One
World. Still, a conviction that “the basic defect in the structure of the world before World
War II was the lack of consciousness in the minds of individuals that they were related to
the world-community,” as Wright put it, could make social scientists’ primary objective
persuading the public to believe in the fiction of a world community.157
“Patterns of Aggressive Behavior” also suggests the importance of education in
the campaign to build a democratic world community.158 As a microcosm of society, the
classroom was a training ground for the democratic way of life. It was the critical place
social institutions could intervene in the development of human personalities in order to
produce mature, world-minded citizens. A democratic education was not a matter of
indoctrinating students in a particular ideology; in fact, it mattered little what students
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were taught. Lewin’s clubs produced democratic societies—and, therefore, citizens—
while making masks and paper airplanes. What was important was the democratic
process through which the clubs decided on a “group goal” and accomplished it. Indeed,
the group was the goal.159
Underlying this faith in education was a conviction that human nature was plastic;
that is, that environment determined personality. This presented reasons for optimism
against the fatalism that humans were naturally aggressive and selfish creatures, as
assumed by realist political scientists and liberal economists respectively. But it
demanded vigorous action since impressionable youth easily could be stamped with
authoritarian personalities.160

159

Yaron Ezrahi usefully constructs a three-part typology of the political resources science and technology
provide in a liberal-democratic polity where freedom is a core value. First, the classical liberal model of
freedom itself as the principle of order: science demonstrates the self-organizing quality of nature and
society, thus legitimating individual self-interest as the basis of the common good. Second, the notion of
enlightened cooperation between citizens who have learned to behave rationally: science provides the rules
which guide the actions of informed individuals in the interest of the common good. Third, an enlightened,
centralized power maintains the freedom of the masses: an expert few use the truths derived from scientific
inquiry to assure that society maximizes the common good. The postwar social scientists who sought to
observe and adjust society from behind the burlap curtain can best be characterized as rejecting classical
liberalism and nervously straddling the second and third categories. Yaron Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus:
Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1990), 19-21.
160
For a comprehensive intellectual history of American social science’s engagement with this problematic
in a Cold War context, see Jamie Cohen-Cole, “The Creative American: Cold War Salons, Social Science,
and the Cure for Modern Society,” Isis 100 (June 2009), 219-262. On psychology in U.S. political culture
more generally, see Ellen Herman, The Romance of American Psychology (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1995). For the interwar period, Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Mark C. Smith, Science in the Crucible: The American
Debate Over Objectivity and Purpose, 1918-1941 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994). On the effect of
the war, see especially, James H. Capshew, Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and
Professional Identity in America, 1929-1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Postwar
studies of authoritarianism were particularly significant. Cf. T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel
J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950).
Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, eds., Studies in the Scope and Method of “The Authoritarian
Personality (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1954); Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1954); Fillmore H. Sanford, Authoritarianism and Leadership: A Study of the
Follower’s Orientation to Authority (Philadelphia: Stephenson-Brothers,1950); Harold W. Metz and
Charles A. Thomson, Authoritarianism and the Individual (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution,1950);

83
For this cohort of internationalists, a functioning world community required not
just world-minded international civil servants, but a world-minded public loyal to the
institutions and symbols of a world government. Indeed, Unesco billed itself as the
people’s UN agency. In a message to the first World Congresses of Sociology and
Political Science, Director-General Torres Bodet declared, “We are the bridge between
learning and the peoples of the world.”161 The knowledge that crossed this bridge was
intended to construct and shape world public opinion, to adjust the values and expand the
group identity of individuals to encompass an emerging world community; in short, to
create world citizens. Just as loyalty to a nation state was built upon prior loyalties—first
to the family, then to the school and local community, ethnic and religious groups—so
loyalty to the world community would be founded upon loyalty to the nation. The
cosmopolitan citizens of a world community had to see even local issues from a global
perspective. Creating a world community required extending the view from everywhere
from an epistemological strategy for elite experts to a popular sensibility.
Pursuing this mission revealed a fundamental tension between Unesco’s
organizational structure and its mission. It was an international governmental
organization that represented nation states, yet was devoted to transcending nationalism.
In McCarthy era debates over U.S. participation in Unesco’s program, this tension was
expressed in terms of the Cold War, but fundamentally was about conflicts over the
proper role of the U.S. government and over what it meant to be an American. These
Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties: A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks its
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domestic battles had a profound impact on Unesco. It ceased to be an organization that
sought to turn Americans into world citizens; it became an institution the United States
acted through but that did not act upon the United States. This transition corresponded to
a change in what it meant to be an engaged social scientist. The bridge between learning
and the people was pulled up as experts focused more on communicating within elite
intellectual and political circles than on engaging with popular commonsense. The ideal
of the two-way street, a key component of the view from everywhere, was badly
damaged.162
Analyzing Tensions Affecting International Understanding
In 1950, the Social Science Research Council published Bulletins 62 and 63. Each
of these Bulletins described an interdisciplinary research paradigm that promised to
contribute to social theory and engage with the critical international issues of the day.
Bulletin 62, Tensions Affecting International Understanding: A Survey of Research by
Otto Klineberg, was supported by the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace and
prepared under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council’s Committee on
Social Relations Aspects of International Tensions, the liaison Committee for Unesco’s
Tensions Project. Bulletin 63, Area Research: Theory and Practice by anthropologist
Julian H. Steward, was a product of the Committee on World Area Research.163 Although
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the tensions frame stressed trans-border connections and contradictions where area
studies trained attention on socio-cultural wholes, the same works filled the footnotes of
both texts and both foregrounded the problem of personality structures in dynamic
relationship with cultural patterns. The correspondence between Bulletins 62 and 63 was
a product of a historical moment in which Klyde Kluckhon, an anthropologist known for
his studies of Navajo witchcraft could become the director of Harvard’s Russian
Research Center. Although “significant not for their accuracy, but for their
suggestiveness,” “psycho-cultural hypotheses about political acts” were the state-of-theart in American international studies.164
The differences between the Area Studies and Tensions programs were less in
regard to theory and method than purpose and institutional support. Steward wrote,
“Whether the ultimate motivation of such research is to guide policies of the United
States or of the United Nations or whether it is to further scholarship as such is probably
an academic distinction.”165 This may have appeared a reasonable conclusion in the year
the United Nations went to war in Korea. Yet it mattered a great deal that Klineberg’s
Tensions Project was performed in the service of a UN specialized agency with the goal
of enhancing international understanding to promote world peace, whereas Steward’s
164
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area research was primarily a university-based enterprise, funded in large part by
American foundations and, although less explicitly normative, more directly responsive
to United State’s foreign policy needs. Bulletin 63, a founding text of the SSRC’s longest
running Research Committee, introduced a major chapter in twentieth century American
social science.166 The project described in Bulletin 62 represents a forgotten chapter. Here
I describe the origins of the Tensions Project before uncovering the assumptions that
guided its socio-cultural approach to international politics.
The resolution authorizing the Tensions Project at the 1947 General Conference in
Mexico City was introduced by Louise Wright, delegate of the United States and Director
of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. The project she proposed reflected the
discussions of a January 1947 World Community symposium held at the University of
Chicago, which included the leading American social scientists and was organized by her
husband Quincy.167 One of the six working papers presented at the conference was by a
future director of the Tensions Project, Robert Cooley Angell, a University of Michigan
sociologist who was both the protégé and nephew of Charles Horton Cooley, one of

166

Ken W. Worcester, Social Science Research Council, 1923-1998 (New York: Social Science Research
Council, 2001) 32 (note 52). See also Vicente L. Rafael, “The Cultures of Area Studies in the United
States,” Social Text 41 (Winter, 1994), 91-111.
167
At the symposium, participants discussed papers by Louis Wirth (who got the conference off to a
confusing start by defining “community” in terms of an ecological community that formed the base for a
“society” of shared values—the opposite terminological relationship virtually every other participant
assumed), Margaret Mead (who claimed that “unity in diversity” was a means not an end), the economist
Kenneth Boulding (who professed feeling like economics was impotent in the face of the contemporary
crisis and craving a deeper knowledge of psychology), Robert C. Angell (on the role of international
communication in a world society), the political scientist Harold D. Lasswell (on measuring and managing
world loyalty), and Professor of International Law Pitman B. Potter (who, in the course of describing the
role of world institutions needed for a world community noted the “dangerous—even absurd—ellipsis that
wars begin in the minds of men”). Other participants included Talcott Parsons, Charles Merriam, Pendleton
Herring, Hans Morgenthau, Adalai Stevenson, Karl Polyani, and Ruth Benedict. Quincy Wright, ed. The
World Community (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 262, 315.

87
social psychology’s founding fathers. The resolution instructed the Director-General “to
promote enquiries into:
1) the distinctive character of the various national cultures, ideals, and legal
systems; 2) the ideas which the people of one nation entertain of their own and of
other nations; 3) modern methods developed in education, political science,
philosophy and psychology for changing mental attitudes and for the social and
political circumstances that favour the employment of particular techniques; 4) the
influences which make for international understanding or for aggressive
nationalism; 5) population problems affecting international understanding,
including the cultural assimilation of immigrants; 6) the influence of modern
technology upon the attitudes and mutual relationships of people.168
This was a research agenda designed to help Unesco discover the means to correct what
Quincy Wright had diagnosed as “the basic defect in the structure of the world”—that is,
“the lack of consciousness in the minds of individuals that they were related to the worldcommunity.” But from the perspective of social psychology, changing minds required
changing society. A Social Sciences Department (SSD) report to the Unesco Executive
Board put it bluntly: “What is in the minds of men is largely a product of the objective
conditions…The problem of resolving tensions is obviously one that goes far beyond
education, scientific psychology, or cultural activities reaching as it does into economic,
political, technological, population and other considerations.”169
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The Tensions Project was an American initiative, but even at Wright’s symposium
scholars objected to the fiction of a world community. Most significantly, Wright’s
colleague at the University of Chicago Hans Morgenthau, the leading postwar realist
political theorist, was clearly disturbed by the discussion. In his foundational textbook
Politics among Nations, published in 1948, he agreed with the internationalists’
contention that “[t]here can be no permanent peace without a world state” and that “a
world community must antedate a world state.” But he argued that the necessary
conditions for a viable world community—an effective world public opinion that
expressed common political and moral values—were so remote as to render the idea
positively dangerous. Precisely because politics reduced to psychology, the notion that
Americans should pledge their loyalty to a world rather than a national authority was not
only silly (for what services did this authority provide?) and in practice imperialistic (for
what were international values except a claim for the universalism of a particular national
culture?) but potentially treasonous. In the context of the nascent Cold War, such a
psychological defection could destabilize the balance of power between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Indeed, in Politics among Nations Morgenthau explicitly described
realism as a reaction against the naïve idealists promoting world community at Unesco
and advocated a return to the lost art of secret diplomacy.170
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The most powerful impetus for the Tensions Project came from an organization of
intellectuals that found Morgenthau’s coldly calculated assessment of the behavior of
nations an unappealing fiction, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
(SPSSI). The SPSSI was founded in 1936 by “socially minded psychologists” to “help
get scientific knowledge into the bloodstream of applied social action by building as
many bridges as possible between theory and practice in group, community, national, and
international living.”171 In September 1945, the SPSSI sent a questionnaire to social
scientists in forty-eight countries to solicit their interest in forming an international
version of the Society. A SPSSI committee grouped suggestions for potential programs
into seven categories, which, with the exception of basic methodological research, were
isomorphic with the Tensions Project’s.172 Also in 1945, the SPSSI published Human
Nature and Enduring Peace, which offers a comprehensive guide to the assumptions
underlying the Tensions Project. By far the Society’s most successful yearbook, it was
written in a question and answer format in which an interdisciplinary all star team of
more than fifty specialists described the social psychological causes of war and peace for
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a popular audience.173 The first director of Unesco’s Tensions Project, the Princeton
psychology professor and public relations guru Handley Cantril, was president of the
SPSSI during 1947-1948. The second director was Otto Klineberg, a Columbia
University social psychologist who was a past president of the SPSSI. The point is not
that the SPSSI determined the program of the SSD, but simply that the Tensions Project
reflected the interests of a very particular set of American intellectuals. It should be
understood as part of a struggle to define the values and methods of social science, both
in the international community and within the United States.
The Tension Project’s early initiatives exemplified the view from everywhere. In
July 1948, Cantril convened a meeting of eight “wise-men” at Unesco House to issue an
authoritative “common statement” on the “influences throughout life which make for
attitudes” of national aggression.174 The consensus statement stressed the plasticity of
human nature, arguing that the treatment of international tensions should target the
institutions that patterned personalities. Peace, the wise men declared, depended on social
and economic justice, an end to colonial exploitation and minority oppression, and
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support for international social science institutes. More interesting than the content of the
statement, however, was the process through which consensus was achieved. The
impressive roster of wise men represented disciplinary and national perspectives. The
meeting began with a three hour session in which each participant shared his life history,
emphasizing the “influences he thought had determined his point of view and his
interests” and ended two weeks later with a two hour debriefing in which the experts
“bluntly and frankly” discussed “the tensions [they] had felt during [their] two weeks
together.”175 While the perceived psychodynamic demands of international,
interdisciplinary research turned collaborative social science into introspective group
therapy, it is just as significant that the final statement was issued in a press release.
Expert knowledge was intended to shape public opinion by addressing the public directly.
The “wise man” John Rickman, a British psychiatrist, acknowledged the risks of
popular engagement, warning that if the method were perfected, the experts “should be
prepared when they have formed conclusions to have them laughed at, attacked, and
ignored for a generation, for it is most unlikely that their group findings would not
uncover unwelcome truths.”176 Reaction to the Common Statement proved him right. The
British Press was particularly critical, with the Manchester Guardian titling its editorial
“A Holiday in Paris” and describing the “twelve remorseless paragraphs” as platitudinous
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pointlessness.177 The problem, as Louis Wirth explained in his opening address to the
first World Congress of Sociology, was intrinsic to social knowledge:
With social phenomena it is difficult to demonstrate the validity of the expert’s
judgment, as distinguished from common-sense judgements [sic]…Unlike the
generalizations of physical or biological science, [ideas in the social sciences] are
thus more in the realm of the sacred than the secularly, and a critique of these
sacred beliefs not infrequently is regarded as ‘dangerous thought.’178
As the experience of the SSD’s experts repeatedly demonstrated, direct engagement with
popular commonsense exposed social scientists’ lack of cultural authority. According to
social psychological theory and experience, a didactic approach to changing attitudes and
opinions would have limited efficacy.
The Tensions Projects most ambitious early research program deployed the view
from everywhere to illuminate the social, political, economic, and cultural factors that did
pattern a community’s “basic character structure.” The Community Studies project
coordinated standardized, interdisciplinary studies of a rural and an urban community in
Australia, France, India, and Sweden. The choice of both a rural and an urban community
responded to a suggestion by Louis Wirth in his influential article “Urbanism as a Way of
Life,” that such comparisons were “an indispensable prerequisite for the comprehension
and possible mastery of some of the most crucial contemporary problems of social life
177
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since it is likely to furnish one of the most revealing perspectives for the understanding of
the ongoing changes in human nature and the social order.”179 Adding intercultural
comparisons to the urban-rural comparison promised to reveal the common tensions
caused by modernization.
Intended to be a more psychologically attuned version of the Middletown and
Yankee City studies, the project engaged some of the era’s most esteemed social scientists
in an advisory role.180 These experts developed a handbook for training field workers in
an interdisciplinary set of techniques: interviews to collect life histories; administration
and analysis of questionnaires; use of personal (e.g. diaries) and public documents (e.g.
newspapers, censuses, tax reports); Rorschach and Thematic Apperception Tests;
creation of genealogies; and indexes of social distance.181 As much as specific
techniques, however, the training schemes emphasized the need for “sensitiveness in
meaningful observation” and “the paramount necessity of good rapport and human
consideration.” In fact, the psychologists described the tests as merely “auxiliary in
providing some sort of quasi-objective support for the interpretations of behaviour and
human relations.”182 Epitomizing the therapeutic ethos of action-research, the handbook
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instructed the field workers that interviews should be brought to a “non-traumatic or,
better still, a therapeutic close” since “one of the main features of group discussion—
whether its primary purpose be therapeutic or research—is an interpretation which will
help the group to deal with its own problems.” The investigator-therapist was required “to
tread the razor edge between essential detachment and inevitable and equally essential
involvement.”183
Establishing the rapport necessary to walk this razor’s edge between detachment
and engagement proved quite tricky, however. The Australian team reported
dissimulating to gain the trust of their research subjects/patients:
It was considered inadvisable to present the aim as being that of studying the
community as a whole for the purpose of understanding the tensions leading to war.
Stated so broadly, the aim would appear so unusual in the context of the normal
world and life goals of the community as to create the suspicion that the actual aims
of the research workers must be more mundane, and they were disguised in this
curious phraseology because they were against the interests of the community, e.g.
to assist the taxation authorities.184
The researchers’ assumed commonsense would not comprehend their psycho-cultural
hypotheses about international tensions. But rather than opprobrium for trespassing on
sacred turf, as Wirth had warned, they worried about raising suspicions for the most
mundane of reasons—taxes. In fact, the Indian team reported that their study was delayed
by communist groups spreading a rumor that they were government agents sent to
procure the rice harvest.185 The field workers were not disguised tax collectors, but there
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was a manipulative quality to the ethos of action-research. Who wouldn’t be leery of the
figures crouching behind the burlap curtain?
The Community Studies project focused on in depth analysis of a small sample of
the world community. In contrast, another component of the Tensions Project sought to
reveal and help control international tensions by correlating thousands of superficial data
points. During the summer of 1948, the SSD contracted the newly formed World
Association of Public Opinion Research to coordinate standardized public opinion polls
in eight countries.186 For the advocates of world community, developing the capacity to
gauge world public opinion was essential because the very idea of a democratic
international authority depended upon the force of world public opinion. As Morgenthau
pointed out, without a world public opinion there was no world community to govern. A
government of the people had to be responsible to the will of the people; indeed, reliable
public opinion polls could only be performed in the Free World. Just as importantly,
public opinion would become an object of UN action. The ideal of a dialogic relationship
186
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between public opinion and state authority was reified in the “barometer.” After initial
polls established a baseline of opinion, repetition of the same questions created an
instrument that tracked changes. An objective of the Tensions Project’s international
surveys was to devise a “barometer of international tensions” that would become both an
influence on and an object of state policy.187 To assure enduring peace, pollsters argued
that the UN should devise, evaluate, and adjust mass communications campaigns as well
as social, economic and political policies in response to nation’s opinions of each other,
sense of security, and loyalty to international institutions. The international polls were as
much about creating as understanding world public opinion.
With the help of Cantril and his Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton,
American social psychologist William Buchanan finally published a synthesis of the
results of the twenty-one question survey (which allowed for roughly 16,000 correlations)
in 1953. Buchanan presented How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion as
both a methodological experiment into the extraordinarily tricky task of standardizing
opinion polls across linguistic, cultural, and political borders and also as a contribution to
understanding the role stereotypes played in international tensions. Buchanan drew on
Walter Lippmann’s definition of stereotypes as “pictures in our heads” and developed the
visual analogy to describe the purpose of the opinion surveys as discovering the “map” of
the world people carried inside their heads.188
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How Nations See Each Other reproduced international maps inside people’s heads
that resembled something out of the Middle Ages, with most of the planet white space of
little interest but occasionally occupied by mythical monsters: “The survey accentuated a
phenomenon that has frequently been remarked—the narrow limits of the individual’s
horizon.” The corollary to the fact that the pictures inside the public’s heads were mostly
empty canvases was that “national stereotypes are flexible over a period of years,” and
thus “stereotypes should not be thought of as causative, but as symptomatic.”189 In fact,
one of the key correlations the international survey attempted to draw was between
personal security—e.g. job satisfaction, social status—and positive identification with
national and international groups. Treating the causes (attitudes) instead of the symptoms
(opinions) of international tensions required targeting the social and cultural institutions
that patterned a nation’s basic personality structure, beginning with the family and
continuing through school and into industry at ever wider circles, finally extending to
international institutions.
While the social scientists who participated in Unesco’s program often played on
the lyrical appeal of the constitution’s preamble, the notion that anything began in the
mind smacked of the fatalistic belief in a fixed, aggressive human nature as opposed to
the optimistic faith in a pliable, perfectible human nature. Cultivating optimists loyal to a
world community required intervening in the intimate forces that shaped individuals’
deep values and attitudes. Social scientists did try to adjust attitudes through action-
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research, but the basic personality structures of adults were notoriously resistant.
Children, on the other hand, were susceptible to enlightenment through education, and so
the social psychological methods for treating international tensions that the SSD’s
Tensions Affecting International Understanding project researched were applied in the
Education Department’s Education for International Understanding Program.
The Education for International Understanding Program essentially consisted of a
series of seminars that exemplified the epistemological-pedagogical strategy of the view
from everywhere. The Education Department hosted the first seminar in the summer of
1947 in Sèvres just outside Paris. Unesco contracted the organization of the seminar to
the Associate Director of the Division of Education of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Howard E. Wilson. A staff of sixteen and fifty-one visiting
lecturers—psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, educators—guided
eighty-one participants from thirty-one countries through what Wilson described as a
“pioneering experience, intended to explore the possibilities and limitations and problems
of the Seminar technique.” Instead of a traditional series of lecture courses, which would
not “reveal and utilise the rich variety of backgrounds and interests” of the participants
and would be too “authoritarian in tone” for a Unesco undertaking, the six week seminar
used the study-group method to create a collaborative “laboratory atmosphere.” The
seminar was an experiment.190
The purpose of the seminar, like all those that followed, was three-fold: 1) “the
creation of bonds of friendly understanding and co-operation among members; 2)
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instruction in techniques of education for international understanding; and 3) the
production of reports to help educators around the world enhance international
understanding.191 These reports were published in the Towards World Understanding
series, all of which contained the proviso that the value of the seminar could not be
judged by the quality of the reports: “The final test of a seminar is its effect on the
participants of living and working in an international community, and through them, the
effect on educational practice in the countries from which they come.”192 The seminar
manifested the ideal of the world community in microcosm. The emphasis of the
seminars was on adjusting the character of the participants, on creating transnational
communities, and on widening teachers’ circles of loyalty.
The next summer’s experiment in living in a world community—held in
Podebrady Czechoslovakia just months before the three East Bloc member states stopped
participating in Unesco’s program—emphasized the conviction that education for
international understanding was a process that began at birth and extended through all
facets of a citizen’s life. The seminar focused on the education of children between the
ages of three and thirteen and was addressed by two of social science’s stars: Columbia
University Teacher’s College anthropologist Ruth Benedict and future SSD director Alva
Myrdal. Myrdal, who was a leading intellectual of the Social Democratic Party in
Sweden, presented on “Social Obstacles to Education,” which included everything from
poverty (which, she emphasized, children experienced as a relative quality), cramped
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urban housing, single parents, and working mothers. Overcoming the obstacles required
interventions like financial assistance to families, town planning, and marriage
counseling.193 Benedict, in one of the last public appearances before her death, warned
against taking the American experience of assimilating European immigrants as a model
for the world community. Educators had to learn to respect cultural diversity. Polygamy,
monogamy, and polyandry were simply “alternative solutions” to the problem of
providing a stable home, and each custom was subject to abuses that could stifle the full
development of personalities. National cultural patterns were deeply embedded in the
individual through practices that began at birth, and so educators of world citizens had to
become students of comparative cultures who, like the anthropologist, exhibited
“objectivity and tolerance” in the face of difference.194
The broad conception of education for international understanding went beyond
interwar initiatives sponsored by Unesco’s predecessor, the International Institute for
Intellectual Cooperation, which focused on reforming curriculum and textbooks.195 While
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European experts endorsed the inclusive approach and British and European
internationalists had a strong interwar tradition of education for international
understanding, the most intense pressure to maintain it came from the United States.196
The U.S. delegation consistently pushed for more emphasis on Education for
International Understanding as a part of Unesco’s total program, arguing that it should be
an inter-departmental priority that touched on all aspects of citizens’ lives, even targeting
adults.197
Seminar participants, however, tended to be educators who understood the school
as a strategic point through which experts could intervene in human development. The
report In the Classroom with Children under Thirteen, was most explicit on this point:
“Not only can [kindergarten] correct many of the errors of home training, but it can also
prepare the child for membership, at about the age of seven, in a group of his own age
and habits—the first of many such social identifications that he must achieve on his way
to membership in the world society.” “The narrow family spirit of the parents” prevented
children from integrating with their class group and, the report warned, it was “in the
family that the children are infected with nationalism.” In school children could be
trained to develop a “critical sense,” defined as an “objective attitude.” Indeed, the
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essential psychological unity of mankind was demonstrated by the “universality of
certain intellectual behaviour-patterns, precisely, those that constitute the scientific
method.”198 Scientific rationality provided the cultural common ground on which a world
culture could be built.
Yet as A Handbook for Suggestions on the Teaching of Geography, noted,
international understanding required “attitudes of sympathy, tolerance, co-operation and
respect,” and so the “emotions as well as the intellect are involved.”199 Geography
education, in fact, served a critical function in the production of world citizens; it
demonstrated the interdependence of nations and helped students develop a “world
perspective.” One recommendation even encouraged teachers of young children to
reverse the normal sequence of lessons that began with the classroom, the school
building, and town and widened to include the nation, continent, and finally the globe.
Beginning with the whole planet would help students “get into the habit of regarding the
earth as his habitat, and his country as part of it, instead of considering the rest of the
world as an annex to his own country.”200 Although this suggestion rather recklessly
inverted the social psychological theory of how children actually developed group
loyalties, it shows the intent to cultivate citizens who respected the view from
everywhere.
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The goal of the Education for International Understanding program was clear:
developing world citizens. But without a world community represented by a world
government, the meaning of world citizenship itself was problematic. This problem was
analyzed in the pamphlet The United Nations and World Citizenship, the product of
another 1948 summer seminar that met at Adelphi College (and, for at least one
afternoon, Eleanor Roosevelt’s estate) in New York. The atomic bomb and bacterial
warfare meant that “one world or none [was] the choice given us by military reality.” The
report was typical in asserting that world government was no longer “merely a dream, a
desire of idealists; it is a practical problem that we must solve if we are to live.”
Demonstrating their “realistic approach” to international organization, the authors
emphasized the weaknesses of the UN System. In particular, it distinguished between the
current reality of “international” cooperation and the necessary goal of “transnational”
cooperation. Whereas international cooperation implied a forum in which states
negotiated programs based on their national interests (which, the authors noted, often
were not actually in the interests of the majority of their citizens), transnational
cooperation meant working together for the common good of the world community. The
report identified the kernel of “functional world government based on transnational rather
than international co-operation” in the more narrowly focused, expert administered
programs of the specialized agencies. In an effective transnational government, the
recommendations of the Food and Agriculture Organization’s experts would have the
power to bind governments.201 And yet the pamphlet’s “realism” emphasized the fact that
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the conditions in which a transnational government could function did not exist. In the
absence of world government, world citizenship referred to a psychological condition,
but the ultimate goal was to make it a political reality.202
In this sense, The United Nations and World Citizenship highlighted the dilemma
that education for international understanding was education for a fictional future world.
The question, then, was whether the internationalists could transform their fiction into
commonsense.
The United States and Unesco
This question is not exactly whether internationalist social scientists successfully
popularized their conclusions. Rather, it is whether these cosmopolitan intellectuals
articulated with a public that had a chance of forming a viable state?203 Did they help
citizens make sense of their world? Did they interpret social experiences in terms the
public found worth appropriating? Did they express a purpose around which a movement
could congeal? For the intellectuals who envisioned a democratic world community, the
relevant public was first and foremost the United States. American social scientists were
the most prominent authors of this particular fiction, they engaged with the most
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enthusiastic audience, and the United States was the hegemonic leader of the Free
World—the prospects for any world community, however distant, depended on America.
Sixty-five years after its founding, it is hard to remember contemporary American
enthusiasm for the founding of the United Nations without blushing (or smirking).204
Contemporary social scientists quantified the surprising breadth of American’s support of
the UN to demonstrate that a strong international authority was a realistic proposition.
The SPSSI’s Human Nature and Enduring Peace, for example, provided a detailed
analysis of public opinion on international collaboration, reporting that 71 percent of
Americans favored participation in a Union of Nations in 1944, compared to the 33
percent who supported joining the League of Nations in 1937. And the better educated,
informed and paid, the more likely one was to support a strong international organization:
according to a 1944 Fortune survey, 77.7 percent of well informed respondents thought
the United States should actively participate in “a world organization with court and
police strong enough to enforce its decisions,” compared to 61.4 percent of poorly
informed and 33.3 percent of uninformed respondents.205 Another Gallup poll in 1947
reported that 56% of Americans believed the UN should be “strengthened to make it a
world government with power to control the armed forces of all nations including the
United States.” In fact, the State Department kept tabs on the World Government
movement. A 1947 internal memo reported that the world government movement was
“under able and aggressive leadership,” supported by organizations outside the
movement itself, including churches, the American Veterans Committee, and even the
204
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Executive Committee of the American Legion, which proposed establishing a world
army, eliminating the veto in the Security Council, and arms control.206 Thirty state
legislatures passed resolutions supporting an international organization that would pool
U.S. sovereignty with other countries, and as late as 1949, 111 members of the House of
Representatives (including John F. Kennedy, Gerald Ford, and Henry Cabot Lodge)
sponsored a resolution to make it “a fundamental objective of the foreign policy of the
United States to support and strengthen the United Nations and to seek its development
into a world federation.”207
American support for Unesco was especially pronounced. In 1945, a State
Department analysis of the press and opinion leaders reported nearly unanimous approval
for plans to found an international educational organization.208 Once the Organization
began work, grassroots support quickly grew. In fact, the scholars at the 1947 World
Community conference in Chicago were both heartened and disturbed by Unesco’s mass
appeal. Attempting to appraise the results of the conference, the final commentator,
Herbert Emmerich of the Chicago Public Administration Clearing House, ended on a
cautionary note that could not contain his enthusiasm: “It is very easy to feel that
UNESCO is the whole show.” While it was not,
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“[it] has demonstrated a very particular strength. I have seen it operating in this
country, where practically hundreds, if not thousands, of American voluntary
groups come together because they want to hear about UNESCO.…it is a mass
concept of culture—democratic, ‘grass-roots’ culture—it goes to every
schoolteacher and every school child in the country. It has a vast political potential
if we know how to harness it correctly. The fact that the Elks, the Knights of
Columbus, and the Rotary clubs show up, as wells as women’s clubs, at UNESCO
meetings is something we cannot afford to sneer at. It evidences an enormous
appetite for a new kind of citizenship in a new world community and world
society.”209
Elite internationalists found the public’s enormous appetite exciting, but worried about
how to harness the explosion of energy ignited by Unesco’s claim to be “the people’s UN
agency.”
The architects of Unesco’s constitution had designed structures for including nonstate actors and for organizing public participation. The Executive Board, which oversaw
the design and execution of the program, consisted of members elected in their individual
capacities (i.e. not government representatives). This idea, which European elites,
particularly the French, held dear, was that Board members would be chosen for their
intellectual eminence and would represent the transnational world of learning, not the
narrow interests of national governments. In practice, seats on the Board were reserved
for representatives of the big three (the United States, Britain, and France) and many
governments briefed their (non)representatives. A more innovative feature was a system
of National Commissions. Unesco encouraged each member state to form a National
Commission made up of nongovernmental organizations and notable individuals that
would advise national governments and coordinate with the Secretariat to carry out the
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Organization’s mission.210 In practice, the Ministries of Education often organized the
National Commissions, which ranged from a few notable officials or citizens to complex
layers of committees, sub-commissions, and executive councils.
The U.S. National Commission was by far the most active, and billed itself as the
bridge between Unesco and the people. It was the most organizationally complex, too.
The State Department supplied a small Unesco Relations Staff to aid the National
Commission’s one-hundred members, forty appointed by the State Department and the
others representatives of major voluntary associations ranging from the unions and
professional associations to service clubs and activist groups. Members served as
delegates to the General Conference. The semi-governmental National Commission fit
neatly within the U.S. tradition of government supported yet still proudly
nongovernmental cultural relations programs.211
Beginning in June, 1947, the State Department published the monthly National
Commission NEWS to help publicize Unesco, particularly the Commission’s domestic
activities. It also published an assortment of brochures, such as Unesco and You, intended
to help individuals participate in Unesco’s mission. Unesco and You presented a “sixpoint program” that stressed “any activity that teaches racial tolerance, attacks ignorance
of other peoples, and promotes the conditions of a world peace can be termed a
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‘UNESCO’ activity, or said to embody the ‘UNESCO approach.’”212 As ineffectual as
such a milk-toast call to arms might appear, the response quickly overwhelmed the
Commission’s abilities to manage the movement. At a 1947 meeting of the National
Commission in Chicago, the Chairman of the Commission, Milton S. Eisenhower
(President of Kansas State University and brother of the general), stated, “The tide of
popular interest is rising so rapidly that I am sometimes frightened by it.”213
One of the early indictors of Unesco’s popularity was the Commission’s first
national meeting in Philadelphia during March, 1947 at which 1,000 delegates
representing 500 organizations gathered to discuss its domestic program and to publicize
the new organization. The second national meeting in 1949 in Cleveland drew “a capacity
audience of 9,000” to hear Eleanor Roosevelt and Director-General Torres Bodet. In
between two regional conferences in Denver and San Francisco spread the Unesco
message in the West: nearly 2,000 delegates representing 576 organizations attended the
Denver meeting, figures which grew to 2,184 and 948 respectively in San Francisco.
Social scientific theory and methods were an integral component of this activity.
For example, at the Mountain-Plains Regional Conference on Unesco in Denver, the
National Opinion Research Center of the University of Denver distributed a 41 page
report titled, “Where UNESCO Begins: The Climate of Opinion in the United States and
Other Countries” that summarized and analyzed survey research on attitudes towards
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international cooperation, minority groups within the United States, immigration, and aid
to war devastated countries.214 Wallace Stegner contributed “A Delegate’s View of the
Conference” for the National Commission’s report on The Pacific Regional Conference.
The Conference, he wrote, “was built around one idea: to carry the ideas and principles of
UNESCO from the level of international planning, international organization, and
abstract philosophical statement, to the grass-roots local level, to communities and to
individuals.” To accomplish this, the Conference was broken into discussion groups,
which used the “group dynamics” techniques that Lewin had developed at MIT. Initially
skeptical of the elaborate technique (which would be hard to distinguish from highly
structured small group work in today’s high schools), Stegner left impressed with the
quality of the meetings and the “inclination to be [as] critical of local or American
attitudes as to be suspicious of foreign ones.” The Human and Social Relations section
was the most popular, with 36 percent of delegates making it their first choice compared
to 29 percent for Education and just six percent for Natural Sciences. It focused on
relieving “local tensions springing from prejudice and ignorance” as an example to the
world—a task that could begin with legislation based on President Truman’s Civil Rights
Report. In the Natural Sciences section, scientists “made it plain that they felt the future
of the world depended on bridging the gap between natural and social sciences” and
passed a resolution recommending study of legislation transforming the UN into a
“Federal World Government with power to enact, interpret, and enforce world law on
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individuals to prevent war.” The real accomplishment of the Conference, Stegner
concluded, was that it had “mobilized…a nucleus of hitherto ineffective, scattered, or
bewildered workers for peace and has given them a firm direction and a sense of
solidarity.”215 The intellectuals who imagined a world community did represent a public.
A flurry of organizing at the town, county and state level grew out of these
conferences.216 The Unesco National Commission News promoted Kansas as a model of
local Unesco engagement. “Despite icy roads” that suppressed attendance, a meeting of
the Kansas State Unesco Commission in December 1947, attracted 802 delegates
representing sixty-four of the state’s 105 counties and 170 state-wide organizations. 528
observers joined the delegates to discuss how Kansans could contribute to world peace
through developing mutual understanding. Actions included setting up “editorial
councils” of knowledgeable citizens to send letters to the editor in support of
international causes like the European Recovery Program. A Committee on Elementary
and Secondary Education “began a critical study of textbooks used in Kansas schools to
determine wherein they feed prejudices, wherein they are inaccurate, and, in general,
wherein they contribute or fail to contribute to international understanding.” A
Commission sponsored clippings service determined that in one month alone 1,100
stories ran in Kansas newspapers that referenced Unesco producing 260,000 words of
copy and bankrupting the Commission’s clippings budget. Unesco inspired towns,
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universities and public schools “adopted” their kind in countries like Germany, the
Netherlands, Ethiopia and China.217
This type of initiative undertaken by a “State Commission” that had no formal
relationship with the government, however, worried both National Commission members
and the State Department, which requested that all state organizations drop the officialsounding “commission” title. Similarly, despite the success of the regional meetings in
fostering grassroots participation, the National Commission stopped sponsoring them
after the San Francisco meeting, in part because it struggled even to keep up with
coordinating the activities of its own 100 member board and numerous committees.218
But the commissions renamed themselves councils and the grassroots continued to grow.
Yet if fears of atomic annihilation and repugnance of racial prejudice inspired an
incipient Unesco movement, countervailing forces were just as strong. In the early Cold
War, even the pursuit of peace became a suspect goal. In 1946 the Soviet Union formed
the Communist Information Bureau to launch its own cultural campaign. The Cominform
generally operated through “captured” front organizations such as the World Peace
Council and the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and directed the policy of
Communist Parties in Western Europe. A series of ostensibly open conferences like the
1947 East Berlin Writers’ Congress, the World Congress of Intellectuals in Wroclaw,
Poland and the 1949 World Congress of Peace in Paris evolved into a massive “peace
offensive.” The peace offensive reached its apex in the Stockholm Appeal, a petition
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against Atomic weapons that its supporters claimed garnered a half-billion signatures
around the world. The All-American Conference to Combat Communism (claiming a
membership of eighty-million immediately upon forming) denounced the Appeal as “an
important weapon” in “pernicious psychological warfare.” An American iteration of the
European peace conferences held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City in 1949
degraded into an ugly confrontation between ex-communist intellectuals turned cold
warriors and the last hangers-on to a lost popular front consensus. A few meek Soviet
intellectuals were caught in-between their KGB handlers and their CIA sponsored
assailants. The “minds of men” was a battlefield in a war between cultures.219
The United States government decided that the high stakes of the cultural Cold
War could not be trusted to an unpredictable intergovernmental organization. Instead of
funneling resources into Unesco’s program, precious American dollars went to ostensibly
private enterprises like the Congress of Cultural Freedom or Free Radio Europe that in
reality CIA were fronts.220 Tellingly, these ventures were coordinated by the Agency’s
International Organizations Division. In 1946, the US National Commission for Unesco
had unanimously endorsed spending $250 million on “the worldwide communications
system required by the United Nations” to reach “all the major areas of the world” via
radio. By 1950, the Voice of America had, as Time Magazine enthused, “the richest
219
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sponsor of them all, and sells the world’s most priceless product. The sponsor is Uncle
Sam and the product freedom.”221 In 1947 congressional debates over the Informational
and Educational Exchange Act (the Smith-Mundt Bill), the State Department described
the Act as “an aggressive program in support of our foreign policy.”222 Clearly, this
version of cultural relations was not about transcending national interests.
The difficulty of using Unesco as an agent in the cultural Cold War meant that the
State Department developed an attitude toward the organization that resembled damage
control more than nurturance. After the United States and UN Secretary-General Trygve
Lie pressured Unesco to deploy an “informational” campaign to support the UN
intervention in Korea, any hope that Unesco might bridge the ideological divide between
the East and West appeared lost. Indeed, political scientist Walter Sharp, whose work
directing Unesco’s International Collaboration Project was described in the previous
chapter, wrote, “By contributing in the short run to clearer understanding of what Soviet
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totalitarianism means, UNESCO’s action may in fact tend to increase rather than to
alleviate existing bipolar political tensions.”223
Even as the Secretariat half-heartedly implemented its information campaign in
Korea, Cold War tensions threatened Unesco’s integrity as an international organization.
The attack came from within the United States. In the fall of 1949, the State
Department’s survey of media and opinion leaders found that Unesco continued to
receive favorable coverage, but that “very sharp” criticism was on the rise. By January
1952, it was keeping tabs on a “small number of right wing organizations,” such as the
America First Party, that advocated U.S. withdrawal from the UN. The study warned that
the radical fringe might infect more mainstream groups like the American Legion.224 By
then, however, the attack against the UN System was already an integral component of
McCarthyism, and just as Unesco inspired unparalleled enthusiasm, so it attracted
unequalled hostility. In June, Senator Pat McCarran succeeded in attaching a rider to an
appropriations bill that banned funding any international organization that “directly or
indirectly promoted ‘one-world government or world citizenship.’” The explicit target
was Unesco. As an Anne O’Hare McCormick headline in the New York Times stated,
“The Charge Against Unesco Is ‘Internationalism.’”225
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McCormick was right, but the charge was cloaked in the threat of communist
subversion. When McCarran’s Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, under the
leadership of Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland, began investigating the loyalty of
U.S. nationals working for UN Organizations, Unesco was the first specialized agency it
targeted. After Truman signed Executive Order 10422 on January 9, 1953, all U.S.
citizens working for a UN agency were required to pass the FBI administered loyalty
check that Executive Branch employees had been subjected to since 1947. The Order
applied even to academics who were simply attending a UN sponsored conference, and
the loyalty screening had to be repeated for each new contract, no matter how many times
a citizen had been cleared before. Loyalty Boards even asked for the finger prints of
American heads of UN agencies who had been elected by member states to represent the
international community. Like all the others, Unesco’s new Director General Luther B.
Evans complied, although his loyalty to the United States hardly could be questioned
since he regularly passed confidential information on to the State Department.
Facilitating background checks became a major responsibility of the State Department’s
Unesco Relations Staff. The FBI routinely took months to submit its reports to the
International Organizations Loyalty Board, which often rendered clearance a moot point.
The Unesco Relations Staff, however, thought of the Order as a sort of prophylactic
against charges of subversion, even proactively deciding that all new members of the
National Commission should be screened.226
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The effects of Executive Order 10422 on Unesco were significant. Predictably, it
led to a decrease in the number of Americans employed by the Secretariat and contracted
as experts, thus actually undermining U.S. influence. Compounding this effect was the
loss of international prestige inflicted by the hypocrisy of the leader of the Free World
violating its citizens’ civil rights and the pure foolishness of a witch hunt that undermined
the international institutions the country underwrote. The loyalty investigations quashed
lingering hopes that UN Organizations could evolve into agents of truly transnational
cooperation. Commenting on the McCarran amendment banning appropriations for any
international organization advocating world government, the Manchester Guardian took
a condescending pleasure in the multiple layers of irony: “The Russians, from precisely
the same narrow nationalist standpoint, also denounce those who advocate ‘world
government’! But what of all the American idealists who, following Wendell Willkie,
talk so much and so earnestly of ‘One World’? They must be having a thin time against
the Stalin-McCarran ideological combination.”227
Ironically, however, the loyalty checks also intensified the international identity
of Unesco’s Secretariat in Paris. The Loyalty Board identified eight Americans in the
Secretariat with subversive ties and requested that their contracts be terminated. By
demanding that U.S. members of the Secretariat put loyalty to the United States ahead of
loyalty to the international organization and impugning the “integrity” of citizens who
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rejected nationalism, Executive Order 10422 attacked the ideological foundations of
internationalism. Unesco’s Staff Association rallied to the defense of the accused. The
Staff Association typically had trouble recruiting representatives and focused on issues of
pay, stocking the staff bar, and inter-agency soccer matches. In defense of the eight,
however, its passionate legal and moral argument centered on the duty of a member of
the international civil service to maintain loyalty to the international community, a
loyalty that did not contradict but rather was superimposed on loyalty to his country. An
international civil servant’s integrity depended on rejecting the narrow perspective of
national interest. An international identity was a vaguely felt, lightly worn affiliation until
it came under attack.228
And despite the vehemence of the anticommunist attack on the UN and Unesco, it
is far from clear that their status declined in American public opinion. In fact, State
Department analysis in mid-1952 showed that despite “some adverse results in local
communities and private organizations,” the attacks had resulted in “no diminution in the
broad allegiance of the general public to the UN. Indeed, grass-roots support appears to
be increasing.” Along with the hard numbers, the National Opinion Research Center
(which had participated in the Denver Regional Conference on Unesco) supplied the
State Department with interpretive comments that called the results of the poll
“encouraging to those of us who are trying to correct current misinformation about the
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United Nations and Unesco,” and concluded that the survey demonstrated that Americans
felt the UN was “not strong enough—rather than that it is too strong.”229 In 1955, the
polls reported American public opinion of the UN at its highest level in five years, with
88 percent supporting continued U.S. membership and only one percent expressing an
unfavorable opinion of Unesco. Of course, the polls also consistently revealed that only
one in fifteen Americans could accurately identify Unesco.230
The National Opinion Research Center’s reports to the State Department
demonstrate the pollsters’ attempt to make government policy respond to public opinion.
But they also reveal one of the obvious weaknesses of this strategy as a tool of
democracy; the appropriate policy response depended entirely on whether an expert
already supported the UN and Unesco or did not. If public opinion had supported U.S.
withdrawal from the UN, this would have indicated the need to “correct misinformation.”
More fundamentally, the fact that so few people apparently knew much about the issues
on which they expressed an opinion suggested that the polls were not measuring a
significant social factor. As contemporary social scientists complained, citizens were
unlikely to act on such superficial whims—causality disappeared into the abyss between
opinion and behavior.
Many Americans, however, were passionate about the UN and Unesco, and their
passions had significant effects. The Cold War inflected conflicts within American
229
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society over the meaning of the international community, but the tensions these
confrontations exposed were largely a product of individuals’ experiences of changes in
their local community. Making sense of the American public’s contradictory response to
the idea of a world community, reified in Unesco, requires adopting an approach similar
to the Tension Project’s community studies. Tensions at the scale of the neighborhood or
city did affect international relations, especially when the city was the biggest boomtown
in the world’s most powerful country.
Los Angeles’ Tensions Affecting International Understanding
“The best place to view Los Angeles of the next millennium is from the ruins of
its alternative future,” Mike Davis’ wrote at the end of the last millennium.231 The
particular ruins evoked in the opening sentence of The City of Quartz were the remnants
of Llano del Rio, a utopian community founded on the eve of the First World War ninety
miles from Downtown. Although the colonists had abandoned their dream of a model
socialist community in the desert by the end of the Great War, alternative futures
remained part of the fabric of a city that was built on dreams. At the end of the Second
World War, many Angelenos imagined their city could become a multicultural
microcosm of the world community.
Los Angeles would seem an unlikely place to look for a popular instantiation of
the fictional world community. In the interwar years, Los Angeles’ boosters promoted the
city as the “white spot” of the American West. The economy burned hot on oil and real
estate speculation and the savings of well-off immigrants from the American Midwest
attracted by the fabled endless summer. During the Depression, the dust bowl blew in a
231
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second wave of white migrants who the urban middle class often despised, but who also
shared elements of their social conservatism. The internal migrations assured that unlike
contemporary demographic shifts on the East Coast, population growth strengthened the
conservative WASP base of a tight-knit economic and political establishment. Restrictive
housing covenants, de facto and de jure segregation of schools, and exclusive clubs
helped keep property values high and assured white residents could enjoy the American
dream undisturbed by the contradiction at its core. Indeed, despite rampant corruption in
government and business, the hard-edged conservatism came wrapped in Christian moral
probity. The economic and political elite promoted the city’s open-shop ordinances to
attract Eastern capital investment and wielded the police force’s notorious “Red Squad”
as a sort of private militia against union organizers, out-of-place minorities, and other
“goody-goodies, sissies, and long-hairs.” In addition to the state’s coercive forces, the
head of the establishment, Harry Chandler, controlled the city’s leading newspaper, the
Los Angeles Times—and the Hearst Empire’s Los Angeles Examiner was hardly a radical
alternative. It is not surprising, then, that the taproot of the postwar New American Right
can be traced back to Southern California.232
And yet even before the great changes wrought by the economic, social, and
cultural upheavals of the Second World War, alternative visions of the city survived. In
1938, for example, a strange coalition of anti-vice moral reformers, good government
civic reformers, and an assortment of left-of-center activists ranging from communists to
232
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labor leaders to liberal Republicans succeeded in recalling the city’s mayor and replacing
him with Judge Fletcher Bowron, a self-identified New Deal Republican who promised
competent municipal governance in the progressive tradition. And more radical
possibilities existed in the city’s sprawling neighborhoods. The historian Daniel Hurewitz
has portrayed a thriving bohemian enclave in Edendale, where artists and communists
challenged the conservative WASP culture from personal and political perspectives.
During the popular front years and through the Second World War, Communists fought
racial injustice, leading the especially active local chapter of the Civil Rights Congress.
In 1942, Angeleno leftists organized the Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee to advocate
for seventeen Mexican-American youths wrongly convicted of murder in a case that they
understood as a Californian equivalent of the Scottsboro Boys trial. Hollywood
celebrities joined the defense, too, showing that the conservative establishment could not
dictate all the headlines.233
In fact, the War intensified simmering racial tensions. Despite its unusually
homogenous white majority, Los Angeles was home to the largest populations of
Mexican Americans and Japanese in the country. On the one hand, the fight against
fascism helped make racism explicitly un-American. This was especially true when the
victims were identified with a nation that was an American ally, as in the Zoot Suit riots
in which white servicemen attacked Mexican youths. On the other hand, a vanishingly
small number of white Angelenos protested the evacuation of nearly the entire Japanese
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population of 40,000 to internment camps for the duration of the War. But the eviction of
the Japanese did not whiten Los Angeles; Little Tokyo was renamed Bronzeville. The
wartime industrial boom attracted African Americans at a rate of more than 10,000 a
month by 1943; during the 1940s, the number of African Americans in Watts alone
increased from less than 9,000 to more than 92,000. Indeed, nearly exponential
population growth combined with racial discrimination in the real estate market (and the
return of Japanese) to create an acute housing shortage. And African and Mexican
Americans’ contribution to the country’s total war reinforced their resolve to win the
rights of full citizenship. Realizing the promise of victory required reimagining the
identity of the city.234
The United Nations figured significantly in postwar visions of Los Angeles’
future. Attorneys arguing cases against restrictive covenants cited not only the state and
national constitutions, but the UN Charter. More dramatically, in 1950 the California
Supreme Court struck down the Alien Land Law, which barred Japanese from owning
land, on the grounds that it violated the terms of the UN Charter as elaborated in the UN
Declaration of Human Rights. “The position of this country in the family of nations,” the
Court declared in Fujii v. The State, “forbids trafficking in innocuous generalities, but
demands that every State in the Union accept and act upon the Charter according to its
plain language and its unmistakable purpose and intent…the Charter is the supreme law
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of the land.”235 According to the Court, leadership of the Free World conferred a
responsibility to uphold the liberal principles on which it was founded.
But the Court had speeded ahead of commonsense. The State Department
concluded that Fujii provided a major impetus for the Bricker Amendment, which would
have crippled the Executive Branch’s treaty-making powers.236 Already in 1946 the
successful opponents of California’s Proposition 11, which would have made
employment discrimination based on race illegal, had argued that the measure itself
violated the rights of employers and would actually increase racial tensions by attempting
to “legislate brotherly love.” Instead of laws, the Los Angeles Times editorialized,
“Persuasion, education [were] suitable means for overcoming prejudice.” As the historian
Kevin Leonard shows in his study of the wartime evolution of the race concept The Battle
for Los Angeles, before the War racist Angelenos had openly advocated white
supremacy—forming, for example, the “Anti-African Housing Association”—but now
even proponents of racial discrimination had to profess their enlightened contempt for
racism.237
In fact, political and intellectual elites took education for intergroup
understanding seriously, and the UN was a critical symbolic resource. On the Fourth of
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July, 1945, Mayor Bowron addressed 15,000 Angelenos gathered at the Hollywood Bowl
for a “Declaration of Interdependence” celebration. “Our country,” he proclaimed, “is, in
a sense, composed of minorities; it is the United Nations on a continent.” To explain the
new meaning of American citizenship to the rally, Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy
evoked a favorite metaphor of the world community: “The melting-pot philosophy, with
its implications of reduction to a grey uniformity has given way to a new emphasis.
American civilization encourages and embodies the contributions of the various
cooperating national and cultural groups in the United States in the way that a symphony
orchestra creates a rich and complex harmony…In this way we achieve cultural variety
within the larger unity provided by our common language, economy, and political
institutions.”238
Los Angeles’ advocates of the symphonic image of the American community
embraced the “Unesco philosophy.” In preparation for the Pacific Regional Conference,
the Southern California Unesco Council—which included the President of Pepperdine
College, the Provost of UCLA, the state’s Assistant Superintendent of Public Instruction
and other notable citizens—met in Mayor Bowron’s office. On a nearly weekly basis,
women’s clubs such as the Federation of Women’s Clubs, the League of Women’s
Voters, and the Business and Professional Women’s Club heard presentations from
Council members. The President of the local Rotary Club congratulated his peers on their
work with Unesco, declaring, “It is to our everlasting credit that we in Rotary can be
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numbered in the growing army of world citizens who are making a practical contribution
to the realization of a world community.”239
The Los Angeles School District jumped on board the Unesco bandwagon. School
programs that included reciting a UN pledge of allegiance along with the American
pledge, forming model UN assemblies and participating in Unesco essay contests were
not unusual in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but under Superintendent (and member of
the National Commission) Alexander J. Stoddard’s leadership, the entire Los Angeles
Schools District devoted the 1948-49 school year to the Unesco inspired theme “Who Is
My Neighbor?” The National Commission NEWS reported, “Proud mothers and fathers
watched their Johnny or Nancy while the young people continued to alternate the reading
of the preamble of the United States Constitution with the preamble to the United Nations
Charter. This was the climax of the PTA pageant culminating United Nations Week at
one of Los Angeles’ larger junior high schools. For the past seven days the teen-agers had
been eating, sleeping, and talking United Nations.”240 The Unesco program grew out of a
previously established program in “education for international understanding” begun in
1944, before Unesco had even existed. Its purpose was to assure that “each person may
grow in his understanding of world culture and problems so that he may cooperate
intelligently in a world community.” It was intended to produce students who were
knowledgeable and interested in world affairs, recognized and helped solve “world
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problems according to the practices of democracy,” understood the “economic and
cultural factors which make the world an interdependent community of nations,” and
combined “love of his own country with a broad social consciousness towards the
problems of the world as a whole.”241
Superintendent Stoddard appointed a Central Advisory Committee on Unesco to
organize the program and wrote the introduction to a teacher’s guide called “The ‘E’ in
Unesco,” which the District adopted in 1950. Components of the program included a
monthly Unesco Bulletin; in-service workshops with guest speakers, including
Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk; an assortment of special days and weeks, such as UN
Week, Brotherhood Week, World Trade Week, Pan-American Week, and Negro History
Week; All City Youth Conferences dedicated to the “furthering of good intergroup
relations in the local communities”; community service; and a locally produced radio
program for junior high students. The Unesco program embraced the doctrines of
progressive education in stressing process over product; for example, students learned to
live in a world community by taking turns and listening “courteously to points of view
different from their own.”242 The curriculum appeared to be precisely the sort of
educational program the opponents of anti-discriminatory legislation had argued should
be used to persuade citizens to abandon prejudices.
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Despite its focus on character and courtesy, however, the Unesco program could
not escape a reactionary backlash. The attack could hardly have come as a surprise. In
1950, a group of conservative citizens just up the highway in Pasadena had succeeded in
ousting the progressive superintendent (and President of the American Association of
School Administrators), Willard Goslin. The Pasadena fight combined resentment over
proposed increases in property taxes to cover the costs of rising enrollment and racially
charged anxiety that a rezoning scheme would decrease property values with general
hostility to the “‘superprogressive’ educational methods based on the John Dewey system
of use of practical psychology in teaching children.” The offensive was neatly
summarized by the rally cry of the President of the Pasadena School Development
Council, a consortium of parents, real estate interests and right-wing Republicans that led
the offensive: “Progressive Education Means Progressive Taxation.”243
While an insinuation of socialism had tinged the argument against progressive
education from the start, it was not until the summer of 1950 that the question was raised
of whether Pasadena’s curriculum was “part of a campaign to ‘sell’ our children on the
collapse of our way of life and substitution of collectivism?” In the fall, a new president
of the School Development Council made the charge of subversion against
Superintendent Goslin concrete before an investigative meeting of the California Senate
Education Committee, chaired by Republican red-hunter (and author of the act that
mandated teacher loyalty oaths) Nelson Dilworth. One key piece of evidence: Goslin was
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a member of the Unesco National Commission. Months after Goslin left Pasadena, one
Board Member speculated on the depth of the socialistic plot he had helped foil; firing
the superintendent “may have ‘upset a timetable’ for nationalization of the public
schools.” Foreshadowing the Los Angeles drama, Goslin received the telegram from the
Board of Education requesting his resignation while attending a Unesco meeting in New
York. Despite a belated groundswell of support from community leaders and parents,
Goslin agreed to resign without a fight (but with a large check), justifying his decision on
the democratic grounds that the Board Members were the duly elected representatives of
the people.244
Similar structural forces and distrust of government were at work in Los Angeles.
In 1949, like mayors of most major American cities, Bowron attempted to ease the
critical postwar housing shortage by contracting the federal government to construct
10,000 units—which, importantly, would be free from racial quotas. Again following a
national trend, the initially uncontroversial housing project quickly came under attack
from real estate developers and business leaders who formed the Committee Against
Socialist Housing. The controversy led to an investigation of the Housing Authority of
the City of Los Angeles by the California Un-American Activities Committee and to the
successful recall of Mayor Bowron in 1953.245 And the story in the schools was much the
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same. Rising enrollments and inflation led to a budgetary shortfall, which in 1951
Superintendent Stoddard declared would require a nearly $200,000,000 bond issue to
construct sixty-seven new schools as well as increased property taxes.246 Stoddard also
was an early and vocal advocate for extending federal funding to public education. But
instead of property taxes, efficient administration, or even “nationalization” of public
education, the L.A. school battle centered on the Unesco program.
Florence Fowler Lyons delivered the first broadside against the “Stoddard Unesco
program” in the fall of 1951. She charged “open advocacy of one-world government in
these books.” “Our children are being trained not as citizens of America,” she continued,
“but as faceless citizens of the world.” The Los Angeles Times gave the story two
columns and included a photograph of Lyons holding a copy of “The ‘E’ in UNESCO”
and pointing at a school blackboard with the words “Our Ancestors Were” above
columns of student names headed “English, American, Negro, German, Russian, and
Greek.” The caption read: “RED RUSES DESCRIBED—Florence Lyons, writer,
demonstrates to Southern California Republican Women how Communism may be
injected into teaching in the schoolrooms.”247 The Communist subversion Lyons exposed,
however, was the idea Mayor Bowron and Justice Murphy had celebrated when they
turned the Fourth of July into National Interdependence Day. It was the idea that the
United States, the City of Los Angeles, the classroom were—or rather ought to be—
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microcosms of the world community. Instead of learning to integrate their diverse
perspectives to produce a view from everywhere, Lyons insisted that students should be
schooled from a 100 percent American perspective.
The Unesco controversy dominated debates about the proper role of public
education in Los Angeles for the next few years. Conservative organizations like the
Liberty Bells (which advocated repeal of the Sixteenth Amendment that allowed the
federal government to levy an income tax), Grand Parlor Americanism Committee,
Native Sons of the Golden West and other conservative clubs joined the Women’s
Republican Study Club in an all out campaign to ban Unesco from the schools. Most
importantly, the California American Legion joined the cause, making the fight against
Unesco a priority mission of its Americanism Committee.248 The Unesco Relations
Office in Washington was swamped in angry letters from Southern California demanding
copies of In the Classroom with Children under Thirteen so patriotic citizens could read
the shocking sentences for themselves: “As longs as the child breathes the poisoned air of
Nationalism, education in world-mindedness can produce only precarious results. It is
frequently the family that infects the child with extreme nationalism. The school should
therefore combat family attitudes that favor jingoism.”249 The demand for the fourth
pamphlet in the Towards World Understanding series quickly outpaced the supply.
Stoddard’s response to the personalized attacks from the right was to beat a hasty
retreat. Already in May 1951, Stoddard confessed to the California Congress of Parents
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and Teachers: “In our desire to be fair to other nations of the world, we have bent
backward to teach their isms. As a result, we have been underteaching our own
America.” By the middle of 1953, he was appearing before the California American
Legion, praising the group for “giving its wholehearted support to the public school
system” and urging it to help “put teeth into Senate Bill 1367” (requiring loyalty oaths) to
assure that “a year from now we may be able to say that not one disloyal teacher remains
in the Los Angeles School system.” On the Unesco program, he had “no comment.”250
But advocates for internationalism were as passionate as the super-patriots and
would not let the Unesco issue go away. An impressive list of individuals and
organizations aligned to support the Unesco program: the Parents and Teachers
Association, Unions, YWCA, League of Women Voters, the Urban League and the
Southern California Society for Mental Hygiene, as well as prominent clergy and
professors. The nasty standoff dominated national news stories about Unesco for much of
1952 and 1953 and earned often bemused coverage in the international press.251
The fight reached a climax in a series of boisterous School Board meetings in the
summer of 1952. At what was billed as the conclusive meeting on the issue, an audience
of 500 heard fifty-five speakers lecture the Board. The Unesco faction was led by Ford
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Foundation director Paul G. Hoffman;252 the nationalists by Milton G. Robertson, cochair of an Americanism Committee of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the passion of the meeting resulted in the appointment of yet another
investigative committee. When in January 1953 the Committee endorsed the Unesco
program, finding no evidence that it advocated world government, the Board had run out
of delay tactics and had to make a decision. Despite its own Committee’s
recommendation, it abolished the (already suspended) program, with one Board member
condemning Unesco as the propaganda organ of “loose thinkers” who supported world
government. Instead of banning any teaching on Unesco, however, schools were
instructed to provide purely “objective” information.253
The logic of the objectivity solution, which had been percolating for at least six
months, was explained by a Board member: “We must teach our children about
UNESCO and the U.N. as a part of current history. I don’t rank it with Communism, but
it must be taught in the manner our students are taught Communism,—factually and with
no advocacy thereof.”254 On the value of objectivity, at least, the advocates of world
community and of 100 percent Americanism agreed. A letter to the editor expressed the
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essence of the disagreement—and within the conceptual framework of internationalist
social science. Dissenting to a Los Angeles Times editorial that endorsed the School
Board’s assertion that “there are no ‘higher and more proper things for Americans than
American sovereignty,’” the letter explained, “Just as community and State loyalties and
sovereignties are rather petty considerations compared to national ones, so should
national loyalties and sovereignties be considered petty and unimportant compared to
world ones.”255 Agreeing on an objective perspective on society depended on agreeing on
what society should be.
This story fits easily within McCarthy-era narratives of the “paranoid style in
American politics.” After all, this was a period in which no communist nations were
participating in Unesco and the Organization was supposed to be acting as a propaganda
wing of the UN Force in Korea. Indeed, in the introduction to the most compelling
contemporary analysis of McCarthyism, The New American Right, Daniel Bell explained
that the phenomenon could not be understood “in conventional political terms.” Instead,
the authors had independently selected “recent concepts of sociology and social
psychology” to diagnosis the neurotic state of American politics.256 This analysis was of a
piece with the style of social science promoted by Unesco’s Tensions Project. Ralph
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Bunche provided a more Machiavellian explanation. He traveled to Southern California
to denounce the charges of Communist subversion against Unesco as “irresponsible,
unfounded in fact and ridiculous”—an example of “the ‘big lie’ technique.”257
But in the context of Los Angeles, the conflation of internationalism and
Communism was neither irrational nor dishonest. Communists in Los Angeles, as in the
rest of the country, had been the most vocal, committed, uncompromising advocates of
racial justice for the past two decades.258 And conservative WASPs had so stretched the
term through decades of overuse that any effort to use government to balance the playing
field between labor and capital, tenants and landlords, or minorities and WASPs was
classified as “Communism, Socialism, New Dealism, and other isms,” as Florence Lyons
labeled the Unesco program. Indeed, Lyons’ inclusion of “New Dealism” in her
accusation implies that a conviction about the proper role and scope of government was
at the core of the controversy. The accelerating nuclear arms race, the Korean War, and
the ravings of McCarthy certainly raised the stakes, but the Unesco controversy in the
Los Angeles Schools was another front in the ongoing “battle for Los Angeles.”259 The
battle was over what victory in the War against fascism meant for peace on the home
front.
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Beneath the “pseudo-conservatives’” inflamed rhetoric was more than a kernel of
truth. At first glance, a letter to the editor demanding the schools ban anything with a
Unesco “slant” seems to embody the hysterical irrationalism of McCarthyism:
Children are fed a lethal dose of propaganda, a little at a time, so that the
pinpointing of any one phase of it can be made to look ridiculous, while the
eventual, over-all effect is accomplished cumulatively. It is one thing to teach
objectively about the United Nations; it is another to slowly, year by year and grade
by grade, build false, one-way concepts, in order to create future citizens favoring a
Socialistic world government subordinating our own to the level of a vassal
state…This is far more insidious and difficult to combat than open warfare with
rabid Communists, for these people are not Communists—they are either
Socialistic planners or befuddled Americans.260
Unesco’s Education for International Understanding program did advocate for world
citizenship and world government, denounce nationalism and target impressionable
children with subtle methods designed to develop a supranational loyalty to the symbols
of the UN.
Along with internationalism, the charges against Unesco were meddling and
manipulation. This accusation expressed deeply felt anxiety about the power of experts.
Another letter to the editor proclaimed, “Too long has it been said, ‘Leave education to
the experts.’ Now we want our schools returned to the people.”261 Outside the controlled
setting of the laboratory school, the experimental subjects/citizens could be deeply
suspicious of the experts crouching behind the burlap curtain.
But while the nationalists did not hesitate to speak for “the people,” Angelenos
were far from united. Despite common charges of alien subversion and international
interference, pulling back the burlap curtain reveals local teachers, parents and
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administrators. Far from sneaky subversives, their outstanding characteristic was
unguarded earnestness. Despite a Wall Street Journal editorial that gloated that the
School Board’s ban on Unesco “has served on UN a timely and badly needed warning
that there is a province of our domestic affairs that UN must keep out of—the public
school system of the country,” the Unesco Secretariat in Paris merely followed the
controversy in press clippings.262 In fact, as shown above, Unesco’s Education for
International Understanding program was itself predominantly a U.S. enthusiasm.
Nevertheless, the national and local conflicts had tremendous repercussions on the
international organization. Unesco’s supporters sought to clear the Organization of
charges by explaining how it served the U.S. national interest. For example, at the Fourth
National Conference of the U.S. National Commission for Unesco in the fall of 1953, the
Chairman of the Commission and former Deputy Director General Walter Laves
dedicated his speech to explaining how continued U.S. participation in the Organization
was “a necessary part of our declared foreign policy to achieve peace and is clearly in the
national interest.” Also in 1953, the Southern Californian Judge and Chairman of the U.S.
Delegation to the Unesco General Conference Irving Salomon investigated the charges
against Unesco. His report cleared Unesco of Communist subversion and helped
President Eisenhower publicly grant the Organization a clean bill of health. But the
Salomon Report also cleared Unesco of the charge that it advocated “political world
government” and sought to undermine loyalty to the U.S. government by creating world
citizens in any political sense. The report emphasized that “in the most nationalistic
sense, it is in the United States interest to be engaged in this kind of international
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cooperation.”263 This strategy succeeded in staunching the wild charges of subversion—
even the national leadership of the American Legion eventually issued its own report
clearing Unesco and finding that its own Americanism Committee had employed “hatemongering” tactics.264 But in grounding their defense of Unesco in strategic national
interest, Unesco’s defenders denied the real subversive, anti-nationalist values of the
world community, however farfetched that fiction was. The logic of national interest only
made sense when the United States acted through Unesco, not when Unesco acted upon
the United States. Advocates of world citizenship and paranoid super-patriots were exiled
to the kooky fringe together.
And as a direct result of the Los Angeles controversy, Unesco did cease
advocating world citizenship. During the height of the controversy in 1952, the Education
Department was planning another summer seminar, this one under the typically catchy
title, “Education for World Citizenship with Special Reference to the Principles of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Beginning in February, State Department
officials, Unesco staff in New York, and American educators—including an official of
the National Education Association, which also had a program in Education for
International Understanding—began urging the Secretariat to change the seminar’s name
and forwarding letters from Southern California denouncing the organization for
supporting world government. For months the Education Department resisted, ironically
263

Walter Laves, “Unesco in United States Foreign Policy,” 14 Nov. 1953; “An Appraisal of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,” July, 1953, 398.43-Unesco/7-3153, RG 59,
NARA.
264
The Americanism Committee succeeded in persuading the membership to vote to suppress the report,
which only served to further discredit the Legion in the mainstream national media. “UNESCO Not Red,
Legion Group Says; Special Report Clears U.N. Affiliate of Charges,” Los Angeles Times (Sep 11, 1955),
A1; “Legion Group's Report Clearing UNESCO Hit,” Los Angeles Times (Sep 13, 1955), 32.

139
basing its case in national sovereignty; it lacked the authority to change the title of a
seminar mandated by member states at the General Conference. Finally, in July—a
month after the McCarran rider had banned funding organizations that advocated world
government—the Department relented and agreed to change the name to “Education for
Living in a World Community,” a title Eleanor Roosevelt had urged.265 Director General
Torres Bodet opened the conference with a speech explaining the change in title. “It has
never been the purpose of Unesco to turn citizens from their national loyalties,” he said.
“An education which aims at teaching people to live as citizens of a world community
must be, in every country, a national education.”266 It was true that the social theory from
which the fiction of a world community emerged held that national loyalties and world
loyalties were compatible, and the name change was semantic. But the abandonment of
the ideal of world citizenship and the emphasis on strengthening national identifications
did signal a real shift in the character and mission of the Organization.
Unesco was no longer “the people’s UN agency,” but rather an organization of
national governments. After Stalin died, the Soviet Union finally joined the Organization
in 1954. Although the East Bloc added a volatile element to the biannual meetings of the
General Conference, it also added stability by introducing a more familiar balance of
power. In 1954, too, the status of Executive Board members finally changed from
individuals selected for their intellectual eminence and personal integrity to
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representatives of governments. The controversy that had swirled around Unesco since its
inception dissipated over the course of the decade and the budget gradually grew as the
Organization concentrated on providing technical assistance to underdeveloped countries.
But the popular excitement Unesco had inspired in the United States also dissipated, and
the Social Sciences Department lost prestige as it struggled to articulate a new purpose.
The refutation of a challenging conception of world citizenship and world government
drained the fiction of a world community of any truly subversive threat to the
international order based on national sovereignty. And while the view from everywhere
was institutionalized in the organizational structure of UN agencies, the notion that
participation in Unesco’s program could adjust American attitudes and values was
abandoned.
Many observers celebrated the new more “realistic” approach. In the 1954 second
edition of Politics among Nations, Morgenthau explained his more nuanced, positive
treatment of international cooperation: “[The first edition] had to be as radical on the side
of its philosophy as had been the errors on the other side. With that battle largely won,
the polemic purpose can give way to the consolidation of a position that no longer needs
to be attained, but only to be defended and adapted to new experiences.” With the
ongoing “colonial revolution,” it was necessary to “recognize the struggle for the minds
of men as a new dimension of international politics to be added to the traditional
dimensions of diplomacy and war.” In the dynamics of the Cold War, the UN agencies,
he argued, could serve the U.S. national interest on this new ideological battle field.267
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Conclusion
The Tensions Project’s last major initiative resulted in the publication of The
Nature of Conflict: Studies on the Sociological Aspects of International Tensions, a
collection of essays and comprehensive annotated bibliography that was intended as a
final synthesis.268 University of Pennsylvania sociologist Jessie Bernard’s review of the
field provided a scathing critique of the “basic assumptions” of the “so-called ‘tension’
approach.” She warned against the near cultish enthusiasm for manipulative “action
research” associated with the late Lewin’s Group Dynamics Center, dismissed the
semantic theory that postulated conflict derived from misunderstandings instead of the
incompatibility of goals and values, and mocked Freudian “plumbing” theory, which
blamed aggression on clogged outlets for the release of memories and emotions. In place
of the tensions approach, she endorsed “the theory of games of strategy as a basis for the
sociology of conflict.” Ironically, given her distaste for manipulative social science, game
theory relied largely on esoteric mathematical models that effectively excluded lay
participation in making policy.269 In this model of social science, the scientist was
invisible behind a one-way mirror, not peering over a burlap curtain.
Raymond Aron, a regular Unesco contributor, was nearly as dismissive of the
results of the Tensions Project. In “Conflict and War from the Viewpoint of Historical
Sociology,” he brilliantly expressed the historian’s frustration with both the Tensions
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Project’s social psychology and Bernard’s systems theory: the attempt to escape from
history through the discovery of social laws. He used historical examples, for instance, to
show that sometimes national stereotypes followed state policy and sometimes they led
state policy; only careful analysis of specific instances could accurately distinguish cause
and effect. Assuming the purpose of research was to provide useful policy advice, Aron
asserted that the best social science could offer were analogies to similar historical
moments: “Only a sociologist using the historical method could become Adviser to the
Prince.”270 In both Bernard’s and Aron’s model of social science, the sovereign
determined the goal.
It was left to Robert Angell, now President of the International Sociological
Association, to defend the Tensions Project from Bernard’s and Aron’s withering
critiques, with their damning implication that the tensions approach was inexcusably soft
and thus irrelevant to the hard realities of the Cold War. Angell described the need to
evaluate UN agencies’ “contribution to intersocietal normative accommodation.” “One of
the great hopes of the world,” he wrote, “is to discover through social science how to
build a more inclusive social system within which States can peacefully co-operate.” It
was precisely the rules of the game Angell wished to modify, and instead of advising
princes, he called upon social scientists to collaborate with the “literally thousands of
persons in the world who are eager to participate in the building of the larger social
system.” The key to this inclusive democratic order, of course, was developing a world-
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minded citizenry.271 According to the fiction of democracy, after all, the people were
sovereign.
The fiction that guided the Education for International Understanding program
was both conventional and radical: the Second World War had been fought for
democracy, the Four Freedoms of the Atlantic Charter were real, and winning the peace
meant victory against fascism at home as well as abroad. The popular passion for the
“Unesco idea” in the United States suggests that the fiction was not quite pure fantasy,
but its incineration in the flames of the equally passionate reactionary backlash makes
even trying to recover the ashes a suspect endeavor. To write the history of the world
community is to write a counterfactual history.
The controversy the Unesco program incited in the Los Angeles Schools
demonstrated the interaction between international, national, and urban scales. Lewin was
right that conflict at the level of classrooms and neighborhoods contributed to
international tensions. But it was precisely the concrete particularities of the intersecting
patterns at different scales that mattered. The interactions between these levels were
complex and contingent, but not entirely unpredictable. The robust balance of power
between the nuclear armed superpowers turned the Cold War into a battle for hearts and
minds. The United States position as the leader of the Free World made domestic race
relations an international issue and created a political opportunity for antiracist activists.
But the fight against totalitarianism also created the conditions for McCarthyism,
narrowing the opening for left-of-center social justice activists, and making antinationalism appear akin to treason. In Los Angeles, the War brought the long sought
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industrial boom, but with it came massive demographic shifts that undermined the city’s
identity as a WASP haven, challenged municipal services, and even threatened residential
property values. Liberal intellectuals and activists envisioned the multiracial metropolis
as a model of the world community and rallied to the “Unesco philosophy.” Yet while
overt white supremacy was no longer tasteful, right wing groups deployed nationalism as
a cudgel to beat the dreamers of a world community. Even though local activists
defended the Unesco program, intellectual leaders were quick to retreat from the ideals of
world citizenship and world government, which were relatively vague and distant
aspirations. Because these local tensions resulted in conflict in the most powerful
country, they posed an existential threat to Unesco. As an organization of nation states,
Unesco was ill positioned to fight for transnational, as opposed to international,
government.
The intellectuals who authored the fiction of the world community surely were
not surprised by the reactionary passion it inspired. In fact, the methodology they
developed focused on means over ends in order to avoid conflict. Distaste for conflict
was why experts attempted to engineer unity in diversity from behind the burlap curtain.
For the advocates of world community, the appeal of the UN specialized agencies was
precisely that they were non-political functional agencies pursuing uncontroversial ends.
But identities are relational things; they become real through opposition. And so the most
controversial publication in the Towards World Understanding series took recourse in
science fiction: “[Men] have natural enemies on which to exercise their aggressiveness,”
it imagined an elementary school teacher explaining, “and… they would be better
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advised to declare war upon natural scourges such as famine and plague than to fight
their fellow men… ‘What if the inhabitants of Mars should declare war upon the whole
earth?’ one of his pupils may whisper. There would be no need to reply to the remark, for
this child will already have had an inkling of a universal truth.”272
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Chapter Three
The View from Above
The Conservation of Nature and the Development of International Organizations
A Century which relies only on analysis and seems to be afraid of synthesis is not on the
right way; for only both together, like breathing in and breathing out, form the essence of
science.273
Although controversial from its inception, the campaign to use the tools of social
psychology to build a community of world citizens clearly responded to Unesco’s
constitutional mandate to act on “the minds of men.” Yet in an important sense, this
mandate contradicted a fundamental rationale for the UN specialized agencies. In contrast
to the explicitly political General Assembly and Security Council, their value was
supposed to derive from their technical—that is, nonpolitical—function. Precisely by
focusing attention not on group loyalties and cultural values but rather on seemingly
obvious problems such as disease, hunger, and ignorance, the argument went, the
functional agencies could bridge political divides. For internationalists who placed their
hope in the specialized agencies, apolitical scientific knowledge was a critical political
resource mobilized through technical battles against natural hardships.
According to this logic, as a sort of intended unintended consequence, the
transnational infrastructure constructed to fulfill vital basic needs would cultivate loyalty
to the international institutions that provided these services. For the contemporary
political scientist David Mitrany, who successfully branded this the “functionalist”
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approach to international organization, the end and the means were “a working peace.”274
Forty years earlier, William James had put it more poetically. In “A Moral Equivalent of
War,” James called for “an army enlisted against Nature” and dedicated to eradicating
injustice to replace war’s “dread hammer [as] the welder of men into cohesive states.”275
When the United Nations established its system of specialized agencies, this army
enlisted against nature marched under the banner of scientific conservation. Whereas the
social psychological approach to building a world community aimed directly at the
superstructure—values and loyalties, attitudes and opinions—the conservationist strategy
targeted the base—soils and waters, forests and fisheries. The causal logic flowed from
prosperity to peace, but the goal remained a world community. Indeed, demonstrating the
potential complementarity of these approaches, Mitrany was a member of the 1948
International Congress on Mental Health’s International Preparatory Commission,
presenting its conclusions on “Problems of World Citizenship and Good Group
Relations.”276
The model of objectivity social scientists pursued through the view from
everywhere was inappropriate to the functionalist strategy for marshalling scientific
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authority for social and political reform. In their efforts to raise standards of living
through the rational development of natural resources, natural scientists advocated a
perspective best called the view from above. Where the view from everywhere focused
attention on the diversity of culturally determined perspectives, the view from above
concentrated on the unity of material nature. Detlev Bronk, Chairman of the U.S.
National Research Council, succinctly expressed the political implications of this faith in
ontological universality in his welcoming speech to the 1949 United Nations Scientific
Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources: “National boundaries are
meaningless in the study of natural phenomena. The properties of inorganic matter and
living organisms are little affected by the limits of States. Natural phenomena, observed
anywhere, must be fitted into a consistent pattern of universal validity. This is the basis
for the world-wide unity of science.”277 The natural world was one world, but on this
solid base, humans had constructed a patchwork of cultural, economic, and political
structures that did not conform to natural boundaries. A unified world science was
necessary to develop a global view from above that revealed the natural patterns to which
a stable world society must correspond. Because reserves of natural resources crossed
political boundaries and were unevenly distributed between nations, their rational
conservation and utilization required—and could facilitate—international cooperation.
Where the view from everywhere attempted to produce unity out of diverse
cultural patterns, the view from above promised to find unity in the diverse patterns of
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natural environments. Chapter Six examines the practices of mapping global natural
resources in the international community. This chapter analyzes the institutional politics
and scientific debates that created the space in which the surveys made sense.
If social psychology was the synthetic science of the view from everywhere,
ecology filled this role for the view from above. At a highly abstract level, the central
themes of both social psychology and ecology were interdependence and equilibrium. For
internationalist conservationists, interdependence applied to national economies,
economic sectors, types of resources, and scientific disciplines. Equilibrium often
expressed the ideal of a complex, dynamic ecological balance. But the bewildering
complexity of the equilibrium—the interdependency of everything—meant that in the
final accounting, balance often simply signified world population debits against natural
resources credits.278
The audit of nature’s books revealed a world community headed deep into the red.
By the late-1940s, the planet was well into a century of unprecedented anthropogenic
environmental change.279 Food shortages put Europe on the ration and famine wasted
India even as populations continued to grow. Indeed, international resources conservation
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was consistently framed as a response to the population crisis. And even as the debit side
of the ledger grew, the credit side shrunk. Environmental scientists warned that
exploitative agricultural practices were so depleting the world’s soil fertility that the earth
was in danger of losing the capacity to support civilization. Increasing the yield of the
world’s natural resources so that they kept pace with increasing populations and rising
expectations could buy precious time in which the population bomb might be defused.280
With citizens understandably distracted by fears of another, possibly final war, supporters
of the UN specialized agencies ratcheted up their rhetoric to win support for the army
uniting against natural hardships. In 1949, when President Truman announced Point IV,
the Bold New Plan for technical assistance to underdeveloped countries, international
civil servants and activist experts recognized a potential “moral equivalent of war.” Just
as New Deal conservation had contributed to the growth of the U.S. federal government,
the “conquest of nature” offered IGOs an opportunity for institutional growth.281
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Conservationists fretted over the ecological ignorance of citizens and politicians,
but the broad definition of their field also meant that it was overcrowded with institutions
that had a stake in resource management. At the national level, multiple government
departments, frequently with competing ambitions, were typically charged with
husbanding a country’s renewable and non-renewable resources. These bureaucratic
divisions were recreated at the international level, where each specialized agency
articulated with its national equivalent. Mobilizing for the international conquest of
nature presented these organizations with an opportunity for institutional growth, but also
with threats of territorial invasion from rival agencies. Because agencies had distinct
institutional cultures, expertise, and mandates, the very purpose of a natural resource—
that is, how nature would be valued—was at stake in bureaucratic negotiations over
which organization could claim competence over which resource.282
The significance of these bureaucratic turf battles was a consequence of
embedding the view from above in the organizational structure of the UN System. Even
more than an accounting perspective, the view from above offered a cartographic
perspective. Its most recognizable forms were surveys of soils, flora and fauna, geology,
climate, and populations—all of which could be synthesized in an ecological map. In the
interwar years, this form of scientific observation literally achieved the view from above:
airplanes allowed specialists to rapidly survey nature and aerial photographs facilitated
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mapping natural resources in remote areas.283 But seeing the world from the air did not
make boundaries obvious. Determining where one soil type, climatic zone, or ecological
area ended still required expert judgment—and rugged boots. Deciphering “a consistent
pattern of universal validity” was hard work. And not just because of nature’s
mischievous diversity. Social surveys of agriculture, education, health and employment
were superimposed on natural resource surveys, and these categories corresponded to the
mandates of particular UN specialized agencies. In the language of science studies, ideas
and institutions were co-produced.284
Defining the criteria of “universal validity” and reforming institutions to
harmonize with nature’s pattern demanded renegotiating society’s boundaries. Indeed,
this cultural boundary work was the reason the view from above could be an instrument
of social and political reform. And since the political map of the world was redrawn in
the 1940s, boundaries of all sorts appeared unusually unstable. In the postwar
international community, the work of producing the view from above included
establishing, sustaining, enlarging, policing, breaching, and sometimes erasing (to borrow
Thomas Gieryn’s list of verbs along with his method of cultural cartography) the
boundaries separating science from politics, natural knowledge from social knowledge,
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governmental from nongovernmental, nature from civilization.285 The unsettled quality of
this cultural cartography in the postwar international community afforded well-positioned
experts and civil servants a surprising degree of strategic creativity to redefine their
organizations’ functional mandates. Unesco’s success in claiming a piece of the valuable
natural resources turf—a field unmentioned in the Organization’s constitution—by first
establishing and then erasing the boundary separating utilization of natural resources
from protection of nature demonstrates how these boundary maneuvers worked in
practice.
From this analysis of bureaucratic politics and technical papers, I argue that the
relationship between epistemology and politics—between knowledge and power—is
always flexible; that is, contingent upon interactions in particular historical situations. For
this argument, boundary work that targeted the line separating imperialism from
internationalism is particularly important. In fact, one of the origins of the view from
above was a quintessentially imperial mode of natural history in which far-flung
collectors sent specimens or standardized meteorological and geographic data to “centers
of calculation” (e.g. botanical gardens, museums, naval offices) in the metropole where
the fungible information was organized into tables, taxonomic systems, and maps.286 For
the UN, the challenge was to make the production of the view from above a basis of
international cooperation.
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This chapter surveys five international conservation conferences held in 1948 and
1949 to reconstruct the epistemological and institutional logic of the view from above at
the historical moment development became the raison d’être of the specialized agencies.
Conferences in the United States (for the Americas), New Zealand (for the Pacific), and
France (for Europe and Africa) culminated in two concurrent conferences in Lake
Success: the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of
Resources (UNSCCUR) and the Unesco-International Union for the Protection of Nature
Technical Conference on the Protection of Nature. These conferences represent a small
but not arbitrary sample; a handful of well-placed experts linked the regional meetings
into a series in an attempt to produce a world approach to nature conservation. The
conferences reveal how the purposes and practices of nature conservation varied by
nation, region, and empire, but also how the boundaries between like-minded groups
crossed political borders. The conservation movement was fragmented but already
transnational. Analysis of the conferences reveals the often contradictory multiplicity of
conservationists’ intellectual and political commitments. The big ideas that would shape
the international development regime for the next twenty-five years were present at the
inception. But with seemingly boundless possibilities, the conservationist’s crusade was
in danger of galloping off in all directions at once. The goal of the conferences was to
enlist these diverse forces into a single army for the war against nature.
Before surveying the conferences, the chapter begins by investigating the unlikely
route through which these five conferences were mobilized in the campaign to establish a
world approach to nature conservation.
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Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and the Origins of the Nature Conservation Conferences
On his return to Paris from Unesco’s General Conference in Mexico City in
December 1947, Director General Julian Huxley stopped off for a meeting with leaders of
the U.S. conservation establishment at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington
D.C. There he reported that the General Conference had “demonstrated the lack of
whole-hearted international support of the principle of worldwide wild life and National
Park conservation.” The General Conference had forced the Secretariat to delay a
conference to establish a semi-governmental International Union for the Protection of
Nature. The directors of the U.S. Fish and Wild Life Service, National Park Service and a
representative of the Forest Service attended the meeting in Washington, but the key
participants were three conservationists busy planning international conservation
conferences of their own: William Vogt, Chief of the Conservation Service of the PanAmerican Union, who was General Secretary of the Inter-American Conference on the
Conservation of Renewable Resources; Harold J. Coolidge, Executive Secretary of the
U.S. National Research Council’s new Pacific Science Board, who was a prime-mover
behind the Seventh Pacific Science Congress, particularly its Standing Committee on
Nature Protection; and Arthur “Tex” Goldschmidt, who, from his position in the
Department of the Interior, was the government’s point-man on the U.S. sponsored
United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources
(UNSCCUR)—a conference suffering its own repeated delays due to lack of wholehearted international support. The four men decided to reframe each of the conferences
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(plus a European and African symposium assigned to Huxley) into a coherent series to
cultivate what Coolidge termed a “world approach” to nature conservation.287
The ease with which this plan fell into place at an informal hour-and-a-half
meeting belies the years of recondite negotiations necessary to convene each of the
conferences—particularly Unesco’s Nature Protection Conference and UNSCCUR. The
problem was less that there was too little interest in conservation than that there was too
much. The conferences exemplified the porous membrane between governmental and
nongovernmental. National and international organizations of both types attempted to use
or prevent the conferences to establish or defend fields of competence, strengthen
international networks, and influence policy.
The origins of UNSCCUR dated back to a proposal in 1944 from the father of the
American conservation movement, Gifford Pinchot, to President Roosevelt. Pinchot
described conservation—“the planned and orderly use of all the earth produces for the
greatest good of the greatest number for the longest time”—as “a necessary requirement
for peace.” Intentionally avoiding divisive details, he envisioned an “open discussion [of]
the principles upon which all Nations can agree for conserving and distributing the
natural resources of the earth.” He hoped the conference would consider “an inventory of
the natural resources of the earth,” and establish an International Resources Office to
serve as a global data bank.288 Like all conservationists, Pinchot valued the view from
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above. The idea appealed to Roosevelt, who imagined a conference in which each of the
United and Affiliated Nations would send one man to a secluded spot in the United States
to exchange information on their countries’ resources and “begin a program to build up
non-buying nations into good customers.”289 If conservation were the basis of peace, then
in this vision, it depended on an international community of elites that resembled the
“community of kings” of the feudal era, not the popular world community idealistic
internationalists promoted.290
The first obstacle to a World Conservation Conference turned out to be
Roosevelt’s own State Department. Edward R. Stettinius was already struggling to
reconcile designs for the postwar system of international organizations. He pointed out
that in addition to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
complex negotiations over an International Trade Organization, Article I of the UN Food
and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) provisional constitution mandated that the agency
“shall promote and…recommend national and international action with regard to…the
conservation of natural resources.” Pinchot’s meeting appeared redundant. By March
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1945, Roosevelt was convinced that a world conservation conference would have to
await the outcome of the San Francisco meeting that August where, it was hoped, the
institutional architecture of the new international system would be finalized.291
In September 1946, a month before Pinchot’s death, Truman finally proposed that
the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) convene UNSCCUR.292 Although it
emphasized the relationship between prosperity and peace, the proposal called for a
different conference than Pinchot and Roosevelt had envisioned, particularly in terms of
the enhanced role of science:
Warfare has taken a heavy toll of many natural resources; the rebuilding of the
nations and the industrialization of underdeveloped areas will require an additional
large depletion of them. Waste, destruction and uneconomic use of resources
anywhere damage mankind’s common estate. The real or exaggerated fear of
resource shortages and declining standards of living has in the past involved
nations in warfare. Every member of the United Nations is deeply interested in
preventing a recurrence of that fear and of those consequences. Conservation can
become a major basis of peace. Modern science has itself become a major
international resource which facilitates the use of other resources. Their adequate
utilization can become a major basis of world prosperity.293
This was a denationalized vision of nature in which undeveloped or wastefully exploited
resources anywhere were the business of people everywhere. Instead of avoiding dissent
by sticking to general principles, conflict would be avoided by focusing on technical
details.
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The proposal came from the head of the U.S. government, but it called for a
nongovernmental meeting. Delegates would not “represent the views of the governments
of their nations,” but would be free to express their expert judgment. The meeting would
be “devoted solely to the exchange of ideas and experience among engineers, resource
technicians, economists and other experts in the natural and social sciences” and focus on
assessing the practical value of techniques in terms of benefit-cost analyses.294 As the
Chairman of UNSCCUR’s Preparatory Committee, Columbia University economist
Carter Goodrich, observed shortly after Truman announced Point IV in January 1949, the
definition of science as an international resource “fit very precisely the…specifications”
of the President’s Bold New Program of technical assistance to underdeveloped
countries.295 Indeed, Point IV energized ECOSOC (the UN Economic and Social
Council), which re-branded UNSCCUR its first major technical assistance project.296
While important segments of the U.S. conservation community supported
UNSCCUR, Europeans, FAO, and even ECOSOC were unenthusiastic. So few nonAmericans attended the initial meetings of UNSCCUR’s Preparatory Committee that they
had to be labeled informal. The U.S. designated two high profile Standing Committees to
comment on the provisional agenda. In contrast, most Latin American countries offered
no comments; the Soviet Union predictably never responded to invitations to participate;
and Western Europeans were generally annoyed by the American initiative. French,
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Dutch, British, and Swedish commentators were “greatly disturbed” that UNSCCUR
“overlapped so much” with a half dozen European based international organizations that
were already holding regular congresses on what the Americans called nonrenewable
resources.297
Not surprisingly, FAO, which was fiercely territorial even by the standards of
specialized agencies, was especially suspicious that the conference was only ECOSOC’s
driving wedge into its turf. Following the logic of IGOs, the reason FAO officials did not
want the conference—duplication of their functional mandate—assured that they would
seek a lead role in organizing it. FAO demanded “complete responsibility for
recommendations to the Preparatory Committee with respect to ‘renewable resources’.”
FAO selected the topics, chairmen, and authors and edited or wrote the key papers in
“close cooperation” with the USDA. (Such cooperation was the norm, especially while
FAO was still located in Washington D.C.)298 UNSCCUR helped define FAO’s field of
competence as “renewable resources,” a term FAO officers soon stopped demarking with
quotation marks.
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Given that UNSCCUR was a “scientific” conference and the central role that the
environmental sciences would play in Unesco’s program, it is surprising that the ILO and
WHO participated more actively in the preparations than Unesco. The absence was not
for lack of personal interest. Huxley and Joseph Needham, the Director of the Natural
Sciences Department, were leading figures in the British Social Relations of Science
movement, which united scientists ranging from Fabians to Communists who called for
state planning of science and the scientific planning of society. As a series of conferences
in 1942 on “Science and World Order,” “European Agriculture,” and “Mineral Resources
and the Atlantic Charter” demonstrated, this movement was intensely concerned with
resource conservation. It was in the context of these meetings that the British Communist
scientist J. D. Bernal had proposed an International Resources Office “capable of taking a
comprehensive view of resources [i.e. material, technical, and human resources] and their
utilisation.”299 (Pinchot had framed his original proposal to F.D.R. as a step towards
realizing Bernal’s scheme.) Unesco’s first report analyzing the Organization’s role in
UNSCCUR echoed Bernal’s conclusion: “From the cultural point of view, from the point
of view of the survival of the human race, what was wanted was synoptic facts of the
resources of the world; balanced accounts of resources given in standardized units so that
figures would be available for all countries which could be easily compared.”300 Unesco’s
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tepid response to UNSCCUR was not due to a lack of enthusiasm for the view from
above.
UNSCCUR’s focus on technical knowledge in order to exclude controversies over
ethical principles and cultural values did raise concerns within Unesco. In response to an
analysis from the Social Sciences Department on “inter-relationships between resources
and tensions” that suggested “inequalities of distribution of resources within a country
may also lead to a state of mind inimical to international understanding,” the Office of the
Director General noted that “while this is true, it is even more explosive than the ‘haves
and have-nots’ item [i.e. rich and poor countries], and should not be added. Moreover,
UN is debarred by its Charter from interfering in domestic affairs.”301 The unequal
consumption of resources at any political scale—the cause of war UNSCCUR was
supposed to avert—was too controversial to discuss. If the development of international
functional agencies was a contribution to peace, then this justified excluding important
causes of war from open discussion. But this strategy grated against Unesco’s idealistic
institutional culture, which sought to make social tensions manageable by exposing them
to the light of rational analysis.
The paradoxes of science as a political resource, however, do not explain
Unesco’s halfhearted participation in preparations for UNSCCUR. Part of the problem
was simply that Unesco did not have the staff in New York to participate in the
Preparatory Committee. More importantly, the Secretariat’s priority was establishing
competence in the field of nature protection by convening its own international
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conference. In 1947, Huxley wrote to UN Assistant Secretary-General Henri Laugier:
“The economic aspects of the Conservation of Resources are not directly within our
purview; the Preservation of Nature is one of our concerns, and where the two problems
merge, as they do very markedly in [the case of the two conferences], we must clearly
work hand in hand.”302 Unesco’s claim to a piece of the coveted natural resources turf in
the UN system was based on sustaining the boundary between preservation and economic
utility.
The national and institutional politics of the international preservation of nature
were nearly as complex and competitive as the conservation of resources. The initial
impetus for a new international organization for nature protection came from the Swiss
League for the Protection of Nature, which proposed an international conference in
Brunnen in 1947 to establish a semi-governmental union. The Swiss billed the new union
as a reincarnation of a Consultative Commission for the Protection of Nature that had
been created in Berne right before the First World War. But this proved too
presumptuous. One problem was that the Consultative Commission had been “unable to
carry out any work owing to the First World War, and its very existence was
forgotten.”303 More significantly, the Swiss initiative angered the European conservation
establishment. Phyllis Barclay-Smith, Secretary of the International Committee for Bird
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Preservation (founded in 1922 and the biggest preservationist INGO) warned Needham
that “all nature preservation circles in the United Kingdom look with considerable
suspicion on the Swiss attempt to secure the initiative in forming a new International
body.” Not only did the Swiss lack any “historical claim” to leadership, but they had “no
overseas stake in the problem, such as have Great Britain, France, Holland and Belgium.”
The rightful leadership of an international organization should “come from the former
centre in such matters, Belgium and Holland.” If it had been slow to reconstitute, “some
allowance must be made for the difficulties under which these countries, and our own,
labour at the moment.”304 For Barclay-Smith and other European preservationists, it was
ridiculous that a tiny, non-imperial power should attempt to claim leadership of
international nature protection, but the opportunism of the neutral Swiss taking advantage
of the devastation wrought in defense of a free Europe was truly galling.
The most eminent of the Belgian nature protectionists, Victor Van Straelen,
President of the Institut pour l’Etude Agronomique du Congo Belge and of the
Administrative Council of the Parcs Nationaux du Congo Belge, agreed on the
importance of imperial leadership and demonstrated that British-Belgian respect was
mutual: “The only way of doing something in Africa is through European governments.
The governments in Africa are not interested…The centre is the British government;
everything depends on it.”305 Nature preservation, however, was not a priority for the
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British in the hard years following World War Two. H.M.G. wrote Needham that the
Swiss conference “should be postponed or confined to an unofficial exploration of the
problem.”306 A contemporary scheme to make the Empire self-sufficient in fats by
converting millions of acres of wilderness to groundnuts in Tanganyika was conducted
with military urgency, but precious financial and diplomatic resources could not be
spared for nature protection.
To keep the British on board, Needham brokered a deal in which the Swiss agreed
to make the 1947 Brunnen conference (where they had planned to formally constitute the
new International Union) a nongovernmental meeting and any organization it established
provisional. The following year Unesco would call an intergovernmental congress at
which government delegates would “definitely approve the constitution of the allinclusive semi-governmental organization.”307 After a bitter debate that revealed the split
between the imperial and non-imperial powers at Brunnen, Needham’s compromise was
adopted.
But the Swiss initiative on which Unesco piggy-backed also reflected a project
designed for the old world—fittingly, its objective was to revive a forgotten Commission
from 1913. The plan had been initiated independently from the UN system and neither
the Swiss League nor Unesco had made much effort to engage the United States, which
provided forty percent of Unesco’s budget and was a recognized leader in all aspects of
nature protection. Only one American organization was represented at the Brunnen
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conference, the New York Zoological Society, which also acted as an “unofficial
observer” for FAO. The Unesco secretariat, however, did not fully recognize the
weakness in the foundation it had built for its bid to convene an international congress. It
did not brief the “leading U.S. private and national organizations” on Unesco’s nature
preservation project until a week before the delegates were to leave for the General
Conference in Mexico City where the organization’s 1948 program would be
determined.308 Thus, the “chequered history” of nature protection at the General
Conference. The Conference placed priority on Unesco’s contribution to UNSCCUR.309
The British delegates at Brunnen had prevented the formation of an international
organization on Huxley’s guarantee that Unesco would convene an intergovernmental
congress in 1948, but the United Kingdom and the United States had forced him to
postpone it.310
This was the background to the meeting at the National Academy of Science.
Huxley needed to engage the American conservation community and transform the
relationship between UNSCCUR and the Nature Protection Conference from competitive
to collaborative ventures. Goldschmidt hoped to tap Unesco’s connections to the
European scientific community to gain international support for UNSCCUR. Yet even
after Huxley and Goldschmidt agreed to partner, Unesco still did not have the staff to
spare in New York to participate in UNSCCUR’s Preparatory Committee. Goldschmidt
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improvised a solution in the best way possible: “without costing any money.” He wrote
Huxley to suggest “your friend Fairfield Osborn” or his associates at the Conservation
Foundation represent Unesco at the meetings.311 Osborn had spun the Conservation
Foundation off of the N.Y. Zoological Society, of which he was also president; thus,
Osborn’s NGOs represented FAO in Brunnen and Unesco in New York.
On the one hand, organizing the conservation conferences required sustained
negotiations between bureaucratic interests at the level of the nation, the region, and the
UN. National ministries and specialized agencies demanded control over particular fields;
government representatives debated resolutions at intergovernmental conferences; and
non- or semi-governmental organizations applied pressure to influence agendas. On the
other hand, in an informal meeting, Huxley, Coolidge, Vogt, and Goldschmidt patched
together their respective conferences into a series that linked world regions and claimed
to represent a world approach to managing nature. This accomplishment was possible
because the transatlantic conservation community was so small—much smaller than its
national equivalents. The intimacy of this community—where Osborn’s organization
represented FAO at a meeting on nature protection supported by Unesco and Unesco at a
meeting on conservation led by FAO—enabled improvisation for and amplified the
voices of a few well-connected individuals. But this intimacy was also a weakness. The
five conferences—and the communities they represented—were linked in an ad hoc
manner; attendees and even organizers had to be told that they were participating in
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regional conferences building towards global UN congresses. In the terminology of midtwentieth century social science, there was no organic world conservation community.
The Conservation Conferences
Participants in the series of five conservation conferences attached various, often
contradictory objectives to them. Many attendees surely wondered whether, aside from
padding one’s C.V., there was any point to the congresses. Reading through the
thousands of papers published in the conferences’ proceedings, most too short to be
anything but a single dull point, the historian can empathize with these grumpy backrowers. Yet it can also seem like the conferences were planned for the future historian—
the only reasonable justification for the expense and hassle of organizing such large
gatherings of academics and civil servants being to produce a panoramic snapshot of an
intellectual community. Each of the preliminary conferences was intended to represent a
region, but the regions—the Americas, Africa and Europe, and the Pacific—made sense
less in terms of biogeography than geopolitics. In this section, I survey these three
conferences to identify prominent political, sociological, and intellectual patterns in the
still fragmented international conservation community.
The Hemisphere Congress
Only in retrospect, and from a particular angle, can the first of the regional
conferences be seen as preliminary to the Lake Success conferences. The Inter-American
Conference on Conservation of Renewable Natural Resources, or the Hemisphere
Conference, is more properly placed in the context of sixty years of American scientific
congresses. It was organized pursuant to the fifty-fifth resolution of the Third Inter-
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American Conference on Agriculture, held in Caracas in 1945, but it is illuminating to
trace its origins through the Eighth American Scientific Congress held in Washington
D.C. in 1940. At the Eighth Congress, 3,800 attendees representing 650 educational and
scientific bodies and all twenty-one republics produced twelve volumes of Proceedings.
The Agriculture and Conservation Section of the conference was chaired by Hugh
Hammond Bennett, Chief of the USDA’s Soil Conservation Service, whom the
Hemisphere Conference would nominate for the Nobel Peace Prize. In Bennett’s section,
Pinchot presented his plan for “Conservation as a Foundation of Permanent Peace,” of
which a World Conservation Conference was to be the first step.312 Indeed, there were
few new ideas at the Hemisphere Conference. The War transformed political, economic
and social realities, but the conceptual tools for understanding the new world were
inherited from the old.313
But the reason for tracing the origins of the Hemisphere Conference to the Eighth
American Scientific Congress is the latter’s timing. It had been intended to mark the
fiftieth anniversary of the Pan American Union, but convened on the day “the flaming
cauldron of war in Europe was overturned upon small and relatively defenseless nations,”
as Secretary of State Cordell Hull put it. Hull echoed the two principal themes of the
plenary speeches when he wrote that the gathering of scholars stood as a “rebuke to [the
War’s] mad perversion of science to destructive ends” and dedicated the Proceedings to
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“these faithful benefactors of mankind and to the great American family of nations which
offers them a haven of peace, democracy, and security.”314 The family patriarch,
President Roosevelt, invoked the creative and destructive potential of science and the
collective security of the American republics in his opening address—themes Truman
would echo eight years later at the Hemisphere Conference. The soaring rhetoric of the
Cuban Minister of National Defense, Domingo F. Ramos captures the mood: “No more is
there an American meaning ‘North America,’ or a ‘Our America’ of Latin Americans;
there is only one America which for each and every one of us constitutes ‘My
America.’”315 In other times and places, Latin American diplomats dismissed the Pan
American Union as “the colonial division of the Department of State,” but in Denver in
1948, the historical moment in which the Monroe Doctrine appeared more like mutual
security than informal imperialism had not fully passed.316
U.S.-Latin American relations in conservation had grown closer during the war.
The foundation of the Pan American Union’s Conservation Service, under the leadership
of the General Secretary of the Hemisphere Conference William Vogt, was only one
indication. The Conference’s President, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Charles F.
Brannan, reported that since 1942, the year the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural
Sciences was founded, 140 scientists from Latin American countries had visited the U.S.
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Soil Conservation Service, including 73 trainees who had spent one to two years with the
Service.317 So many new inter-American conservation programs had been started that
when the Chief of the Uruguayan Soil Classification and Conservation Service proposed
an “Inter-American Organization for Conservation of Renewable Natural Resources,” the
delegates dismissed the idea out of hand; it was simply redundant.318 Latin American
delegates described new constitutional laws mandating resource conservation and
ambitious new programs based on the U.S. model, such as the Mexican plan to establish
at least 250 conservation districts.319 Cooperation was taken to its logical conclusion in
the “servico” program of the Washington D.C. Institute of Inter-American Affairs (also
established in 1942), which placed and paid the salaries of U.S. citizens in Latin
American ministries of health, education, and agriculture, where they directed their own
staff and reported both to the secretary of the national ministry and to the U.S. Institute—
an arrangement that highlights the fragility of the boundary separating internationalism
from imperialism.320
Whether the U.S. relationship with its southern neighbors represented imperial
exploitation or international cooperation depended in part on who benefited from the flow
of the Hemisphere’s resources. At the Eighth Congress, Secretary of Agriculture Henry
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Wallace envisioned an elaborate system of agricultural development in which Latin
American countries produced tropical cash crops that could not grow in the United
States—rubber, cinchona, kapok, cocoa, tropical hardwoods, and so on—which would
“provide a sound basis for complementary trade relations” and “give practical
significance to the idea of Pan-American solidarity.” Fair trade, not free trade, was the
guiding ideology.321 Managing the accounts of such a system required attaining the view
from above. Wallace also addressed the Statistical Section of the Congress, which passed
resolutions calling for an Inter-American Conservation Commission that would be
“charged with the duty of preparing an inventory of world natural resources…in the
interest of permanent peace.” For Wallace, the Hemisphere’s moral community was
founded upon balanced trade relations between interdependent nations; to assure the
solidarity of the American continent (it was conventional to refer to North and South
America as a single continent) economic patterns had to align with natural patterns.
This logic implied that the primary target of conservationist’s interventions was
society, not nature. According to the ecologist Paul Sears, “The basis of man’s
adjustment to the soil is to be found in the form or pattern of his culture.”322 Soil erosion
was to mid-twentieth century conservation what climate change is to early-twenty-first
century environmentalism, and apocalyptic scenarios inspired similar zeal. A resolution
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at the Hemisphere Conference referred to soil conservation as a “universal crusade.”323
Yet while soil scientists could measure a civilization’s health in the fertility its soils and
sound the alarm, making the necessary adjustments required social knowledge. The
Hemisphere Conference left no doubt about the value of breaking down disciplinary
boundaries. Its Declaration of Principles stated: “Conservation requires the coordinated
assistance of all branches of knowledge that deal with peoples and their institutions.
Economics, sociology, psychology, anthropology—all these and many other disciplines
must guide us in the application of what the basic sciences have shown to be
desirable.”324
This multidisciplinary strategy for democratically achieving, in Sears’ words, the
“readjustment of culture to soil” was most fully developed in the USDA’s agricultural
extension program. When the USDA’s Director of Extension, M. L. Wilson, outlined the
purposes and practices of extension work, he drew explicitly on the group dynamics
literature that influenced the architects of the view from everywhere. He described it as a
two-way traffic, bringing new research and knowledge to the farm and bringing the
problems of rural people to the attention of science. In explaining the importance of
social science to extension programs, Wilson stressed that the purpose was not just to
improve farming, but also “the idea of human conservation [and] personality
development.”325 More than dollars-per-acre, the measure of a conservation program’s
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success was the quality of rural life. The proper organization of the soil may have
determined the proper organization of society, but an ecological approach to conservation
required expertise in both soil science and social psychology. Fertile fields, mental
health, and world peace were dependent variables.
The ethos of the view from everywhere was even incorporated into the practice of
soil surveys—an observational technology that usually typified the view from above. The
Chief of the Soil Service Survey Division described how land capability was determined
by “scientifically trained soil technicians” who walked the field, boring holes at regular
intervals to determine soil “depth, texture, permeability, available moisture capacity,
inherent fertility, organic matter content, and other characteristics.” The surveyors
measured slopes, noted characteristics like rockiness, gauged soil loss through erosion,
and recorded the present use of the land. All of this information was coded onto aerial
photographs. These and smaller scale soil surveys had identified roughly sixty-million
acres of cultivated land in the United States that was unsuitable for permanent
agriculture, but also 100 million acres of forests and grasslands “potentially suited for
cultivation.” Soil surveys literally manifested the view from above. But aerial
photographs and other data were “joined with practical farm experience in classifying the
land and in working out the right combination of practices to make full use, without
waste, of the land resources.” Not only did the system emphasize interdisciplinary
collaboration between “soil conservationists, soil scientists, agronomists, engineers,
foresters, biologists, [and] agricultural specialists,” but also the technical experts were
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expected to learn from the experience of “local farmers.”326 In its interdisciplinarity and
commitment to dialogue with the citizens whose behavior it was meant to change, this
method of determining the value of land resembled the view from everywhere.
The goal of ecological land management was to maintain a productive balance
between systemic tensions—to emulate climax communities in which plants, animals,
soil, and water existed in dynamic balance by making the most efficient use of an area’s
energy resources. Accounting metaphors proliferated. The Hemisphere Conference’s
Declaration of Principles stated the standard analogy:
The principal is the natural resources. The interest is the earth’s ability to maintain
their yield so long as natural relationships are preserved and so long as man will
govern his activities and institutions to accord with them. No generation is free to
spend more than the interest yielded by rational use of the heritage. On the contrary
the duty of every generation is to apply its full knowledge to protect and increase
the capital sum.
In fact, population growth meant that increasing the capital sum was imperative,
but many participants doubted the possibility that expanding resources was a viable
solution to the crisis. The most significant development in conservation discourse
between the Eighth Congress and the Hemisphere Conference was increased attention to
the peril of population growth. Few people were as influential in elevating population
growth to the top of the conservation agenda as the Conference’s Secretary General.
Vogt’s shockingly alarmist Road to Survival, published the year of the Conference,
quickly became the population control movement’s most successful popularization to
date. Road to Survival provided a continent by continent survey of carrying capacity,
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which Vogt calculated according to the equation C = b : e, where C was carrying
capacity, b was biotic potential of the land, and e represented environmental resistance. In
Vogt’s world, b had a fixed limit, which was realized in the natural climax community,
and human action generally worked to increase e, thus lowering carrying capacity. The
agricultural revolution (a term Vogt placed within sneering quotation marks) had “not
raised the earth’s biotic potential,” but instead had “enormously increased” global
environmental resistances by “destroying hundreds of millions of productive acres.”327 In
part, this argument was just an italicized version of conventional wisdom derived from
the experience of the Dust Bowl (and, ironically, glutted grain markets) that pushed for
the retirement of marginal farmland before more soil blew away.328 But according to
Vogt’s arithmetic, people were always a negative variable. Attempting to use science to
raise the planet’s carrying capacity (i.e. increase production) was a certain path to
extinction. The only road to survival was a radical break from the inherently exploitative
capitalist system and population control.
Not surprisingly, the Hemisphere Conference reflected Vogt’s passion for
population control. The discussion leader for Section I, “Human Populations and
Productive Capacity of the Land,” was Robert C. Cook, the longtime editor of the
Journal of Heredity. Cook was very much interested in the quality of populations, but his
introduction to the papers tactfully ignored eugenic concerns. Instead, he related the
parable of the Mesa Verde people, whose agricultural society had succumbed to drought,
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its land reverting to desert: “So intimate are the interrelationships of the nations
becoming that there is a real danger that the tragedy of the Mesa Verde could be
reenacted on a global basis. It might be that there would be left no hospitable valleys to
the south in which the nations of the world could take refuge…the prospect of population
increase or its decline elsewhere on the earth has a significance for us.”329 Instead of
accelerating economic growth, development programs might transform the entire planet
into a manmade desert—the very symbol and substance of underdevelopment. The goal
should not be growth, but rather the dynamic yet stable equilibrium of the climax
community.
Indeed, the succession from a weedy pioneer to a mature climax community was
the transition from an economy of exploitation to an economy of conservation. It has
become taken for granted that industrialized countries, and particularly the United States,
were the model towards which development programs attempted to guide
underdeveloped nations. But too much attention to the ideal of the climax community and
the strength of the U.S. economy can distract from the problem of the pioneer community
and the negative example of the United States. Bennett’s statement to the Eighth
Congress was a typical preamble to a soil conservation sermon: “As far as can be
determined from historical records, the United States has wasted its precious soil resource
faster than any other nation or race that ever engaged in agriculture on an extensive
scale.”330 Or, in Vogt’s characteristic language: “Unfortunately, our forefathers…were
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some of the most destructive groups of human beings that have ever raped the earth.”331
At the Hemisphere Conference, plant ecologist Walter Cottam explained the problem:
“The invasion of an unspoiled continent by an intelligent but unenlightened civilization
led to a psychology of abundance that lies at the bottom of our resource woes today.”332
As the historian Robert Kohler has shown, this generation of American naturalists grew
up exploring pockets of biologically diverse nature spared from the creative destruction
of westward expansion; to them, the frontier epoch had endowed Americans with a
wasteful pioneer mentality.333
While there was a consensus that population growth and a frontier mentality
threatened civilization, Vogt’s radical solutions garnered much less support. An
international conference with Catholic countries was hardly the place to push birth
control—only the vaguest of allusions (“other measures that careful study renders
advisable”) made it into the resolutions. On the resources side of the balance sheet, the
Chief of the USDA’s Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Oris V. Wells (who would soon
move on to FAO), began his paper by asking rhetorically, “Against what criteria…should
the new [desired] balances be measured? What purpose or end do we seek?” He was
justified in assuming “that no one will seriously argue for the extreme view that the
restoration of our renewable natural resources to their original or primeval state is either
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possible or generally desirable, even though this may be so for a few parks.”334 Charles
Kellogg, the eminent and long-serving Chief of the USDA’s Division of Soil Survey,
represented the consensus at UNSCCUR: “What we are seeking,” he declared, “is a
cultural balance between people and resources, and that balance is often far, far above the
natural balance.”335 In a world without frontiers, natural, social, cultural, political, and
economic balances were interdependent, and they all required active intervention to
maintain optimal equilibrium. Despite prophecies of civilization’s collapse, the general
mood of the Hemisphere Conference was an optimistic faith in the power of science to
guide humanity through the eye of the natural resources needle.
The optimism of the Hemisphere Conference was founded on a sense of
hemispheric solidarity, but this very solidarity posed a potential obstacle to a world
approach to conservation. The catastrophic eruption of violence in Europe had
accelerated the institutional integration and bolstered the communal spirit of the
Americas that was necessary for conservation in the broad sense. But solidarity based on
enforcing the Hemisphere’s boundaries was out-of-sync with the postwar world. With the
establishment of the UN System and the geographic expansion of the United States’
sphere of influence, Latin Americans worried about U.S. distraction in Europe and the
Pacific. In the America’s, the boundary between international cooperation and imperial
exploitation remained extremely fine, of course. U.S. technical assistance and regional
economic planning could easily slip into a form of indirect rule. Nevertheless, how the
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positive spirit of Pan Americanism could be integrated into a world community remained
an open question. The nature conservationists who had met at the National Academy of
Sciences, however, were happy to label the Hemisphere Conference the first regional
meeting in a coherent series aimed at building a world approach to conservation.
In fact, the Conference promoted an ecological approach to resource management
that exemplified the kind of program they had envisioned. The focus on the
interdependence of resources, nations, and scientific disciplines assured that conservation
was understood in a holistic manner. The assumption that cultural patterns must conform
to natural patterns, and not the other way around, endowed natural scientists with
enormous authority, essentially relegating social scientists to technicians, but also had the
paradoxical effect of making social knowledge the key to conservation. In terms of
Unesco’s plans, the overarching theme that humans needed to live within the earth’s
limited carrying capacity effectively reconciled the imperative to address resource
shortages with the objective of preserving nature.
Nature protection featured prominently at the Hemisphere Conference, and so Hal
Coolidge’s presentation on the “World Approach to Nature Protection” was incorporated
seamlessly into the agenda. He laid out a history of the international movement beginning
with the long-forgotten Swiss initiative of 1913 and proceeding through the regional
conferences—at all of which Coolidge made a similar presentation—to the upcoming
congresses in Lake Success. The Hemisphere Conference even passed a resolution
recommending the Pan American Union establish a committee to work with Unesco on
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developing a world convention for wildlife protection.336 Only ten days separated the
Hemisphere from the European and African Conference in Fontainebleau, and so the
American delegation, including Coolidge and Vogt, arrived in France energized by their
success in Denver.
The European and African Technical Symposium on Nature Protection
When the plans to integrate Unesco’s Protection of Nature Conference and
UNSCCUR were hatched at the meeting in Washington D.C., plans for the American and
Pacific regional conferences were already well developed. The European-African
conference, however, was a new idea—and Huxley still had to face his European friends
to whom he had promised an intergovernmental congress formally establishing a new
international union in 1948. The French government, eager to bolster the Parisian IGO,
bailed Unesco out. It called the conference with Unesco and the Swiss run Provisional
International Union for the Protection of Nature as “joint conveners.” Unesco simply
attached a European and African Technical Symposium to the intergovernmental meeting
formally establishing the International Union for the Protection of Nature (IUPN).
Discussion at the Technical Symposium focused on defining the new union’s program.
The Secretariat thus improvised a way around the veto of the United States and Britain—
Unesco’s two most powerful donor governments. Officially, the IUPN constitutive
conference was a French initiative and the European and African meeting was a
preparatory regional conference, not the world congress on nature protection that had
been rejected.
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The precedent for the European and African Technical Symposium was the 1933
congress that had produced the International London Convention for the Protection of
African Fauna and Flora. The aristocratic Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the
Empire (SPFE) had lobbied Great Britain to convene the congress to coordinate wildlife
policies. The London Convention defined key terms like “national park” and “strict
natural reserve” and created a list of species that would be either strictly protected (group
A) or require a license to hunt or collect (group B) throughout the continent.337 The
Fontainebleau agenda included reports from three terminology committees that attempted
to classify protected areas with Linnaean precision and debated the feasibility of a global
wildlife convention. But, as Van Straelen (the head of Belgian Congo’s national park
system) complained, the whole terminology question, which devolved into a debate over
whether French or Latin was a more appropriate lingua franca, seemed “purely
academic” and “futile in view of the ground still to be covered before an actual
programme of nature protection could be formulated.”338 In line with broader
disillusionment over the failure of legalistic internationalism during the interwar years,
epitomized by the League of Nations, delegates at Fontainebleau dismissed the London
Convention as worth little more than the paper on which it was printed. The practical
irrelevance of international conventions was the reason a new functional international
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union was necessary. Its task was to build the popular opinion and political will on which
law depended.
But before the IUPN could galvanize a world movement, its founders had to agree
on its mission. The odd procedure in which the French government called a conference
that Unesco organized at the instigation of nongovernmental organizations was reflected
in the semi-governmental Fontainebleau Conference. Take the U.S. delegation: Ira
Gabrielson, former Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service and now President of the
Wild Life Management Institute, headed the delegation, which, included Vogt, the
omnipresent Coolidge, and George Brewer of the Conservation Foundation. Between
them the four delegates represented seventeen non- or semi-governmental organizations,
while Gabrielson and Coolidge also represented the U.S. government—although they
were not authorized to commit it to anything. Representatives of eighteen governments,
seven international organizations and 107 national organizations signed the IUPN’s
constitution. The Union that emerged from this constitutive conference required a new
acronym to describe its legal status: a GONGO, or a governmental and nongovernmental
organization.339
In the context of postwar international nature conservation, the most striking
absence from Fontainebleau was FAO. If the IUPN was to influence the international
community’s renewable resources programs, it would have to either displace or
collaborate with FAO. When he declined Unesco’s invitation to the conference, FAO’s
Acting Director-General mentioned only one topic of interest to his organization: “the
conflict which frequently arises between sportsmen’s groups, who are interested in the
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preservation of game, and agricultural groups, particularly producers of range
livestock.”340 Especially in Africa, where the SPFE had begun as an elite coalition of big
game hunters aligned against farmers and ranchers who saw large ungulates and cats as
oversized pests, FAO’s concern made sense: nature protection seemed opposed to the
development of natural resources. Opposition, however, implied engagement. FAO did
not show up for the conference because officials assumed nature protection was
irrelevant. At Fontainebleau, the Swiss biologist J. G. Baer (who would serve as the
Union’s third president), proposed a definition of nature that makes the preservationists’
irrelevance to development clear: “Nature is an assemblage of conditions that permit
biological equilibrium to be maintained without the intervention of man.”341 If the IUPN
defined the object (nature) of its program by the absence of human work, then not only
was it irrelevant to FAO’s interests; it was feeble competition. Erecting an impermeable
boundary between Man and Nature was the antithesis of the functionalist model of
international organizing embodied in the specialized agencies. How could an “army
enlisted against nature” be recruited to the preservationist cause?
But even irrelevance has its benefits. A comparison with Soviet nature protection
organizations is surprisingly helpful here. Baer’s description of natural balance had been
explicitly rejected at the Hemisphere Conference, but was still the principle through
which Soviet scientists justified their system of zapovdniki—inviolable nature reserves.
In theory, the zapovdniki were natural laboratories for fundamental research that could
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determine ecological baselines to guide resource development projects. In practice, the
historian Douglas Weiner has argued, a key benefit of excluding humans from nature was
that it created a protected enclave in which scientists could preserve values and identities
from a pre-Stalinist community—it was easy to ignore the threat of nerdy naturalists
engaged in esoteric “pure science” and who advocated for the rights of ducks.342 The
stakes were incomparable, but a similar dynamic was in effect at Fontainebleau. The
quaint sentimentality of “nature protection” led FAO to ignore the IUPN. The
preservationist reputation of the IUPN confined it to the margins of the international
community during its early years, dependent on handouts from Unesco and barely able to
afford a single secretary, but also provided a sort of bureaucratic cover under which
Unesco trespassed into FAO’s turf. Unesco’s patronage of the IUPN and its organization
of the postwar nature protection conferences established its legitimacy as an international
actor in the natural resources field—an area in which its constitutional mandate was
dubious at best.
If a FAO official had attended the Fontainebleau Conference, he would have been
alarmed to discover that the preamble to the IUPN’s constitution defined “the protection
of nature” as “the preservation of the entire world biotic community, or man’s natural
environment, which includes the earth’s renewable natural resources of which it is
composed, and on which rests the foundation of human civilization.” More to the point,
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at Fontainebleau, the British ecologist Frank Frasier Darling explicitly compared the
IUPN’s “immense” responsibility to FAO’s.343
The conflation of protection and conservation was at the core of the ecological
approach, but it did not occur without a fight. The continental Europeans who had led the
attempt to establish the IUPN in Switzerland did succeed in preventing the substitution of
a “C” for the “P” in the IUPN’s name (although only for the next eight years). The
American delegation, which drafted the constitution’s preamble, claimed responsibility
for the capacious, utilitarian definition of nature protection.344 An undercurrent in the
tension over conservation versus protection was the frustration of Europeans with the
pervasiveness of U.S. influence.
But the Americans were not without allies. In the late-1940s, the key alliance was
Anglo-American. 345 Before and especially during World War II, ecologists such as
Arthur Tansley “assumed leadership of the nature reserves movement,” displacing the
preservationist values of amateur naturalists. Ecologically oriented professional scientists
advocated protecting a sample of the full diversity of biological communities in nature
reserves. Indeed, in 1947 Huxley himself chaired the official British Wild Life
Conservation Special Committee that labeled reserves “Sites of Special Scientific
343
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Interest.”346 The logic justifying the SSSIs was similar to the Russian rationale for
zapovdniki, but at the Fontainebleau Conference, the botanist John Ramsbottom of the
Natural History Museum stressed that the British “attached great importance to the fact
that nature protection should imply the systematic action of man.” Natural communities
worth protecting included “climaxes determined by man”—and not just picturesque rural
landscapes but “the new London flora which had developed in bombed-out districts.”347
This approach did not discard preservationist values so much as add a layer of utilitarian
rationale to patriotic, psychological, spiritual, and aesthetic arguments for nature
protection—a strategy that intentionally complicated the meaning of utility. The progress
of ecological science required natural laboratories, and civilization’s progress, perhaps
even survival, depended on scientific advance. Linking nature reserves to the rational use
of natural resources was in step with the American strategy, but the British emphasis on
the value of protected areas for science was a more pronounced feature of the European
movement generally.
The significance of embedding nature protection within a regime of rational use
was even more strongly emphasized in the African context. At Fontainebleau, the
Secretary of the SPFE, H. G. Maurice, introduced the section on “Fauna Conventions and
International Legislation” by noting, somewhat grudgingly, that while attendees might be
motivated by “the cultural aspects of wild life conservation” he “had no illusions about
346
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the kind of arguments that should be used to convince Governments which could only be
moved by facts of an economic character.” Nature Protection, Maurice argued, was “the
only way of avoiding ultimate defeat [i.e. starvation] in the battle man had deliberately
started against nature.” 348 This formulation nicely captures the manner in which the
passive connotations of nature protection were reconfigured as an active campaign.
Ironically, the unintended consequences of subjugating wild lands necessitated a new
front in the war on nature—nature protection.
Although the imperative to frame nature protection within broader fears of
resource depletion was similar in Africa and Europe, the terms of the debate were
inverted. In Europe, Man threatened Nature at his own peril; in Africa, Nature threatened
Man at its own peril. Nature reserves in Africa were a means of separating nature from
civilization. At Fontainebleau, this dynamic was most clearly expressed in a debate over
the ban on killing gorillas. During the meeting on “Big Game Protection in Africa,” the
General Inspector of Game for French Africa, Colonel Bourgoin, proposed downgrading
the gorilla from the A list (strictly protected) to the B list (regulated hunting). Not only
were gorillas numerous, but they were a menace, “killing off as many as thirty people a
year, destroying crops and often forcing whole villages to move by destroying all the
surrounding vegetation.” A total ban on hunting was, therefore, “neither practical nor
desirable” (although Coolidge, whose specialty was primatology, vehemently disagreed).
Instead, Bourgoin proposed the “British method”: protecting gorillas (and other species)
in “large areas properly selected.”349 As the historian John MacKenzie shows, the object
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of both game preservation and culling in large parts of Africa was to emphasize “habitat
separation” between humans and wildlife.350 In order to rationalize the relationship
between civilization and nature in Africa, the boundary between the two had to be
clarified. Protecting nature meant eliminating wildlife in settled areas.
Notoriously, it could also mean eliminating human life in wild areas. After
listening to Vogt’s predictably misanthropic presentation on the scientific management of
wildlife, Huxley wryly concluded, “Man was decidedly a scourge.”351 The veteran British
colonial game warden Captain Keith Caldwell, who had performed a wildlife survey for
the SPFE in East Africa the previous year, acknowledged that there was “too much game
in partially cultivated areas,” but he identified the main threats to wildlife as “inevitable
economic development” and “native hunters”—civilization and “primitive man.”352 The
most disturbing challenges to African nature were the interactions between these two
threats; for example, the 30,000 “natives” who hunted with guns in Tanganyika or
colonial agriculture development that forced peasants to exploit marginal lands.
Separating human and wildlife habitats was the principal method of nature protection in
Africa, but it did not resolve the root problem: the effacement of the border separating
civilization from “natives.” Renegotiating the complex triangular relationship between
civilization, “primitive man,” and nature was the task of conservation.353

350

John M. MacKenzie, The Empire of Nature, 253-4; Jane Carruthers, The Kruger National Park: A
Social and Political History (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995); Roderick P. Neumann,
“The Postwar Conservation Boom in British Colonial Africa,” Environmental History 7: 1 (Jan. 2002), 2247.
351
IUPN, Preparatory Documents, 31.
352
IUPN, Preparatory Documents, 36-7.
353
The historiography of imperial conservation in Africa, particularly soil conservation, is extensive,
especially compared to Latin America. For an introduction, see William Beinart and Lotte Hughes,
Environment and Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); William Beinart and Peter Coates,

190
The selection of Jean-Paul Harroy as the first Secretary-General of the IUPN
assured that the ambitious conservationist agenda would be more than an ostentatious
opening sentence of the constitution. Harroy, a protégé of Van Straelen who had been
Director of the Institute of National Parks of the Belgian Congo, ran the impoverished
IUPN’s new office in Brussels during the evenings while working days as the SecretaryGeneral of the Belgian Institute for Scientific Research in Central Africa. When Harroy
left the IUPN in 1955, it was to serve as Vice-Governor-General of the Belgian Congo
and Governor of Ruanda-Urundi. But in 1948 he was best known for his monograph,
Afrique, Terre Qui Meurt: La Dégradation des Sols Africains sous l’Influence de la
Colonisation. Vogt essentially summarized this book in his Africa chapter in Road to
Survival. Harroy’s book in turn drew heavily on British and American work, particularly
The Rape of the Earth: A World Survey of Soil Erosion by the British authors G.V. Jacks
and R.O. Whyte. In an imperial twist on the American conservationists’ frontier
hypothesis, Harroy blamed desertification on capitalist exploitation and colonialism.
Europeans, who had no stake in the long-term health of the land and were greedy for
quick returns, had imported European land use practices to Africa, with devastating
consequences. He emphasized the need for a holistic approach that broke through
disciplinary barriers. Beginning with a primer on soil science and working its way up to
chapters on the spiritual, material, economic, political, and social dynamics of African
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societies, Afrique, Terre Qui Meurt showed how colonialism destroyed local customs that
had evolved over centuries to preserve the natural equilibrium.
Yet despite Harroy’s condemnation of colonialism, his conclusion forcefully
demanded a stronger, more interventionist colonial state. “L’État, et souvent l’Etat,” had
the power to assure “l’acceptation de sérieux sacrifices immédiats nécessaries a la
sauvegarde d’intérêts supérieurs futures.”354 He called for conservation education, but
also endorsed compulsory labor and overt coercion. Similarly, Jacks and Whyte had
concluded that racial characteristics combined with the “intrinsic nature of the soil” in
Africa meant that a sustainable civilization required “a feudal type of society in which the
native cultivators would to some extent be tied to the lands of their European
overlords.”355 It was up to imperial governments to enforce a sustainable reconciliation
between civilization, “primitive man,” and nature. The IUPN was established under the
auspices of Unesco, but on an institutional map of the international sphere, it would have
occupied territory between international and imperial organizations.
There was very little technical discussion at the African and European Technical
Symposium. Instead delegates debated the very meaning of nature protection. Was it to
preserve pristine bits of wilderness or to effect a broader harmonization between nature
and civilization? Before the war, international nature protection had focused on
international conventions and exotic mammals and birds. The postwar nature
conservationists certainly had a weakness for rare animals, but they framed their
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arguments in broad ecological terms and raised the stakes to the survival of the human
species. The disagreement between preservationists and conservationists revealed a
fractured movement, but the fault lines were more complex than merely separating an
Anglo-American block from a continental block. European colonial representatives sided
squarely with the holistic interventionist approach. Indeed, more starkly than the
Hemisphere Conference, the Fontainebleau meeting revealed the potential for
cooperation in international conservation to cross the boundary into coercive imperialism.
More subtly, the debate was also about the meaning of internationalism. The
conservationists recognized that effective participation in the postwar international
community depended on developing a compelling functional program—to grow, the new
International Union for the Protection of Nature had to do something.
Roger Heim, the French botanist who chaired the meeting and would be the
IUPN’s second president, concluded the conference by mixing two of the
conservationists’ dominant metaphors: “We are running a race with mankind as a whole
and, if we are slow in taking vital decisions, we may finally lose the battle.” Yet it
remained unclear whether those who gathered in Denver and Fontainebleau were running
in the same battle.
The Seventh Pacific Science Congress
Plans for the last of the regional conferences actually predated the War, and just
months after fighting in the Pacific ended, scientists were already reviving plans for the
Seventh Pacific Science Congress. They hoped it would furnish reassuring “evidence of a
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return to peace in that troubled region.”356 The goals of the Pacific Science Association—
an organization of thirty-seven National Research Councils and Academies that was
responsible for convening the Congress—were to “initiate and promote co-operation” in
scientific research aimed at “affecting the prosperity and well-being of Pacific peoples”
and “to strengthen the bonds of peace among Pacific peoples by promoting a feeling of
brotherhood among the scientists of all Pacific countries.”357 But for all the rhetoric
linking science to peace, the organization of the conference was a testament to the
enduring impact of the World War on international science.
The Seventh Congress was supposed to have met in Manila in 1943, but Filipino
scientists reported that rebuilding the devastated city’s scientific infrastructure made
merely participating in the congress a challenge.358 Changing the location was
cumbersome because the Pacific Science Association, which gradually evolved out of
Pacific Science Congresses following the First World War, had no operating budget and
no permanent base. After each Congress, the Secretariat transferred to the host nation of
the next Congress.359 In many respects a great boon to science, the Second World War
had so disrupted non-martial international scientific communication that no one even
knew who the active members of the Association were. Following a discussion between
Coolidge and the President of the Canterbury Branch of the Royal Society, the U.S. NRC
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handled the delicate international diplomacy that granted New Zealand the right to
convene the Seventh Congress. The inefficiency of the process underscored how obsolete
the Congress’ institutional structure had become, especially in the context of the postwar
boom of functional international organizations.
The American scientific community was anxious to reestablish an active
international research program in the Pacific because of the expansion of U.S. power in
the area, including trusteeship of Micronesia. When the anthropologist George Murdoch
returned from the Pacific Theater, he informed the NRC that he thought he “could receive
a lot [of] material support” for research through “his contacts in the Navy” (he was right),
and the NRC quickly jumped on board.360 In June 1946, the NRC organized a Pacific
Science Conference in Washington, D.C. to assess the contribution science could make to
the administration of the United States’ new Pacific possessions. This Conference
recommended the creation of the Pacific War Memorial with a ten million dollar
endowment to fund scientific research in honor of fallen soldiers and the establishment of
a Pacific Science Board under the auspices of the NRC to coordinate projects.361 The
Navy endorsed conferences on Micronesian conservation, writing Coolidge (who
basically was the new Pacific Science Board) that “it would be of much benefit to the
government of the Trust Territory if…the problems of conservation in the Trust Territory
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could be explored.”362 Advocates of Pan Pacific cooperation had long taken the Pan
American Union as their model, and the Navy’s patronage and Coolidge’s energy opened
the possibility that intensified international cooperation could turn the Pacific Science
Board into the equivalent of Vogt’s Pan American Conservation Service.
At conferences in Honolulu and Washington D.C., scientists stressed the
importance of research in the Pacific Islands; the islands were “laboratories for the study
of evolution.”363 The characteristics that made them so valuable for scientific
investigation—isolation, uniqueness, and smallness—also meant that their natural
balance was peculiarly delicate. But this peculiarity furnished a “microcosm experiment
illustrating conservation needs and problems of the world in miniature,” since “a similar
equilibrium must be established between the human race and its more and more limited
world-environment, a problem the failure to solve which will have consequences that
may not be mitigated by any outside assistance.”364 The recommendations for
conservation in Micronesia began by recommending that “all policies be direct toward
limiting the population” to sustain a balance with limited resources.365 The
implementation of this principle in the Trust Territories would be not just sound
conservation policy; it would be a real world experiment with relevance to the little island
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called earth. Blurring the line between action and experiment would turn out to be a
durable trait of international development—at times it appeared like all projects were
pilot projects. However small projects might be, they were also experiments, each one
with potentially worldwide implications.366
The Navy’s assistance was also vital to the success of U.S. participation in the
Seventh Congress in a more direct sense: it flew most of the official American delegation
of twenty-five scientists to the Congress. This was no mere perk. There were no
passenger boats traveling from North America to New Zealand in the two months prior to
the Congress and at $1,178 for a round-trip ticket, commercial air fare was prohibitively
expensive.367 Despite claims to the contrary, old-fashioned geography still mattered.
Usually the “tyranny of distance” affected travel in the opposite direction; for example,
only three of the fourteen Australian experts who prepared papers for UNSCCUR were
able to participate in the meeting.368 (Coolidge was listed as one of two official
Australian representatives at the Unesco-IUPN Lake Success conference.) In contrast,
seventy-four Americans made it to New Zealand. Geography mattered, but unlike
everyone else, Americans had the resources to overcome it.
The New Zealand organizers were especially concerned about attendance of
experts from poor territories and war devastated countries. Instead of the armed services,
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they wrote to Unesco, which approved an unusually large grant of $20,000, the estimated
cost for the transportation of just ten scientists.369 When Needham advised Huxley that
Unesco participate in the Seventh Congress, he justified the expense by pointing out that
it provided an opportunity to meet scientists from “many scientifically undeveloped
countries” and extend international cooperation beyond the “countries in Europe and
North America.”370 But of the nearly two hundred foreign participants at the Seventh
Congress, only two were from Latin America. The legacy of World War, civil war, and
geopolitics dictated that Japan, China and the U.S.S.R. were unrepresented. Although
Unesco’s grant was supposed to aid scientists from underrepresented Pacific nations and
territories, five of the eight scientists it supported were from Western Europe.371 Of the
thirty-nine participants from trust territories and colonies (not including Hawaii), all but
three or four were white colonials. The administration of “natives” was a major theme of
the Congress, but, like the Fontainebleau Conference, it was not a promising venue in
which to encounter a non-Western perspective.
The Symposium on the Protection of Nature was part of the Zoology Division of
the Congress, which tied it to the more contained birds-and-mammals nature protection
movement rather than the ecological approach. Coolidge suggested adopting the IUPN’s
broad definition of nature protection and, unlike at Fontainebleau, he succeeded in
changing the name of the Standing Committee on Nature Protection to the Standing
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Committee on Pacific Conservation.372 But if nature protection meant protecting all of
“man’s natural environment,” then the whole Congress was part of the conservation
movement.
Soil conservation was well represented at the Congress, but was separated from
nature protection in its own Division of Soil Resources, Agriculture, and Forestry, which
formed a Standing Committee on Soil and Land Classification for Production and
Conservation. The Committee’s mission was to standardize classification systems and
calculate the total productive potential of Pacific soils.373 The intent of this work was best
exemplified in a report by F. A. van Baren of the University of Indonesia on an effort to
create a comprehensive series of soil maps at scales ranging from 1:50,000 to 1:200,000
for Java and the large outer islands. The soil surveys were designed to serve as the basis
for planning large-scale agricultural development projects and direct “the migration of
indigenous people from the over-populated island of Java to other parts of the
Archipelago, should soils of sufficient agricultural value occur.”374 The view from above
would allow the scientific coordination of resource use and population movement.
Even as van Baren described the surveys, the Indonesian independence movement
was thrusting a bayonet into the colonial state’s dream of a God’s-eye perspective. (The
Netherlands, however, would become the leading center for training experts in soil
science and aerial surveys for the UN agencies.) Nevertheless, the Standing Committee
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on Soil and Land Classification’s program was designed to extend this vision of scientific
planning throughout the Pacific region. This ambitious project was just part of a grand
vision for a coordinated scientific program for the Pacific. In all, the Seventh Congress
approved seventeen Standing Committees, and passed over one hundred
recommendations to guide Pacific research. Yet the Committees were essentially the
hobbies of professional scientists. Passing resolutions was easy when they carried no
force.
Gilbert Archey, Secretary-General of the Seventh Congress, acknowledged to
Unesco that all the Standing Committees had “suffered from lack of continuity of effort.”
Similarly, “At each Congress resolutions which we believe to be of importance, and
which, if given effect to, would have been of practical value, have been carried; but each
Congress has, as it were, died.” The Pacific Science Association had to be modernized.
The solution was to create a permanent secretariat, located at the Bishop Museum in
Hawaii, to “maintain activity and drive in implementing the resolutions.”375 This decision
represented a rejection of interwar scientific internationalism based on informal, personal
relations and individual initiative.
The President of the First Pan Pacific Science Congress, Yale geologist Herbert E.
Gregory, dissented. In his Introductory Address to the Seventh Congress, Gregory
recalled with pride the early “more or less informal but highly successful work” and the
Constitution’s purposeful lack of “the usual definitions of responsibilities and authorities
of officers and committees.” Each Congress’ organizing committee was free to invite
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“only those with red hair,” and participants “only in a vague sense…represent[ed]
nations, institutions, or professional societies.”376 Although few paused to notice, this
alternative vision of scientific internationalism was swept aside for a new model—a
model that resembled the collaborative, project-based war work so many of these
scientists had spent the last decade performing.
The Pacific Science Council thus joined the alphabet soup of postwar
organizations. Its first task was to formalize relations with the new intergovernmental
agencies, particularly the South Pacific Commission, Unesco, and FAO. Unfortunately,
like the IUPN, the PSC enjoyed more moral support than financial, of which it had none.
Fortunately, and also like the IUPN, Coolidge came through. He tapped his connections
to raise $13,000 ($12,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation and $1,000 from the Coolidge
Foundation), enough to get the new organization off the ground.377 Scientific
internationalism may have been bureaucratized, but knowing the right people still
mattered. The PSC did not have the capacity for major action, but its creation was
justified as yet another “information and liaison centre”—and even small projects could
be important experiments.
The Pacific region was not bound together by political, economic, and cultural
institutions like the Americas or Europe and Africa. Indeed, it was not clear “the Pacific”
really corresponded to a region in any meaningful sense—an ambiguity that was
compounded by uncertain colonial situations and the lingering disruptions of the War.
376

Herbert E. Gregory, “Introductory Address,” Proceedings of the Seventh Pacific Science Congress: v. 1,
43.
377
Archey to Wang, 23 Jan. 1949, 5 (9) A06 (931) “49,” Seventh Pacific Science Congress 1949, Unesco.
Coolidge was a Boston Brahmin and not only his surname indicated presidential relations—he was also the
great grandson of Thomas Jefferson.

201
But the War also increased American commitments across the region, which vastly
expanded opportunities for scientific research. And the military organization of science
served as an unheralded model for the vision of the new, more bureaucratic organization
of international science in the Pacific. In this light, the Pacific Science Council was an
attempt to integrate international science in the Pacific into the emerging international
functional system, even if it was not clear that the Council represented a functioning
community. The gap between ambition and ability was especially glaring because of the
scope of the ambition: nothing less than to coordinate a comprehensive scientific program
that would produce a synoptic view from above of the entire Pacific’s natural resources.
Yet the absence of a working community also could be an argument for forming a
functional organization. This was a paradox intrinsic to the logic of functional
international organizations; their capacity for effective action depended on the power of
the community they were supposed to create.
Beyond Nature’s Boundaries: The Lake Success Conferences
The venue of the Unesco-IUPN International Technical Conference on the
Protection of Nature physically expressed the strategy of embedding nature protection
within conservation. It met during the middle week of the three-week UNSCCUR and
took advantage of the facilities of the larger meeting. 706 participants from fifty-two
countries attended UNSCCUR and, with substantial overlap, 138 participants from thirtythree countries attended the Unesco-IUPN Conference. The Protection of Nature
Conference took human ecology and conservation education as its main themes,
pointedly downgrading the importance of formal legislation and taking a comprehensive
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view of nature protection. It passed twenty-three resolutions, ranging from a request that
Unesco facilitate the duty-free exchange of conservation education materials and
encourage the formation of nature protection youth movements to an endorsement of an
IUPN plan to perform ecological surveys for large-scale development projects and a
proposal that WHO, FAO and Unesco establish an oversight commission to regulate the
use of insecticides. UNSCCUR, in contrast, was not empowered to issue
recommendations, and it added several new layers of issues and interests to the already
bursting conservation agenda. Still, at the inception of the UN’s technical assistance
program, the purposes and practices of development were debated within the rubric of
resource conservation, which included nature protection.
The Conservation Foundation’s Fairfield Osborn opened he first plenary sessions
of both conferences. In both presentations, Osborn called for “the acceptance of a clear
concept regarding man’s relationship to his environment.”378 Sounding a theme that
would echo for the next three weeks, he asserted that resource depletion was caused not
by a lack of scientific knowledge and appropriate technology, but by the failure to apply
it effectively; thus, “conservation becomes a political and administrative, an educational,
even a social, cultural and ethical problem.” As such, conservation “offers a point of
synthesis for international co-operation for which the world is waiting.”379 The
intellectual platform that supported Osborn’s credibility to summarize “the world
resources situation” rested on the success of his 1948 book Our Plundered Planet, a
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harrowing survey of worldwide soil erosion and population growth that was more-or-less
interchangeable with Vogt’s Road to Survival.380 His presentations at Lake Success well
represented the philosophical basis of the “world approach to nature protection.”
UNSCCUR, however, included a perspective that had been virtually absent from
the regional meetings: the view of the newly independent nations, most prominently
India. 70 Asians and thirty-three Middle Easterners participated (as authors and/or
attendees) in UNSCCUR, including thirty-one Indians (fourteen of whom attended).
Adding Latin America, the number of participants (only half of whom actually attended)
from what would become the Third World was 186. In comparison, 431 U.S. and
seventy-three French citizens participated. Delegates from new nations contributed few
“new” ideas—which is hardly surprising since most had been educated or worked in
colonial, European or U.S. institutions, and conservation itself was largely a colonial
invention. But they emphasized a different sort of boundary work: shoring up the
boundary between imperialism and internationalism.381
Delegates from India, Egypt, the Philippines, and Latin America emphasized the
need for “balanced development,” but the balance tended to tip towards industrialization.
A. M. El Banna, an economist at the National Bank of Egypt, insisted that rapid
industrialization, not agricultural production, was “the only hope then to tackle the
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population problem…so that a rise in the standard of living can throttle any increase in
population.”382 What the self-identified underdeveloped countries required from the
developed countries, and what they hoped to get out of UNSCCUR, was capital and cooperation. At the plenary meetings, only representatives from developing countries
presented detailed inventories of their national resource endowments, which read like
investors’ guides.383 Yet while they proposed using natural resources to underwrite
industrialization, few put their faith in the free market. A paper by the geologist and
Mineral Adviser to the Indian government D. N. Wadia argued that “the under-developed
countries of the world have been exploited for their metals and ores by the industrially
developed countries,” but this unbalanced relationship would end “in the coming era of
self-determination for each nation.”384 Imperialism caused underdevelopment.
Wadia called for a new era of international conservation “in place of the laissez
faire attitude of the past.” His plan resonated with Wallace’s vision of the Pan American
Union, Bernal’s proposal for an International Resources Office, and Roosevelt’s original
agenda for a World Conservation Conference. “To foster…interdependence of countries
on the world’s material resources and thus attempt to establish an equilibrium between
these two sets of countries,” Wadia asserted, “should be the goal of the United Nations
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Economic and Social Council.”385 The functions of imperial and international resource
conservation might be the same, but the purposes were incompatible.
The “era of self-determination for each nation,” of course, had not yet arrived.
During a symposium on “Resource Techniques for Less-Developed Countries,” S. S.
Bhatnagar, Director of the Indian Department of Scientific Research, praised Truman’s
“great wisdom” in speaking of “‘less-developed regions’ or ‘areas’ rather than ‘lessdeveloped countries,’” since “even in the most developed countries there can be regions
which are comparatively less developed.”386 American and European scientists frequently
made the same point, but in the postwar international community the formulation
“underdeveloped areas” also finessed the hypocrisy of imperial participation in an
international system that was based on sovereign nation states.
Defining underdeveloped areas according to nonpolitical criteria was much more
than a semantic tactic; it was a core principle of scientific conservation. As the Chairman
of the Board of the Tennessee Valley Authority, Gordon Clapp, reminded UNSCCUR:
“Natural resources do not conform to man-made boundaries.”387 The significance of the
TVA was manifested in the structure of UNSCCUR’s agenda: mornings were spent in six
specialized sections covering mineral, fuel and energy, water, forest, land, and wildlife
and fish resources; afternoons were devoted to plenary meetings demonstrating the
interdependence of these resources and of the specialists themselves; and the fifteen
plenary meetings culminated in “The Experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority” and
385

D. N. Wadia, “Metals in Relation to Living Standards (In Industrially Under-developed Countries),”
115.
386
S. S. Bhatnagar, Proceedings of UNSCCUR, 310.
387
Gordon R. Clapp, “The Experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the Comprehensive
Development of a River Basin,” Proceedings of UNSCCUR, 369-375, 374.

206
“The Integrated Development of River Basins.” All of the lessons of the conference could
be channeled through the TVA. In the 40,000 square mile watershed, twenty-seven multipurpose dams were “integrated into a single system” to assure a maximum of flood
control, navigability, and electric power; soil conservation and reforestation were
complemented by small-scale industrial development that processed the region’s raw
materials; wildlife conservation attracted hunters and tourists. All of these uses were
interdependent: full power production could undermine flood control; habitat for
waterfowl could harbor malarial mosquitoes; productive soils required phosphate
synthesized with hydroelectric power. Therefore, “balanced development of the resources
of the area, through a unified approach, [was] both a philosophy and a technique.”
Scientific conservation required specialist analysis of each resource, but then the
synthesis of this knowledge within “limits…fixed by the boundaries of nature.”388
The irrelevance of political boundaries to natural resources provided an
opportunity for political reform. The justification for the TVA was not that the watershed
occupied 40,000 square miles, but that it spanned seven states. By focusing on the
technical problems of integrated river basin development, the TVA had grown into a
powerful regional planning agency that increased interstate cooperation; catalyzed the
creation of dozens of local planning commissions, conservation departments and
cooperatives; and empowered local institutions such as libraries, public health
departments, and universities. According to the rural sociologist William Cole,
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The sense of belonging to the region, of being affected by it, of having a part in its
development has been a major factor in the strength of the TVA. This strength has
not been confined to any single political party, or to political leadership, but is
strongly embedded in the citizenship of the region… [I]t is important to regional
resource development that the people have a collective consciousness.”389
This was why the TVA was David Mitrany’s favorite example of functionalism as
an organizing strategy. It had the intended unintended consequence of unifying the
region’s social and political institutions and cultivating a responsible citizenry. A
representative of the U.S.-Canadian International Joint Commission for boundary waters
claimed his experience showed that international watersheds could create “the true
machinery of peace” and transform borders into “imaginary line[s]” that “joined rather
than divided nations.”390 But whereas Mitrany’s functionalism called for downplaying
political ideology, for most commentators, the TVA’s primary virtue was that it showed
“Democracy on the March.”391
The symposium also revealed the limits of boundaries fixed by nature, however.
The Indian engineer Kanwar Sain questioned the wisdom of planning based on the
watershed as a unified whole. Invoking Pinchot, he argued, “The guiding principle in
river basin developments should be the greatest good for the greatest number, irrespective
of territorial boundaries within the same country or the watershed limits.” “Following
water where it flows to assess its potential assets,” as Clapp advocated, had “serious
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drawbacks” since “Mother Nature’s distribution of water [did] not always coincide with
her children’s requirements.” Sain pointed out that projects on the Colorado, Missouri,
and Gunnison rivers were designed to benefit areas in distant states—even on the otherside of the continental divide.392 At the very least, river basin development ought to be
assessed according to the benefit of the entire nation, and “ultimately” by “the food and
energy requirements of the whole world.”393 As the postwar history of large dams in
India and elsewhere demonstrates, in the name of national or international progress, this
seemingly benign rationale could recapitulate the imbalanced colonial relationship that
Wadia had criticized. Resources in one area were exploited for the benefit of people in
another area.394 Yet Sain’s criticism was difficult to refute: a central tenet of the world
approach to nature conservation was that an underdeveloped region anywhere harmed
people everywhere.
The debate over where to draw regional boundaries was intense, but it occurred
within a conservation discourse. In whichever space experts managed natural resources,
their task was to draw “unity from conflict,” as Clapp put it, by reconciling competing
resource values “in the most efficient and prudent manner”; that is, to maintain balance
within a bounded system. But UNSCCUR also revealed a vision of scientific progress
that had been veiled at the three regional conservation meetings: growth without limits.
In his welcoming address, Secretary-General Lie reminded the conference that the
United Nations had “achieved miracles of production in the heat of the last war.” If the
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UN now supported science and technology with that same commitment in peace, “no one
could predict the world population which our resources could support, or the rise in the
average standard of living that would be possible.”395 U.S. Secretary of the Interior Julius
Krug contrasted the old, “essentially negative” conservation with a “new era” in which
“scientists and engineers [could] find and develop food, fuels and materials to meet the
demands of the world’s increasing population, with a greatly improved standard of
living.”396 The British economist Colin Clark, who was paired with Osborn in the
opening plenary session, argued that an agricultural labor shortage was the cause of the
contemporary food crisis; the cure was more farmers on the land (not, as some put it,
fewer “parasites”—Clark attributed advocacy of population control to racism). Clark,
who was already famous for pioneering work calculating national incomes, was not
afraid of sketchy data. He made a “crude ascertainment” of the world’s available arable
land based solely on climate, counting as “double the high rainfall tropical soils which
are capable of growing two crops a year and allow[ing] various deductions for the poorer
climates.” His fanciful view from above revealed that Latin America had 17.5 million
and Africa 15 million square kilometers of “standard farm land”; in comparison, the
United States, Canada, Australia, and Russia together had only 9.25 million square
kilometers. His proposal and “the world’s future well-being,” however, depended on a
technical fix: the solution to the “scientific problem of the tropical soils,” which were
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infamously infertile.397 Instead of managing scarcity efficiently and fairly, experts would
design more efficient techniques that assured abundance. Instead of natural limits that
required transforming society, this vision foresaw human resources transforming nature.
In this vision, there were still untapped natural resources, such as at least a billion
acres of crop land in the tropics, the virtually virgin fisheries of the Southern Oceans, and
untold reserves of shale oil. But these were merely the last remnants of the geographic
frontier; science made accessible “the limitless frontiers of knowledge.”398 Indeed, there
was “little point in conserving fuels to repose underground for use centuries later when in
the interim science might open up vast new resources of energy.”399 “There were virtues
in living extravagantly,” as the Vice-President of the U.S. Gulf Research and
Development Company put it; Americans’ extravagance supported industrial research
laboratories that found substitutions for depleted resources, from which the whole world
benefited.400 Scientific optimism reached its apogee in the plenary meeting on Creatable
Resources. Scientists reported cutting edge techniques for producing new sources of fat
from micro-organisms, proteins from yeast and algae, sugars from wood, potash from
seaweed, and vegetables from soil-less culture. Modern-day alchemy promised a way of
overcoming the “almost…physical impossibility” of simultaneously raising standards of
living and feeding a growing population.401
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Development through exploitation of the endless frontier excluded nature
protection from conservation. Progress in this technologically oriented version of
development was measured by increased consumption—waste was an unexploited
natural resource. There were advantages to managing wildlife as if it were a crop, but in
his opening address to the Unesco-IUPN Conference, Osborn warned against being
“tricked into believing that we are ‘the masters of the universe’.” The only grave danger
to the human race was that man would “consider himself exempt…from natural laws.”
Perhaps creatable resources could diminish civilization’s toll on nature, but the world
approach to nature protection pursued the higher calling of “re-awakening in the minds of
people…the inestimable values [of] nature.”402 The nature protectionists had successfully
framed the resource crisis as an overpopulation issue, but instead of reforming
maladapted frontier values, fears of the population bomb spurred efforts to extend and
intensify the exploitation of nature—and ultimately to escape from nature.
Privileging growth over balance also revealed a conflict between the values of
development and conservation—or more precisely, a conflict between those versions of
conservation that placed high value on nature protection or social equity and those that
valued growth. In Sarah Phillips’ compelling history of New Deal conservation, Director
of Agricultural Extension M. L. Wilson, whose paper fittingly concluded the Proceedings
of the Hemisphere Conference, serves as the representative of the losing side of the
struggle between equity—the quality of rural life—and efficiency—increased
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production—that was inherent in New Deal conservationism.403 In the context of a U.S.sponsored UN conference dedicated to raising standards of living, this domestic tension
was reproduced at a global scale, but inequity between the United States and the rest, not
within the country, was at issue.
After establishing that there were no current “critical mineral shortages,” the
Canadian Deputy Minister of Mines H. L. Keenleyside noted that if other nations’
demand for metals was even half that of the United States, it “would be greatly beyond
the capacity of any known or probable supply.”404 A French commercial counselor (quite
diplomatically) noted the indisputable fact that “America develops its remarkable
civilization by contributing, far more than the rest of the world, to the impoverishment of
the globe in the most important metals.”405 A balanced world economy implied greater
equality between the United States and the rest of the world, but even the optimistic nonrenewable resource experts could not quite bring themselves to imagine the world’s
resources supporting an “American standard of living.” If the planet could not support an
American standard of living and the United States would not redistribute a portion of its
wealth, how could a conservation program perform the “miracles of production”
necessary to fulfill the rising expectations of people in underdeveloped areas?
403
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The miracle was technical assistance. Carter Goodrich (the Chairman of the
Preparatory Committee) described UNSCCUR itself as no mere meeting: “What we have
been doing is technical assistance,” Goodrich insisted.406 This rather wishful path to
development had important implications for science in the UN system. By placing the
transfer of science and technical know-how at the center of development, technical
assistance transformed international conferences from a forum for academic exchange
into an act of development. Technical assistance blurred the boundary between discourse
and action. Participants in and critics of IGOs’ programs (and Unesco’s in particular)
might complain that all they seemed to do was host conferences, but, according to the
logic of technical assistance, it was doing something.
For the many activists and experts who understood conservation to be a social
reform movement, UNSCCUR’s focus on techniques obscured the social justice issues
that should have been at the heart of its agenda. Zuckerman wondered if it were
“technically feasible to produce all the fat and all the protein we wanted from algae,”
whether it “would be distributed better than the protein which at present exists in surplus
grain.”407 This critique reached its dramatic climax when Cornelia Pinchot, Gifford’s
widow, took the floor during a symposium on “Resource Techniques for Less-Developed
Countries” to explain why “so many conservationists regard this particular Conference
less as a dream come to fruition than as a noble opportunity side-stepped.” UNSCCUR,
Pinchot lamented, “might have been used as an unparalleled opportunity for a thrashing
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out of the social issues upon which civilization, perhaps the future of the world itself,
depends.” By treating conservation “purely in terms of materials, matter and technical
processes,” instead of stressing “‘wise conservation for the use of the People’ (with a
capital P),” UNSCCUR represented “a long step backward.” What most angered Pinchot
was the “upside-down, Humpty Dumpty nonsense” that the scientists had been forbidden
from making policies and passing resolutions, which implied a “lack of faith in the
creative mechanisms of democracy.” The task of “social scientists and conservationists,”
was to protect freedom from “the degradation of slavery and totalitarianism whether
coming from the Right or the Left.” Freedom could not be synthesized in a fermentation
tank.408
In this way, far from avoiding controversy, UNSCCUR’s technical focus became
the subject of heated debate. ECOSOC’s defenders rose to Pinchot’s rhetorical heights.
The Chilean Chairman of the session in which Pinchot erupted replied that ECOSOC
“had in mind the question of peace with a capital ‘P’” when it convened UNSCCUR.409
The Danish Chairman of the final plenary session lectured the scientists on the
frustrations of formal diplomacy: “For to be the representative of a government means,
first of all, to be no longer a free man.” Instead of squandering half the conference
debating adjectives and attempting to “advance knowledge by voting,” as Goodrich put it,
ECOSOC had placed its faith in the “value of the exchange of ideas.” The delegates were
not mere government officials but “scientific missionaries.”410 Bhantnagar described
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UNSCCUR as “a congregational worship.” “Recorded resolutions,” he noted, “are often
relegated to the wastepaper baskets and to cold storage in many a government and private
organization; but the resolves that we take as a result of personal contacts and convictions
based upon knowledge are remembered, go deeper home and bear good fruits in time.”411
As for Pinchot, the importance of UNSCCUR came down to a question of freedom, but
instead of assuring freedom by subjecting politics to scientific deliberation, intellectual
freedom was preserved by decisively separating science from politics.
UNSCCUR, of course, was inherently political. And the little “p” politics of
bureaucracy was of more immediate significance than heady questions over the meaning
of democracy. What prevented the conference from formulating resolutions, for example,
was not that scientists were “so dangerous that they [could] not be trusted with the little
power implied in the making of a recommendation,” as Pinchot sarcastically suggested,
but bureaucratic turf battles. After the conference, the ECOSOC officials and U.S.
advisers who had spent a couple of years organizing the meeting proposed studying the
Proceedings and polling participants to extract important recommendations for the UN’s
resources program. Given the ubiquitous complaint that resolutions passed by
international conferences were ignored, the usefulness of gleaning post facto
recommendations was dubious. The response to the proposal was not a dismissive raised
eyebrow, however, but rather righteous indignation.
When he found out about the proposal, FAO’s Director-General Norris Dodd
issued a policy statement reminding ECOSOC that the resolution authorizing UNSCCUR
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approved a meeting “devoted solely to the exchange of ideas and experience” among
experts and explicitly prohibited recommendations. In characteristic language, Dodd
concluded, “We must insist…that we are not hindered in the execution of our program by
any duplication of our efforts on the part of other United Nations Agencies.”412 The 550
papers collected in eight volumes of Proceedings were UNSCCUR’s contribution. After
a contentious meeting in which FAO representatives demanded that ECOSOC relinquish
any claims to even advise on renewable resources, ILO officials reported mild annoyance
with FAO’s predictably confrontational approach. But they went on record supporting its
jurisdictional claims.413
In the functional organization of the UN System, the efficient use of resources
depended on coordinating the specialized agencies’ activities into an integrated and
balanced program; just as resources were interdependent, so were the agencies mandated
to manage them. But in a system in which everything was connected and resources were
scarce, each agency’s field of competence was vulnerable to invasion from any direction.
Under the pressures of bureaucratic interests, the unified approach to natural resource
development intensified defense of the boundaries separating categories of resources.
Despite FAO’s objections, ECOSOC did derive two “proposals for United
Nations Action” on the conservation and utilization of resources from UNSCCUR. One
proposal was for a series of international conferences organized around a particular
resource or region, which could be taken for a tacit acknowledgement that UNSCCUR’s
412
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many doubters had been right that a comprehensive world resources conference was
premature. The other proposal called for a program “to promote the systematic survey
and inventory of non-agricultural resources.” Excluding agricultural resources was, of
course, in deference to FAO, which was already busy coordinating the first global
agricultural census (taken in 1950). Similar to FAO’s census, the ECOSOC proposal
envisioned the UN developing international “standard concepts, terminology, methods
and procedures,” compiling the published data of national governments, and providing
technical assistance in “organizing, planning, and training” for surveys. Resource surveys
were the business of national governments, but “the assembly of national data into world
inventories could [provide] insight into the potential role of specific national resources
both in national development and in international trade.”414 (And, of course, it was
cheap.)
Participants’ only significant point of consensus at the Lake Success Conferences
was the need for a better view from above. Whether the topic was metals and minerals,
fuels, water, soils and crops, forests, wildlife, or fisheries, rational management required
better inventories and maps. Whether the greatest good was assured by a resource regime
based in free trade or fair trade, decentralized democratic planning or centralized
planning, strong colonial administrations or independent nations, expert judgment or
popular mobilization, industrialization or agricultural production, dominance over nature
or harmony with nature, efficiency depended on accurate surveys. Agreeing on the map,
however, could not compel agreement on the best route, let alone the destination. But the
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power of the least common denominator should not be underestimated. With so many of
the boundaries in the cultural cartography of international conservation contested,
looking for a “consistent pattern of universal validity” in literal maps of soils, forests, and
waters was a good bet. And in pursuit of the view from above, international organizations
did grow.
Conclusion: Do Epistemologies Have Politics?
Organizing a productive world approach to conservation required establishing
some stable boundaries, but the postwar conservation conferences also revealed a strategy
of social and political reform that depended on the permeability of boundaries—what I
call the osmotic theory of reform. In this strategy, any boundary could be permeable,
from literal political borders and the rough edges of ecological zones to the metaphorical
boundaries separating science from politics and nature from civilization. For laissez faire
internationalists, freedom and efficiency in economic policies automatically spread into
freedom and efficiency in the political sector; for prophets of planning, wise conservation
of one natural resource required the conservation of all resources in a process that
ineluctably extended planning functionally and geographically.
As the organizational structure of the UN System congealed in the second-half of
the 1940s, the membranes separating national government, intergovernmental, and
nongovernmental organizations were particularly porous. Experts and civil servants
moved back and forth between the institutional types; IGOs spawned NGOs;
governments funded NGOs; NGOs’ primary objective was to influence governments and
IGOs. Prototypically, when Margaret Sanger wrote to secure U.S. NRC participation in
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an International Congress on Population and World Resources in Relation to the Family
in 1948, she described its purpose as presenting “factual data to arouse the statesmen’s
interest”—specifically, to help create an international environment in which Unesco
could make population issues a major aspect of its program. The idea for such a
conference, she reported, had come from a conversation with Huxley.415 The boundary
work at these international conferences was about defining the meaning of international
organizations—about establishing what they were for. Programs and budgets were not
negotiated at the conferences described in this chapter, but the leaders of international
organizations attempted to redraw cultural cartographies through them—which is why
they are revealing sites for identifying the institutional and intellectual spaces that
politicians, civil servants, and experts crafted programs to fit.
Negotiating institutional and intellectual boundaries in order to stake out valuable
territory in the international bureaucracy was a risky business. Take the IUPN. After
Fontainebleau, Harroy was stuck with the task of finding something for the new
organization to do: a project that would provide focus, demonstrate competence, and get
some revenue flowing. By the spring of 1949, he thought he had found just the thing: the
IUPN would contract a small team of ecologists to the British Overseas Food Corporation
to monitor and advise its Groundnut Scheme in Tanganyika. The Groundnut Scheme was
a response to the postwar food crisis (specifically the shortage of oils), an agricultural
development project on an unprecedented scale that fit the IUPN’s conservationist charter
and Harroy’s prescription of ambitious planning by a strong colonial state. But it was also
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an anathema to any version of nature protection. Already in 1949, the Groundnut Scheme
was a sort of anti-TVA—the staple example of how not to develop natural resources—yet
Harroy reported to Unesco that on his plan to contract ecological expertise to the Scheme,
“dépendre l’avenir de notre Union.”416 The Groundnut Scheme’s rapacious campaign to
extract fat from the land combined in one ill-conceived enterprise an amazing range of
the practices Harroy had condemned in Afrique Terre Qui Meurt, yet he tied the survival
of his fledging Union to its fate. Building coalitions between diverse interests was
fundamental to the functionalist strategy for international political development. But in
forging the alliances and securing the funding to raise an army for the war against nature,
it was easy for reformers to end up fighting to preserve territory that they had set out to
transform.417 As the IUPN’s flirtation with the semi-governmental colonial Overseas
Food Corporation exemplifies, the new international organizations were frequently in
danger in slipping into an imperial mode.
As an instrument of state power, the view from above has received a lot of bad
academic press in recent years. It is the perspective of hubristic, bungling, and oppressive
high modernism in James Scott’s Seeing Like a State; it is an insidious tool of American
hegemony through economic liberalism (finally manifested in the UN System) in
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American Empire, Neil Smith’s biography of the geographer Isaiah Bowman; and in
Peder Anker’s Imperial Ecology, ecologists deployed “the master perspective from
above” to “empower the social order of their patrons in various colonial agencies or
commercial companies,” as well as the apartheid South African state, Unesco and the
UN.418 The synoptic perspective has become paired with imperialism and the
authoritarian state in Foucault’s knowledge/power complex.
But, in the terms of Langdon Winner’s classic essay on the political implications
of technologies, do epistemologies have politics?419 Was the centralization of power
intrinsic to the view from above?
All modern governments rely on surveys, inventories and maps. Internationalists,
imperialists, and nationalists; socialists, free market liberals, and mercantilist
conservatives; mining interests, farmers, and nature preservationists—all of them argued
that the view from above showed their vision of the social order matched nature’s pattern.
Certainly, the political implications of the view from above were different when it was
pursued through a UN specialized agency than, for example, Soviet institutions in the
1930s. Indeed, all modern governments rely on surveys, inventories and maps. The view
from everywhere clearly had political consequences, but those consequences were
determined by people acting in what mid-century social scientists would have called the
total situational context. In the terms Langdon Winner employed for technologies,
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epistemologies have flexible politics, never intrinsic politics.420 Science is always related
to politics, but in order to understand the relationship, it is first necessary to pry them
apart. Foucault’s slash should not be taken as binding knowledge to power, but as a
necessary first cut. When you start pulling, the tangled connective tissue this analytical
surgery exposes is the stuff of history. The following chapter, therefore, follows Unesco’s
environmental sciences program into the field to explore the making of the view from
above in practice.
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Chapter Four
Men against the Desert
The Bureaucracy, Mythology, and Experience of International Development Science
“Thou shalt inherit the holy earth as a faithful steward conserving its resources and
productivity from generation to generation. Thou shalt safeguard thy fields from soil
erosion, thy living waters from drying up, they forests from desolation, and protect thy
hills from overgrazing by the herds, that they descendants may have abundance forever.
If any shall fail in this stewardship of the land, thy fruitful fields shall become sterile
stony ground or wasting gullies, and thy descendants shall decrease and live in poverty or
perish from off the face of the earth.”
Walter Clay Lowdermilk, The Eleventh Commandment421

According to the logic of functionalism, the UN specialized agencies should focus
on solving urgent problems like hunger, disease, and illiteracy. By attacking natural
hardships, the functional agencies could earn the loyalty of governments and publics,
which would enable them to develop into strong intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs)—perhaps eventually the executive agencies of a legitimate world government.
Functionalism carried a sort of wizened realist cachet, especially compared to the earnest
naiveté of the internationalists who hoped to build the defences of peace in the minds of
men. But eliminating world hunger and illiteracy and stopping the spread of infectious
disease were hardly modest goals. Indeed, considering the specialized agencies’ paltry
budgets and the political obstacles to international cooperation, these practical goals
could appear incredibly naïve.
For historians in particular, this mismatch between ends and means has made the
UN System significant more as a symbol than as an actor on the world stage. Whether it
represents the high ideals of a liberal democratic world community or the insidious
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character of American imperialism, the effect is to focus attention on the UN’s dramatic
founding and render incidental its decades of evolution and growth. Yet the specialized
agencies expanded and multiplied in the decades after their creation. More tellingly, their
activities spread into areas that overflowed the functional boundaries of their
constitutional mandates. And they had important effects. Their programs cultivated
epistemic communities—transnational networks of experts who shared values, norms,
and causal frameworks.422 They performed standardized surveys that made the global
economy, society, and environment visible.423 IGOs played a key role in shaping how
governments and citizens perceived the world and measured progress. Ironically, by
producing an ever more compelling global view from above, the specialized agencies’
most impressive accomplishments highlighted their own failure to improve the world.
But, then, assuring the continuing patronage of states and mobilizing world public
opinion required conveying a sense of global crisis.
This chapter analyzes the Natural Sciences Department’s (NSD) Arid Zone
Program to show how Unesco succeeded in earning an international reputation as an
authority on natural resources. From exceedingly humble beginnings in 1949, the Arid
Zone Program grew into the Arid Lands Major Project in 1956. The Major Project
officially ran for six years before evolving into the International Hydrological Decade,
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which became the permanent International Hydrological Program when the decade was
up. Moreover, as the Major Project wound down, the Project’s Coordinator, Michel
Batisse, became Director of the new Division of Studies and Research Related to Natural
Resources. In 1968, this Division organized the intergovernmental Conference on the
Rational Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere, which led to Unesco’s
Man and the Biosphere Program. By 1972’s landmark United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment in Stockholm, often identified as the birth of sustainable
development, Unesco could point to two decades of experience investigating the
challenges of developing resources without degrading the environment.424 Batisse began
his history of Unesco’s journey “from desert to water,” by almost gloating that natural
resources were “not mentioned in Unesco’s constitution and…not even referred to during
the working sessions leading to Unesco’s creation.”425 The Arid Zone Program
established the NSD’s competence in, and thus jurisdiction over, the science of natural
resources.
The pursuit of a view from above of local and global natural resources was key to
the NSD’s success, but does not explain the particular success of a desert research
program. Just as the Tensions Project and the Education for World Citizenship Program
depended on the fiction of the world community, the Arid Zone Program was animated
by a powerful moral narrative. This was desertification—a declensionist ecological
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narrative that resonated with the deepest anxieties of development.426 The power of this
ecological fiction derived from its contradictions and ambiguity. Deserts were portrayed
as both the cause and effect of underdevelopment. But development was diagnosed as
both the cause of and the solution to the problem of deserts. However cause and effect
were parsed, whether deserts were natural or manmade or even spreading at all,
reclaiming the land required basic scientific research and the intervention of states. The
desertification narrative, therefore, provided a compelling argument for Unesco’s move
into natural resources that appealed to governments and influential members of the
scientific community.
Unesco promoted the Arid Zone Program as an urgent battle that pitted “man
against the desert.” Forty years after the Major Project ended, however, Batisse conceded
that “in the end, …the Unesco programme had neither shrunk the deserts nor stopped
erosion, which then more than ever before threatened the world.” Instead, the program’s
accomplishments were intellectual and social. “It had opened the way,” Batisse wrote,
“towards an interdisciplinary approach to developing lands. It had served as the loom for
weaving a lasting worldwide network of human contacts and dependable
interchanges.”427 The program had failed “to make deserts bloom again,” but, Batisse
claimed, it had succeeded in cultivating an international community of experts that
transcended both disciplinary and political boundaries. Unesco’s officials took special
pride in overcoming the most obstinate barriers, whether between the natural sciences
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and social sciences or the United States and the Soviet Union. In essence, Batisse claimed
that the Arid Lands Project had provided a successful moral equivalent of war.
This chapter evaluates the success of the Arid Zone Program in these terms; not
by calculating the increased yields of arid lands, but by investigating how effectively the
NSD used science to forge a measure of bureaucratic autonomy and produce an
international community that integrated disciplines, institutions, and nations. It begins by
showing how the institutional ecology of the UN System produced an environment in
which a basic research program on deserts made sense as a response to a global food
crisis. The heart of the paper then analyzes the many permutations of the scientific “myth
of desertification” to illuminate the contradictory assumptions and values that united the
international army waging a war against nature. Finally, it focuses on a few exemplary
projects and controversies to reveal how the functionalist strategy that guided the Arid
Zone Program played out on the ground.
The Uses of Uselessness
The political scientists Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore note that scholars’
of intergovernmental organizations emphasis on the act of creation reflects an a priori
assumption that IGOs are merely the agents of states; the question thus reduces to why
national governments created them in the first place.428 This emphasis on origins
obscures the creative strategies that civil servants used to win a measure of bureaucratic
autonomy. In this respect, the bureaucratic character of the specialized agencies was more
significant than their international status. In The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy,
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Daniel Carpenter shows that by earning a reputation for competence and building
influential coalitions, the U.S. Postal Service and Department of Agriculture achieved a
degree of authority that was both more independent and broader than the politicians who
established them had ever intended. Instead of focusing on the evanescent political
appointees at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy, this analysis identifies “the structural
power of the mezzo level”— career bureaucrats who learned how to successfully
innovate programs and acquired the discretionary authority to do so.429 Carpenter’s
argument is particularly intriguing because it so closely resembles the mid-century
functionalism that informed the architects of the specialized agencies.430 Acknowledging
the importance of the mezzo level and accepting that officials were committed to forging
bureaucratic autonomy (whether or not they were successful) directs attention to the daily
work of international secretariats and away from the General Conferences at which states
negotiated programs and budgets.
Indeed, as the first three chapters have emphasized, the characterization of the UN
specialized agencies, especially Unesco, as intergovernmental organizations is somewhat
misleading. Thomas Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, and Richard Jolly have suggested adding
a “third UN” to the traditional concept of two UNs—that is, the member states and
secretariats.431 This third UN is composed of NGOs, academics, expert consultants,
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independent commissions and other influential actors. The third UN was the key
constituency to which the secretariat demonstrated its competence and where it built
coalitions. In practice, of course, the boundaries between these three UNs were extremely
porous. Individuals, for example, routinely served simultaneously on advisory panels and
in national government agencies or moved between academic, government, and
secretariat appointments. In fact, the third UN often determined the position of member
governments at the General Conference.
The origins of the Arid Zone Program demonstrate the imbrications of the three
UNs. The program began as a proposal from the International Union of Theoretical and
Applied Mechanics for an Arid Zone Research Laboratory for Fluid and Soil Mechanics,
just one of a host of proposals for UN international laboratories. Although visionary plans
for a network of international laboratories foundered, Unesco’s 1948 General Conference
in Beirut approved an Indian resolution instructing the Director General to convene a
committee of experts to investigate the possibilities of establishing an International
Institute of the Arid Zone. Unesco took advantage of the United Nations Scientific
Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources (UNSCCUR) to convene
an informal study group on the question, and an official committee met at Unesco House
a few months later. Instead of an international institute, however, the committees of
experts recommended establishing a committee of experts. The resulting Advisory
Committee on Arid Zone Research was composed of scientists appointed by the DirectorGeneral from the nominations of member governments. The Advisory Committee
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essentially determined the program that the NSD executed, but NSD officials set the
agenda for the Committee’s meetings and advised the Director-General on the
appointment of experts who were nominated by states. The whole scheme, of course, was
subject to the approval of member states at the General Conference.
Although experts on the Advisory Committee served in their individual capacity
as representatives of the scientific community, the secretariat employed a complex if
predictable political geography to determine the ten appointees. The United States,
France, and Great Britain had permanent seats; Middle Eastern countries ostensibly
rotated, but an Israeli had to be balanced by an Egyptian; India, Pakistan and Australia
were usually represented; and one position was reserved for a Latin American scientist.432
Since one of the reasons for defining the program geographically was that it enabled a
comprehensive (i.e. interdisciplinary) approach to the problem of deserts, disciplinary
diversity was as important as geographic balance. Notable members of the Advisory
Committee included the Chief Hydrologist of the U.S. Geological Survey Luna B.
Leopold (son of the famous wildlife ecologist); B. T. Dickson, the retired Chief of the
Division of Plant Industry in the Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organization; the engineer and energy expert M. S. Thacker, Director of the
Indian Institute of Science; H. G. Thornton, Head of the Department of Soil
Microbiology at the Rothamsted Experimental Station in England; G. Aubert, Chief of
the Soils Service at l’Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer in
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Paris; and S. N. Naqvi, Director of Pakistan’s Meteorological Service.433 As this list
reveals, members of the Advisory Committee worked in national or colonial agencies or
were professors with strong government ties. In fact, the experts tended to occupy exactly
that mezzo layer of the bureaucratic strata—chiefs of departments—that Carpenter argues
was critical for forging bureaucratic autonomy. As shown below, membership on the
Advisory Committee could be a way for bureaucrats to advance their own careers and
institutions.
But it would be a mistake to discount these experts’ commitments to the ideals of
internationalism. Perhaps the most influential expert to serve on the Advisory Committee,
Gilbert White, personifies this commitment. A University of Chicago geographer and
President of Haverford College, White was a veteran of New Deal conservation
programs.434 Not only did White chair the climatic UNSCCUR plenary meeting on “The
Integrated Development of River Basins,” but he also convened a study group of the
Haverford American Friends Service Committee for the World Mental Health
Conference described in Chapter One. The study group reported on the need to provide
children with experiences that encouraged the “transference of self into the realm of other
people, thus erasing the false images that impede understanding.”435 Even for those who
were not Quakers dabbling in psychoanalysis, service on the Advisory Committee
committed experts to the norms of the view from everywhere as much as the view from
433
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above. The primary objective of the program was to produce an international community
of arid zone researchers.
Instead of a popular community of world citizens, however, the war against nature
focused on creating a cadre of international experts. According to UN practice, the title of
expert was reserved for non-staff members. But the secretariats of the specialized
agencies developed enduring relationships with the experts they contracted, and these
experts became loosely affiliated with particular organizations. For example, both FAO
and Unesco hired plant ecologists, but Louis Emberger, who held the chair of botany at
the University of Montpellier, was a Unesco expert—he hosted Unesco conferences,
attended Advisory Committee meetings, and led multiple Arid Zone regional training
seminars on plant ecology. As Sir Ben Lockspeiser put it in his closing address to an
international conference on arid lands research in Israel, the campaign against the desert
called not only for “generals”—that is, elite scientists—but also “trained troops”—
“technologists, engineers, and technicians.”436 Much of Unesco’s Arid Zone Program was
indeed devoted to training the troops, but it was generals who comprised a functioning
international community.
Lofty notions of transference were not obvious in the Arid Zone Program’s
purposefully prosaic initiatives, however. From its first session, the Advisory Committee
decided “to concentrate on…rather concrete approaches to the Middle Eastern
problem.”437 One of the program’s first activities was to compile a directory of
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institutions performing arid zone research, which included contact information and brief
descriptions of 90 institutions.438 Each year the Advisory Committee agreed on a broad
research area focus, and the secretariat partnered with a member state to host an
international conference on the theme. For example, in 1952, hydrology and underground
water in Ankara; in 1954, energy sources, especially solar and wind power, in New
Delhi; and in 1956, climatology and microclimatology in Canberra. Unesco published the
proceedings of these symposia as state-of-the-art reviews in its Arid Zone Research
Series, which eventually ran to thirty volumes. To produce periodic interdisciplinary
syntheses of the field and identify critical research questions, the NSD co-hosted general
symposia in Israel in 1952, Tuscan in 1955, and Paris in 1960. The program gradually
diversified as it expanded. By the late 1950s, routine activities included: organizing
regional training courses on topics like soil classification and mapping,
microclimatology, and plant ecology; granting study abroad fellowships to young
scientists who committed to return to their home institutions (just a few per year initially
and reaching fifteen to twenty per year by 1960); and providing expert consultants,
equipment, and even dollars to select desert research institutes in underdeveloped
countries to support the integrated, interdisciplinary organization of research. The 1956
meeting of the General Conference in New Delhi elevated the program to the status of
Major Project on Scientific Research on Arid Lands with a geographic focus on the arid
region extending from Morocco to India. By becoming one of just three major projects,

438

Arid Zone Programme, Directory of Institutions Engaged in Arid Zone Research (Paris: Unesco, 1953).

234
the Arid Zone Program had clearly demonstrated that it was the NSD’s most successful
initiative.439
The geographic definition of the program was a critical aspect of its bureaucratic
success. Since the Secretariat’s main function was coordination, any research relevant to
deserts was potentially part of the program. As part of the Major Project, the NSD began
publishing the Arid Zone Newsletter, and the introductory editorial explained that the
Major Project included arid zone research on a “local, national, regional or world level,
on a bilateral, multilateral or international, or a governmental or non-governmental basis
[—] its scope is universal.”440 In other words, even arid zone research not sponsored by
Unesco was part of the program. To help give this claim substance, the secretariat
encouraged the formation of national cooperating committees. The committees’ job was
to coordinate research and tie national efforts into the international program. (Like most
such endeavors, the results were more impressive on paper than on the ground.)
The Major Project’s geographic focus was also a strategic advantage because, as
the historian Mathew Connelly has emphasized, the Middle East was where the Third
World was born, and the Third World was where postwar international development
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programs thrived—or at least survived.441 In the institutional ecology of the UN System,
the only factor limiting the program’s growth appeared to be available resources.
Initially, these were quite limited. In 1952, the year the program became
operational, its budget was just $40,000. In 1957, the first year of the Major Project, the
budget nearly doubled from its 1956 level to $223,633 and it peaked in 1960 when costs
exceeded $450,000.442 The pressure of a tight budget was further eased by grants from
the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA) and the UN Special Fund
(established in 1958), which some years exceeded allocations to the Arid Zone Program
from Unesco’s regular budget. In fact, by 1963, Unesco’s entire two-year regular budget
of $39 million was more than doubled by funding from the two UN programs.443 Budget
growth could not relieve a sense of scarcity, however, because the Unesco’s mandate was
so broad. Member states (especially the major donors), friendly and hostile observers in
the media, expert consultants, and secretariat officials constantly called for greater
concentration in Unesco’s programs. But the organization’s strengths—its broad
mandate, the near universal membership of nation states, and especially the participation
of dozens of INGOs—created a centrifugal force that program planners could not resist.
All of these factors affected the Arid Zone Program.
When the NSD circulated a questionnaire asking scientists what activities the
Arid Lands Project should support, it reminded them to “please bear in mind that the
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programme, though it is planned and proposed by the Secretariat, has to be approved by
the General Conference which consists of delegates of 80 Member States. This implies
that the programme must in some measure achieve an equitable geographical distribution
of the activities and satisfy the varying needs of the countries.”444 Accepting these
constraints, the scientists generally accepted the diffuse program.
But in truth, the scientists themselves were difficult to herd. In response to the
questionnaire on project priorities, “a limnologist suggested that the limnology of arid
zone lakes was not receiving sufficient attention,” a zoologist recommended more
emphasis on zoology, and so on.445 The opinions of scientists could not be ignored.
“When one of the science advisory committees decides that UNESCO ought to take
particular actions in science,” wrote former Director-General Luther Evans, “the
Director-General usually takes the recommendation seriously, because he knows that the
scientists concerned are likely to have enough delegate votes in the next General
Conference to defeat him if he opposes the recommendation.”446 The NSD valued a
holistic, ecological approach, but these bureaucratic imperatives were just as important in
inspiring the secretariat’s commitment to a “balanced,” not a targeted, program.
This centrifugal pressure was built into the functional organization of the UN
specialized agencies, too. Indeed, it was inherent in the synoptic perspective of the view
from above. The imperative for integrated planning meant projects were constantly in
444
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danger of disintegrating; or, more precisely, overflowing bureaucratic boundaries. A
FAO/World Bank official put the problem to song (sung to the tune of “Phil the Fluter’s
Ball”):
Twas on a Monday morning that the DG said to me
Will you write a letter to the Fund telling them that we
Are preparing our new project for a Member government
So I took a piece of paper out and this how it went:
Estimate the project cost and see what I can do
If I add a million dollars then I multiply by two
Count up all the experts multiply by three
The more the experts in the field the bigger job for me
(CHORUS): Copy to the in-tray, copy to the file
One to the pending—bottom of the pile
Circulate it round the house to another ten
Post upon the table and I’m off to sleep again
Twas on a Tuesday morning—imagine my elation
When they asked me if the project needed any irrigation
So I flood the project area quickly proving that they oughter
Make the operating agency entirely Land and Water
CHORUS
Twas on a Wednesday morning that a letter came to me
Asking if the project needed any forestry
So I quickly got to work and using my imagination
Made the object of the project one of reafforestation
CHORUS
Twas on a Thursday morning that I nearly did a dance
When they asked if the project was of interest to Plants
So leaping on the project like a bureaucratic vulture
I quickly turned the project into one of horticulture
CHORUS
Twas on a Friday morning that they asked for my decision
Was the project of significance to Animal Division
So ignoring everybody else I took another sheet
And wrote a brand new project with the emphasis on meat447
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As the verses so eloquently suggest, a key measure of an international civil servant’s
career was the size of the projects he or she coordinated, both in terms of material
resources and functional area. Part of a program officer’s job was making vivid causal
connections between environmental, social and economic factors.
In fact, the Arid Zone Program’s paradigmatic project, the integrated survey, was
designed to make these interactions visible. The program adopted the methodology for
integrated surveys developed by the Division of Land Research and Regional Survey of
the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) of
Australia.448 The CSIRO approach emphasized classifying landscapes based on the
concept of the “land system, defined as an area, or group of areas, throughout which there
is a recurring pattern of land forms, soils, and vegetation…. which expresses the
integration of elements in the land complex.” The historically determined interactions
between environmental factors—not the separate characteristics of soils, climate, slope,
and vegetation—were what integrated surveys attempted to map. Integrated surveys of
land systems began with the intensive study of aerial photograph mosaics to identify
“recurring patterns,” which represented preliminary “land units.” Next, an
interdisciplinary team consisting of, for example, a geologist, geomorphologist, soil
scientist, and plant ecologist, traversed the landscape to sample its characteristics and
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confirm the boundaries of land units. Finally, the interpretation of aerial photographs and
field data were combined to produce a map of the land system and accompanying report.
The integrated nature of the survey meant that similar land units had similar development
potentials. Unesco experts promoted the methodology as particularly well-suited to desert
development because it could cheaply and quickly classify extensive areas.449
But since social and economic factors obviously affected a landscape’s potential,
Unesco encouraged the incorporation of social scientists into the integrated survey team.
By 1964, when the NSD organized a major international conference on Principles and
Methods of Integrating Aerial Survey Studies of Natural Resources for Potential
Development, a Division of Applied Social Sciences had been grafted on to the
department. Its chief reported that “social scientists should participate in the preparation
of surveys and so be ‘integrated’ in the same way as their various colleagues of the
natural sciences.”450 Although this principle often remained lauded in theory but latent in
practice, it captured the comprehensive ethos of the view from above that guided the
NSD’s pursuit of the view from above.
Coordinating integrated surveys was also an effective means of expanding the
NSD’s fields of competence and strengthening its international network. For proponents
of integrated surveys, the method was as important as the product. Experts from various
government departments (e.g. the forest department, soil conservation program, and
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geological survey) typically had to collaborate to produce an integrated survey, and so
they were a technology for facilitating functional integration across bureaucratic
boundaries. They got rival departments working together—and connected Unesco to each
participating institution.451
But in the UN System, long-term success also required guarding against the
danger of mission creep, which not only could make a project impractical, but could
undermine a program officer’s authority. The project might outgrow the office or incite
conflict by trespassing on another department’s or agency’s field of competence. Thus,
when FAO officers got word of a integrated survey Unesco was planning in Syria, they
vigorously objected that the plant ecologist, soil scientist, geo-hydrologist and
agriculturalist represented “four fields [that fall] completely within the competence of
FAO and that the type of work proposed, leading up to scientific settlement of the area”
was FAO’s jurisdiction. To save the project and ease tensions, officials agreed to make
the survey a joint venture, with FAO providing the natural scientists and Unesco social
scientists, who would integrate “the cultural values of the Bedouin” into the survey. In
this case, institutional rivalries directly increased the interdisciplinary ambition of the
project. As a Unesco official noted, however, a national political crisis “solved” the
bureaucratic “problem” by temporarily suspending UN work in what became the United
Arab Republic.452 Indeed, international civil servants were often more attuned to
bureaucratic politics within the second UN than the international politics animating the
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first UN. The competitive-cooperative relationships between the secretariats were a key
determinant of the specialized agencies’ programs.
For officials in the NSD, the stakes in the jurisdictional competition with FAO
were high. Establishing a credible presence in natural resources was particularly
important for attracting TA and Special Fund monies. Between 1955 and 1964 the
Expanded Program for Technical Assistance awarded 22% of its money to agricultural
development projects (i.e. FAO’s turf), compared to just 12% for education (i.e. Unesco’s
turf). The Special Fund explicitly targeted surveys and research on natural resources as a
way to encourage investment in underdeveloped countries. In its first six-years, the Fund
distributed nearly 40% of its resources to FAO, double the amount assigned to Unesco,
and FAO jealously guarded its turf.453 It required subtle boundary work for Unesco to
make inroads. This was the game Michel Batisse played with aplomb. His skills at
managing bureaucratic relationships—at transforming competition into cooperation—
enabled him to leverage a doctorate in solid state physics and an isolated post as science
liaison officer in Cairo into an authoritative reputation on international environmental
issues and, eventually, an Assistant Director-Generalship in Unesco.
A key advantage of deserts was that their limited agricultural potential provided
Unesco an inconspicuous toehold in natural resources. As the FAO representative at
Unesco’s first study group on international arid zone research remarked, “If it were
possible for this group to confine its attention to purely desert conditions…[t]here would
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be less danger of overlapping.”454 Jurisdiction over useless land hardly seemed worth
fighting for.
But, as the following section shows, deserts were profoundly important
symbolically. And since Unesco’s climatologic definition of arid zones covered more
than a third of the planet, FAO and, to a lesser extent, the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), were far from willing to cede the territory. The NSD employed
two key strategies to make its claim legitimate.
The first was simply to co-opt the other agencies. From the beginning, both the
WMO (which created a Panel of Experts on Arid Zone Research in 1952) and FAO were
invited to Advisory Committee meetings, and Unesco often described the Arid Zone
Project as an interagency program for which it provided the Secretariat. Batisse was
particularly conscientious about inviting FAO to nominate experts to lead training
courses or contribute papers to the Arid Zone Research Series. At times this strategy was
quite successful, but more often FAO officials inveighed against Unesco’s “tendency…to
override projects of interest to, and directly affecting FAO.” This quite typical memo,
from the chief of FAO’s International Agency Liaison Branch, continued, “FAO is forced
to ‘tag along’ on many projects initiated by UNESCO, for which, naturally, UNESCO
gets the credit.” Seven years later, the Liaison Branch warned that FAO was in danger of
being “submerged by Unesco with little help from the UN.”455 Instead of easing the
competition for scarce resources, FAO officers warned that “with the attraction of Special
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Fund monies [Unesco had] given up the pretence of concentrating only on scientific
research.”456 Still, the idealization of integrated, interdisciplinary projects and, therefore,
coordinated interagency programs (“concerted action” in UN development lingo) made
cooperation a norm that was difficult to resist.
Unesco officers’ second strategy was establishing and then blurring the boundary
separating fundamental science (also called pure or basic science in Unesco) from applied
science. Justifying the need for cooperation in the first place required defining each
agency’s discrete area of competence. Unesco claimed competence in fundamental
research—that is, research defined by the fact that it was of no immediate use—and
granted the other specialized agencies’ jurisdictions over the relevant applied sciences.
To win the patronage of member states, however, officials emphasized the long-term
practical benefits of basic research. And, as FAO officials constantly complained and
Unesco officials occasionally celebrated, there was an enormous “‘grey area” where it
was difficult to determine the difference between basic and applied research.
Nevertheless, FAO accepted the division and devoted its efforts to reinforcing the
boundary in order to maintain “the natural relations which should exist between two such
organizations, the one concerned with fundamental and the other with applied
science.”457 FAO possessed the coveted turf, but the battle was fought on Unesco’s terms.
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This bureaucratic boundary work explains why Unesco found useless knowledge of
useless land extremely useful.458
In fact, Unesco devoted considerable energy to differentiating basic and applied
science. According to the Organization’s influential Current Trends in Scientific
Research, known as the Auger report after its author, the former director the NSD,
“Development work” depended on “applied research,” which derived from “oriented
fundamental research” (a.k.a. the grey area), with the whole structure founded upon “free
fundamental research or pure research.”459 In this linear model of development, some
sciences were necessarily more fundamental than others. Ultimately, according to Auger,
“we are forced to the conclusion that the whole universe, including life, is governed by
laws which are themselves no more than derivatives of these laws of physics and
chemistry. In that case, the notion that laws of another type, other general principles, can
influence the happenings of our daily life must be absolutely rejected.”460 By rendering
“pure research” distinct from yet fundamental to applied research, the linear model
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justified the NSD’s specialized role in development work. Ironically, for all the talk of an
interdisciplinary, integrated approach, the NSD’s holism depended on an absurdly
reductionistic philosophy of science.
The Arid Zone Program began as just one of many proposals for programs in the
natural sciences. Like the much hyped International Institute for the Hylean Amazon,
most of these projects fizzled out. But the Arid Zone Program evolved into the NSD’s
Major Project and became a model for other programs; for example, the NSD established
an International Advisory Committee on Scientific Research in 1953, an Advisory
Committee on the Marine Sciences in 1956, and another for a Humid Tropics Program
explicitly designed to complement the Arid Zone Major Project in 1957. This
organizational model thrived because it allowed the program to adapt to the pressures of
the three UNs. But structural fitness only partially explains how the program succeeded
in establishing the NSD’s competency in natural resources. To unite the three UNs in the
battle against the desert, participants also had to articulate a compelling narrative.
The Myth of Desertification Revisited
In December 1949, as Assistant Chief of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service
Walter Clay Lowdermilk moderated the committee of experts’ debate over the merits of
an International Institute of the Arid Zone, the NSD was already strategizing a publicity
campaign for the non-existent program. In January, the science editor of the London
News Chronicle, Ritchie Calder (later Lord Ritchie-Calder), embarked on a two month,
15,000 mile expedition from Algeria through the Sahara, Libyan deserts and Sinai to
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Israel.461 Over forty publications in twenty-eight countries carried Calder’s dispatches,
serialized under the title “Men against the Desert.” Through a partnership with the British
Ministry of Education, Unesco’s Courier reported, 15,000 English schools incorporated
the articles into their curriculum. The News Chronicle even produced a wall map on
which students could trace the intrepid journalist’s journey.462 Calder’s stories served as a
recruitment tool for the international army waging a war against nature.
Calder had served as Director of Plans and Campaigns in the Public Warfare
Executive Branch of the British government during the Second World War, and this
experience in wartime propaganda was evident in his dispatches from the desert. “A new
kind of desert war is on,” Calder reported, “It is not a battle of men against men, of
weapons against weapons. It is a fight against the sands of the arid zones of the world.”
He followed the trail of the “desert rats,” a famous British brigade, to tell the story of the
“legionnaires of science” who fought a battle on two fronts. “Firstly, means must be
found to stem the invasion of the desert upon neighbouring arable lands under cultivation.
Secondly, ways must be devised by scientists and technicians for improving life in the
arid and semi-arid lands, and turning them into valuable new food-producing belts in
regions where the world is most hungry. In the train of new-found food resources may
come new industrial and cultural strength, much of it built upon or around land which
was once the site of former great civilizations.” For population growth meant that “now,
more than ever, it is true that man cannot live on only two-thirds of the world. He needs it
all.” The series concluded, “Eagerly, scientists are grappling with the desert. They have
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welcomed Unesco’s proposed international co-operation and exchange and Unesco’s
campaign to remind the world of the forgotten Men against the Desert.”463
Although Calder sought to rally mankind for the war against the desert, the
ultimate enemy turned out not to be nature, but men. Left alone, nature was bountiful.
But “wandering men” and their goats, capitalist farmers who mined the soil for shortterm profits, and hunters who used fire to prevent savannahs from succeeding into forests
had created deserts. Calling for a “New Deal for the World’s Arid Lands,” another author
in the Courier repeated the common wisdom: “We made a wilderness when we knew
little of nature’s laws. We plundered this planet, robbing the good earth of its fertility,
destroying the forests, decimating wildlife—creating wilderness.”464 This was the
significance of the “great civilizations” that had once flourished in the deserts of the
Middle East; they proved that the arid zone had the potential to support large populations
and, conversely, that people were responsible for the desert.
Human culpability was a cause for optimism, however. Calder reminded his
readers that centuries ago civilization had sustained itself on dew in the “barren sunscorched Negev,” so with modern science no land, no matter how dry, was beyond hope.
“But the immediate challenge,” he continued, “is that of the man-made desert. For what
man has done, man can by brains and sweat undo.” He lamented the fact that despite
examples of “efficient damming controls...only too often rivers are allowed to go as they
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please,” yet his description of victory was headlined “Nature Reasserts Herself.”465
Restoring nature’s fertility meant protecting “her” from the degradations of man, which,
ironically, required asserting more comprehensive controls over her. The war against the
desert was a fight to reclaim lost land.
“Men against the Desert” provided a rather crude popular rendition of the
development narrative that justified the Arid Zone Program. The program itself played a
central role in refining and spreading the narrative, but Unesco certainly did not invent
the story. Rather, the diverse participants in the program found the narrative compelling
because it was already meaningful. Historians, geographers, and political ecologists have
carefully traced the development of this narrative of environmental degradation at local
and global scales.466 By the mid-twentieth-century, the dramatic dustbowl in the United
States and similar events in Australia and Southern Africa, famine in India, and the
French obsession with the desiccating effects of deforestation in North and West Africa
had made “deserts on the march” the common enemy that the emergent global
conservation movement rallied against.
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Ecological theory furnished the scientific basis of what the geographers Thomas
and Middleton call the “myth of desertification.”467 In nature, plant species lived in
predictable associations, which existed in a dynamic balance with their environment.
Through processes of adaptation and succession, these communities achieved a mature
stability in what the American ecologist Fredric Clements termed the “climatic climax”
and the French botanist Charles Flahault simply the “natural vegetation.” Plant ecologists
typically determined that, except in truly arid zones, the natural vegetation was a forest,
which maximized the biological potential of the environment. Indeed, French
phytosociologists named the natural plant association after its dominant species, which
was usually a tree even when other species were more prevalent. Since organisms were
exquisitely adapted to their environments, natural vegetation could be deduced from data
on a particular place’s soil, climate, and geomorphology.
All too often, however, predicted natural vegetation was not found where it ought
to be—savannahs stretched where forests ought to grow. The climax association,
ecologists argued, had regressed to a sub-climax. Scientists perused historical documents
(e.g. ancient Greek and medieval histories that described forests where none now existed
and petroglyphs showing giraffes in the Sahara) and located “relict” populations (often,
ironically, at well-tended religious shrines) that showed what the “original vegetation”
had been. The climatic climax was the natural state; therefore, humans were responsible
for the degradation. Even in semi-arid zones climatically unfit for trees, scientists
discovered evidence that the natural vegetation ought to be trees. Since soils, vegetation
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and climate were interdependent, human induced deforestation and soil erosion could
actually desiccate the environment, turning forests into savannahs and fields of wheat
into bowls of dust. Thus, the narrative went, the cradle of agriculture had been turned into
a man-made desert that now posed an existential threat to civilization. A FAO Forestry
Officer stationed in Cairo warned that “the terrible desert has already reached the shore of
the Mediterranean on a wide front and sends out its drying winds to the European
countries.”468
This declensionist narrative antedated the discipline of ecology, of course. Indeed,
U.S. environmental historians often trace their own discipline’s roots to G. P. Marsh’s
nineteenth-century classic Man and Nature, which described how “advances in
civilization” had led to the “exhaustion of the natural resources of the soil” so that the
area from North Africa to India, which had once sustained “a population scarcely inferior
to that of the whole Christian world” on “milk and honey,” could no longer “contribute
anything to the general moral or material interests of the great commonwealth of man.”
469
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likely to implicate Marsh in the crystallization of a desiccation narrative that justified
oppressive and ill-conceived land-use policies, especially in Africa.470 These authors
trace the remarkable consistency of the environmental degradation narrative around the
world and its equally remarkable stability from Europeans’ first encounters with
unfamiliar lands in the nineteenth century through the colonial period to independent but
underdeveloped nation states. The narrative, which actually preceded experience let alone
scientific research in the field, provided such a powerful interpretive frame that
contradictory evidence was either assimilated or dismissed. In James Fairhead and
Melissa Leach’s astute phrase, experts and administrators systematically misread the
landscape.471
Part of the disconcerting power of the environmental degradation narrative
derives from the fact that its fundamental components can be traced back to the founding
myths of Western civilization. Richard Grove locates the roots of modern
environmentalism in colonists’ recognition of their own destruction of tropical “island
Edens” in the seventeenth century, and Richard Drayton traces the intellectual history of
the imperative to improve nature to the Biblical creation myth itself.472 The parable of
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original sin, of tasting from the tree of knowledge and being cast out of earthly paradise
to toil in the desert wilderness, was never far beneath the surface of the myth of
desertification. Describing the lost glory of Baghdad, a member of the secretariat could
not resist noting in the Courier that “somewhere to the south of here, too, is reputed to
have been the Garden of Eden—the cradle of mankind.”473 The scientists who sought to
organize a crusade against “deserts on the march” were more likely to read the Bible as
an unreliable botanical guide than a work of revelation, but they preached with a religious
moral conviction that all land ought to contribute to, in Marsh’s words, “the great
commonwealth of man.”474
Unfortunately, the commonwealth kept getting greater. As much as environmental
decline, the narrative that drove the Arid Zone Program was about population growth. As
in the original Biblical myth, anxieties about sexual reproduction permeated development
discourse, but, unlike the Church, it was politically impossible for any UN agency to
address sexual practices. With population control off the agenda but Malthusian scenarios
in their reports, experts stressed the imperative to increase agricultural yields and bring
virgin lands into production.475 In this accounting, it hardly mattered whether deserts
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were man-made or natural. Deserts, by definition, were underdeveloped; a British expert
on wind and local energy sources advising the Arid Lands Major Project felt it necessary
to point out that the terms “underdeveloped area” and “arid zone” were not synonymous,
even though the latter “must certainly be classed as underdeveloped [given] their
relatively small contribution to the general store of wealth.”476 Precisely because deserts
were useless, the Arid Zone Program established Unesco’s competency over the great
undeveloped regions of the world.
Despite the compelling mathematical logic of population growth, resonance with
archetypal myths, theoretical grounding in ecology, and refinement over centuries of use,
however, the narrative of environmental degradation that motivated the Arid Zone
Program was paradoxical, ambiguous, and contested. The contradictions and plain old
errors of the “myth of desertification” have been thoroughly debunked, by ecologists and
geographers as well as historians and social scientists. But, in fact, the experts who
helped determine the program questioned the narrative’s basic tenets, too. For example,
in 1949, at a meeting of the study group convened to advise Unesco on arid zone research
in Lake Success, the Secretary-General of the International Union for the Protection of
Nature, Jean-Paul Harroy, noted the importance of historical studies which showed that
Roman villages had thrived in the Northern Sahara and demonstrated that the desert
sands were moving forward at a rate of one kilometer a year. As the historical geographer
Meanwhile, the mass of people are coming to realize that their living conditions are far below those
enjoyed by a privileged minority, and are striving to improve their lot as quickly as possible… Hence the
necessity of urgently developing and exploiting the resources of areas which man has so far somewhat
neglected… [Arid and semi-arid zones] are of special importance not only because of their vast extent but
also because they concern a large number of countries where the necessity for quickly developing resources
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Diana Davis has shown, this evidence was crucial in justifying French imperialism in the
Maghreb where colonialists claimed to be “resurrecting the granary of Rome.”477 But the
Chairman of the meeting, Director of the Institut Français de l’Afrique Noire in Dakar,
Théodore Monod, who would be an influential expert advising the NSD’s environmental
programs for decades, corrected Harroy. The image of the ruins was based on the
observations of a lone Scottish forester who had visited the area during the dry season.
His oft-cited one kilometer figure had been authoritatively refuted by an official joint
Franco-British Forestry Commission in 1936-7. In fact, there was no reliable evidence for
“the encroaching Sahara.”478
But current critiques go deeper than deriding the hyperbolic warnings of
voracious deserts to identify flaws in the theory and method of the science underlying the
declentionist narrative. In 2007, Unesco published The Future of Arid Lands—Revisited:
A Review of 50 Years of Drylands Research commemorating a landmark conference
hosted by the University of New Mexico and co-organized by the American Association
for the Advancement of Science and the Arid Zone Program. That conference and its
proceedings (edited by Gilbert White) set the agenda for the Major Project and led to the
establishment of the Office of Arid Lands Studies at the University of Arizona (which
employed the authors of the new volume) as well as an AAAS National Commission on
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Arid Zone Research. Although celebrating the intellectual and institutional
accomplishments of the field’s founding figures, the review understandably emphasized a
half-century of progress. In particular, it noted the move away from models of ecosystem
behavior based on “equilibrium (‘balance of nature’) towards nonequilibrium (‘flux of
nature’) models”; the explicit inclusion of humans in the models (“contrary to earlier
approaches, which saw humans as separate from nature”); and the conviction that
“integrated watershed management starts with the understanding that whatever happens
in one part of a watershed—e.g., groundwater extraction, soil erosion, or land use
change—affects the function of the system as a whole.”479 It would be difficult to identify
a more prominent ideal in postwar development thought than integrated river basin
development, but a review of the Arid Zone Research series furnishes plenty of models of
nature that assume static natural equilibriums and exclude humans.
The best example of this homeostatic conception of natural harmony was the Arid
Zone Project’s sponsorship of an experiment to establish the true natural vegetation of the
Atar region of Mauritania. Under Monod’s direction, workers fenced in seven enclosures
representing various soil and vegetation associations “to prevent all grazing and
degradation by other influences,” and observed ecological succession. By 1959, the
Institut Français de l’Afrique Noire reported the appearance of unexpected species, and
the NSD remarked that “the increase of vegetal productivity have been most
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encouraging.”480 Clearly, in this experiment, people (and their animals) were imagined as
separate from nature, only entering the field as a degrading factor. It is not surprising,
then, that Monod (as well as the phytosociologist Emberger) represented the International
Union for the Protection of Nature at meetings of the Arid Zone Advisory Committee.
The IUPN’s most substantial contribution to the program was seconding the
French ecologist R. Balleydier to Unesco’s Fundamental Education Centre in Egypt and
later to Turkey to produce conservation educational kits for use with twelve to fourteen
year old students. Balleydier described his curriculum as combating the “classic
phenomenon, now familiar to all Mediterranean naturalists, of man’s spoiling of the
natural environment [through] the wasteful use of forests, fires, the ploughing up of land
not suited to the purpose…and, above all, an archaic, destructive pastoral economy.”
Population growth, of course, increased pressure on soil and water resources and thus
accelerated their decline.481 In the context of an economic development program, faith in
a natural ecological equilibrium produced a paradoxical conception of productivity:
scientists argued that herds of livestock larger than predicted carrying capacity indicated
environmental degradation and that fields entirely removed from the human economy
were the most productive. Furthermore, from the Secretariat’s perspective, this version of
the desertification narrative engaged nature preservationists in a program intended to
intensify land-use.
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But, contrary to the Future of Arid Lands—Revisited, even scientists who
valorized nature’s balance also understood humans as part of the dynamic equilibrium. In
his 1949 report for the International Union of Biological Sciences advising the Secretariat
on international arid zone research, for example, Monod noted that despite daily
observations of nomads “mutilating” trees, this “had been going on for thousands of years
[and so] a certain equilibrium has been established between the destructive power of man
and the capacity of regeneration of plant life.”482 Monod’s understanding of the
environment as well adapted to the nomadic way of life reflected the widespread notion
that traditional subsistence economies had evolved cultural traditions that maintained
natural equilibriums. In this sense, the experimental fields Monod created were not meant
to be read as literal representations of nature but more like social scientists’ ideal types.483
In fact, contributors to the Arid Zone Program routinely rejected a conception of
nature that was separate from human culture. When, a decade into the program, the Arid
Zone Research Series published A History of Land Use in Arid Regions, the editor,
British geographer L. Dudley Stamp, concluded that the global review called “into
question the whole concept of a climatic climax vegetation, at least insofar as the arid
lands are concerned.” A “delicate balance” did indeed characterize arid lands, but this
balance had to be understood as a symbiotic relationship between plants and animals,
including humans.484 Indeed, by the time Balleydier designed his educational kits, the
nature protectionists had proven themselves archaic relicts unfit for the international
482
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environment of the 1950s. In 1956, the IUPN had finally changed its acronym—a bigger
deal than a name change in the international community—to the IUCN (International
Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources). Although Balleydier
blamed farmers and herders for soil erosion, which disrupted the hydrological cycle
causing desertification, the ecologist designed the curriculum for communities working
the land. The environment researchers sought to know may have been a product of
human abuse, but reclaiming it required gaining greater ecological control. Thus Calder’s
unacknowledged paradox that in order for nature to reassert herself, rivers and people
could no longer be allowed to wander wherever they pleased.
In this version of the environmental degradation narrative, “man” achieved
redemption by reversing the terms of nature-society interactions: instead of culture being
shaped by the natural environment, nature became part of the cultural system. At the New
Mexico symposium on the future of arid zones, Charles Kellogg, the Chief of the U.S.
Soil Conservation Service, described the ultimate goal of “science in man’s struggle on
arid lands”: “An attempt ‘to return to nature,’” he warned, “would condemn the majority
of the world’s population to starvation and death…We are seeking a cultural balance or,
more accurately, a cultural dynamic of relationship between resources and people for
efficient sustained production.”485 The explicit point was that balance—efficient
sustained production—was a goal, a normative value, not a description of nature.
Moreover, far from manifesting harmonious natural balance, desert ecosystems
epitomized nature’s unpredictability. Thus, the Chief Engineer of Public Works in Tunis
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summed-up scientific commonsense in his department: “‘In Tunisia, every year is
exceptional.’ Seemingly it should be the same in every arid region.”486 Constructing the
“cultural balance,” experts of all political and disciplinary loyalties agreed, required hard
work and rational planning.
Parallel with the declensionist narrative of desiccation, then, experts produced a
triumphalist story of “man” domesticating an unpredictable, unproductive environment.
In his history of land use in Egypt, the Cairo University geographer G. Hamdan defined
irrigation as “the medium of interaction between men and milieu, whereby he humanizes
the natural landscape, models and remodels it into a ‘second-nature’—the cultural
landscape.” Instead of the common image of Egypt as naturally limited to a thin corridor
of fertile land along the Nile, Hamdan celebrated the “spectacular” growth in cropland
through irrigation and the introduction of new crops, fertilizers, and practices that enabled
the intensification of agriculture, especially multiple crops per year. Despite
acknowledged environmental costs, these innovations had nearly doubled the country’s
effective arable acreage during the first sixty-years of the twentieth-century. Hamdan
divided Egyptian agricultural history into “Paleotechnic,” and “Neotechnic” periods and
heralded the emergence of a new “Biotechnic” phase with the construction of the Aswan
High Dam. The Biotechnic period would bring “the final removal of water as the
endemic limiting factor of Egyptian land use” and replace nature’s devastating variability
with a second-nature that assured an optimal, socially controlled equilibrium.487
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Soviet experts presented an even grander narrative of “the transformation of
nature” that envisioned the entire planet incorporated in a socialized second-nature. The
soil scientist and Director of the NSD, Victor A. Kovda, explained how capitalist
development had led to “the gradual desiccation and exhaustion of the soil,” but after the
October Revolution, the Soviet Union had begun transforming the natural environment
into “a factor which accelerates the rate of development of the country’s productive
forces.” The virgin lands program under Khrushchev in the mid-1950s, which, Kovda
celebrated for reclaiming 30 million hectares of unproductive dry steppes in Central Asia,
was just one example of the triumph of “patriotic scientists devoting their lives to the
study and conquest of the desert.”488 “The map of the Soviet Union,” proclaimed the
Soviet member of the Advisory Committee, academician G. V. Bogomolov, “is thus
being reshaped and the desert areas are on the way to disappearing.”489 Even if statemandated, this confidence in the capacity of the socialist state to subjugate the
environment to the will of society was paradoxically based on a faith in the harmonious,
orderly equilibrium of natural biocenoses, which could be scaled up to include the entire
globe in a single metabolic cycle.
In this holistic worldview, the laws of nature, like those of society, were
deterministic and, therefore, could be deduced. Soviet science and technology promised
to bring the geosphere, hydrosphere, and biosphere under socialist control to produce
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unprecedented abundance and expose the fallacy of Malthusian overpopulation.490 The
point here, however, is simply that Soviet experts, who had not participated in the first
few years of the Arid Zone Program and bombastically contrasted their heroic progress
with imperialists’ failures, were quite comfortable with the program’s framing narrative.
Indeed, experience developing the drylands of the Central Asian and Transcaucasian
Republics was the Soviet Union’s best evidence of the superiority of its model of social
and economic development. The Soviet’s sought to compete for the leading role in the
program’s narrative, rather than reject the story.491
The Soviet case brings into sharp relief a fundamental tension in agricultural
development programs: development was promoted as an effort to extend the benefits of
modern civilization to impoverished local populations, but local communities were also
obligated to abandon “traditional” ways of life to contribute their share to the Union.
Integrating the diverse empire of nations into a cohesive political entity was an end as
much as a means of development. The key to the Soviet model for the development of
arid lands was the integration of the territories of the Russian Empire into the U.S.S.R.
Rationalizing nature and society meant diverting water from parts of the country with a
surplus to the vast areas with a deficit, but the goal was to maximize the exploitation of
natural resources in the Union as a whole.492 The state mandated regional agricultural
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specialization (e.g. cotton growing throughout much of arid Central Asia) and set
production quotas, thus undermining local communities’ relative self-sufficiency and
extracting wealth from the imperial periphery. Development projects could look a lot
more like exploitation than assistance.493 This same tension between socio-political scales
characterized European colonial development schemes, especially during “the second
colonial occupation” following World War Two when metropolitan governments
intensified development schemes in an attempt to ameliorate their own economic
crises.494 The historian of the British Empire Joseph Hodge has described the political
imperatives that forced colonial experts to vacillate “between raising colonial living
standards and welfare, and responding to the pressures of metropolitan needs” as the
“enigma” of agricultural development.495 The Arid Zone Program’s environmental
degradation narrative reproduced this enigma at the level of the world community. The
goal was to raise the standards of living of desert communities, but population growth
also meant that all areas had no choice but to contribute to the great commonwealth of
man.
According to this development narrative, subsistence agriculture and extensive
pastoralism, since they produced little or no surplus, could only be problems. It did not
matter how well adapted they were to challenging environments or what alternatives were
available. In arid environments, agricultural development programs found nomadism
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particularly challenging. Nomads, especially nomads with voracious goats, played a
leading role in standard versions of the myth of desertification, but ecologically oriented
experts also argued that “savannahs [were] the reason for pastoralism, and not vice
versa.”496 Indeed, a common diagnosis of the problem with nomadism was that it was too
well adapted to the environment. In this reading, nomads had lost the war against nature;
they were submissive to their environment rather than dominating it. In his synthetic
account of nomadism in the Sahara for the 1960 symposium, however, Professor R.
Capot-Rey of l’Université d’Alger, argued that the state had “no right” to eliminate
nomadism because there was no other viable way to make the arid lands pay; settlement
schemes would “let a region which feeds a million individuals return to the desert, at a
time when a third of mankind is suffering from hunger.”497 This anxiety—that misguided
development could itself be a leading cause of underdevelopment—bubbled below the
surface of much development thinking, but was a central theme of the desiccation
narrative. In the rush to extract surplus value from the land, both state and private
development projects risked turning marginal lands into true deserts. The ruins of great
cities in the desert sands, as well as famines in colonial possessions, could be read as
evidence that civilization caused underdevelopment.
Beyond material concerns, many experts worried that the homogenizing effects of
development programs impoverished the world’s cultural heritage. French authors, for
example, typically expressed a romantic admiration for nomads’ freedom, resiliency,
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physical prowess, and sense of honor. With anticipatory nostalgia, they mourned the
inevitable passing of this manly way of life so well adapted to the environment but now
forced to adjust “to the inexorable demands of modernization.”498 Stamp offered a more
intriguing observation in his conclusion to A History of Land Use in the Arid Regions: not
only was a “modernized version of semi-nomadism” the “right answer for vast areas of
the arid lands,” but semi-nomadism was the “highest form of human existence” and a
world-wide characteristic of modern life—a point that must have resonated with many of
the peripatetic experts who participated in the Arid Zone Program.499
Despite these prominent endorsements, however, it proved impossible to
incorporate nomadism into the development narrative as something more than an
anachronism in need of development. A subtle, probably incidental, change in language
is meaningful here. When Gilbert White suggested “the nature of nomadism” as a topic
for the 1960 arid lands symposium, claiming there was a “surprising lack of knowledge”
about how nomads actually made a living, the secretariat changed the proposal to the “the
problem of nomadism” in its draft program.500
It would be a mistake to attribute the bias this change symbolizes to the power of
the environmental degradation narrative, however. The fundamental problem with
nomads was not that their livestock overgrazed or even that they did not produce a
surplus to contribute to the great commonwealth. Nomads’ original sin was that their
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loyalties were to the clan or tribe not the nation.501 For in the end, it was not land that was
the object of development but nations. Elites from developing countries were
unapologetic about the necessity of nation-building. The Egyptian Chairman of Unesco’s
Executive Board, Mohamed Awad, for example, observed that the extent of nomadism in
the Middle East was in “direct proportion to the weakness of the central government”:
“The prominence given to local tribal solidarity has often been a handicap in the
development of a national spirit and outlook. It is therefore not enough from the point of
view of the country’s welfare merely to settle the nomads—they must also be socially
integrated.”502 In assessing contemporary settlement schemes, another Egyptian expert
emphasized the need to reclaim land that nomads’ abuse had turned into desert, but
concluded that “the crowning achievement of these projects will be the reduction of the
cultural and social contrast…between the Western Desert…and the rest of the
country.”503 The goal of development was to cultivate productive, loyal citizens of a
modern nation state. Whether nomads played the role of tragic hero, innocent rube or
plundering villain, therefore, the fate of nomadism in the environmental degradation
narrative was sealed.
The case of nomads reveals how the enigma of agricultural development—the
tension between the local community and the greater commonwealth—was both resolved
and perpetuated by decolonization. In the international community of states—the first
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UN—the local essentially stopped at the nation. Governments determined the interests of
their citizens, and Third World elites often echoed the coercive logic of imperialism. A.
S. Helaissi, for example, asserted that the Saudi government was justified in requiring
Bedouins to settle because “living as they do outside modern civilization, [they] cannot
appreciate or determine what their real interests are, nor can they envisage the means of
achieving higher social standards.” 504 Many experts challenged this presumption. For
instance, the director of an African research institute (probably Monod) advised the
Major Project to perform more social research before intervening in people’s lives
because “it would be just (and prudent) to know them first and also to ask them” what
their “notions of happiness” were. A Unesco officer noted, however, that this research
path had been foreclosed by the General Conference “when the Major Project was
established on the basis of promoting scientific research with a view to improve living
conditions.”505 What counted as a rational use of the land (or improvement) was worked
out between governments and their experts, and the key measure was gross national
product. As a FAO report in preparation for the 1960 symposium noted, underdeveloped
countries should request technical assistance from UN agencies only for projects that
“related to its general economy and not to an isolated section of it, or affect a certain class
of its population.”506 In this vision of a liberal international order, nation states, not local
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communities or individuals, were endowed with autonomous rights; democracy at the
international scale depended on its absence at the domestic scale.
The urgency of national development obscured the moral and material tension
between maximizing the local and the general good. Since the conservation of natural
resources called for rational planning by a central authority possessing a national view
from above, the narrative of environmental degradation provided a moral imperative for
government intervention. It thus appealed to newly independent states struggling to unite
culturally fragmented nations.
The purposeful destruction of traditional ways of life and strengthening of
national spirit seems a long ways from the celebration of unity in diversity and the fiction
of a world community. But this contradiction could be reconciled by focusing on the
federal structure of the international community. An Iraqi expert, for example, explained
that a “tribesman’s loyalty [was] stronger towards his tribe than towards his country,” and
so the government had used land reforms and education to break tribal ties. Assimilating
tribesmen into the nation had the effect of “integrating the tribal groups within the global
society.”507 Individuals gained membership in the international community through
national citizenship.
But while national loyalties were sufficient for the infantry in the war against
nature, generals had to develop a broader international perspective. And these “men
against the desert” were the true heroes of the environmental degradation narrative. The
transformative potential of fundamental science was its promise to create a truly
international class of experts loyal to the world community. At the inauguration
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ceremony for the Fouad 1 Desert Institute (rechristened the Cairo Desert Research
Institute after Nasser took power) in December 1950, Director-General Torres Bodet
declared that the fight against the desert was a task for “the new man that Unesco hopes
will emerge—a man who not only thinks in terms of the world as a whole but also acts on
a basis of solidarity towards his fellow men.”508 It followed that more than its practical
advice, the Advisory Committee was important as an example of these new men at work:
“The chairman was an Indian, Dr. A. N. Kholsa,” reported Calder from the first meeting
of the Advisory Committee, “ and at the same table sat an expert from Egypt comparing
notes with an expert from Israel. They were, however, representing not countries but
common problems.”509
Gaining this worldly perspective and winning promotion into the elite corps of the
international army was not just a matter of comparing notes at international meetings,
however. After describing how his research on the sediment loads of ephemeral desert
streams in New Mexico had led him to chase thunderstorms and wade into flash floods,
Luna Leopold insisted that transforming mere environmental data into true understanding
required emulating the self-sacrificing “zeal” of the seventeenth-century Spanish
explorers who had been the first Europeans to penetrate this inhospitable desert.510
Scientific prophets earned their wisdom through trials in the wilderness. And the
narrative of environmental degradation provided a profoundly important mission for the
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scientific vocation—world prosperity and peace depended on these “men against the
desert.”
Like all myths, the myth of desertification was open to interpretation. In some
readings, peasants ignorance of the modern techniques of soil conservation or nomads’
relentless herds created man-made deserts. In other readings, modern techniques
combined with the capitalist imperative to maximize profits initiated a cycle of
desiccation. Many experts combined these two narratives to blame “the rape of the earth”
on the colonial encounter; traditional communities and virgin environments had not had
time to adjust to potent modern technologies and market penetration. Others, adopting a
longer planetary perspective, argued that deserts were the product of atmospheric
circulation patterns on which humans had no effect. In some reports, desert encroachment
was a literal threat; in others, desert expansion was invoked figuratively, especially as a
metaphor for soil erosion. Some scientists idealized environments in which humans
worked in harmony with self-regulating natural processes, while others glorified
thoroughly socialized environments in which man dominated nature. Despite their
contradictions, most participants in the Arid Zone Program subscribed to each of these
views at different times, often within the same paper, or creatively combined them to
produce more subtle explanations. Which interpretation scientists selected depended not
only on their national traditions and personal predilections, but also on the temporal and
time scales of analysis, the particular place under investigation, the problem being
addressed, and the intended audience.
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Scholars have provided compelling critiques of the hegemonic power of the
degradation discourse that emphasize its stability over time and place. But the
ambiguities and contradictions of the narrative were just as important. They helped enroll
nature preservationists and development advocates, socialist and capitalist experts,
colonial officers and anti-colonial intellectuals in a common conversation. They united
these diverse participants in the international army waging war against nature, even as
they necessarily left the nature of the enemy undetermined.
An Intimate History of the International Army
The myth of desertification provided a poly-synonymous narrative capable of
engaging the interests of Unesco’s diverse participants. This useful ambiguity implies
that the narrative did not determine the direction that the Arid Zone Program would take.
Indeed, the narrative can be interpreted as a product of the international environment in
which Unesco operated; it survived because it could be adapted to the pressures of
bureaucratic rivalries, ideological conflicts, and contradictory visions of the future.
Understanding the evolution of the Arid Zone Program, therefore, requires analyzing the
interactions of the three UNs: the interplay between international, bureaucratic, and
disciplinary politics; between international and local milieus; and between ideas and
institutions. But it would be a mistake to assume that international structures
mechanistically determined the nature of the Arid Zone Program, too. Entrepreneurial
civil servants and international experts crafted a program designed to establish Unesco as
a leader of the international crusade against the desert—and by extension build the
organization’s reputation for competence in the field of natural resources. In other words,
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the course of the war was undetermined. This final section briefly reviews a few
exemplary episodes to show how the strategies of the “men against the desert” played out
on the ground.
Irrespective of the program, the ranks of Unesco’s international army of experts
certainly grew over the duration of the program. In the early 1950s, Unesco’s
organizational culture was dominated by the secretariat. Experts passed through Paris on
their way to assignments in the field and then were forgotten until their official report
arrived. But as the organization’s role shifted from coordination to performing technical
assistance projects, these outside contractors were absorbed into the institutional culture
of the secretariat. Indeed, in 1959 field experts became subject to the same rules and
regulations as regular staff members, although they still worked on a limited-term
contract basis.511 Decolonization fueled this growth as the specialized agencies took over
aspects of the colonial powers’ development mission. In 1960, the addition of seventeen
new African states not only transformed the balance of power in the General Conference,
but also accelerated a fundamental change in Unesco’s cultural geography. By 1962,
Director-General Rene Maheu announced that the field staff, including more than 400
experts on mission, now equaled the professional workforce in Paris and was projected to
double it in just a couple of years. An article describing the transition in Opinion, the
Staff Association magazine, was titled “Turning Unesco Inside Out.” “More and more
obviously,” it opined, “we are at the centre of an operational network, the rear
headquarters of a vast army whose members are serving in the front line.” Uniting the
home front and the front line required a change in the magazine itself; it “must become a
511
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two-way channel of communication between Headquarters and the field.”512 This was the
familiar norm of the two-way street, an integral element of the view from everywhere.
But the expansive if vague ideal of a world community was replaced by a narrower, more
concrete goal: developing the international civil service into an international community.
War metaphors were ubiquitous in development discourse, so it was quite natural
to equate the field with the front line, but one of the points of this analogy was that
experts often experienced their missions as taking them into hostile territory. Beyond the
discomforts of working in underdeveloped countries, experts’ encounters with local
bureaucracies frequently incited international epistolary skirmishes. The French soil
scientist Roger Schaefer’s 1966 mission to the University of Alexandria to lead a monthlong regional training course in Soil Biology provides a scandalous example.
Schaefer left for Egypt full of confidence and enthusiasm. He had co-directed the
conference twice before, once as a last-minute replacement at the Indian Agricultural
Research Institute in New Delhi and then at the Latin American Institute of Soil Biology
in Santiago. The later course was a tremendous success; Schaefer’s Austrian colleague
declared it “the best geo-ecological course organized so far in the whole world.”513 But
much of the credit went to the prestigious Institute of Soil Biology: the local organizers
handled logistics, planned the program, delivered many of the lectures, and assured that
governments sent well trained scientists. As a rule, the quality of international seminars
depended on the competence and cooperation of the local partners.

512

R. J. Spector, “Turning Unseco Inside Out,” Opinion 2 (1962), 15.
H. Franz, “Report on the First Latin American Course in Soil Biology, Santiago Chile,” 11 Oct. 1965,
631.46 (8) A06 (83) “65” Regional Training Course in Soil Biology – Chile -1965.
513

273
Cooperation did not characterize the Alexandria course. Although Schaefer
initially approved of the location because of the University’s highly regarded soils
program, his brusque confidence made his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Ghaffar, feel like
a mere functionary. Or perhaps Ghaffar was not cooperating in good faith from the
beginning—the archival record leaves a nasty stain on both scientists’ reputations. As the
course ended, Ghaffar informed Unesco that his government would file a formal
complaint against Schaefer, who had referred to participants in the course as “halfsavages” and showed how “UNESCO under-estimated the Egyptian scientists and
university staff members” by offering them a meager cash “tip” for their hard work.
According to Schaefer, Ghaffar had set out to sabotage the course because it had not been
locally designed. The “half-savages” remark, Schaefer revealed, had been taken from a
private letter to an American colleague in which he complained that the “students range
from a half-savage to a PhD”; University Security had opened his mail because of
speculation that he was an Israeli agent. And Ghaffar was holding some of Schaefer’s
personal papers hostage for thirty Egyptian pounds—“ransoming [was] just not among
the virtues of a cultured scientist.” When Ghaffar wrote an American bacteriologist that
Schaefer had plagiarized him in a student handout, Schaefer announced that he was
compelled to report the incident to the Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs to
defend the honor of French science. A clash of personalities certainly contributed to
“L’affaire Schaefer,” as Batisse named it.514 But the incident should be read not as an
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anomaly caused by eccentric characters, but as a parody of technical assistance.
International experts’ status as privileged outsiders, parachuting into savage lands to
enlighten and reform, often embroiled Unesco’s international army in bureaucratic
battles.
The unpleasant sense of cultural superiority was inherent in the missionary
objectives of technical assistance, evident even in relatively successful missions, such as
the establishment of a Geophysical Institute in cooperation with the Pakistani
Meteorological Institute. Beginning in 1951, the NSD sent experts in geodesy,
seismology, geomagnetism, and atmospheric physics, as well as $35,000 worth of
technical instruments, to train young Pakistani scientists and oversee the construction of
an observatory.515 Building an independent scientific organization was the goal of the
mission, but creating an effective scientific institute required more than state-of-the-art
instruments and technical competence. For better and worse, this was truly missionary
work. The expert on the geophysical mission who most clearly articulated the necessary
faith in scientific rationality was the English atmospheric physicist Fournier d’Albe,
whose mission was devoted to the ancient practice of rainmaking: “A mission of this sort
has an ideological impact which may leave behind more permanent effects than the
material results of its achievement,” he reported (an especially apt conclusion in his
case). “What we are trying to bring to Pakistan may be called…the scientific spirit of
endeavor.” This task, the irreverent d’Albe mused, required defeating the three “evil
Jinnis” endemic to contemporary Muslim culture: the “Passive Acceptance of
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Misfortune” (the most fearsome); the “Magic of the Written Word” (also leading to
fatalism); and finally, the “Prejudice against Manual Work.”516 The technical expert’s
task was to impart a zealous commitment to the scientific life, just as Leopold had
preached. But in the context of a European expert in a newly independent nation, this
vocation carried the condescending residue of the colonial civilizing mission, which the
Schaefer affair exposed.
The Geophysical Institute also demonstrates that international cooperation could
be a tremendous asset for local institutions. Beyond the prestige earned from international
service, participants from underdeveloped countries could channel aid—that is, experts,
instruments and sometimes even dollars—to their favored institutions. The Director of
the Pakistan Meteorological Service, S. N. Naqvi, was probably the most successful
practitioner of this tactic. Geophysics was not a centerpiece of the Arid Zone Program.
But like most of West Pakistan, Quetta was classified as an arid region and the
geophysical project was gradually incorporated into the program. Indeed, by the time the
Geophysics Laboratory was firmly established and most of Unesco’s experts returned to
Europe in 1955, Naqvi had been appointed to the Arid Zone Research Advisory
Committee. The Meteorological Service became the central node of Unesco’s Arid Zone
Program in Pakistan. Adopting the interdisciplinary norm of the program, Naqvi was
soon reporting on an experimental orchard planted on the Geophysical Institute’s
grounds, oceanography, mineral prospecting, and groundwater research. In 1959, Naqvi
initiated an integrated survey of the nearby Isplingi Valley to demonstrate the
methodology’s value for development planning. To perform the survey, the Geophysical
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Institute’s Arid Zone Research Laboratory, under the leadership of Unesco expert H. I. S.
Thirlaway, a Cambridge University seismologist, coordinated the work of the Pakistan
Soil Conservation Project, Forest Research Institute, and Geological Survey.517
International engagement could help expand a national agency’s fields of competence
and enhance its bureaucratic autonomy.518
For scientists, participation in the international program could also be a means of
extending the reach of their work. This dynamic was obvious in the program’s first major
research endeavor, mapping the distribution of the world’s arid and semi-arid regions.
The NSD contracted this assignment to Peveril Meigs, a geographer of the U.S. Army
Quartermaster who, as Chairman of the newly established Arid Zone Committee of the
International Geographical Union, had initially proposed the project.519 Deserts,
obviously, are areas with little water, but defining deserts as lands receiving less than a
certain amount of annual precipitation could be misleading. Most importantly, a hot area
might actually be more arid than a cool area that received less precipitation. Meigs,
therefore, followed accepted practice by basing climatic classification on calculations of
potential evapotranspiration; that is, the amount of “water that would be needed for
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maximum evaporation and transpiration in the course of a year.” A negative
evaportranspiration index indicated that less water was available than necessary for
complete vegetative cover; on the potential evapotranspiration index Meigs used,
developed by the Johns Hopkins University climatologist C. W. Thornthwaite, semi-arid
lands fell between –20 and –40 and arid below –40.520 But to be useful for agricultural
development, a host of other factors had to be taken into account, too: absorbent
characteristics of the soil, intensity of rain, winter or summer rainy seasons, length of
days, windiness, extremes of hot and cold, etc. Indeed, Meigs explained that “almost
every type of land utilization…theoretically should have its own tailor-made system of
climatic classification.”521 In order to avoid scientific classifications that violated
commonsense on the homoclimatic map, Meigs adapted the Thornthwaite formula by
using measures of extreme months rather than annual thermal indices.522
The theory and practice of thematic mapping are the subject of Chapter Six; what
is important here is that Thornthwaite, through his position as President of the
Commission for Climatology of the World Meteorological Organization, objected to any
alteration of his formula and insisted that the map be redrawn according to his system.
The WMO, already suspicious of Unesco’s foray into climatology, delayed endorsing the
maps for two years, and then only conceded that they were “satisfactory…for a
preliminary survey of the problems” given the “short time and limited facilities” at
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Meigs’ disposal.523 Since the Arid Zone Program was intended to establish standardized
scientific practices globally, debates over whose classificatory system, laboratory
protocol or survey methodology to follow carried high professional stakes for members
of the third UN.
But it was national rather than disciplinary politics that hampered Meigs’ career in
the international scientific community. Indeed, despite Thornthwaite’s petulance and the
WMO’s damning praise, his homoclimatic map was a great success. It won the official
imprimatur of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics and the International
Geographical Union and became the standard reference for the global distribution of
deserts. The Arid Zone Program even adopted a simplified version of the map for its
logo; an elegant symbol of a world without political boundaries, united by a common
natural enemy. Meigs loved the work and wrote NSD Director Auger that he wished to
join the department in order to contribute to “the development of a program of scientific
and human development” despite a cut in pay: “Satisfaction, genuine service, and
professional growth” were more important than money.524 Auger proposed that he head
the Arid Zone Program, but the State Department did not approve the appointment.
In fact, Meigs had the time to prepare the homoclimatic map because he had been
suspended from the Army without pay while under investigation for un-American
activities. By 1954, he had been subjected to five rounds of security hearings over twelve
years. When the NSD considered hiring Meigs to create a homoclimatic map of humid
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climates, the State Department reported that, although he had been repeatedly cleared and
was technically competent, he had been “number 2” on McCarthy’s list and the subject of
congressional inquiries regarding his relationship with Unesco. The State Department
recommended hiring a less controversial figure. 525 No other Unesco expert could claim
the distinction of making it all the way to number two, but intrusive and tedious
questionnaires, missed conferences, canceled contracts, and rescinded job offers due to
security clearance problems were absolutely typical for American international experts
into the 1960s. After all, in some corridors of the U.S. government, an earnest
commitment to the ideals of the world community raised suspicions of subversive
tendencies.
The subtext of Arab-Israeli animosity in the Schaefer affair also hints at the limits
of “concrete approaches to the problems of the Middle East” to cut through national
political tensions.526 Not only were Israelis always excluded from conferences and
seminars in Arab countries, Arab scientists, often under government orders, boycotted
Arid Zone meetings attended by Israeli scientists. International cooperation was as
effective at dramatizing national conflicts as manifesting common interests.527 When
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Naqvi attempted to organize a regional training seminar on integrated surveys, the
Meteorological Services’ parent department “vetoed” the plan—apparently the Ministry
of Defense did not approve of using West Pakistan as a field laboratory for training
Indians in cartography.528 “National” replaced “International” in the course’s title.
But at other times, national governments did take advantage of the apparently
apolitical quality of science to find common ground. In December 1956, Louis Emberger
was scheduled to lead a regional training course in plant ecology in Cairo. With the
Anglo-French-Israeli Suez debacle, however, the notion of a French-led course in Cairo
became preposterous. Yet less than a year later, a member of the Egyptian Unesco
National Commission informed Batisse that Emberger’s visit would be a “great honour
for the Egyptians.” According to Unesco’s resident officer, Emberger was the first French
expert officially invited to Egypt since the Suez crisis, and he made attendees “forget by
his personality and tact all national barriers and helped also in such a way most
considerably in the spiritual task of Unesco regarding the mutual understanding and the
respect of the qualified scientist without any narrow distinction.” 529
It is easy to write the history of international development as a story of neoimperial blunders. But it is also important to acknowledge the joy bursting through the
conventions of bureaucratic writing in this official report. This long-serving international
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civil servant experienced the regional training course as a sort of scientific communion,
and so a victory for the forces of internationalism. These high ideals help explain what
kept so many professionals loyal to an international army so often characterized by
futility. In the scientific vocation, there was nobility in defeat.
And for Unesco, the capacity of science to bridge political divides proved its
practical value. By 1957, Unesco’s American Director-General Luther Evans felt
obligated to concede to Soviet demands for a top position in the Unesco Secretariat.
While the Soviets pushed for the head of Relations with Member States or the Cultural
Department, the State Department counseled that the Department of Natural Sciences was
least “subject to distortion and possible subversion.”530 The Education and Social
Sciences Departments, the later so often ridiculed as ineffectual, were out of the question.
The Soviets first candidate for the post was the physicist Stanislav Shumovsky, who had
attended MIT and served as an advisor to the U.S. Air Force during the war. Even after
the State Department informed the Director-General that Shumovsky had been publicly
exposed as a spy, the U.S. government quietly approved the Soviet’s replacement, the
soil scientist Victor Kovda.531 Kovda became the first Soviet director of any UN
specialized agency department. Because the Cold War became defined as an ideological
battle for hearts and minds, the perception that science was non-ideological provided a
basis for international cooperation between East and West. Irrelevance was a political
asset.
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In the international scientific community, however, the appointment of a Soviet
director of the Natural Sciences Department was a momentous event. Kovda exemplified
how scientists could balance patriotic national service with the ideals of the transnational
scientific community, and he remained a key player in the international scientific
community for decades. 532 He was a vigorous advocate for Soviet science, comfortable
framing his own work on soils within the logic of dialectical materialism and quite
sensitive to perceived slights to Soviet accomplishments. But within months of assuming
his office, Kovda was pushing for a U.S. deputy director to shore-up the credibility of his
department as a politically neutral international functional organization.533
Assessing the effect of Kovda’s appointment on the course of the Cold War is
equivalent to judging the Arid Zone Program by its impact on the global extent of deserts.
But for many Western scientists, the opportunity to collaborate with a Russian was a
profound experience. The most zealous American acolyte of the Arid Zone Program
provides a poignant example of how Kovda’s appointment raised the emotional stakes of
international cooperation.
Peter Duisberg was an indefatigable booster of desert research. Duisberg was a
private agricultural consultant based in El Paso, Texas and chairman of the Committee on
Desert and Arid Zone Research of the Southwestern and Rocky Mountain Division of the
AAAS. The landmark American Association for the Advancement of Science-Unesco
International Arid Lands Conference owed much to his behind-the-scenes work. He was
disappointed by the practical follow-up to the 1955 meeting in the United States, but still
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directed his boundless enthusiasm towards helping realize an Argentinean proposal for a
Latin American international arid lands meeting, which convened in Buenos Aries in
1963. For Duisberg, the conference was a means of catalyzing an arid zone scientific
movement at a critical moment in the development of the continent. He canceled his
business contracts and spent most of 1959 through 1962 traveling through South America
to organize national arid lands research committees—sometimes as a paid consultant,
sometimes as an unpaid, semi-official Unesco representative.534
Duisberg passionately advocated for extending the Arid Lands Major Project to
Latin America, but he understood his work within the historical context of Pan-American
cooperation, arguing that the conference should be a hemispheric rather than a
continental meeting. Latin Americans could learn from the mistakes of the United States.
On his own initiative, he explored the possibility of financial support, perhaps even cosponsorship, from the Organization of American States. Batisse gently warned Duisberg
that “he had gone a bit far in [his] discussions with O.A.S.,” whose participation would
“change somewhat the politically neutral character of the conference.”535 But Duisberg’s
mistake was a result of truly seeing no conflict between U.S. and UN internationalism.
He recognized that others had good reason to, however. After meeting Kovda in
Argentina, he wrote Batisse that he “had gained some, appreciation of [Kovda’s] warm
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personality, his love of his scientific field soils, and his keen intellect [sic]." And he
wrote to the Director of the NSD to clear up potential misunderstanding:
I understand you had serious doubts about my motives at first because I seemed
so interested in my arid lands assignment for UNESCO. If I had been any other
nationality than american [sic] I suppose that would have been a sign of
virtue…I didn’t take this assignment for UNESCO without considering the
possibility of my nationality being a disadvantage [but] when David Baytelman
of Chile told me that I wouldn’t meet anyone much farther left or anti-U.S. than
[sic] he and that he would support me all the way, I decided to take it. As a
UNESCO representative I will always try to think of what is best from an
international point of view.536
In the international scientific community, the Cold War was experienced at the level of
interpersonal relations. In its quaint way, then, this letter pledging loyalty to the
international army waging war against nature was an effort at easing international
tensions. International service demanded that, in pursuit of the view from everywhere,
Duisberg strive to empathize with declared enemies of the United States.
The myth of desertification described an epic battle between man and nature. For
internationalists, the war against nature provided a common cause that transcended
political ideologies and national interests and so could unite the great commonwealth of
mankind. But in practice, professional ambitions and mundane bureaucratic alliances and
rivalries shaped the Arid Zone Program. International projects fostered transnational
communities, but also exposed national hostilities. And internationalists were both
celebrated and persecuted for their ideals. International civil servants, of course, were all
too familiar with the perils of using the apolitical quality of science as an instrument of
political reform. As the lead article in a special issue devoted to international scientific
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cooperation of Unesco’s Impact of Science on Society concluded: “[The] functional
approach to the overall and supreme problems of international amity…can be of
scientific, economic and political value. The game is well worth the candle, but it must be
played with consummate skill.”537 The goal of the game was to get the three UNs playing
on the same team.
Conclusion
International scientific cooperation dedicated to desert research turned out to be
well adapted to the pressures of the three UNs. For member states, the conquest of the
desert not only promised to make unproductive lands pay, it also justified increased
government intervention in rural economies and the centralization of power. The first UN
liked the program so much that the secretariat was put in the unusual position of arguing
in the General Conference that one of its programs should be wound down. In the
institutional ecology of the UN functional agencies, basic research on arid lands provided
a strategic foothold in the natural resources turf. Most importantly, the Food and
Agriculture Organization was willing to cede jurisdiction over useless knowledge of
useless land. Yet deserts were also the very symbol of underdevelopment, the antithesis
of civilization; the domestication of desert wilderness resonated with deep cultural
traditions. And, in the postwar decades, the cultural authority of science was at its apex.
For the experts who comprised the third UN, therefore, the Arid Zone Program provided
a calling worthy of the scientific vocation. Membership in the cosmopolitan fraternity of
scientists, and the model of a transnational community this provided, was as important as
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the mission to stave off a Malthusian demographic collapse. Of course, participation
could enhance a scientist’s reputation and a bureaucrat’s resources, too. In terms of
enhancing its reputation, building an international network of supporters, and expanding
its field of competence—that is, of forging bureaucratic autonomy—the Arid Zone
Program was the best thing the NSD had going.
Much of the program’s success can be attributed to the skillful work of the NSD’s
civil servants and the experts serving on the Advisory Committee. But the power of the
myth of desertification should not be underestimated either. A testament to the myth’s
power was its endurance. Not only did the narrative precede the program, but when the
1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment led to the creation of a new specialized
agency, the United Nations Environmental Program, UNEP made the fight against
desertification the centerpiece of its program. UNEP dusted off the most hyperbolic
prophecies of deserts on the march, going so far as to predict that, if its program was not
supported, within 200 years “there will not be a single, fully productive hectare of land
on earth.” Critics have subjected UNEP’s version of the desertification narrative to
withering critique, debunking it as an “institutional myth.”538 “Myth” here is a term of
derision. But as Emery Roe pointed out two decades ago, development narratives are
indispensible precisely because they make action possible by ordering overwhelming
complexity and providing a common basis for action. Like all myths, development
narratives are necessarily open to interpretation.539
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The protean quality of development narratives can make them frustrating objects
of criticism. Instead of falling apart when subjected to deconstructive analysis,
development experts rearrange narratives to incorporate criticism. This strategy goes
beyond co-opting counter-narratives. The critique of development has been a
fundamental and necessary component of development discourse. One of the critical
tasks of development intellectuals, after all, is to explain how society got into this mess,
and in the process distinguish current initiatives from past failures. The scientists who
participated in the Arid Zone Program were vigorous critics of the field in their time. “If
there is one lesson which seems to stand out above all others in this review,” Stamp wrote
in the conclusion of A History of Land Use in the Arid Regions, “it is the almost complete
lack, in many areas, of precise knowledge of the present position.”540 The lesson was not
that society should rush to heed the warnings of scientists, but that scientists did not know
what they were talking about. Of course, this blunt criticism was also a call for expanded
patronage. Indeed, perceptions of failure more than experiences of success have driven
institutional growth and intellectual innovation in the development field.
The narrative of environmental degradation, which the Arid Zone Program
reproduced on a global scale, was not about explaining the cause of underdeveloped lands
so much as articulating a common cause worth fighting for. Too often, the normative
quality of this basic science program was cloaked. The key ecological concept of natural
vegetation, for example, illustrates how a powerful theoretical construct could slip into a
description of an idealized past that the future ought to resemble. At their worst, scientists
attempted to usurp the authority of nature by arguing that their findings compelled social
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policy. But experts who participated in the Arid Zone Program were often quite explicit
that they did not derive the basic values for which they campaigned from some
prelapsarian harmony of nature. Indeed, unpredictable, unproductive, unstable desert
environments were the enemy. They had to be domesticated to produce an ecological
balance. For these scientists, equilibrium was the goal, not a naïve description of nature.
This stance could justify wholesale transformations of nature that precipitated
environmental degradation on an unprecedented scale and destroyed human communities.
Such misreadings of human-environment interactions and ill-conceived projects have
contributed to discrediting the paradigm of natural balance, replacing it with a more
historically sophisticated conception of contingent ecological fluctuation, at least in
sophisticated academic and professional circles.
As a normative proposition, however, a model of ecosystem behavior based on
flux hardly seems like an improvement on a model based on equilibrium. Flux is not an
objective likely to galvanize an international army; indeed, one of its analytical strength’s
is a purposeful rejection of a vision of the common good. It is hardly surprising that
stories of contingent, meaningless change have not captured the public imagination. But
the choice between balance and flux is false. Rather, society is perpetually trying to
regain its balance amid all the fluxing change.

289
Chapter Five
The Cautious Optimism of Scientific Propaganda: The University College of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland Chair of Race Relations and the Eclipse of Liberal
Internationalism
“…the most valuable citizens any country can possess are the troublemakers, the public
nuisances, the fighters of small, apparently unimportant battles. No government, no
political party anywhere cares a damn about the individual. That is not their business. So
I believe in the ginger-groups, the temporarily associated minorities, the Don Quixotes,
the takers-of-stands-on-principle, the do-gooders and the defenders of lost causes.” Doris
Lessing, Going Home541
The 1950/51 Statements on Race are Unesco’s best remembered early products.
Historians find the Race Statements useful markers for the postwar establishment of an
international liberal orthodoxy on the meaning of race: race was a legitimate biological
category of trivial importance but an illegitimate social category of tremendous
importance.542 The scientific consensus was forced, but this only suggests the strength of
the antiracist position; the biological equality of the races was now presumed.
Eliminating racial barriers to human cooperation was a critical prerequisite to cultivating
a view from everywhere. In addition to the Statements on Race, the Social Science
Department’s Race Program published a series of antiracist pamphlets, The Race
Question in Modern Science, to celebrate the “unity in diversity” of mankind and
cultivate rational attitudes towards race relations. The series, which the Race Program’s
head, the anthropologist Alfred Métraux, frankly referred to as propaganda, was the
Social Science Department’s most popular publication. The goal was to make “race
541
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prejudice…a shameful sentiment that men will hesitate to avow.”543 The liberal experts
talked about race incessantly, but, in an ideal society, the public would ignore race
completely.544
The Race Program’s literature was hardly innovative—the pamphlets mostly
popularized the findings of interwar U.S. race relations research for an international
audience—but it provided a clear script for antiracist activists and educators. Because
Unesco acted on an international stage, the Race Program’s texts helped articulate (along
with documents such as the Atlantic Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the United Nations’ Charter) the norms and values required for membership in the
emerging liberal world community. For liberal democracies, which claimed to represent
meritocracies, this new orthodoxy denaturalized inequitable distributions of wealth and
power. The Race Program was an attempt to internationalize the American creed—that
complex of positive values Gunnar Myrdal had so influentially argued contradicted the
historical reality of racial oppression—for a new, American-led world order.545
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For all the historical importance of the Statements and the popularity of the
pamphlets, however, the architects of Unesco’s Race Program acknowledged that racial
prejudice derived not from rational analysis but from “emotional attitudes” and,
conversely, that racial discrimination could be a rational economic strategy. They fretted
that they were merely “preaching to the converted,” and that “scientific research [had]
taken the place of action that is more direct, but also more difficult and more
dangerous.”546 Even with the cultural authority of science near its historical apex, activist
experts understood that science was one of the weaker social forces affecting race
relations. Indeed, contemporary social science showed that the persuasive power of
rational argument paled in comparison to emotional appeals.547 In many ways, as this
chapter suggests, the international community’s ecological expertise played a more
important if subtler role in structuring racial inequality than did its scientific
pronouncements on race.
The Race Program was not designed to propagate complacency, however. Its
purpose was less to describe the world as it really was than to reform it as it ought to
be—and intergroup relations ought to be conducted rationally and in good faith. The role
of the race relations expert was to act as a trusted mediator who could engage conflicting
races in transformative conversation. This was a version of the view from everywhere’s
expert as group therapist, his objectivity assessed by his ability to empathize yet not
identify with the position of each group. As much as through its content, the message of
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the Race Program—and race relations more generally—was expressed through a mature
tone of cautious optimism.
It is easy to see why the rhetoric of deliberative progress was congenial to
Western governments. The war against fascism and the ascension of former European
colonies to legal equality in the international community had further discredited the
already discreditable racial justification of white power. The United States responded to
Soviet propaganda, which exploited America’s shameful record on race to challenge its
leadership of a multiracial world, with a propaganda campaign of its own that
emphasized the democratic superpower’s peaceful progress towards racial equality.548
For the United States, race relations had been defined as a domestic dilemma before it
became an international public relations liability; for European powers, race relations
(understood in terms of color) was a colonial problem. The United Kingdom updated its
self-proclaimed civilizing mission—always a more significant justification for
colonialism than biological racism—to articulate a vision of empire compatible with the
principles of the Free World: colonies would be granted independence within an
interracial New Commonwealth when they had achieved the necessary standard of
civilization.549 Like the U.S. State Department’s propaganda and the imperial civilizing
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mission, the cautious optimism of liberal race relations focused on the potential of
equality and valued gradual progress over radical change.
Yet it is equally clear why race was a dangerous subject for an IGO: it was a
transnational identity. Attempts to define a nation racially were the clearest violation of
the liberal orthodoxy, but race was also the most visible manifestation of an affiliation in
competition with nationality. Racial identities crossed national borders and divided
nations in ways that could threaten the legitimacy of a government to represent its
citizens. The United Nations, however, was founded upon the principle of national
sovereignty. Investigations of racial discrimination provoked angry accusations that the
UN was meddling in a state’s internal affairs. Neatly demarcating the boundary between
race and nation, therefore, was granted a privileged place on the UN’s agenda, but UN
agencies’ activities on the race question were tightly constricted. As an organization of
member states, political realities mandated that Unesco focus on positive progress, not
entrenched injustice.
The meaning of the international antiracist script depended on where it was
performed. This chapter analyzes a particularly tragic performance: Unesco’s
participation in the establishment of a Chair of Race Relations at the University College
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The campaign to endow the Chair was initiated in 1953 by
the Salisbury Round Table, a Southern Rhodesian chapter of a young businessmen’s
service club, to promote the country’s new policy of Partnership. Partnership was a vague
celebration of interracial cooperation that promised to fulfill Cecil Rhodes’ famous
dictum: “Equal rights for all civilized men.” In classic liberal fashion, racial inclusivity
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was qualified by cultural exclusivity.550 Partnership was intended to demonstrate the
settler colony’s adherence to international norms, and thus bolster its case for full
independence; non-racist governance was now a key standard of civilization in the world
community.
Unesco did not participate in the project until 1960, by which time the optimistic
spirit of Partnership had been replaced by conflict between racially defined nationalisms.
At the international level, the 1950s saw a shift away from the human rights of
individuals to the collective rights of “minorities”—from the elimination of racial identity
and the weakening of primordial affiliations to the empowerment of oppressed groups.551
And in the UN, the civilizing mission itself was under attack. In Central Africa, not only
did race prove inseparable from nationality; other sub- and supra-national affiliations—to
the middle class, international business, academia, urban or rural communities, the
British Commonwealth, Africa, and the international community—shaped the discourse
on race.552
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The Round Table boasted that Central Africa was the world’s best living
laboratory of race relations. Whatever the limitations of the metaphor, the campaign to
endow the Chair of Race Relations provides a revealing case study of the evolving,
paradoxical meanings of racial liberalism in the context of decolonization. Unesco’s
participation in the experiment—deploying an expert on a mission to enhance mutual
understanding in the troubled region—demonstrates the limits of the view from
everywhere in practice.
The Local Situation: The Promise of Partnership
In the 1950s, political observers often described Southern Rhodesia as the crux of
Africa, a critical point at which the world’s racial frontiers met and new cultural
possibilities might evolve. Across the territory’s southern border, Dr. Malan’s defeat of
Field Marshall Smuts in the 1948 election signaled a resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism
and intensification of white supremacy. Debates in the UN General Assembly showed
that the Union of South Africa was the most glaring beacon of hypocrisy in the Free
World’s battle for the hearts and minds of the non-aligned nations. To the North, the
1952 outbreak of the Mau Mau Uprising and its brutal suppression in Kenya revealed the
potential for violence inherent in African nationalist aspirations in a settler colony. In a
bid to gain full independence within the Commonwealth, Southern Rhodesia’s political
leaders attempted to position their territory as the leading member of a Central African
Federation that would include Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which was finally
established in 1953. Recalling the promise of Federation from the perspective of its
demise a decade later, Oxford’s Rhodes Professor of Race Relations and the first Chair of
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Race Relations at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Kenneth Kirkwood
explained that it sought a “via media...between apartheid and Mau Mau.”553 This perilous
yet peaceful middle road was supposed to be constructed by a partnership between
enlightened whites and an emergent black middle class.
According to Colonial Office civil servants and white Rhodesian boosters, an
economically dynamic Federation would contain Afrikaner nationalism South of the
Limpopo, satisfy Africans’ rising expectations, and immunize Central Africa from
communist influence. Uniting Southern Rhodesia with its two Northern neighbors would
promote economic development by taking advantage of regional economic
complementarities: Southern Rhodesia’s agricultural capacity and urban economic
potential; Northern Rhodesia’s rich mineral reserves; and Nyasaland’s large African labor
force. Viewed from above, Federation made sense. But since Southern Rhodesia
occupied an ambiguous status between British colonial territory and independent
dominion—and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were Crown Colonies—the small
European minority could not simply declare Federation. It required approval from the
Colonial Office, and so had to be justified to the British domestic public and the
international community. Thus, Prime Minister Geoffrey Huggins, who dominated
Southern Rhodesian politics for two decades before assuming leadership of the
Federation, proclaimed that interracial Partnership would replace separate development
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as the guiding principle of Federation policy.554 To appeal to an international audience,
the settlers promised to pursue a sort of view from everywhere.
At its most cynical, Partnership was a vague rhetorical strategy designed to avoid
addressing the social, economic, and political forces that structured race relations. When
Southern Rhodesian settlers ended British South Africa Company Rule by winning the
right to “responsible government” in 1923, there were 35,900 Europeans and around
900,000 Africans in the colony. At Federation thirty years later, the European population
had increased to 157,000, nearly doubling in the eight postwar years, but the estimated
number of Africans had grown to 2,360,000. European immigrants were attracted to
Central Africa by one of the highest standards of living in the postwar world. There was a
postwar industrial boom—between 1946 and 1953, employment in the manufacturing
sector doubled—but white prosperity was subsidized by black poverty. Land and labor
laws were rife with contradictions—industry depended upon African labor but denied
Africans employment status; peasants were supposed to adopt modern farming practices
but were denied access to credit and markets; land tenure was based on individual
possession, but Africans usually could not own land—all of which ultimately derived
from the contradiction that European incomes depended on African labor, yet Africans
were legally excluded from the white economy. The racially structured labor market and
division of the land—codified in the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, which Europeans
called their Magna Carta—helped assure that, whatever their class or ethnic origins,
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European immigrants were quickly assimilated into the white community. White workers
afraid of African competition provided a dependable base of conservative political
power.555
If whites enjoyed a “civilized standard of living,” Africans struggled to survive on
sub-subsistence wages and harvests. Instead of revising their Magna Carta, however,
Europeans attempted to use scientific conservation to ease the pressures on soil and
population caused by segregation. Starting in the late 1920s, the Native Affairs
Department had promoted soil conservation, and in 1951 the Native Land Husbandry Act
made far reaching conservation practices compulsory. Among the measures Africans
resented most were attempts to control soil erosion through labor intensive contour
ridging requirements and destocking quotas based on shamefully crude estimates of
carrying capacity. The key to the Land Husbandry Act was the institution of land tenure
based on individual rights instead of communal membership. The legislation used
ecological expertise to justify a standard eight-acre “economic holding” mandated for
African peasant households on the Native Reserves, regardless of local soils and climate.
Converting Africans to intensive settled agriculture had long been a key goal of Christian
missionaries and colonial authorities. But the explicit purpose of the new tenure regime
was to separate the urban and rural economies in order to make both legible and, more
importantly, increase the supply of African workers for the projected industrial boom. To
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claim a plot, land holders had to be actively farming the land (not working in the city)
when surveyors made their assessments. The legislation thus recognized the dependence
of African families on the combination of rural and urban work, but sought to sever the
link.556
The conservation practices legislated by the Land Husbandry Act were every bit
as much a product of international exchange as was the discourse of racial liberalism that
is the primary focus of this chapter. The first Agriculturalist of the Native Affairs
Department, Emory Alvord, was a former missionary from the United States with a
degree in agriculture from Washington State University. He preached the tenets of
American soil conservation.557 The Land Husbandry Act, which legislated Alvord’s
vision, was designed to halt desertification and raise the carrying capacity of semi-arid
lands; it was based on the same science that Unesco’s Arid Zone Project promoted.
Furthermore, the capacity to perform the population censuses and land surveys necessary
to enforce the Land Husbandry Act’s precise requirements depended upon engagement
with the international community. For example, government experts performed Southern
Rhodesia’s first agricultural sample surveys in 1949 in order to contribute to FAO’s 1950
World Agricultural Census. The experts followed up by participating in workshops on
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survey methods at joint FAO-Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa (the
inter-imperial technical assistance agency) training centres in 1953 and 1957.558 Although
not part of its acknowledged purpose, this international scientific expertise, which was
intended to help the Federal government gain a view from above, played a critical role in
structuring racial inequality in Central Africa.
The elaborate legal apparatus that assured racial inequality depended on
maintaining white political power, but the legitimacy of that power depended on the
nonracial franchise. In a developing liberal democracy, voting was the responsibility of
the civilized—or, after 1951 when Huggins’ government raised the voting means test, the
privilege of those twenty-one years or older, literate in English, and with an income of at
least £240 or property worth £500. In a signal of the colony’s national ambitions, the new
law also required voters to be Southern Rhodesian citizens, not just British subjects. The
effect of this nonracial franchise was that in 1952 there were only 380 African voters out
of an electorate of roughly 46,000.559
The British Conservative government and white Rhodesian electorate imposed
Federation against the opposition of the Labour Party and African majority. In the two
Northern colonies, African leaders even petitioned the UN to stop Britain from abdicating
its trusteeship responsibilities. But the domestic reactionary right—the only viable
opposition in the white electorate—was suspicious of Federation, too. Adding the four
million Africans in the two Northern territories emphasized the vulnerability of white
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rule. In response (and after Federation was a done deal), Huggins infamously defined
Partnership as the relationship between a horse and rider.
A different spirit of Partnership inspired the activities of several hundred white
liberals and an even smaller, but ultimately more significant, African middle class.
European liberals founded interracial societies and hosted mixed parties where they
sipped tea with educated Africans. Not surprisingly for a middle class movement, liberal
ideals were vested in the practical vision of nonracial meritocracy. For Europeans, the
dangers of nationalisms white and (especially) black could only be avoided by
encouraging the incorporation of African elites into civilized society. Although only a
handful of Africans joined the interracial organizations, they included many of the future
leaders of the nationalist organizations that would emerge within a decade. In the early
1950s, however, African urban elites—grocers, journalists, ministers, teachers—were
generally more concerned with gaining recognition of their ascension into the ranks of
civilized Christian society than in solidarity with the laboring masses and rural peasants.
This aspiring middle class pursued upward social mobility through education. Despite
evident hypocrisy in practice, the notion that rights (and respect) depended on merit not
race was appealing. In the first book published by an African in Southern Rhodesia,
Bradfield Mnyanda averred, “By all means, let us have a ‘culture bar’ in place of the
present colour bar.” The ideal of a culture bar, with education as the metric, neatly
captured the liberal spirit of Partnership.560 It also resonated with the message of
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Unesco’s Race Program. For example, Métraux, the Program’s head, wrote in an article
that accompanied the publication of the “Statement on Race” in Unesco’s popular
magazine the Courier: “Ironically, the worst sufferers of racial dogma are usually the
people whose intellect most forcibly demonstrates its falseness.”561
But in a community so worried about maintaining the high standards of Western
civilization, Southern Rhodesia still lacked the premier institution of high culture: a
university. At the end of World War II, a group of leading Salisbury citizens formed the
Rhodesia University Association to found a university for Europeans. Far from education
as a lever for social reform, the leader of the Association declared that “until the whole of
our mixed society becomes convinced that a mingling of the races is socially and
biologically desirable, [the only answer] is to continue at the university the social
segregation which is in evidence throughout the country.”562 The University of Rhodesia
Association, however, failed to raise sufficient money.
Fortunately, the British government had taken a belated interest in higher
education in the colonies. In 1945, the Asquith Commission recommended the
establishment of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies (IUC)
to advise colonial university colleges, which now were supported by grants from Colonial
Development and Welfare funds. To assure high British standards and the equivalency of
degrees, the University of London performed graduate examinations. According to the
Asquith Commission:
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It is the university which should offer the best means of counteracting the influence
of racial differences and sectional rivalries which impede the formation of political
institutions on a national basis. Moreover, universities serve the double purpose of
refining and maintaining all that is best in local traditions and cultures and at the
same time of providing a means whereby those brought up in the influence of these
traditions and cultures may enter on a footing of equality into the world-wide
community.563
The IUC’s colonial mission resonated with the key themes of postwar liberal democratic
internationalism that undergirded the view from everywhere: racial equality, national
sovereignty, unity in diversity, world community. As the IUC’s Carr-Saunders
Commission for Higher Education for Africans in Central Africa made clear, the British
would only support a multiracial Rhodesian university.
Potential American funding would also require an integrated institution.564 Earlier
in the century, the American Phelps-Stokes Fund had exported U.S. Southern-style
vocational education for Africans to support Southern Rhodesia’s policy of “separate
development.”565 But after the Second World War, American philanthropies pushed for
compliance with the racial ideals of Cold War liberalism. The Carnegie Corporation, for
example, had a mandate to assist British education in the colonies, and, according to the
IUC’s semi-official history, the Corporation’s finances and philosophy played a
“profoundly important, and in the later years of the [1950s] quite decisive, part in the
evolution of the IUC’s policy towards Africa.”566 Segregation might still be the de facto
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rule in U.S. higher education, but the country’s foundations now promoted integration—
which thus called Partnership’s ideological bluff.
Although the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (UCRN) became the
premier symbol of Partnership, the international community imposed multiracialism on
the university against the wishes of Salisbury boosters. Fittingly, the first secretary of the
IUC, Walter Adams, was named Principal of the UCRN. Under a Royal Charter and
inaugurated by the Queen, the UCRN was proof that the Federation measured up to
postwar civilized racial standards. Yet an integrated institution was so anomalous in
Southern Rhodesia that special amendments had to be made to the Land Apportionment
Act and pass laws for African, Colored, and Indian students to travel to and live at the
university in Salisbury. The Royal Charter—which stipulated that “no test of religious
belief or profession or of race, nationality or class shall be imposed” on any person
associated with the university—was more than a symbol of British patriotic pride. Like
the College’s high academic standards, it was intended to shore-up the UCRN’s
autonomy and protect its multiracial mission from the caprice of Southern Rhodesian
politics. Nevertheless, for Southern Rhodesians who recognized that the success of the
Central African Federation depended on making Partnership a reality, the multiracial
College represented the nation’s future.
The International Context:
The Round Table and Unesco, Unlikely Partners Blown Together by the Wind of
Change
Members of the Salisbury Round Table believed in the Federation, and they
resolved to contribute to the project of partnership by raising £50,000 to endow a Chair of
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Race Relations. The Round Table membership represented nearly an ideal type of
Rhodesian moderate racial liberal: a service club restricted to professionals or
businessmen between the ages of eighteen and forty. First founded in England in 1927,
by the 1950s there were over 400 tables in Great Britain and many more in Europe,
Malaya, and South Africa. Membership in the World Council of Young Men’s Service
Clubs connected the organization with similar American and Commonwealth clubs. The
Salisbury branch, founded in 1952 by a “tabler” from Portsmouth, UK, was the first in
Central Africa; five years later there were eighteen.567 The Race Chair was the Salisbury
branch’s first and most important attempt to fulfill its mission of promoting international
goodwill. It was also about affirming these young white Africans’ Britishness and Central
Africa’s membership in the international community. A description of the scheme
emphasized that Race Relations represented “a world problem” since all over the globe
“peoples of different races and colours, with widely ranging standards of civilisation, are
living together in the one country and under the one government.” But the situation was
particularly acute in Central Africa:
Here the standard of civilisation of the inhabitants of European stock has been—and
generally speaking still is—considerably higher than the indigenous coloured
peoples. That in itself creates great, but fairly simple, problems. Portions of the
coloured races, however, are gradually—in some cases, rapidly—absorbing the
civilisation of the Europeans, and the former differences are lessening. As they
diminish, however, new and immensely more intricate problems emerge.
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Central Africa was a great “human laboratory” in which the problems of a multiracial
society could be worked out, thus providing a service both “to the local community and
to the Community of Nations.”568
The appeal to endow the “Princess Margaret Chair” kicked off in May 1953 (two
months before the Queen Mother laid the University’s foundation stone) with a reception
hosted by the Governor of Southern Rhodesia (i.e. the United Kingdom’s representative
in Salisbury) that raised £800. The campaign quickly assumed global proportions. The
President of Round Table International visited Salisbury and reported that the “project
marks one of the decisive steps in the development of Round Table’s ideals and
international influence.” At the 1954 meeting of the World Council of Young Men’s
Service Clubs in California, all Associations were urged to make funding the Chair a
priority. The International office distributed glossy brochures and produced 80,000 stamp
books in French and English. By 1958, the Round Table of Great Britain and Ireland
prefaced its fundraising appeal with a defense against the “many who have belaboured
the National Association for disseminating too much information on this subject.” In fact,
the Round Table claimed that the global campaign was as important a service as the
Chair itself; all the activity was a “sign of good faith” that “[bore] witness to an earnest
and sincere desire to grapple with and to overcome these problems.” Hope derived from
the process more than the product. But after five years, when the first class of sixty-eight
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students (eight African) matriculated to the College, collections in fourteen countries on
four continents had raised just £14,429.569
Ironically, given the Organization’s chronic budget woes, the Round Table turned
to Unesco for financial not intellectual support. In 1960 the fund still stood at less than
£15,000. Reluctantly acknowledging the campaign’s failure to demonstrate broad popular
support for the African experiment, the Chairman of the Chair of Race Relations
Endowment Trust in Salisbury, Sir Ernest Guest, wrote to Unesco to request a substantial
contribution to the study of race relations in “the best living laboratory on this subject.”
According to Guest, race relations were being “aggravated by persons of all extreme
political views, whether to the left or to the right, in order to make political propaganda
for themselves.” Guest warned that “events were such in Africa” that if the first
appointment had “to wait until 1962, [it] might result in the psychological effect of the
actual appointment being made, being lost.”570 This was a rare emergency appeal for
Unesco to fulfill its constitutional mandate to “build the defences of peace” in the “minds
of men.”
The most significant event in Africa in 1960, of course, was decolonization. Just
nine days before Guest wrote Unesco, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had
declared in the South African Parliament, “The wind of change is blowing through this
continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political
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fact.”571 In 1960, seventeen African colonies achieved independence. For the tablers, the
psychological effect of the Race Chair would be to slow the revolutionary wind blowing
from the Northwest into a calm breeze of deliberative reform. The project had begun full
of optimism in the progressive potential of Partnership, but it was winding up in a spirit
of pessimistic conservatism.
There was an irony in the Round Table raising the alarm to Unesco over the pace
of change in Africa. The United Nations Organizations sailed into Africa on the wind of
change, after all. The Third World was defined in relation to the poles of the Cold War,
but the solidarity of new nations was based on shared colonial histories and often
expressed in racial terms. After the 1955 Bandung Conference had demonstrated the
potential power of a non-aligned bloc, the influence of the Third World in the United
Nations System steadily grew. All seventeen new African nations became Unesco
member states before the end of 1960, accounting for nearly twenty percent of the votes
at the 1960 General Conference, where education in “Tropical Africa” dominated the
agenda. Indeed, the General Conference enthusiastically fanned the wind of change by
electing the Ethiopian Minister of Education, Akale-Work Abte-Wold, its first president
from Africa.572
The Soviet Union and its satellites sought to exploit the new political
configuration by introducing a belligerently worded declaration calling for the immediate
“liquidation” of colonialism. Although African and Asian delegates supported a strong
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anti-colonial resolution, they were more interested in assuring the continued engagement
of the wealthy West in their economic and social development programs. Not only did
they express a more nuanced understanding of colonialism’s legacy than their Eastern
Bloc peers, but also they recognized the implicit danger of the French and British turning
away from their overseas territories and towards the European Community. The result of
negotiations was Resolution 8.2, which declared: “Colonialism in all its forms and all its
manifestations must be speedily abolished, and…accession to freedom and independence
must not be delayed on the false pretext that a particular territory has not reached a
sufficiently high standard in economic, social, educational and cultural matters.”573 The
resolution struck at the heart of imperialism’s ideological legitimacy and Southern
Rhodesian settlers’ justification of white supremacy: the civilizing mission. Resolution
8.2, tactfully adopted without a vote, demonstrated what an unlikely ally Unesco was in
the Round Table’s last stand for gradualism in Africa.
And the realities of minority rule in Central Africa added yet another layer to the
paradoxes of liberalism. White Rhodesians had been pushing for independence longer
than any other sub-Saharan colony. African leaders were placed in the odd position of
petitioning the UN Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples (the Committee of Twenty-four), to prevent Britain from granting
the country independence before majority rule. In fact, the Committee of Twenty-four,
formed in 1962 to oversee the 1960 Declaration, focused its first inquiries on the
573

Unesco, “Implementation of Resolution 8.2, Adopted by the General Conference at Its Eleventh Session,
on “The Role of Unesco in Contributing to the Attainment of Independence by Colonial Countries and
Peoples,” 12C/27, 10 Oct. 1962.

310
territories of the Central African Federation.574 The Federation had been formed, in part,
to contain the expansion of South Africa, but it was quickly becoming the apartheid
state’s rival for pariah status in the international community.
Despite its sinking reputation in the UN, however, the Unesco Secretariat was
happy to work with institutions in the Federation—and then even in Rhodesia after the
Federation had dissolved. When a Unesco conference of African ministers of education
met in Abidjan in 1964, it voted to exclude Southern Rhodesian representatives. Director
General René Maheu, however, expressed Unesco’s “regret” of this decision and
described the projects his organization was currently carrying out “devoted to the
betterment of the African population and its preparation for the day when the country will
obtain independence for its entire population.”575 Unesco’s institutional culture was
profoundly shaped by the Cold War imperative to include member states that defined
their political ideologies in opposition to each other. No principle was more important
than universality. Member states might organize boycotts or haggle over which states to
exclude, but the Secretariat’s schemes focused on keeping states engaged.
This bias towards inclusion did not mean that the Secretariat simply accepted
Southern Rhodesia’s social and political status quo. The report of an Educational
Planning Mission that visited Southern Rhodesia in 1964 asserted that because the
country’s segregated schools could “only perpetuate inequalities of educational
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opportunity, a straightforward statement must be made as to its incompatibility with the
principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Constitution of Unesco, and most specifically, in the Convention and
Recommendation against Discrimination in Education” (the last of which, incidentally,
had been adopted by the 1960 General Conference). The report went on to lay out a plan
for the complete integration of the school system.576 Respect for diversity was the flip
side of universality. Even when the gap between the international community’s ideals and
a nation’s social and political realities appeared unspannable, Unesco was compelled to
act as if it could build the bridge.
The intensity of racial tensions in Central Africa, therefore, only made Unesco’s
support for Partnership—and the Chair of Race Relations—more vital. After all,
Resolution 8.2 included an “urgent appeal to Member States to introduce or develop in
their education programmes the teaching of the principles of racial and cultural fraternity
and equality.” The civilizing mission was not completely abandoned, but a non-racialist
society was now a prominent standard of civilization.
Not only was Unesco preparing to scale up its commitment to Africa when the
Round Table’s appeal arrived; the SSD was attempting to reinvigorate its Race Program.
After the early success of The Race Question and Modern Science Series, the Race
Program had struggled to maintain its momentum, but the Executive Board and NGOs
continued to push for action in the fight against racial prejudice. The problem, Métraux
explained to the SSD’s Director, T. H. Marshall in 1958, was that for its first seven years
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the Program’s “research projects were directed towards the study of ‘happy’ situations.
Unfortunately, these not being numerous, we have now reached the end of our tether.” In
1954, Métraux had solicited numerous intriguing ideas for his program at the Ford
Foundation’s milestone Conference on Race Relations in World Perspective at the
University of Hawaii; however, he lamented, “All the themes which have been discussed
can be considered as ‘hot’ from a political point of view and are therefore outside
Unesco’s competence.”577 To be controversial was to be political, which was by
definition outside the jurisdiction of a functional agency. As a result, during the late
1950s, the Race Program was in a state of unintended “abeyance.”578
In 1960, however, the Race Program tried a new tactic.579 The desecration of a
synagogue in Cologne on Christmas Eve 1959 inspired a wave of anti-Semitic acts in
West Germany that spread into France and beyond. On the continent, anti-racism had
been framed in terms of anti-Semitism more than the color-bar.580 Concerned intellectuals
and Jewish leaders took advantage of the shock of German youth espousing Nazi racial
doctrine and swastikas painted on the Paris Metro to call for new studies of prejudice and
stronger anti-racist interventions. The Race Program’s flagship new project was a study
of prejudice in German youth initiated by Unesco’s Youth Institute in Munich in
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collaboration with the German Social Science Study Group for International Problems
and the World Jewish Congress.581 Although not a direct impetus for the change in
direction, the 1958 race riots in Notting Dale and Nottingham, which targeted West
Indian immigrants, showed that colonial racial tensions were now a domestic issue and
helped solidify a sporadic commitment to the field of race relations in England, too.582
Unesco’s investigation expanded into a comparative study of prejudice in German,
French, and British youth and lost its specific focus on anti-Semitism (much to the
annoyance of its Jewish sponsors, who resented the conflation of the Jewish and Negro
problems, which, Jewish activists regularly complained, implied Jews were a race).
Unesco’s “new direction” was to forthrightly study the unhappy situations; the goal of
engagement was always to include more of the “hot” political issues within the technical
competence of the specialized agency.
Métraux also hoped to apply his program’s risky new direction to race relations in
other regions.583 While not included in the Race Program’s portfolio, the Round Table’s
appeal to study race relations in the world’s “best living laboratory”—and adjacent to the
recalcitrant Union of South Africa, which had withdrawn from Unesco in 1956 to protest
the organization’s antiracist propaganda—was precisely the sort of opportunity the SSD
sought.
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Partnership’s Fifth Act
Guest’s request for a “substantial contribution” to endow the Chair, however,
mistook Unesco for an international foundation. Instead, SSD Director Marshall
suggested that the Organization follow its common practice of paying the salary and
traveling expenses for a visiting professor—“an ‘expert’ with the status of a Unesco
official”—for one or two years to help the College establish its new program. The Round
Table was thrilled with the proposal, which appeared to be a simple way to finally fill the
Race Chair while building its endowment.584 As the young businessmen quickly
discovered, however, few endeavors were simple once an IGO got involved. As a general
rule, the height of bureaucratic hurdles was inversely proportional to the incentives
bureaucrats had to clear them. Although Unesco agreed to provide an expert for the
semester beginning March 1961, the position was not filled until June 1964. While
Unesco bent rules and the Round Table persistently nagged the interested parties, the
unexplained silences, impossible demands, and sudden reversals of the UK and
Federation governments and the UCRN revealed the changing international dynamics of
race relations in Central Africa.
In the UN, Britain had consistently denied responsibility for Southern Rhodesia.
Even as the request for an expert on race relations was channeled through London, the
UK argued before the UN General Assembly that it should not have to report on
Rhodesia because the latter was a self-governing territory. This was wishful as much as
legal thinking. With the end of empire, the problem facing Her Majesty’s Government
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was how to divorce itself from a territory that only a few years earlier had appeared to be
a vanguard of European civilization on the Dark Continent, but was now an international
symbol of reactionary white supremacy. In 1961, the UK negotiated a new constitution
with the Federation intended to allow the territory to ascend to independence, only to
witness the overtly white supremacist Rhodesian Front win elections in 1962 and finally
oversee the dissolution of the Federation in 1963. On multiple occasions, the SSD lost
months waiting for approval from the UK National Commission, but the National
Commission was simply waiting for events to clarify the situation in Central Africa. It
was hardly to Britain’s credit, but it was practically true that Southern Rhodesia had
become a self-governing territory.585
The Central African Federation government’s approval of the Chair of Race
Relations, therefore, was essential. To demonstrate the government’s support, the Round
Table’s initial appeal to Unesco included a statement from Jasper Savanhu, one of two
African representatives of Southern Rhodesia in the Federal Parliament and a leading
spokesman for Partnership. It was not every day that a black M.P. in a segregated country
asked Unesco to engage in interracial education. Yet the government’s immediate
response to Unesco’s offer to send an expert was that it was unwilling to pay even the
nominal eight percent of the cost (£450) required by agency rules. The government only
agreed to let the project proceed on the Round Table’s guarantee that it would reimburse
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the government’s portion.586 A Unesco sponsored Chair of Race Relations perfectly
matched the international public relations objectives of Partnership, but the government’s
parsimony hardly implied enthusiastic support. Rather, this grudging acquiescence
reflected the fact that Unesco did not enter the stage until the fifth act of the Partnership
tragedy.
As a vague policy that was never put into concrete practice, Partnership did not
have an official end, but by 1958 its failure was clear. That was the year that the Southern
Rhodesian Prime Minister, Garfield Todd, was kicked out of office. Todd embodied the
spirit of Partnership. A former missionary from New Zealand who had been an influential
figure in African education, he had replaced Huggins in the clubby world of Southern
Rhodesian politics when the elder statesman assumed leadership of the Federation. As
Prime Minister, Todd eloquently articulated the ethos of Partnership, even addressing
electorally insignificant African audiences; yet his administration pushed through no
significant anti-discriminatory legislation. Nevertheless, Todd’s defeat in the polls,
widely attributed to his endorsement of mild electoral reforms designed to allow African
nurses and teachers to participate in the non-racial franchise, demonstrated a white
backlash against even symbolic reform. For many African elites—Partnership’s domestic
target audience—Todd’s defeat confirmed what five years of empty rhetoric had already
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made too clear: Partnership “was conditional on the maintenance of white political
domination and economic privilege.”587
Even before Todd’s defeat, however, a more militant and broadly based African
nationalist movement was replacing Partnership’s interracial tea parties. In 1955, two
Southern Rhodesians founded the City Youth League, which recruited Africans aged
sixteen to forty—ironically, also the cutoff age for Round Table membership. In historian
Michael O. West’s words, the self-consciously non-intellectual Youth League “scorned
the newly hegemonic multiracialism in black politics.”588 Yet after proving their power in
African politics, the leaders of the Youth League co-opted more established, universityeducated African leaders. The Southern Rhodesian African National Congress that
emerged from this alliance in 1957 gestured towards the ideals of interracialism, but the
label “tea drinker” quickly became a slur. By 1960, to be an African moderate was to be a
government stooge.589
Most importantly, the Southern Rhodesian ANC reached out from the city to
mobilize the vast majority of the population: peasants struggling to scratch out a living in
the sandy soil of the Native Reserves. The nationalists found a receptive rural audience
because, after a slow start, by the mid-1950s the government was actively implementing
the conservation measures legislated in 1951. The nationalist leader Ndabaningi Sithole
captured the African reaction to the Native Land Husbandry Act: “Of course, the
European governments did all this in the name of preventing soil erosion, conserving soil
and water and flora! And these measures, in actual practice, turned out to be effective
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instruments in preventing white supremacy from being eroded and in conserving white
supremacy!”590 The Congress Party’s General Secretary called the conservation law “the
best recruiter Congress ever had.”591 Instead of the intended effect of making marginal
land productive and separating urban from rural communities, compulsory scientific
conservation practices highlighted the political causes of rural poverty and helped unite
city workers and country farmers into a national movement.
One need not check the math to know that the calculations of carrying capacity
that legitimated the eight-acre “economic holding” mandated by the Native Land
Husbandry Act represented international ecological standards no better than Partnership
represented international liberal racial norms. Still, international economic development
programs across Africa often appeared more like a war against peasants than the “war
against nature” internationalists hoped would unite nations across ideological divides (see
Chapter Three). Internationally sponsored nature protection programs could have a
similar radicalizing effect on rural Africans, and here Unesco played a key role. For
example, Unesco helped the Federation submit a request for assistance to the UN Special
Fund that promised that through skillful management of Central African national parks
and game reserves “marginal lands” could be made to “yield large returns.” The request
only mentioned race to point out the country’s non-racial franchise, but the “marginal
lands” to be set aside as “representative ecological units of Africa’s unique wilderness”
required the displacement of established communities and the alienation of sacred
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sites.592 By helping extend the reach of the authoritarian state into rural communities, the
international expertise that promoted wilderness preserves, prescribed soil conservation
techniques, and refined survey methodology raised the political consciousness of
peasants. It helped make possible an African—that is, a racial—national identity.
But just as importantly, the African nationalists drew strength from positive
identification with the international community. The new Zimbabwean nationalism was
imagined as part of a greater Pan-African movement, which was institutionalized in 1963
with the creation of the Organization of African Unity.593 It also drew on and appealed to
the international community’s ideals of liberal democracy. Instead of seeking to
differentiate a worthy black elite from the uncultured masses, the new movement called
for universal suffrage; “one man, one vote,” replaced Rhodes’ “equal rights for all
civilized men” as the standard. As the historian Ngwabi Bhebe argues compellingly,
even the nationalists’ relatively limited acts of violence and sabotage against whites in
the early 1960s were designed to incite British intervention and demonstrate
determination to the leaders of other African nations—a strategy that depended on the
conviction that Africans occupied the moral high ground.594
In contrast to the African nationalists’ strategy of internationalizing the crisis in
Central Africa, white nationalists began to define their cause through conflict with the
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Commonwealth and the international community. The postwar wave that sought to
spread British loyalties throughout the Commonwealth had receded back to the Isle.
While the symbols of the British Crown still inspired lingering patriotic pride, H.M.G.’s
policy of decolonization in Africa, its demands for African political representation before
Rhodesian independence, and the notion of an interracial Commonwealth aroused
disdain.595 For white supremacists, the UN was even worse. The Rhodesian Front
government blamed the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN for forcing an irresolute United
Kingdom into taking irresponsible positions on Rhodesia. For example, in December
1963, less than a month after the dissolution of the Federation, a Lieutenant Colonel
warned the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly that Britain might “hand us over to
UNO and power drunk Pan-Africanist demagogues.” Similar to the anti-Unesco vitriol in
the McCarthy-era United States, the UN’s anti-colonialism and racial equalitarianism
became an important rationale for extreme white supremacist policies.596
Todd’s successor as Prime Minister, Edgar Whitehead, attempted to crush African
nationalism and dampen white reaction by banning African nationalist political parties
and enacting the repressive Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, essentially establishing a
permanent state-of-emergency in Southern Rhodesia. At the same time, his United Party
spearheaded the 1961-62 Build a Nation and Claim your Vote campaigns to engage
Africans in the political system. Although also an attempt to improve Rhodesian race
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relations through propaganda, the Build a Nation campaign tacitly acknowledged the
failure of Partnership; instead of forging an alliance between progressive whites and
African elites, it reached out to “all Rhodesians,” targeting rural Africans and even
promoting the repeal of the white Magna Carta, the Land Apportionment Act.597 Not
surprisingly, this combination of repression and propaganda failed to moderate either
white or black nationalism. Detaining legitimate African leaders and banning nationalist
parties highlighted the hypocrisy that imbued the Build a Nation campaign, which in any
case came far too late to persuade blacks, but provided ample hot air with which to stoke
white reaction.
Thus, by 1964, the prospect of a Unesco sponsored Chair of Race Relations at a
multiracial university in Salisbury—a swell idea in 1953 and an urgent last stand in
1960—had an anachronistic feeling. Yet the Salisbury Round Table was irrevocably
committed to its own international community—the World Council of Young Men’s
Service Clubs had made the endowment its first world project—and 1964 was the year its
persistence finally paid off.598 In case there were any doubts over the Rhodesian Front’s
commitment to progressive race relations and international exchange, the government
insisted on including an entirely gratuitous clause in the contract requiring Unesco’s
expert to attain official approval for foreign participants invited to “any meeting, seminar,
conference or training course.”599 But while the UK and Rhodesian governments
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certainly did not expedite the Chair of Race Relations, neither was the main culprit of the
delay; the University College was the real problem.
Kenneth Kirkwood and the Chair of Race Relations
When the Round Table first offered the endowment, a Chair of Race Relations
had perfectly matched the UCRN’s political function within the Federation: to manifest
partnership. After a slow start, the College had developed rapidly, especially once Walter
Adams left the IUC to become Principal in 1955, but remained a fragile institution.
Adams was dedicated to building a first class British university, and his vision of the
Race Chair reflected these ambitions. Instead of a long-term appointment, he decreed, the
Chair should be filled by a series of established scholars, each “eminent in his own
academic field.” The relevant academic fields, according to Adams, included:
“Sociology, Anthropology, Genetics, Psychology, Moral Philosophy, Political Science,
Law, History [and] Economics.” At the end of a one-year appointment, during which the
visiting professor would participate in an on-going seminar on race relations, the
distinguished scholar would give a public series of lectures, which would be published
under the title of the Chair. After a decade of rotating through the various disciplines and,
not incidentally, national perspectives, the “series would provide a substantial original
contribution to scholarship and a many-sided study of race relations within Central
Africa.”600 Not only would this plan use Central Africa’s human laboratory to promote
Partnership in the international community; it also resonated with the SSD’s
methodology for constructing a view from everywhere.
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But after this initial endorsement, Adams’ appeared to be purposefully sabotaging
the project. In 1962, after nearly a year of unreturned letters on the subject, the SSD was
left with “the impression that the University is not in fact favourable to the appointment
of the expert, or at least changed its mind since the [original] request.” Meanwhile, much
to the SSD’s irritation, Adams informed the increasingly frustrated and embarrassed
Salisbury tablers that the delay was “entirely the fault of Unesco.” 601
Unesco’s struggle to find an expert acceptable to Adams suggested aspects of the
dilemma the UCRN faced as an integrated institution in a segregated society. When the
SSD leaked the name of a candidate likely to assume the Chair to the anxious Round
Table, Adams wrote indignantly:
We have been gravely embarrassed in our discussion here to discover that the
possible availability of Professor Kirkwood has been disclosed to the Round Table
Race Relations Endowment Trust, with the result that it is now widely known in
outside circles in Salisbury…. [The Round Table] and the Trust have nothing
whatsoever to do with the appointment of the Chair, which on all accepted
university principles must be at the unfettered discretion of the College.602
Adams vehemence reflected the reality that the College’s survival depended on
maintaining the fiction of its “unfettered discretion” to run its own affairs. In fact, the
appointment of a Unesco expert to fill the Chair, like all UN agency assignments,
required the approval of the recipient country’s government. And the Federal government
influenced the staffing of the UCRN even when a UN agency was not involved. But
UCRN’s vulnerability to governmental interference only increased Adams’ urgency to
reinforce the boundary between academics and politics.
601

Zyss to Sackey, Dec. 62; Wilson to Zyss, 24 Dec. 1962; Zyss to Adams, 22 Jan. 1963, 323.12.37 (689),
Race Relations Chair, AMS – Teaching of Race Relations – Rhodesia and Nyasaland – Part. Prog., Unesco.
602
Adams to Henquet, 14 May 1963, , 323.12.37 (689), Race Relations Chair, AMS – Teaching of Race
Relations – Rhodesia and Nyasaland – Part. Prog. Unesco.

324
When the Rhodesian Front assumed power, the government’s interventions
became more heavy-handed. In 1963, for instance, it deported the dynamic young
historian Terence Ranger. As an academic, Ranger engaged in groundbreaking research
recovering the “African voice”; that is, reconstructing the continuity of African resistance
to colonial rule, which had obvious implications for the African nationalist movement. As
a political activist, he earned public notoriety by founding the Anti-Colour Bar
Association and serving as vice-chairman of the nationalist Zimbabwe African People’s
Union District Council in Salisbury. Ranger was a prominent example, but the social
science faculty in general was several standard deviations to the left of whatever political
center remained in Southern Rhodesia.603 Between radical faculty like Ranger and an
increasingly nationalist African student body, the UCRN became known to white
Rhodesians as the “Kremlin on the hill.” Predictably, the presence of professors affiliated
with Unesco provided evidence in Parliament of communist infiltration.604
Under siege, Adams had little choice but to fall back upon the College’s Royal
Charter. Rather than an outpost of international communism, the College was a refuge of
international science. To promote the UCRN as a symbol of Southern Rhodesia’s
membership in the civilized community of nations, the country had to respect the Free
World’s norm of academic freedom. This defense was a delicate maneuver, to say the
least. In 1961, Adams wrote in a circular to the staff that the College Council was
“worried by the effect on the College of the publicity by the political activities of a few
members of the staff…outside the College and their repercussion upon the position of the
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College in the community.” Since the political activity was performed outside the
College, “the problem [was] not therefore, one of academic freedom.” In his “personal
capacity as a citizen,” a faculty member was “free to engage in public political activity.”
However, “there may be some limit to the extent or kind of public political activity that is
appropriate for a member of the university staff…The obligation [of faculty] is twofold—
an obligation to speak and to lead, an obligation to weigh with scrupulous care the effects
of speech and action. Membership implies a loyalty to the interests and strength of the
university institution itself.”605 By pledging their primary loyalty to the College—through
which they gained membership in and became accountable to the international academic
community—the faculty assured the autonomy of the UCRN and thus their right, in
theory, to think and speak freely.
When Adams awkwardly implied that the faculty ought to curtail “outside”
political activities, he acknowledged the impossibility of cleanly separating one’s
academic “public” identity and civilian “private” identity, although this was the very
distinction on which the College’s autonomy depended. He also made the uncomfortable
admission that in Central Africa “academic freedom” required sacrificing civil liberties.
With the stakes so high and the sacrifice so great, Adams was incensed that the College’s
business—especially collaboration with a controversial UN agency that promoted racial
equality—had leaked to “outside circles in Salisbury”; it revealed the gaping holes in the
boundary separating the College from society.
When Adams described the qualifications for the visiting professor, only one item
appeared problematic: the first holder of the Chair of Race Relations should not be an
605
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American. The reason he preferred a non-American was that he thought the Carnegie
Corporation or Ford Foundation might fund the subsequent appointment, which,
according to Adams, would mean selecting an American.606 Support from Unesco could
help establish a truly international, as opposed to American, reputation for the Race
Chair.
But escaping U.S. influence was not so easy. Race relations was an American
academic industry. There were, of course, non-American experts in the field, but the pool
of scholars with an established reputation in race relations was so much deeper in the
United States that after six months of searching, the SSD sent Adams a list five American
professors who had expressed interest. It had “come to the conclusion that it would be
exceedingly difficult to find an interested and available candidate elsewhere than in the
United States.”607 One of the effects of Unesco’s Race Program was to spread Americanstyle social science research into intergroup relations.
In fact, spreading American-style research and anti-racist propaganda was one of
the Race Program’s purposes. When Unesco’s German Youth Institute together with the
Social Science Study Group for International Problems submitted its proposal for a
“Research and Education Programme for Combatting [sic] Ethnic and Racial Prejudice,”
one of the primary goals was “to interest social scientists in Europe in research on
prejudice in order to catch up with the USA.”608 This aspect of the project did not
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represent a new direction for the Race Program. For example, Métraux wrote to warn the
U.S. National Commission in 1951 of the harm caused by “the appaling [sic] ignorance
of what is being done in the United States to fight racism in all its forms.” “It has been
my policy since I accepted my present job,” he assured the Commission, “to let the public
know that, in the fight against racism, America is on the fore-front and that the material
which we use in our own campaign is mostly of American origin.”609 Métraux was a
sincere booster of American social science and society, but by echoing the line of the
U.S. Information Service’s international propaganda on race—yes, America has a race
problem, but through determined effort it is making extraordinary progress—he also
shored up U.S. patronage for a potentially threatening program. Unesco was thus an
unlikely place to find an alternative to the American perspective on race relations.
Adams had political as well as intellectual reasons for avoiding an American
expert. On the one hand, Jim Crow had provided a model for separate development in
Central Africa; the Federation’s Partnership propaganda complimented American race
propaganda; and Rhodesia proudly allied with the United States against the communist
“savages” in the Congo. Rhodesia, according to the country’s European establishment
and Southern U.S. politicians, was the Free World’s bulwark against communism and the
chaos of tribalism in Central Africa. On the other hand, Europeans in Southern Rhodesia
accused the United States, like the United Kingdom, of betrayal. Whereas the Rhodesian
backlash against Partnership had swept the Rhodesian Front into power, the Southern
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states’ massive resistance to Brown v. Board of Education had forced Eisenhower to
deploy Federal troops in Little Rock to enforce desegregation. An analogous British
action was what European nationalists dreaded and African nationalists hoped to provoke
in Rhodesia. U.S. international propaganda on race relations provided leverage for its
own domestic civil rights movement, which turned the United States into a largely
negative example for most Europeans in Southern Rhodesia.610
For Unesco and the UCRN, the fundamental problem was finding an expert for
the Race Chair who would be accepted as “unbiased” by white Rhodesians yet respected
by the international community. This challenge was explicitly addressed by Philip
Mason, the Director of the nascent Institute of Race Relations (IRR) in London, when he
recommended candidates to the SSD. Mason understood the Southern Rhodesian context
well because, with support from the Rockefeller Foundation, which underwrote the
establishment of the IRR, he had researched the historical roots of the territory’s racial
crisis in the IRR’s first published monograph.611 It was Mason who first recommended,
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as “an obvious name,” Kenneth Kirkwood, as well as the University of Manchester’s
Chair of Anthropology Max Gluckman. The political and intellectual differences between
the liberal Kirkwood and the Marxist Gluckman were profound, but for Mason, they
presented the same problem: both had views on Central Africa (“very definitely
expressed” in Gluckman’s case) that were “already fairly well-known in Rhodesia.” The
reason “previous knowledge of the country [was] something of a disadvantage,” Mason
explained, was that he was “thinking of this Chair, as…the founders of the Chair
originally did, as an educative influence among the Europeans of Rhodesia.”612 Ignorance
of Central Africa was an advantage because it meant the expert would not have
prematurely revealed his bias against the color bar, the Land Apportionment Act, and
minority rule. With the proper tact, he might engage the European community in a
constructive conversation.
In fact, for a few months it looked like ignorance of race relations would be a
prerequisite for the first Chair of Race Relations. Adams summarily dismissed all of
Mason’s recommendations. He proposed a few improbable candidates, and finally, after a
delay of several months that rendered the decision moot, accepted the nomination of the
thirty-two year old Dutch physical anthropologist Johan Huizinga.613 Huizinga’s
dissertation analyzed the “cephalometric relationship between first degree relatives,” and
he had just founded the Institute of Human Biology at Utrecht.614 Adams’ letters rarely
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explained his rationale, but physical anthropology certainly had the benefit of sidestepping the urgent conflicts of contemporary Rhodesian society. Ironically, research on
the biology of race would not compromise Adams’ commitment to making the UCRN a
“non-racial island of learning” in a racially fraught nation.
In any case, after Huizinga fell through, Adams went silent on the Race Chair for
almost all of 1962, only to reassert his enthusiasm for the project when Unesco’s
Assistant Director-General in charge of Technical Assistance, Malcom Adiseshiah,
visited the UCRN. Adams could hardly afford to disclaim the College’s commitment to
race relations when the issue was sandwiched between negotiations over Unesco’s
collaboration on two major UN Special Fund projects, one to develop a secondary teacher
training program and the other to implement a plan to make the College a regional center
for wildlife conservation.615 Race relations came as part of the UN’s development
package.
But by 1963 the tablers, too, had begun to wonder whether directly addressing
race relations was such a good idea. “Would it not be better,” the Round Table’s L.K.S.
Wilson asked the SSD, “for a Sociologist or a Social Scientist or an Anthropologist,
whatever you may care to call him, be the person to bring to bear on the subject the
question of human feeling after it has been studied by a person who holds qualifications
in what might be termed a pure or more exact science?” “At the present moment,” an
615
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economist, for example, “might be more realistic.”616 It was as if nationalist passions had
contaminated the laboratory, rendering safe investigation of race relations impossible.
Apparently, the situation called for either an expert on race relations who was ignorant of
Central Africa or an expert on Central Africa who ignored race relations.
In the end, Adams acquiesced to the appointment of Kirkwood. Kirkwood may
have had the disadvantage of being an acknowledged expert on race relations and Central
Africa, but he was exquisitely sensitive to the challenging position the UCRN Professor
of Race Relations would occupy: between Africans and Europeans, the academy and the
public, Southern Rhodesia and Britain and the international community. Indeed, when the
SSD asked Kirkwood if he would accept the appointment, he answered that he would, but
thought a professor “outside the immediate context of British-Central African relations”
(i.e. not British) would be better: “A ‘neutral’ appointment might induce a properly
academic view of the new chair at the outset.” The point was not so much bias as the
appearance of bias; to be effective, the Chair had to be respected “by the people of all
ethnic groups in Rhodesia and Nyasaland.”617
Kirkwood strongly identified with an international British community. Born in
Transvaal in 1919 and educated at the University of Witwastersrand in Johannesburg, he
was married to a Southern Rhodesian whose father had been elected to the colony’s first
Parliament under responsible government. A former Lecturer in Native Administration at
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the University of Natal, his mission was to keep the liberal ideals of the British Empire
alive through decolonization. “Given confidence in the West, and especially realistic and
determined co-operation by Britain,” he wrote upon return from his Unesco mission to
Salisbury, “Africa’s gifts, both human and material, can contribute to the world in the
manner which was foreseen in the past by Lugard and the other pioneers who proclaimed
the principles of the ‘dual mandate.’”618 He did not, however, hesitate to criticize
Colonial Office policies—although he was that type of self-assured British scholar who
tended to blame bad policies on a “lack of imagination.” He had advised the Round Table
on the Race Chair for a decade. He was a cosmopolitan, but he was a local, too. Here was
a social scientist who could be relied upon to salve, not stir up, the frightening “human
feeling” that discussions of race relations in Central Africa inevitably aroused.619
Once Kirkwood accepted the position, the Round Table’s only concern was
assuring that he arrived by September 1963 when the World Council of Young Men’s
Service Clubs would hold its General Conference in Salisbury to celebrate the installation
of the Chair of Race Relations.620 Even though he could not accept the position for
another year, Kirkwood made the long trip from Oxford. His acceptance speech,
delivered to an audience that included the President of the College Council, the architect
of Federation and Partnership Lord Malvern (Geoffrey Huggins), explained the purpose
and practice of a professor of race relations. Summarizing the postwar liberal racial
orthodoxy, he dismissed “race in its narrower physical sense” as significant mostly as it
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manifested as “social conceptions [of biology], or attitudes, rather than any inherent
biological differences.” Culture, which was always changing, was “of much greater social
significance than race.” He therefore supported the “U.N.E.S.C.O. endeavour to see
ethnic group and ethnic used increasingly instead of race and racial.” The goal of race
relations was to make the study of race relations obsolete—the Chair “might then be redesignated ‘the History of Race Relations.’” In this respect, Métraux would have been
hard pressed to find a better representative of Unesco’s Race Program.621
He also tackled the knotty question of patronage; the common assumption, as he
put it, that “he who pays the piper calls the tune.” He agreed that part of the value of the
UCRN Chair derived from the fact it had “been instituted solely through the combined
contributions of so many individuals.” (Not true, but then Unesco’s press release
announcing Kirkwood’s appointment neglected to mention the Round Table.) He noted,
however, that his own professorship at Oxford had been endowed in 1954, in
commemoration of the centenary of Cecil Rhodes birthday, by the Rhodesian Selection
Trust Group of Copper Mining Companies. The American-British owned RST was an
active supporter of Partnership that attempted to push the government to actually
implement the policy. For example, the obscenely profitable and genuinely paternalistic
RST attempted to influence political opinion by founding the liberal, pro-partnership
Central African Examiner in 1957; touted its housing and education programs for African
workers as models of progressive development; and confronted the European mine
workers’ union over the color bar (which, incidentally, prevented the RST from hiring
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cheaper black labor).622 The purpose of race relations often appeared to be to correct the
social distortions that prevented a liberal economic regime from delivering on its promise
to produce the greatest public good—race relations as international corporations’ HR
research, providing the knowledge necessary to manage the racial division of labor.
But Kirkwood did not call attention to the Rhodesian Selection Trust’s patronage
to imply the progressive power of international capitalism. Instead, he emphasized that
the RST and the World Council were wise to “invest in the disinterested pursuit of truth
by individuals who, by deliberate policy throughout the free world, are protected from the
exercise of any financial, political, religious or other influence.” No subject was “in
greater need of the truly scholarly and scientific approach than ‘race relations,’” which
was why it was so important that the World Council had chosen to “invest in
‘objectivity.’” Too often, he acknowledged, “Exhortations to be objective are…no more
than injunctions to share particular prejudices. Such, however, is the universality of
Oxford that every known viewpoint demands and receives its full attention.” The
university community—at least its ideal type, Oxford—was a model for a national
community and a world community struggling to find unity in diversity. The disinterested
and deliberate interaction of individuals representing “every known viewpoint” produced
an objective perspective; that is, a view from everywhere.
Within the sacred walls of the university, the role of a professor of race relations
was not to discover, much less prescribe, the correct social structure for a multi-racial
society. Borrowing a phrase from his intellectual lodestar, John Stuart Mill, Kirkwood
explained that there was no “ideally best polity.” Kirkwood himself preferred a
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“permissive official attitude towards self-regulatory integration or voluntary
segregation,” but recognized that such a policy only worked given “comparable standards
of living and mutual trust and a mature tolerance between peoples.” A scholar’s duty was
to encourage “tolerance and humility to prevail over intolerance and arrogance in the
realm of study as well as in policy and practice.” Patience was essential. In Central
Africa, as elsewhere, “alarmists” were always crying that “the sands of time are running
out,” but the sands of time were always running out: “The present constitutional and
political difficulties are and must be seen to be ephemeral…The achievement of mutual
trust and confidence between Africans, Europeans, Asians and Coloured peoples is as
necessary now as it was in 1953 when the goal of partnership was written into the
preamble of the constitution which is shortly to be dissolved. That particular constitution
was short-lived but the zone and the peoples who it sought to unite form one of the most
significant human frontiers in the world.” A professor of race relations had to
demonstrate faith in “confident and calm analysis and rational adjustment even in times
of rapid change or crisis.”
As a professor of race relations, Kirkwood certainly upheld his own standards. In
the early 1950s, he had written against the proposed Federation because Southern
Rhodesian whites were not sincerely committed to racial partnership. He asserted that
“education for citizenship in multiracial societies” to reduce “white fear and black
suspicion” was necessary before the new nation was formed. 623 Then a year after its
establishment, Kirkwood analyzed the prospects of the Federation. His investigation
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showed that the polity was unlikely to last because it had been imposed on an unwilling,
increasingly assertive African majority. Yet his conclusion contradicted his analysis: “My
cautious optimism for the future of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is founded
largely on an appreciation of the human qualities of Africans, especially the moderation
and patience of many educated men and women. In concert with the nonracial whites
they can create a union based on partnership.”624 Just before leaving to assume the
professorship at the UCRN in 1964, Kirkwood completed the manuscript Britain and
Africa. While deploring “facile optimism,” he was “pleased that the continuous appraisal
of relations between Britain and Africa…should have led me to a confident view of the
future.” With the dissolution of the Federation, a planned chapter on Central Africa had
to be divvied up between East and South Africa, but the final chapter was titled “Britain
and Independent Africa: Partnership—the Uncompleted Task.”625 Ever the paragon of
cautious optimism, Kirkwood arrived in Salisbury determined to do his part for
Partnership.
His six-month tenure at the UCRN offered little to justify his optimism. Upon
arrival, he set about organizing a “Seminar on ‘National Unity’ in Southern Rhodesia” to
“examine in detached, academic rigour certain aspects of ethnic, cultural and racial
pluralism—social, economic, political, legal and educational—with a view to identifying
particular obstacles to understanding and co-operation, and considering possible methods
of reducing or removing any such obstacles.” The SSD congratulated Kirkwood on his
“care and prudence” in maintaining discussion of race relations at a “strictly academic
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level.” But the faculty on whose collaboration the seminar depended was “from opposite
political standpoints…openly hostile to the U.N.E.S.C.O race relations project.” 626 The
SSD airlifted its besieged expert a complete series of Unesco’s Race Pamphlets and a
provisional version of a new statement on the biological significance of race. (The latter,
as if designed to be discreditable to white Rhodesians, was drafted in Moscow.)
Kirkwood reported that in the face of the “extreme tension” in the surrounding society,
the UCRN seminar was conducted “as normally and objectively as possible, with the
fullest distribution of U.N.E.S.C.O material, and with a maximum focus upon
U.N.E.S.C.O.’s publications on Race.”627 Kirkwood’s refuge in Unesco’s pamphlets
shows how securely established the postwar liberal orthodoxy had become. With their
focus on “happy situations” and cautious optimism, the pamphlets were safe—nostalgic
artifacts from the hopeful days of interracial tea parties.
Kirkwood took solace in the fact that he was attacked by both the right (white
supremacists) and left (African nationalists), but in fact there was no more middle ground
to stand on. As racial tensions in Rhodesian society intensified, European and African
students, who had never really mixed socially, broke into openly hostile camps. The
factions negotiated ever more complex formulas to assure racially balanced student
government, but the African students ended up boycotting the Student Council. It was
time to choose sides. Even Garfield Todd, Southern Rhodesia’s Prime Minister during the
heyday of Partnership, had thrown in his lot with the African nationalists; his daughter, a
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UCRN student, openly joined ZAPU.628 Equivocation implied a moral equivalency
between white supremacy and African liberation, and African nationalism was the only
legitimate progressive force in Central Africa.
In fact, Kirkwood’s emphasis on the significance of sub-racial ethnic identities
resonated with the Rhodesian Front’s reversion to a form of indirect rule. During the
1950s, implementation of the Native Land Husbandry Act had attempted to break tribal
customs, but during the 1960s, the Rhodesian Front pursued conservation through
Community Development programs that elevated chiefs and revived traditional tribal
practices. The Rhodesian brand of Community Development, which was reliant on social
surveys and ethnographic knowledge, was designed to empower local leaders at the
expense of nationalist leaders and to separate traditional African rural society from
modern Rhodesian society.629
Rather than breaking the color bar, African elites’ strategy now emphasized race
as the foundation of a shared Zimbabwean identity that had never before existed; they
sought to elevate racial unity to eliminate ethnic diversity. Thus, writing in 1964 while at
Princeton on a Unesco fellowship, the nationalist intellectual and UCRN lecturer Nathan
Shamuyarira described “tribalism” as more dangerous than “the racialism we are
defeating.” “We must proceed positively,” he wrote, “like true Pan-Africanists, to destroy
every vestige of tribalism.” African nationalist dogma held that all power must be vested

628

Gelfand, A Non-racial Island of Learning, 233-288; Maxwell, Universities in Partnership, 242-256.
Terence Ranger, “Democracy and Traditional Political Structures in Zimbabwe,” in Ngwabi Bhebe and
Terence Ranger, eds., Historical Dimensions of Democracy and Human Rights in Zimbabwe: Pre-Colonial
and Colonial Legacies, 31-52, 38-41.
629

339
in an undifferentiated majority. And the African majority could be identified by the color
of its skin.630
Shamuyarira was temperamentally inclined towards Kirkwood’s brand of
liberalism and it is easy to imagine him debating differences with detached academic
rigor in an Oxford seminar. But for Zimbabwe, Shamuyarira rejected the whole idea of
the disinterested, dispassionate seminar: “The NDP [National Democratic Party, founded
in 1960] added one important factor that had been singularly missing in Rhodesian
nationalism: emotion. Nationalism is basically emotional, and has to be to succeed. At
times—particularly in early years—it should be blind and blinkered if it is to establish its
principles, and begin to transform or reform a decadent society.”631 The clenched fist, not
the open mind, was the appropriate symbol of contemporary race relations.
Kirkwood’s summary of his final report opened by regretting that the mission had
been conducted under Prime Minister Ian Smith’s threat of a Unilateral Declaration of
Independence: “The optimism of a Teilhard de Chardin—who saw promise for mankind
in the first atom bomb—was required if pessimism was not to be felt at the prospect of
U.D.I.” Yet he refused to submit to defeatism. The summary of his report ends with
words that might have made Teilhard de Chardin blush: “The talents and energies of
[able and sympathetic individuals of all races and walks of life] exist to be mobilized as
soon as opportunity allows and the shock of U.D.I. might indeed serve to hasten such
mobilization.”632
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Although Kirkwood returned to Oxford in January 1965, he did not file his report
for more than a year-and-a-half. The difficulty was that there was so much not to say. The
final report was to be submitted to the Rhodesian government, and Unesco issued the
standard instruction to “omit any politically controversial matters,” which should be
included in a confidential annex. Ever sensitive to controversy, Kirkwood decided that
his first effort “was too outspoken on certain matters.” The SSD was impressed by the
more circumspect report he filed a year later, and congratulated itself on having selected
the ideal expert for the post. But the report was still too controversial. There was no
question of sending it to the illegal government in Rhodesia, with which all
communications had ceased. The SSD tentatively suggested that it might be acceptable to
the British government; it had been a UK participation program project, after all.633 In the
end, the report appears to have been buried under a pile of paper on a civil servant’s desk
before inadvertently finding its way into a wastepaper basket. It can’t be located in the
archives, at any rate.634 Such a fate seems fitting for a report on a mission so out-of-sync
with the time and place in which it was performed. The Chair of Race Relations at the
University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had been established for a nation that no
longer existed. But then, in the imaginations of most of its citizens, it never had existed.
Yet the liberal ideals enshrined in the Chair of Race Relations should not be
dismissed. Even in Africa in the mid-1960s, the pressures of colonial liberation
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movements had not completely swept them aside. African nationalists recognized the
danger of subjugating the rights of individuals and sub-national communities to the needs
of the People, who were represented by the Party, itself embodied in a charismatic leader.
In 1963, Kirkwood had recommended Léopold Sédar Senghor, the poet and first
President of Senegal, for the UCRN Chair of Race Relations. (In a sign of how incautious
his optimism could be, Kirkwood thought Senghor’s command of English might present
a difficulty.) That year, Senghor had presented a paper at Kirkwood’s African Affairs
Seminar at St. Antony’s College. In “Negritude and African Socialism,” Senghor
attempted to define an African identity that was expressed through interdependence with,
not opposition to, Europe. Inspired by the University, Senghor spoke of Africa’s
contribution to the “Civilization of the Universal,” of which Oxford was “one of the
peaks.” Unesco, he declared, was playing a “major role” in building “the Civilization of
the Universal by bringing the different civilizations together in discussion.” “Revised
negritude,” he declared, “is a form of Humanism.”635 Even as he mocked the tea parties
he had once attended, Shamuyarira wrote, “The basic aim of nationalism is to broaden the
area of freedom and free action for the individual, in the first place, and for the goodwill
of the majority to ensure equal rights for minorities, once the battle has been won.”636
Tragically, as in so many cases, it turned out that the battle was not won with
independence. When Terence Ranger retired from Oxford in 1997, where he, too, had
served as the Rhodes Professor of Race Relations, he returned to Harare (formerly
Salisbury) and the University of Zimbabwe (formerly the UCRN) where his distinguished
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career had begun. Reflecting on the history he had lived, Ranger wrote: “The
emancipatory potential of Zimbabwean nationalism, in which I had so confidently
believed, had been very imperfectly fulfilled. But I could not have foreseen in 1963,
when I was removed from Rhodesia and from the University College, a future in which
there would be over 10,000 African students at the University of Zimbabwe, all with high
A-level entry qualifications, and in which research and scholarship would be thriving
so.”637 Unfortunately, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the University was
again under attack by an authoritarian regime as an “anti-Government mentality factory.”
The Ministry of Education and Unesco had collaborated to produce hundreds of
thousands of textbooks on Education for Human Rights and Democracy that “represented
universalist history at its best” but, Ranger sadly reported, the expensive texts were
moldering in warehouses—banished as insidious examples of “bogus universalism.”638
Ranger wrote in defense of a pioneering school of “post-nationalist” historians at the
University of Zimbabwe who performed pluralist analyses that honored the complexities,
contradictions, and internal divisions of Zimbabwe—the sort of social imagination so
desperately needed outside the University. White supremacy had been defeated at home,
but the quest for a community that found unity in diversity and debated politics while
sipping tea continued.
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Conclusion
The Salisbury Round Table’s international appeal advertised Central Africa as the
world’s best living laboratory on race relations. An odd boast, but a claim with more
merit than many others boosters have made. What made the experiment with Partnership
so revealing was not that the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was a typical or a
simple society or a miniature model of the world community. It was none of these. But it
was anomalous and complex in illuminating ways, and the international community was
fleetingly fascinated with the experiment. A self-governing colony, Southern Rhodesia,
the “leading partner” of the Federation, defied classification in the UN’s typology of
states, and anti-colonial activists petitioned against its independence. A politically,
economically, and socially segregated society, white elites portrayed it as an exemplar of
racial cooperation. A self-proclaimed redoubt of the Free World and European
civilization on the Dark Continent, Western powers found it an embarrassing reminder
that their unenlightened history was alive in the present. It resembled a living laboratory
of race relations because the contradictions at the core of Western liberalism were
manifested in purified form.
First conceived in the early-1950s, the campaign to endow the Chair of Race
Relations outlasted the Federation and spanned the postwar transition in human rights
discourse from a focus on antiracism and individual rights, equality of opportunity and
universalism to racial pride and minority rights, social equality and diversity of groups.
The promise of Partnership and the New Commonwealth corresponded to the cautious
optimism of the Race Program’s scientific propaganda and the ideology of the Free
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World. More than discovering the laws of harmonious race relations, the value of the
Chair would be to model dispassionate inquiry performed in good faith in a multiracial
community. The postwar liberal racial orthodoxy had promised all individuals access to
the rewards of civilization based on merit, but a decade later the metric of civilization
itself was under attack by anti-colonial leaders as a Western—that is, white—ploy to
preserve inequality. In Africa, decolonization formed new states that often had little but
the experience of colonial resistance and a common racial identity from which to
construct nations. Instead of reinforcing the boundary separating race from nation,
therefore, African intellectuals articulated a distinctly racial nationalism. By the time
Unesco became involved with the Chair of Race Relations, patience and faith in rational
dialogue had come to seem like rationales for appeasement not reform—or, more
generously, like naiveté not wisdom.
The history of the Chair of Race Relations reflects these major shifts in the
political significance of the liberal antiracist script. But it also reveals the subtler ways in
which other transnational affiliations were reproduced in relation to, and in turn shaped
the meaning of, race. Individuals were not just white or black; they were British,
Afrikaner, African, Shona, Christian, university graduates, businessmen, professionals,
skilled workers, peasants, scholars, immigrants, liberals, socialists, conservatives. Not
only did each of these identities overlap differently with race, the valence of an identity—
the strength of its attraction and its affinity with other identities—changed over time.
Indeed, during the era of decolonization in Central Africa, the speed of change could be
astonishing. Furthermore, with varying degrees of success, each of these identities was
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institutionalized—in political parties, tribes, unions, universities, service clubs, Churches,
IGOs—which added substance to the symbolism of identity politics.
This kaleidoscope of institutionalized identities created opportunities for
individuals who could claim membership in multiple, apparently disconnected
communities to influence the pace and direction of change. The ability to move between
communities, to try on different identities and experiment with hybrid cultural affinities,
was fundamental to the freedom liberal internationalism promised. Members of the tiny
African middle class crossed racial boundaries by leveraging their status as cultured
Christians, but, when Partnership turned out to be an empty promise, mobilized their
transnational affiliations (including race) to represent Zimbabwe to the international
community—or, more precisely, to various international communities. Similarly,
members of the Salisbury Round Table sought to use their membership in a transnational
business community to help solidify Southern Rhodesia’s standing in the Commonwealth
and the Free World. And the success of the Chair of Race Relations was understood to
depend on the scholar’s ability to act as a trusted mediator between conflicting
communities; thus the importance of recruiting an objective expert whose detachment
from the local milieu was supposed to facilitate deeper engagement with both races. The
cosmopolitan intellectual sought to empathize with every group, thereby gaining a
glimpse of the view from everywhere—and, with patience, perhaps help others decipher
the pattern of which they were a part.
If the capacity to link local and international communities could place actors at
the center of historical change, a cosmopolitan identity was just as likely to render
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potential elites marginal figures. The opportunity to perform creative and at times
strategic self-identification was not equally available to everyone. Most obviously, skin
color was an indelible marker. But the range of choices all actors had to fashion their
identities was constricted and the ability to reinvent one’s self limited. It was hard work
and a point of vulnerability for the African elites who dabbled in interracialism to
reinvent themselves as militant revolutionaries. The Salisbury tablers who had committed
to the vision of the New Commonwealth and saw themselves as ushering Central Africa
into the modern world turned out to be distinctly marginal historical figures. While
cosmopolitan’s affiliations with multiple communities made them potentially creative
agents of change, it also could render them lonely outsiders rooted in no community. This
is why cosmopolitans have so often been simultaneously dismissed as irrelevant and
lauded (or vilified) as the makers of history.
Although Kirkwood held an endowed professorship at Oxford, on his mission to
Southern Rhodesia, he epitomized the marginal cosmopolitan. To the Round Table and
the SSD, Kirkwood appeared to be ideally positioned to help integrate Rhodesia into the
international community, but he had little standing with the racial nationalists, white or
black, who performed on history’s center stage. The kaleidoscope had already turned, and
in the new cultural configuration Kirkwood found himself a stranger in a familiar land; an
intellectual who represented no viable local community. This experience of marginality
was one of the challenges of being an international expert. It is easy to imagine that on
their lonely missions to improve deeply troubled countries many representatives of UN
agencies felt like particles in an inexorably revolving kaleidoscope.
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In a sense, even the African intellectuals who played such a critical role in the
transformation of Southern Rhodesia into Zimbabwe only affected history at the margins.
Life changed dramatically for them, but, especially for Zimbabwe’s rural producers,
many of the old inequalities endured. In part, this continuity was possible because the
racially defined political revolution did not transform peasants’ relationship with the state
or mend the cleavage between urban and rural communities. International experts were
cosmopolitan in both senses of the word; political leaders in the city continued to rely on
international expertise to guide coercive land-use practices in the country.639 Indeed, as
the historiography of Southern Africa confirms, scientific knowledge of ecology was
more important than (although also interconnected with) scientific theories of race in
structuring race relations. Appropriately, the current Rhodes Professor of Race Relations
at Oxford, William Beinart, is an environmental historian of the British Empire.
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Chapter Six
Mapping Soils to Cultivate Scientists
The FAO-Unesco Soil Map of the World and the Politics of Scale
If one historical artifact could represent the logic and ambition of the view from
above, it would be the FAO-Unesco Soil Map of the World. At a scale of 1:5 million, it
took eighteen 76cm by 110cm sheets to cover the terrestrial planet (excluding
Antarctica), and an additional sheet to record the map’s legend. These eighteen sheets
were organized into nine areas. Each area and the legend were accompanied by an
explanatory text. Together, the eighteen sheets graphically displayed “a first appraisal of
the world’s soil resources.” They showed the distribution of 106 distinct classes of soil,
termed Soil Units, each represented by a color. Similarities between soils were suggested
by color “clusters” so that large swathes of red and pink in Central Africa or a broad band
of peach and orange in Southeastern North America revealed major soil regions.
Patterned overlays, termed phases, indicated important characteristics affecting
agriculture, such as stoniness or salinity, that were not included in the definition of soils.
Finally, alpha-numeric symbols indicated three degrees of relief (from gently undulating
to mountainous) and soil texture (from coarse to fine). This code also corresponded to a
key on the back of each map that named other soils making up more than 20 percent
(associated soils) and additional important soils comprising less than 20 percent
(inclusions) of a delineated area. The combination of colors, patterns, letters, and figures
made up some 5,000 unique map units. Although the place names of the 1942 American
Geographical Society base map remained visible beneath the gaudy patterns, the map
presented a world without political borders. The patches of red banding the tropics did

349
not symbolize the territorial claims of the British Empire, but rather the predominance of
Ferralsols. The patterns revealed by the Soil Map of the World were esoteric, but the
basic message was clear: the great commonwealth of man was dependent on the planet’s
finite soil resources and, therefore, on the scientific elect who could decipher the map’s
meaning.640
Of course, from an ecological perspective that emphasized the interdependence of
natural resources, a similar conclusion could be drawn about virtually any small scale
resource map.641 But, as we have seen, soil held a privileged, almost sacred, position in
the postwar international scientific community. For mid-twentieth century
conservationists, soil erosion filled the role global warming played for early twenty-first
century environmentalists; it was the final cataclysm towards which all modern society’s
little sins against the earth converged. As the most fundamental renewable resource, soils
both reflected and determined the health (that is, the carrying capacity) of ecosystems—
and of the human communities that depended on them. In the context of a perceived
Malthusian crisis, the production of the Soil Map of the World was a critical episode in
the construction of the global environment in the second half of the twentieth century.642
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What makes the Soil Map of the World such a revealing epitome of the view from
above, however, is not just its affinity with the ideology of resource conservation. Rather
it is the daunting challenges posed by the cultural significance of soil, which conflicted
with the values of a global synoptic perspective, and by the material characteristics of
soil, which resisted standardization. These qualities are what make soil mapping an
effective example of the tedious work required to enable scientific knowledge to circulate
around the world for Bruno Latour and make soil taxonomy the exemplar of hard to
classify nature for Geoffrey Bowker.643 Similarly, this chapter is about how scientists
produced standardized, classified, mobile knowledge out of the apparently boundless
diversity of soil.
Just as race was the most intractable obstacle to the view from everywhere, soils
represented a fundamental problem for the view from above. Soil is a profoundly local
thing. It is, as the cliché goes, what local communities are rooted in. Locals may take a
perverse pride in even the most abysmal weather, but it is the land beneath the wintrymix they vow to defend. And knowledge of a particular soil has traditionally been
understood to derive from the virtuous experience of working that soil.644 Indeed, as
discussed in Chapters Three and Four, the intimate relationship between peasants and the
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soil was what could make imperial soil conservation edicts such intrusive and deeply
resented policies for colonial subjects. It was also one of the appeals of soil conservation
for U.S. agricultural extension programs; in conversations over large scale soil surveys,
experts and farmers were expected to bring their different ways of knowing to bear on the
problem of achieving sustainable maximum yields. In terms of legitimacy, expert
knowledge and lay experience with soils met on relatively level ground.
Maps generally are not thought of as instruments of participatory democracy.
Mathew Edney began his seminal study of the cartographic construction of British India
by invoking Borges’ “famous fantasy of an empire so addicted to cartography that its
geographers constructed an ‘unconscionable’ map at the same size as the empire itself.”
The illusion of a perfect correspondence between the territory and the emperor’s
knowledge of it, Edney argues, was at the core of empire and made cartography the
quintessential imperial science.645 Similarly, James Scott has emphasized the oppressive
potential of state sponsored large scale development schemes based on a synoptic
perspective that inevitably represents only a thin simplification of nature and society.646
In important respects, the Soil Map of the World fulfills the expectations of these now
familiar arguments. At the other extreme of the cartographic scale from maps of
individual farms, the Soil Map of the World embodies the values of universal knowledge
legible only to an elite class of cosmopolitan experts. And yet at a scale of 1:5 million,
the Soil Map of the World was also the very antithesis of Borges’ fantasy. It was so
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obviously a thin simplification that governments wondered what useful purpose it could
possibly serve. Nevertheless, many of the experts who collaborated in its construction
worried more about users mistaking the map for reality than defending its verisimilitude.
What was the purpose of a world map of something as profoundly local as soil? What
kind of power did it inscribe?
For soil scientists, the most powerful effect of the map would be to resolve the
terminological Babel that undermined international scientific communication. When
FAO and Unesco initiated the Soil Map of the World project in 1961, no international
soil classification existed. Many countries, in fact, had multiple competing regional
classifications or were in the process of developing national systems. Soil surveyors often
relied on officially obsolete systems or invented ad hoc classifications depending on the
soils and intended uses of a particular survey. It was impossible to achieve any plausible
semblance of collective empiricism under these conditions.647 For soil scientists, then, it
was not the eighteen sheets of maps that were the project’s enduring accomplishment, but
the legend, which proposed a new, international classification system. The legend
provided a common currency for exchanging information. In this sense, the map was a
heuristic device intended to cultivate an international community of soil scientists.
The key selling point of the Soil Map of the World to the member states,
however, was its usefulness for development planning, and this promise ultimately
depended on the universality of the laws of nature, not intercultural collegiality.
Convincing member states to invest scarce resources in what turned out to be a twenty
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year project to produce a map at the dubious scale of 1:5 million was an accomplishment.
As the first global inventory of soil resources, scientists explained, the map would reveal
the potential of the world’s last agricultural frontier, the uncultivated soils of the tropics.
Exploiting these vast reserves of unproductive soils would require further scientific
research, of course, but here, too, the map was vital. Experts explained that it would
“supply a scientific basis for the transfer of experience between areas with similar
environments”—the map as analogy generator. Moreover, a map based on a standardized
classification system would enable systematic, controlled experimentation and the rapid
extrapolation of findings on experimental farms to analogous areas. As the last sheets
were being readied for publication, two key figures in the success of the project, Michel
Batisse of Unesco and Rene Dudal of FAO, invoked the requisite martial metaphor to
describe the maps potential in the war against nature: “Perhaps this is a first step towards
the ‘ultimate agricultural weapon’ which will make it possible to know what can be
produced, under what conditions, with what interventions and at what risk, in any part of
the world.”648 The tension between the map’s dual objectives as an instrument of
development planning and as a heuristic device for cultivating an international discipline
resonates with the central theme of this study, the tension between the view from above
and the view from everywhere.
The combination of applied and basic science rationales justified making the Soil
Map of the World a joint project of FAO and Unesco.649 In fact, a more idiosyncratic set
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of political interactions between the three UNs determined the participants and shaped the
final product. Despite its overt claim to merely represent nature, politics (of course) were
inscribed in the Soil Map of the World. To illuminate the co-production of the world map
and international organizations, I first describe how the project found a comfortable niche
in the institutional ecology of the UN System. Then I turn to the intellectual history of
soil classification and cartography. Finally, I analyze the cartographic practices that
produced such a beautiful and bizarre document. A word of warning: I delve into more of
the technical details of soil science than I have other sciences in previous chapters. Aside
from an admitted fascination with this underappreciated, under-analyzed science, I think
the payoff in terms of terms of broad but well-grounded generalizations is worth the
price.
The Political and Institutional Conditions of Possibility for the Soil Map of the
World
Few tasks could be dearer to internationalist ideals than the construction of a new
classification system that would facilitate the unification of a transnational disciplinary
community—an Esperanto of soil science. The de-territorialized vision of the world
presented by the map was a testament to the power of scientific cooperation to transcend
the fissures that dissected the international community during the Cold War. Such
triumphs of internationalism depend on openings in international political opportunity
structures, on good timing. This section describes the institutional and political conditions

areas with similar environments; 3. Promote the establishment of a generally accepted soil classification
and nomenclature; 4. Establish a common framework for more detailed investigations in developing areas;
5. Serve as a basic document for educational, research, and development activities; 6. Strengthen
international contacts in the field of soil science.
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that made the project possible, which reflect broader patterns in the development of
science in the UN System.
The Soil Map of the World was certainly well timed. The postwar decades were
the golden age of soil survey.650 At any given time, FAO and other international aid and
imperial technical organizations were engaged in dozens of soil survey projects in the
Third World, but these were dwarfed by programs in the United States, Canada, Western
Europe, the Soviet Union, and Australia. Especially in relatively small, densely settled
Western European countries with centuries of experience farming—countries without
agricultural frontiers—soil surveys had traditionally been a low priority. But, following
the American lead, soil surveys enjoyed something of a European renaissance in the
postwar push for efficiency. Throughout the 1950s, soil scientists were busy developing
national classification systems and drafting soil maps. Indeed, FAO’s European
Commission on Agriculture’s Working Party on Soil Classification and Survey had
begun work on the Soil Map of Europe in 1957. These scientists presented themselves as
a model for the methodology of the larger project into which the European soil map was
incorporated.651 The Soil Map of the World made sense as a natural extension of the
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development work of developed countries that had recently acquired an extensive
knowledge of their national soils.
Still, to justify government patronage, and undoubtedly also out of genuine faith
in their mission, soil scientists emphasized the Soil Map of the World’s contribution to
development. Their product could easily be incorporated into the enduring development
narrative of environmental degradation, but also was well-adapted to the particular
historical moment. It officially began in 1961, just a few months before President
Kennedy proclaimed the 1960s the Development Decade at a meeting of the UN General
Assembly. Recalling the pattern set by the UN’s original technical assistance program,
which followed Truman’s Point Four speech, the United Nations embraced the
Development Decade. As a recent review of the history of UN development concluded,
planning was “priority number one” of the Development Decade. The goal of integrated
planning at the national, regional and world scales reinforced UN agencies’ proclivity for
surveying; planned programs were supposed to be keyed to specific targets that were
based on empirical assessments of needs and potential. For developing countries that
depended on commodity exports, natural resource surveys remained a priority.652 The
promise of a global inventory of the world’s soil resources resonated with the period’s
renewed emphasis on planning. Moreover, the audacity of the project matched the grand
rhetoric of 1960s development plans—without threatening ideological or budgetary
constraints.
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Not only did FAO’s area of competence position the organization to take
advantage of increasing development funding in the 1960s, but also the organization was
in the middle of a period of revitalization under Director-General B. R. Sen. Sen sought
to recapture FAO’s original energy and imagination through a high profile Freedom From
Hunger Campaign. Like the Development Decade itself, however, the Freedom From
Hunger Campaign combined grand ambition with a limited budget. Indeed, following a
pattern set early in FAO’s brief history, the plan was largely preempted by the United
State’s own Food for Peace program (begun in 1958) and then by the World Food
Program (initiated by the Kennedy administration) in which FAO and the UN essentially
administered bilateral aid. At the end of the day, the U.S. government was more
concerned about alleviating the domestic problem of grain surpluses, and perhaps
winning a few hearts and minds through stomachs along the way, than increasing
production in poor countries. Sen’s solution to the organization’s limited capacity
borrowed a page from Unesco strategy; FAO would encourage the formation of national
campaign committees and partner with NGOs, governments, other INGOs, and (unlike
Unesco) corporations—theoretically, then, even the Food for Peace program could be
recast as a component of the Freedom From Hunger Campaign. “The role of FAO would
be generally that of a catalyst and coordinator of these world-wide efforts,” Sen informed
the Seventh International Congress of Soil Science in Madison, Wisconsin just weeks
after the Freedom From Hunger Campaign was launched. By alerting the world to the
horrifying facts of hunger and to the potential of technical expertise to solve the problem,
FAO would galvanize the political will to win “the greatest challenge of our time—the
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conquest of hunger.” The International Congress of Soil Science itself was a vital
component of the campaign.653
The International Congress of Soil Science fit the method and message of the
Freedom From Hunger Campaign perfectly. The Congress’ motto was “Alleviate Hunger,
Promote Peace Through Soil Science.” The opening speeches and technical papers
reflected tremendous optimism in the power of science to increase production and thus
provide a critical window of opportunity to get population growth under control.
Dramatically displaying the self-consciously broad perspective of participants in the
Congress, leading soil scientists presented small scale soil maps of South America, SubSaharan Africa, Australia, Western and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Asia.654
Demonstrating the effectiveness of the catalytic strategy, the resolution that instigated the
Soil Map of the World project, which the President of the Congress forwarded to FAO
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for implementation in cooperation with Unesco and other international organizations,
called for the publication of these seven small scale maps.
The head of FAO’s soil survey work, Luis Bramao, proposed that the organization
publish the maps with a uniform legend and scale—a subtle shift that fundamentally
transformed the task from a minor service to a major international project. Unlike some
experts, Bramao was no skeptic regarding the potential value of small scale soil maps. In
fact, he had presented the first draft of FAO’s Soil Map of South America at Madison and
had played a liaison role in the production of another of the seven maps, the Soil Map of
Western Europe, the international cooperative venture of FAO’s European Commission
on Agriculture. Bramao’s objection to simply publishing the maps was that they did not
use the same cartographic conventions, terminology, and legend; they were based on
different proportions of empirical data, reasoned inference and wild speculation; and they
expressed differing conceptions of the significant differentiae of soils. The Soil Map of
the USSR, for example, presented 75 types of soil organized into 36 subclasses, which
were derived from 12 classes that were grouped into four climatic zones, which were,
finally, divided between two world soil groups. This scheme was closely linked to a new,
rigorously logical, six-tiered hierarchical classification. The legend of the Sub-Saharan
soil map, on the other hand, claimed not to represent any classification system at all.655
On different maps, the “same” soils could have different names while different soils had
the same name. Dudal, for example, would claim to have discovered forty names for dark
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clay soils that ought to be classified together on a small scale map.656 The symptomatic
misunderstandings generated by the incommensurability of the maps meant that their
publication was liable to compound confusion rather than increase clarity. Certainly it
would not contribute to FAO’s longstanding commitment to the “systematic collection of
field soils information [necessary for] the unified soil classification of the world which is
essential for the broader understanding and more effective use of soils surveys and land
use.” Instead, Bramao argued, FAO and Unesco should synthesize the maps to produce a
Soil Map of the World with a unified, international legend.657
At Unesco, Batisse and the Natural Sciences Department’s new Director, Victor
Kovda—a soil scientist who also had presented one of the maps at Madison, the Soil Map
of Asia—agreed with Bramao. They easily convinced the Dutch Secretary-General of the
ISSS, Hans van Baren, to interpret the congress’ resolution as an endorsement of the Soil
Map of the World project. Within weeks, the two specialized agencies decided that the
Soil Map of the World would be a joint project coordinated by a new World Soil
Resources Office at FAO under the direction of Bramao. Key players both inside and
outside the specialized agencies’ secretariats were officers of the International Society of
Soil Science (ISSS), which was nearly an equal partner with the specialized agencies in
the project. In fact, the image of a porous membrane between the secretariats and the
ISSS may exaggerate the integrity of the boundary. An Advisory Panel, initially
consisting of lead authors of the maps presented at Madison plus experts from France, the
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United States, and India, met in June 1961 to select the base map, negotiate the principles
of the legend, and work out the methodology for international soil correlation. Initial
projections envisioned the project costing $176,000 and completed by the Eighth
International Congress of Soil Science in Bucharest in 1964.658 The project would make a
mockery of the budget and timeline, but the basic operating plan worked remarkably
smoothly. Indeed, for a joint project of two mutually suspicious specialized agencies
involving cooperation between experts from the three worlds of the Cold War, the Soil
Map of the World was organized with incredible speed, even ease.
The project certainly fit the zeitgeist of 1960s development, but the general
context does not explain the unusually smooth cooperation between FAO and Unesco or
the ability of the project to transcend the Cold War ideological divide. From the archival
evidence just a couple of years prior to the Madison meeting, such intensive interagency
cooperation in soil cartography certainly would have been hard to predict. When Bramao
discovered Kovda’s impending appointed to Unesco in 1958, for example, he warned his
director that, in alliance with the ISSS, Kovda would use the “power and resources” of
his position to launch a “vast program in the field of soil science.” Giving up any
pretence of confining Unesco’s soils work to disciplinary development, Kovda would
seek to “penetrate all the agricultural research institutions.” Unless FAO took strong
action to strengthen its own soils program, Bramao warned, “this field will be lost to us.”
And the main battlefield of the interagency war would likely be FAO’s Soil Resources of
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the World program. Since the Soviet Union had not joined FAO, Russian scientists could
not participate in the program, and so Kovda “bitterly resented” it.659 In fact, for Bramao,
the issue went beyond interagency rivalry; when the Russians expressed an interest in
cooperating on the Soil Map of Europe through contacts in the ISSS, he advised that FAO
should discourage any cooperation.660
Furthermore, beyond the petty cold war between UN agencies, the Kennedy
administration certainly did not intend the Development Decade as a means of
rapprochement; it saw modernization programs as key components of the global
ideological Cold War.661 This dynamic was subtly suggested by the opening speeches of
the Seventh International Congress of Soil Science. Whereas in the late 1940s, the
absence of Soviet scientists from major international scientific conferences was
publically (and sincerely) lamented, none of the opening speakers even remarked on the
presence of the Soviet Union’s most eminent soil scientists at the meeting. Instead, the
American plenary speakers intoned “the climate of freedom” assured by the conference’s
location.662 Ironically, the interactions of national and bureaucratic rivalries in the field of
soil science helped make the Soil Map of the World project a sort of neutral ground in
which productive cooperation was possible.
659

Bramao to Shickle, 24 Oct. 1958, UNESCO/FAO Relations & Cooperation in the Field of Natural
Science, 1956-1964, UN18/7, FAO.
660
Bramao to Ignatieff, 24 Sep. 1958; Tavernier to Bramao, 6 Sep. 1958, in folder Soil Classification and
Survey Working Party, Box Land and Water Division, Land and Water Use Branch (Soils (2)), 10AGL570,
FAO.
661
Cf. Michael Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and ‘Nation Building’ in the
Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold
War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2005); Ekbladh, The Great American Mission.
662
C.A. Elvehjem, “Welcome to the University of Wisconsin,” and Richard Bradfield, “Opportunities for
Soil Scientists in Freeing the World from Hunger,” Transactions of 7th International Congress of Soil
Science, Madison, Wisc. U.S.A., 1960, v. IV (Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1961), X-XII, XXIXXXXVIII.

363
Russian scientists could justifiably claim credit for the sudden revival of interest
in small scale, schematic soil maps evidenced at the 7th International Soils Congress in
Madison. At a celebration of the 220th anniversary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in
1945, Russian scientists had agreed on the need to resurrect the moribund ISSS, yet
another of the international scientific associations that had dissolved during the war. As
arrangements for the first postwar International Soils Congress were falling into place,
Canadian FAO soil scientist V. Ignatieff hoped the international society would provide a
forum for contacts with Russian experts.663 Predictably however, no Russians attended
the 1950 Congress. Then rather abruptly, a large Soviet delegation showed up at the Sixth
International Congress of Soil Science in Paris in 1956 with small scale maps depicting
the world’s soils. Bramao appreciated the attention the maps brought to the scientific
problems of inventorying world soil resources, but reported that, at least for the soils of
Latin America which he knew well, “any similarity with reality is just pure
coincidence!”664 Still, the Russian maps were the talk of the conference, and led to a
resolution calling for the presentation of other small scale maps at the Seventh Congress.
More fundamentally, Russian contributions to soil classification, genesis, and
cartography informed the whole project. Contemporary soil scientists, concerned with
shoring up their self-consciously young science’s autonomy from geology and chemistry,
traced their discipline’s origins to the articulation of the modern concept of soils in the
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late-nineteenth century by the Russian scientist Vasily Dokuchaev. Dokuchaev developed
his theory of soil “as an independent natural-historical body” through intensive surveys
of agricultural lands for cadastral surveys combined with detailed field and laboratory
analysis of soils intended to increase production and prevent erosion. As planning,
research, and educational tools, maps were at the center of Dokuchaev’s practice. Indeed,
in this reading, the origin of international soil science can be traced to the production and
reception of maps at what historian Catherine Evtuhov calls the “confluence of practical
and scientific interests.”665
European’s were inspired by a small scale soil map of Russia that Dokuchaev’s
students presented at the Paris World Exhibition of 1900 and were soon producing their
own maps based on the Russian idea of soil zones. When the ISSS was established at the
Fourth International Agrogeology Conference in Rome in 1924, the pedologists created a
Sub-commission for a Soil Map of Europe. This group produced two continental maps
based largely on Russian ideas before the Second World War.666 Although Americans
failed to respond to a display of Dokuchaev’s soil maps and monoliths at the World
Columbian Exposition at Chicago in 1893-4, U.S. soil scientists pointed to the translation
of a seminal text by K. D. Glinka (one of Dokuchaev’s students) twenty years later as a
pivotal course correction in their science’s early development. The U.S. system of Land
Grant Colleges and the Department of Agriculture’s experiment stations, Soil Survey
Bureau, and Soil Conservation Service (the latter two agencies were combined in 1952)
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helped assure that American soil science gained international preeminence. But unlike in
genetics, the caprices of Soviet ideology shared an affinity with the multi-causal
environmentalist theory of soil genesis; thus, when introducing a legend for a new world
soil map, Kovda could write in good faith that “only classifications based on the
principles of the materialistic dialectics are the most long living, the most fundamental
and promotes in the highest degree the scientific progress [sic].”667 The Soviet’s
embraced the pre-revolutionary Russian origins of soil science. On a scientific exchange
to the Soviet Union in 1958, American experts “received the impression that [the
traditional classification system had] become accepted as highly classical and almost
beyond criticism.”668 Nevertheless, Russian soil scientists remained powerful intellectual
actors in the international community, and both superpowers’ knew they had something
to gain through intellectual exchange. An internationally credible Soil Map of the World
would have to engage Russian experts.
And, given the political realities of cartography in the UN (where even thematic
maps that did not record political borders carried a disclaimer disavowing “any opinion
whatsoever…concerning the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries”), if the Russian’s
did not participate, FAO could only produce a Soil Map of the World minus most of Asia
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and a third of Europe.669 Instead of warning against Unesco’s invasion of FAO’s territory
in his project proposal, Bramao pointed out that in a joint project, “Unesco would co-opt
the USSR’s participation, and through the USSR, information would be made available
from Mainland China and other non Member Countries.”670
But this accounting of how international and bureaucratic politics intersected with
disciplinary history to determine the institutional basis of the Soil Map of the World
leaves out a critical element: personalities. Upon assuming his position at Unesco, Kovda
quickly reached out to FAO to assure its bureaucrats he had no desire to encroach on their
territory (although he certainly did). More importantly, he completely disarmed Bramao
with his awkward charm. “It was our third meeting in our life,” Kovda wrote Bramao
days after the first official discussion of the new project. “This last time…I particularly
admired your scientific background, your personal behaviour and your private interest in
science and ancient art. If the culmination of our official activities was our full agreement
in every aspect of scientific cooperation, so the culmination of our private friendship was
the wonderful dinner given to Madame Kovda and myself in an ancient Rome tavern.”671
Bramao was the son of a distinguished Portuguese family—the man FAO chose to send
to Franco’s Spain for the 25th anniversary celebrations of the nation’s Research
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Council—so this was a friendship that truly transcended political divides.672 Before the
project even began, evidence of its success was archived.
The Intellectual Conditions of Possibility for the Soil Map of the World
Ideas about soil and the material peculiarities of soil were as significant factors in
the genesis of the Soil Map of the World as were international politics and bureaucratic
rivalries, professional prestige and disciplinary traditions. The material characteristics
that make soil such a vivid symbol of local identity—its boundless variability—made it
particularly resistant to the standardization necessary to achieve the view from above.
Soils are not discrete entities; they form a three dimensional continuum across the earth’s
surface with more and less obvious boundaries between types. Moreover, the important
differentiae for a large scale map of a single farm could not be shown on a county soil
map at a smaller scale, let alone a sheet of the Soil Map of the World. Different scales,
therefore, required mapping units of differing levels of specificity. Ideally, these different
levels would be categories of a hierarchal system, so that the specific soils depicted on
the detailed map of a farm would be included in the more general categories of soils
covering that location on the maps of the county and world. Yet it was far from obvious
which characteristics were appropriate differentiae for higher or lower categories—a soil
at the lowest (most specific) category routinely contained properties separated between
classes at a higher (more general) category. The elite soil scientists who fashioned
classification systems and created small scale maps thus grappled with the fundamental
672
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intellectual problem of the view from above (and of globalization more generally):
reconciling the global and local scales. In this section, I sketch the theory of soil
classification and cartography, beginning with the difficult question, what exactly is a
soil?
For all the diversity of terminology and competing systems of classification, there
was at least broad agreement on Dokuchaev’s concept of soil as an independent natural
body—the solum, in pedological terminology.673 According to the U.S. Soil Survey
Staff’s 1951 Soil Survey Manual, the international standard reference for postwar soil
surveyors, “Soil is the collection of natural bodies occupying portions of the earth’s
surface that support plants and that have properties due to the integrated effect of climate
and living matter, acting upon parent material, as conditioned by relief, over periods of
time.”674 There were pronounced disagreements over the relative weight to assign to each
of Dokuchaev’s five soil genetic factors (climate, parent material, flora and fauna, relief,
time) usually associated with national geographies; for example, Russians, with
experience of soils across their vast steppe, emphasized the effects of broad climatic
zones, while scientists from the United Kingdom and the smaller continental countries
were more likely to focus on parent material (i.e. surface geology). But the general theory
of soil genesis was well established.
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The Soil Survey Manual described the Russian revelation of soil as an
independent body as “a revolutionary concept, as important to soil science as anatomy to
medicine.” It “made a soil science possible” by enabling the direct, synthetic study of soil
“morphology,” rather than merely approaching soil through the lens of geology or
chemistry or the climate.675 Morphology was meant quite literally. “Mature soil” was not
a mere layer of unconsolidated rock and decaying plants, but an organized body that
could be dissected to understand the relations of parts to the whole.
In the field, soil scientists dug pits or sunk augers to study soil profiles, vertical
cross-sections of the solum. Profiles were made up of soil horizons, horizontal layers of
soil produced through the interactions of soil-forming factors. Building on Dokuchaev’s
famous studies of Chernozem, soil scientists had defined a normal pattern of “master
horizons,” labeled A, B, and C horizons. The A horizon was the upper-most mineral
horizon (an organic layer often covered it), containing more organic matter and/or lighter
in color than the underlying B horizon. The A horizon was “eluvial,” in that minerals
migrated out of it into the “illuvial” B horizon, which thus accumulated clay, iron, and
other materials. The C horizon was essentially unconsolidated rock that had not been
transformed by the genetic factors. Profile descriptions did not strictly follow this ABC
pattern (one or more master horizons were often missing, a single horizon could reveal
properties of two master horizons, etc.) and national surveys added their own master
horizons over the years. Furthermore, each unique soil bore witness to the nearly infinite
permutations of soil-forming processes. In descriptions of profiles, surveyors subdivided
master horizons into multiple layers by adding an Arabic numeral (e.g. A1, A2), and added
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lowercase letter suffixes to indicate common features (e.g. Bt signified a B horizon with
clay accumulation). In the reports that accompanied soil maps, a detailed account of a soil
profile included qualitative description, texture assessments, standardized color names
and values according to the Munsell color chart, and various quantitative measurements
of properties such as Ph and cation exchange. Like any dissection, each soil profile
description revealed a familiar pattern and a unique body.
Even with this flexibility, however, one of the great challenges of postwar soil
science was adapting a concept of soil derived from studies of recently glaciated
landscapes in the temperate, humid North to other areas. An important master horizon in
one region could seem like a trivial sport of nature somewhere else. Even before the war,
arid soils had shown that the “normal” top horizon need not be illuvial, since
precipitation did not leach minerals and water might even rise through capillary action
and evaporation. The implicit norm of the ABC soil profile was especially problematic
for deciphering the ancient soil landscapes of Sub-Saharan Africa and Australia, which,
unlike the relatively young post-Ice Age soils of North America and Eurasia, had evolved
through multiple bio-climatic eras unlike the present.676 For postwar pedologists,
however, the most urgent practical questions revolved around the exotic soils of the
humid tropics, many of which appeared not to conform to temperate expectations. A
Canadian participant in the Fifth International Congress of Soil Science in the Belgian
Congo, the first outside of Europe, expressed a common anxiety: “Not being familiar
with tropical soils, the featureless nature of their profiles and the lack of distinct
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pedogenetic horizons was rather disappointing to me…This makes one wonder how
much stress should be placed in these soils on some of the commonly accepted
morphological characteristics.”677 The internationalization of soil science thus called into
question basic assumptions regarding how the identity of soils could be known.
But making sense of the vertical dimension of a soil was the easy part;
determining the boundaries of a soil laterally was where things really got dirty. A
scientific classification, experts argued, required pedologists to isolate the “soil
individual” from the seamless continuum of soils. This problem became particularly
acute in the United States, which from early on focused on large scale detailed mapping,
rather than the broad soil zones favored by Russians. Pragmatically, the boundaries
tended to depend on differences that mattered for agriculture.678 Surveyors in the field
could often use relatively obvious geographic signs of change in the complex of genetic
factors (e.g. changes in vegetation, slope, or aspect) to locate the boundaries, but
sometimes important boundaries were invisible on aerial photographs. In any case, this
solution did not resolve the intellectual problem, especially since soils on either side of a
boundary were likely more similar to each other than to soils at the center of a map unit.
At mid-century, the theory that justified the practice was essentially to treat soils
as populations of individuals little different from organisms—except that in the
continuum of soil populations, it was as if every living organism that had ever lived were
extant. Each individual in a soil population represented a range of variation from a modal
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soil profile; at some point differences reached a degree where a soil was identified with
another closely related modal profile.679 But soil scientists found this reliance on two
dimensional profiles unsatisfying; it did not include the range of variation (which often
followed discernable, even cyclic patterns across space) within the definition of the soil.
The U.S. Soil Survey Staff devised a practical solution to the problem of consistently
drawing essentially arbitrary distinctions. They defined the smallest unit necessary to
sample the full variation of the soil “a soil.” This unit, named the pedon, was a hexagonal
cylinder ranging from one to ten square meters across. A soil individual was a population
of pedons (termed a polypedon) bounded on all sides by not soil (e.g. rock, water) or a
different soil.680
The concept of the pedon emerged out of the Soil Survey Staff’s effort to devise a
completely new, comprehensive, rigorously logical classification system. Beginning in
1951, Guy D. Smith, Director of Soil Survey Investigations, headed this highly
collaborative endeavor. The new system went through a series of “approximations.” The
first two approximations were circulated to a select few experts in the United States, but
then each successive version was circulated to an ever wider community of soil scientists
for critique and field testing, including foreign scientists. The classification system was
explicitly intended to be a global system. Indeed, when the seminal Soil Classification: A
Comprehensive System, 7th Approximation was published, the first three of four
679
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exemplary soils used to illustrate the concept of the pedon were from Belgium, Australia,
and Canada.681 And Smith first presented the Seventh Approximation at the 1960
International Congress of Soil Science in Madison. Thus, although U.S. scientists did not
present a continental map, they presented an even more ambitious framework for
controlling global soil knowledge. The Advisory Panel of the Soil Map of the World coopted Smith to represent the United States.
The ultimate goal of the system was to create a natural taxonomy of soils. But
unlike actual living organisms, soils were not the product of biological evolution—
similar soils may or may not have been formed under similar environmental conditions,
but they were not literally related. There was not even the illusion that a real evolutionary
family tree could be discovered, and so a “natural” taxonomy had a special meaning.
“Classifications are contrivances made by men to suit their purposes,” began the 7th
Approximation’s theoretical chapter on classification. “They are not themselves truths
that can be discovered…the best classification is that which best serves the purpose…for
which it is to be used.”682 The authority Smith cited for this claim was not a text of
Linnaeus or Ernst Mayr, but rather John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic. As with
delimiting the soil individual, the solution to the problem of ordering the boundless
diversity of soils lay in imposing human logic on nature, not in discovering nature’s
logic. Noting the 7th Approximation’s citation of P. W. Bridgman’s The Logic of Physics,
the philosopher Bennison Gray commented, “Ironically, soil science seems to have had
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less effect on the philosophy of science than the philosophy of science has had on soil
science.”683
In these circumstances, a natural taxonomy meant not a technical one. A technical
classification system was one created for a specific application, such as farm planning or
highway construction. In contrast, the goal of a natural taxonomy was to further science:
“the purpose of a classification is to arrange the ideas of the objects in such order that
ideas accompany or succeed one another in a way that gives us the greatest possible
command of our knowledge and leads most directly to the acquisition of more.”684 The
natural system, therefore, took into account all the significant traits of a soil, not just the
ones relevant for corn growth or canal building. Since it (ideally) encompassed all of the
properties that affected soil behavior, any applied classification—even ones as yet
unanticipated—could be derived from the natural taxonomy. Therefore, as the eminent
head of the Soil Survey Staff, Charles Kellogg, passionately argued for years, this
instrument of “basic science,” purposefully designed without a specific application in
mind, turned out to be the most practical and economic system of all.685

Bennison Gray, “Popper and the 7th Approximation: The Problem of Taxonomy,” Dialectica 34: 2
(1980), 129-154, 149. Another influence on Smith was Arthur J. Cain, Animal Species and their Evolution
(London: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1954).
684
Soil Survey Staff, 7th Approximation, 6.
685
Kellogg’s defense of the superior practicality of basic science soil maps compared to technical maps
designed for a specific developed in the context of bureaucratic battles between his Soil Survey Bureau and
H. H. Bennett’s breakaway, much larger Soil Conservation Service in the late 1930s through the 1940s.
The Soil Conservation Service specialized in Land Capability Classification maps aimed at promoting
practices that limited soil erosion. Since these maps did not require the detailed profile descriptions and
laborious traverses of the Soil Surveys detailed soil maps they were much cheaper to produce and easier for
farmers to understand, but the shortcut also meant their usefulness was limited and, Kellogg argued, their
simplicity ignored important interactions between properties of the soil that could make their categories
unreliable. When Bennett retired, Congress combined the two agencies and put Kellogg in charge.
Ironically then, as Douglas Helm’s shows, Kellogg’s vision of soil surveying benefited from his
adversary’s success in building the Soil Conservation Service into a large agency with a strong popular
reputation. Douglas Helms, “Land Capability Classification: The U.S. Experience,” in Dan H. Yaalon and
683

375
Of the many radical innovations of the 7th Approximation, probably the most
radical was the claim to rigorous empiricism: unlike previous systems, it was based only
on morphology, not on genetic processes. Following Dokuchaev, previous U.S. systems
had grouped soils by climatic zone in the higher (i.e. more general) categories. The
highest category, the Order, consisted of three classes: Zonal soils, which expressed the
characteristics normally associated with the climate in which they predominated;
Intrazonal soils, which had developed soil profiles, but possessed properties that reflected
localized conditions independent of the general climate; and Azonal soils, which did not
have genetic horizons (e.g. Alluvial soils). But even the best soil scientists often were
unsure or disagreed on the genetic process that produced particular horizons.686 The
definitions of soils in the 7th Approximation, therefore, sought to include only properties
present in the soil, preferably properties that could be quantified. The objective was to
construct
a system of classification that can be applied uniformly by competent soil scientists
working independently but having diverse kinds of education and
experience…Uniformity can be obtained only if the application is objective and not
subjective, objective in the sense that the classification proceeds from the properties
of the soil itself and not from the beliefs of the classifier about soils in general.687
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Ideally, definitions would be written in operational terms; that is, texture was not
described as the size of a particle but the rate of settling when the surveyor followed a
standard operating procedure. And to eliminate the confusion caused by recycled soil
names, the authors invented an entirely novel, exquisitely logical nomenclature using
Greek and Latin bases.
The system received a mixed reception. Its rigor, precision, logic, and erudition
were undeniably impressive. But when applied to the boundless variability of soils in the
field, the logical precision of the 7th Approximation could be difficult to work with, like
spreading peanut butter with a scalpel. Roy Simonson, Director of the Soil Conservation
Service’s Correlation and Classification Division, reported that most soil surveyors in the
United States continued to use one of the more familiar old systems for several years and
recalled “vividly how [his] friends from other countries recoiled at their first encounters
with the nomenclature of the system.”688 Furthermore, identifying soils often required
complex procedures (such as determining soil temperature and moisture in situ) or
complicated laboratory work that could not be done in the field—or at all in some
countries.
But the most vigorous and substantial disagreements were over the wisdom of
jettisoning the traditional genetic basis of classification. The argument for the objective
criteria of morphological properties was compelling, but pedologists worried that the
resulting system grouped soils on trivial grounds that produced meaningless associations.
Asked to review the system for his country, the lead author of the Soil Map of Australia
wrote that “it noticeably brings together superficially similar soils from widely different
688
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climatic regions or with different chronologies, and violently separates slightly unlike
soils from similar regions. Consequently it does great violence to the widely accepted
degree of soil-climate relationship.”689 At FAO, A. J. Smyth, an ex-British colonial
expert, wrote Guy Smith regarding the identification of agriculturally important soils of
the Western Nigerian cocoa growing region; all the soils in this 9,000 square mile area
seemed to belong in the same Subgroup (the fourth category down), “providing they can
be placed within a single Order” (the highest category). He nervously proposed an
entirely new Order.690
The new classification of Russian soils that scientists from the Dokuchaev
Institute had presented at Madison was the antithesis of the morphological approach.691
The higher categories of the new system were displayed in tables of soil zones (e.g. Table
1: “Polar-boreal group of soil formation”). Along the left-hand column were geographic
subzones, further subdivided in the next column into parent material/vegetation. Along
the top row were water regimes (e.g. “boggy water regime”). The boxes in the middle
contained the soil types produced by the interactions of these factors, including boxes
with question marks—presumably for soils predicted but not yet discovered. In fact, the
Russian system stuck closely to traditional classification systems by concentrating on the
classification of “virgin soils”; that is, even soils that had been under cultivation for
689
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centuries were classified according to natural soil-forming factors. In other words, the
soil map was equivalent to a natural vegetation map that showed the plant associations
that would exist in the absence of civilization. In contrast, the new American approach
explicitly attempted to define criteria applicable to cultivated soils. The Russian emphasis
on virgin soils and determinative soil-forming processes was the key to a classification
system that could produce a soil map of a continent its author had never visited.692
Yet defenders of the 7th Approximation argued that it did reveal meaningful
relationships between genetically associated soils, just at one remove. The properties they
chose as differentiae were those thought to be significant indicators of a soil’s genesis
and predictors of its behavior. The higher the category, the fewer but more significant the
associated soil forming factors. To explain how the properties were chosen, Smith used
the example of the traditional distinction between Pedalfers and Pedocals. These were the
soils of the moist Eastern and dry Western United States respectively, which previously
had been separated at the highest category. Collaborators on the 7th Approximation
wanted to preserve this important distinction, but struggled to find diagnostic properties
that did not result in apparently arbitrary groupings. They contemplated annual soil
moisture (virtually impossible to measure), a weak horizon of salt accumulation or
calcium content (both inconsistent), and more before settling on “base saturation, on
conductivity of the saturation extract, and on changes with depth in the saturation with
sodium and potassium.”693 The point was that the authors knew the “natural” classes
before they constructed the definition. To assure collective empiricism, they sought to
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discipline surveyors in the field with a rigid procedural objectivity; yet the objectivity of
the taxonomy itself depended on the judgment of experienced experts.
In fact, the classes of the taxonomy were based on collective experience. Smith
described the process of constructing the system:
Members of a group representing unlike interests and experience see soils from a
number of viewpoints. Different viewpoints toward soil produce different ideas
about its classification. Consequently, compromises between the conflicting desires
of a number of individuals are not only necessary but might actually produce a
system with more general utility than a system which represents a single viewpoint.
‘Compromise’ may not be the exact word. The truth has many facets; each person
has a somewhat different view of the truth, and no human can see the whole truth
clearly. Our goal has been a blending of many views to arrive at an approximation
of a classification that seems as reasonable as we can hope to reach with our
present knowledge.694
The epistemological logic and values of the view from everywhere, not the view from
above, guided the production process of the 7th Approximation.
But, of course, in another sense, all the individuals Smith consulted were
members of the same group—soil scientists. How far the incorporation of diverse
perspectives should be extended was not specified. Would Smith have agreed with the
report of FAO’s observer at the 1950 International Soils Congress, Ignatieff, who wrote
that even though only scientists from Egypt, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia
attended the meeting, “Africa was quite well represented because…there were also those
who are working on that continent in the possessions and dependencies of European
countries”?695 Here diversity of perspectives was closely tied to the identity of diverse
soils, rather than the identity of observers with diverse interests. Certainly the 7th
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Approximation’s concept of objectivity supported this stance. A stark contrast between
Smith’s and Ignatieff’s statements would not do justice to the complexity of the issue, or
to either expert’s epistemic values. The view from above and the view from everywhere
co-existed in dynamic tension.
Of course, classification systems were not intended to be philosophical exercises
or sociological experiments; they were intensely practical endeavors. Beyond aiding
memory and organizing information, the practical purpose of soil classification was to
make soil maps. Section V of the ISSS was devoted to soil genesis, classification, and
cartography because the three topics were inseparable. The scale of soil maps depended
on the purpose of the map. Detailed soil maps were made at a scale ranging from as large
as 1:1,000 or more for some engineering works or irrigation projects and down to
1:25,000 for farm planning, land assessment, and tax appraisal. Semi-detailed surveys at
a scale of 1:50,000 to 1:100,000 were useful for large scale development planning, preinvestment surveys, and county or district maps. Reconnaissance surveys at a scale of
1:250,000 to 1:1 million were useful in national development planning and in scouting
areas for new settlements. Finally, there were the rare schematic maps at a scale of 1:1
million or smaller such as the Soil Map of the World.696
The larger the scale of the map, the lower the classification category it mapped.
For example, detailed maps used the lowest, most specific category; in the six-tiered
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system of the 7th Approximation, this was the Soil Series.697 An individual Soil Series
was named for the place it was first described. It was considered “real” in a sense similar
to the way a species is considered real in biology; a soil individual would be called by its
Series name. Semi-detailed maps showed the next category up, the Family, or, more
commonly, soil associations, which were complexes of Soil Series. In fact, the category
of Families had not been developed when the 7th Approximation was published, so a gap
separated the relatively concrete entities in Soil Series from the higher categories.
Reconnaissance surveys and schematic maps used the Great Group category, which was
the third from the top, or three levels of generalization above the Soil Series, and
included 105 taxa. The assumption that the Great Group could be used for small scale
cartography provides graphic evidence of how deeply the concept of soil zones was
embedded in the new taxonomy. In fact, since the primary purpose of classification was
to make maps, the whole scheme would have been profoundly compromised if the higher
categories did not correlate with broad geographical patterns of soil distribution.
In constructing the 7th Approximation as a tool for soil surveying, the authors
emphasized properties presumed significant in soil genesis at the higher categories,
including the Great Group, and properties significant for soil behavior, especially
behavior under cultivation, in the bottom two categories. A skilled soil scientist,
therefore, could interpret the history of a region’s soil from a small scale map showing
the distribution of Great Groups. And, since the Soil Series included all the properties
defined at the higher categories plus those most pertinent to behavior, a detailed map
697
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revealed both a soil’s past and possible futures. The gap between the Soil Series and the
Great Group, however, raised serious questions about the practical utility of small scale
maps.
Before turning to the making of the Soil Map of the World, it is worth pausing to
reflect on the very different set of practices that went in to making large scale maps. Even
those scientists most enthusiastic about small scale mapping understood that detailed
maps were their bread and butter. The Dutch scientist C. H. Edelman (who was the
primary force behind the reconstitution of the ISSS in the Netherlands after the war) told
the FAO European Commission on Agriculture Working Group charged with preparing a
soil map of Europe at a scale of 1:2,500,000, “Although small-scale maps are important
from a scientific and cultural point of view and useful for purposes of general planning
programs, the greatest use of soil survey is the provision of detailed soil maps.” His point
was that European scientists could win government patronage by demonstrating the value
of detailed maps.698 By the time FAO and Unesco had published the Soil Map of
Europe’s final sheet, the entire continent had been covered in systematic soil surveys. In
the 1960s United States, the Soil Survey Staff surveyed 60 million acres a year. On any
given day, international development agencies had dozens of soil surveys in progress—
by the mid-1960s, FAO alone had 150 soil scientists working in 40 to 50 countries.699 Far
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more experts and resources were in invested in detailed soil surveys than schematic
mapping.
The practical work of detailed maps connected scientists to farmers and the land
in a way that small scale maps did not. To make a detailed survey, surveyors
systematically sampled soils and plotted their progress on aerial photographs. As
discussed in Chapter Three, in the United States, the New Deal democratic ethos of
agricultural extension emphasized (at least in theory) the collaboration between
agricultural experts and farmers in the interpretation of detailed maps in the field.
Performing the surveys was another opportunity for scientists to interact with locals who
could share valuable knowledge from experience working the land. On their traverses
across brooks and property lines, through fields and forests, surveyors acquired a sense of
the land and met the (occasionally armed) locals.700 As historians of colonial science have
shown, struggling to make sense of strange lands, experts often relied on local informants
and ended up constructing hybrid knowledge.701 Moreover leading soil scientists like
Charles Kellogg were public intellectuals who felt it was their responsibility to reach a
popular audience.702 As shown in Chapter Four’s analysis of integrated surveys, technical
assistance surveys also facilitated crossing boundaries between cosmopolitan and local
communities. Field surveys engaged elite international experts with local bureaucracies
700

For the most colorful account, see Macy H. Lapham, Crisscross Trails: Narrative of a Soil Surveyor
(Berkeley: Willis E. Berg, 1949).
701
Cf. D. Graham Burnett, Masters of All They Surveyed: Exploration, Geography, and a British El
Dorado (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Stuart McCook, States of Nature: Science,
Agriculture, and Environment in the Spanish Caribbean, 1760-1940 (Austin: University of Texas Press,
2002).
702
Cf. Charles Kellogg, The Soils that Support Us: An Introduction to the Study of Soils and Their Use by
Men (New York: Macmillan Co., 1941); Charles Kellogg, Food, Soil, and People, Unesco Food and People
Series no. 6 (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1950). Works in this genre, although universally more
alarmist than Kellogg, are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.

384
and in training aspiring experts from developing countries. Ideally, the process and
product of large scale mapping facilitated communication between expert and lay
communities.
The Soil Map of the World was a very different sort of project; its purpose was to
serve as a tool of communication between elite communities. As Bramao had written in a
remarkably prescient 1954 memo essentially outlining the scheme followed by the Soil
Map of the World, the project required “the creation of…small working groups, one per
continent, to work on problems of nomenclature, classification and survey concerning
their respective continents. These groups will serve the purpose best…if they are formed
of the smallest possible number of members…from the most highly qualified scientists in
the field.”703 This was, by design, an aggressively elitist endeavor. But perhaps by
necessity, too—it is easier to criticize elite cosmopolitan projects than to imagine an
alternative means of constructing global knowledge.
Making the Soil Map of the World
At any scale, the key practice on which all scientific soil mapping depended was
correlation. Accurate correlation assured that experimental or experiential knowledge
gained in one place could be extrapolated to other places with similar soils. Accurate
correlation between soils in different places and on different maps meant any expert who
knew the classification could interpret the map. If soils were poorly correlated—if soils
were misnamed so that the same soils had different names on different maps or different
soils had the same name—than the boundaries of the maps could be perfectly accurate,
703
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but the foundations of the whole cartographic system would be undermined. Only
experienced, proven soil scientists could rise through the ranks from field surveyors to
become soil correlators.704 The correlator’s job was to guarantee surveyors in the field
met the standards of collective empiricism. Instead of correlating soils within a
classification system, however, the objective of the Soil Map of the World was to
correlate the systems themselves. In practice, this involved the same negotiation and
compromise, the same “blending of many views to arrive at an approximation of a
classification” that Smith had described in the construction of the 7th Approximation. In a
sense, then, the project required the correlation of correlators.
Detailed surveys may have occupied more man hours and required greater
resources, but global surveys were one of the principal, and most consequential, activities
of the functional agencies.705 In the genre of small scale thematic mapping, the Soil Map
of the World project was unusual for its organizational complexity and intellectual
ambition, but its bureaucratic and intellectual practices were well established. The days
when Peveril Meigs working alone in his basement could compile an internationally
approved homoclimatic map of the world were over before they began. Instead, the
typical model was more like the joint FAO-Unesco bioclimatic and climax vegetation
maps of the Mediterranean Zone on a scale of 1:5 million.706 In 1958, FAO’s Forestry
Division and Unesco’s Arid Lands Major Project appointed experts to a Study Group to
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produce the maps. Unesco appointed two of its stalwart experts, the Egyptian Kassas and
the French phytosociologist Emberger, whose previous work was the standard reference
on Mediterranean ecological zones. FAO appointed Emberger’s principal rival in this
field, the botanist Gaussen of Toulouse. For Batisse, the primary interest of the Study
Group was the “confrontation between these two schools.” After decades of public
clashes, the two experts discovered that a combination of their methods improved them
both during the second meeting of the Study Group. These maps proved quite influential
in their own right and provided a foundation for an important vegetation map of
Africa.707 But for Batisse, the episode demonstrated international agencies’ ability to
facilitate a “rapprochement between the points of view of different countries.” The small
scale of the map, Batisse admitted, had contributed to the experts’ ability to find common
ground.708 This dialectical process, in which the clash of opposing viewpoints produced a
superior synthesis, represented the ideal of small scale thematic mapping in the
international community.
The Soil Map of the World project’s first acts were the appointment an Advisory
Panel and the establishment the World Soil Resources Office in FAO as the project’s
Secretariat. The Advisory Panel met for the first time in June 1961 at FAO headquarters,
and four subsequent meetings took place in Rome (twice), Paris and, finally Moscow in
1966. The first Advisory Panel included experts from France, Brazil, Belgium, the Soviet
Union, India, the United States, Australia, Belgium, New Zealand, and the Netherlands.
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Over the next five years, attendance varied considerably, but by the final meeting, experts
from Ecuador, Kenya, Ghana, Argentina, Romania, Canada, Japan, and Senegal had
attended meetings of the Advisory Panel.709 Yet this list is somewhat misleading. For
example, at the third meeting of the Advisory Panel in 1964—a small meeting in Paris to
deal with budgetary issues limited to four experts from France, Belgium and the
Netherlands and representatives of FAO and Unesco—Aubert of France recommended
that D’Hoore, a Belgian, remain the representative for Africa until the final draft of his
map, begun under the CCTA (Technical Commission for Cooperation in Africa South of
the Sahara), was published. Bramao concurred, but pointed out the urgency of appointing
one or two actual Africans as alternates.710 It might be too cynical to suggest that the
experts from Third World countries were mere tokens; the era when colonial experts’
knowledge of the land empowered them to represent Africa at international meetings was
quickly drawing to a close. But the diversity of the participant list certainly did not reflect
the real influence of national experts and traditions in the project.
U.S. soil science provided a common point of reference for the international
collaboration. Even before the Soil Map of the World project, FAO had used Soil Survey
Staff handbooks and guidelines for its field workers. When FAO developed guidelines
for soil descriptions in the mid-1960s, its soils staff good naturedly “plagiarized” the
709
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protocols of the Soil Survey Manual since “[t]hese already enjoy the widest usage and to
depart from them unnecessarily would have defeated our primary purpose of achieving
greater uniformity.”711 Although reaction the 7th Approximation was often hostile, all the
experts were at least familiar with the system, and most national systems were heavily
influenced by its structure, nomenclature, and move towards an objective focus on
morphological properties. In any case, no other classification even attempted a
comprehensive system for the world’s soils. The second meeting of the Advisory Panel
agreed to use the 7th Approximation as a “correlating medium” between the classification
systems of different continents.712 It was symbolically fitting that the Soil Map of the
World was prepared on the American Geographical Society’s topographic base map.
In a less direct and material sense, the tradition of Russian soil science also
underlay the whole project, of course. As we have seen, Soviet scientists were largely
responsible for initiating the idea for a Soil Map of the World. Under the auspices of the
Soil Map of the World, the Soviet Union hosted correlation meetings in Moscow and
Uzbekistan and the final meeting of the Advisory Panel. But the Moscow meeting of the
Advisory Panel was the only one held outside one of the Secretariats because that was the
only way to assure Soviet participation. The Soviet representative to the first meeting of
the Panel, I. V. Tiurin had died before the second meeting and, despite Kovda’s
intervention, had not been replaced. When the Soviet’s did participate, they often seemed
to be working on a parallel project; for example, at the final meeting in Moscow, Soviet
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scientists (led by Kovda, now back at Moscow State University) presented their own
legend for a soil map of the world at a scale 1:5 million. Writing a colleague about
another ISSS related project, FAO’s A. J. Smyth expressed what must have been a
common anxiety: “Have you hear from Fridland…? I am rather concerned that Fridland,
with the assistance of the Docuchaev, will suddenly present us with an enormous volume
of iron-curtain references?”713
In fact, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States was a particularly active
participant in the project. The United States did not send an expert to two of the five
Advisory Panel meetings, and no American worked in the World Soil Resources Office.
The Soil Survey Staff, after all, had already published a soil survey handbook that was
the international standard and a comprehensive classification explicitly intended to be the
international standard. There was some hesitancy in the American soil science
community about the value of a world map when so many of the world’s soils had not
been surveyed, too.714 The Soviet’s, for their part, were busy trying to reconcile four
competing national systems. And neither country’s bureaucracy made participating in UN
projects easy. The United States and the Soviet Union were not hostile to the Soil Map of
the World, but absorbed in their own affairs, they left the leadership of the project to the
Europeans.

713

Smyth to Bennema, 21 Aug. 1970, Soil Survey Interpretation (Land Capability Classification), March
69 to May 73, LA-2/15, FAO.
714
For example, the Rockefeller Foundation initially expressed an interest in funding the project, but after
conferring with U.S. soil scientists suggested the time for a world map was not ripe. Moseman to FAO, 13
March 1962, World Soil Resources Office: Correspondence with Organizations Rockefeller Foundation,
Land and Water Development, 61-67, LA-10/7, FAO.

390
In particular, to the Dutch and Belgians. Since its founding in 1924, the ISSS had
had only two Secretary-General’s, both Dutch. F. A. van Baren was Secretary-General
from 1950 to 1974, when Rudy Dudal, a Belgian and the international correlator of the
Soil Map of the World, assumed the position (following Kovda’s nomination). Van Baren
was an active and effective Secretary-General, lobbying the Director-General, organizing
study groups, and recommending experts. Unesco even seconded his nephew to the
World Soil Resources Office, one of several Dutch associate experts to hold the
position.715 But the Netherlands connection went beyond this impresario and intimate
networks. In 1955, Bramao had toured European soil survey institutions to recruit for
FAO fellowships and TA assignments. Although British and French experts, like the
Americans, were occupied with assignments overseas or in national surveys, he found
“great interest on the part of Dutch soil scientists in obtaining ETAP [Expanded Program
for Technical Assistance] assignments.” If anything, the Belgians were more enthusiastic
about UN work, and Bramao recruited three experts on the spot. One of these was the
young Dudal.716 As already mentioned, the lead cartographer on the Soil Map of Africa, a
project first proposed at the 1954 ISSS congress in Leopoldville, was Belgian. Tavernier,
another Belgian, took the lead on the Soil Map of Europe. Furthermore, the Netherlands
government, in partnership with Unesco and following a resolution of the 8th
International Congress of Soil Science in 1964, established an International Soil Museum
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at the University of Utrecht intended to complement the Soil Map of the World project.717
These small nations, both with agricultural research and development experience in
enormous tropical colonies, found a comfortable niche in international soil science.
The reason for Dutch enthusiasm for UN work was obvious. In 1957, Ignatieff
reported on the difficulty of recruiting soils experts with knowledge of tropical and desert
environments—and the impossibility of attracting U.S. or Canadian experts on the UN’s
salary schedule—but pointed out optimistically “that some countries which in the past
had Colonial possessions, have, at the present time, a surplus of well-trained personnel—
some of these countries desire, in fact, ‘to export the brains’ (the Netherlands falls into
this category and the United Kingdom may soon be similarly placed).”718 British excolonial experts were already key members of FAO’s staff, but would indeed pour into
international agencies with African decolonization. As we have seen, the Belgians were
already brain exporters before abandoning the Congo. British and French ex-colonial
experts did play key roles in the production of the Soil Map of the World—the French
government, for example, seconded an expert to the World Soils Resources Office to
assemble the final draft of the map and write the explanatory text for Africa. But in this
project, the disproportionate influence of Dutch and Belgian experts, both suddenly left
with so much less soil to study, was unmistakable. This reflected the traditionally
outsized role of small European nations in international organizations and the fact that, in
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the 1960s, UN development programs functioned, in part, as jobs programs for former
colonial powers.
The World Soil Resources Office in Rome did resemble an imperial “center of
calculation” of sorts. Making an inventory of the world’s soil resources meant creating a
databank of the world’s soil knowledge. By the time the sheets were printed, the
collection had grown to over 10,000 maps, 600 of which were the primary sources for the
Soil Map of the World.719 This included all the soil maps officers could get their hands
on; not just continental and country maps, but, for example, maps from large scale
development projects and detailed surveys from FAO’s experts in the field. The different
projections of the small scale maps had to be corrected for and most of the maps had to
be reduced to the 1:5 million scale. Many of the surveys had to be translated and some
effort made to account for the different methodologies for analyzing and describing soils.
The legends had to be correlated with the new international legend, which itself was
continuously evolving over the course of the project’s first decade. The variable
reliability of the sources had to be constantly born in mind, too. Digesting this abundance
of heterogeneous sources required a strong constitution.720
A more obvious problem was an utter lack of soil data. No soil surveys had been
conducted over most of the planet. For these areas, soils had to be inferred. Travelers’
accounts, natural histories, agricultural data, and other written sources were useful, but
the key to the methodology were other types of small scale thematic maps: climatic and
719
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bioclimatic, vegetation and ecological, topographic, geologic, and lithologic maps, and
land use maps. These maps were easier to produce without actually performing traverses
than soil maps. By superimposing as many thematic maps as possible and comparing the
result to similar environments with known soils, scientists could make an educated guess
about the classification of soils they had never touched. Moreover, since these thematic
maps depicted the key soil-forming factors, brave souls could interpret them in the light
of theories of soil genesis to deduce the morphology of soils. In genetic classification
systems, in fact, these maps represented the criteria of classification, especially at the
higher categorical levels used for small scale maps; for example, the Dokuchaev
Institute’s 1960 Soil Map of the USSR defined the “arctic half boggy soils type” in terms
of the information represented on climate, physiography, and vegetation maps. Then, too,
in an interdependent ecosystem, theoretically almost any meaningful variable could be
deduced from the others—natural vegetation maps, after all, relied largely on soil,
climatic, and topographic maps to determine which tree ought to be the dominant species.
To their credit, participants in the Soil Map of the World project did not try to
hide the perilous empirical foundations of their work. Indeed, when the utility of a map at
a scale of 1:5 million was questioned, advocates argued that the scale was the largest
possible given the current state of knowledge on global soils. These were designated
schematic maps for a reason. Not only did each volume describe the main sources from
which the map was compiled, but the World Soil Resources Office printed a reliability
cartogram on each map.721 This was a small inset map that showed three levels of source
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reliability by area: systematic soil surveys, soil reconnaissance, and general information
with local observations.722 These reliability cartograms, which occupied the equivalent of
roughly 4,900 square kilometers of a sheet’s surface, make for an interesting sort of
historical speed reading. As mentioned above, Europe had been entirely covered by
systematic surveys (excluding a swath of far Northwestern Russia). 55 percent of the
African map, on the other hand, was based on general information and just seven percent
on systematic surveys, much of this along the Niger River. The Gezira Development
Scheme in the Sudan was clearly visible as a dense cross-hatch in an expanse of diagonal
lines. In South America, no place names were necessary to identify the state of Sao
Paulo. The entire eastern two-thirds of the United States had been intensively surveyed,
along with the Central Valley of California and western Washington, but other than
systematic surveys of the grain belt in Alberta and Saskatchewan, little of Canada had
been surveyed at all. Intriguingly, the entire Malayan Peninsula had been systematically
surveyed. And so on. In general, the reliability cartograms confirm expectations. There
main interest lies in the fact that they were a technology designed to distance the user
from the map, to remind the user of the gap between the sign of the soil and the soil.
They called attention to the physical and intellectual work required to make the map.
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The reliability cartogram was designed to manage problems inherent in very small
scale schematic mapping, but anxiety about users mistaking symbols for soil also inspired
debate over the best practices for representing the most detailed representations of an
individual soil, profile descriptions. To be meaningful, a standard international
classification system required uniform horizon definitions and standardized notations,
called horizon designations. In 1967, following a recommendation of the Advisory Panel
for the Soil Map of the World, the ISSS convened a working group at FAO headquarters
to devise a uniform system. It recommended including H, O, E, and R master horizon
designations, along with the traditional ABC designations.723 The Working Group on Soil
Horizon Designations published its proposal in the ISSS Bulletin and national soil science
journals for comment. The letters flooded in. A vocal minority of scientists rejected the
whole project. The venerable S. A. Wilde of the University of Wisconsin not only railed
against the “procrustean” effect of replacing written descriptions with standardized
symbols, but objected to any deliberate scientific planning: “In recent years, many of us
have suffered a great deal because of efforts of some well meaning groups to impose their
credos on other people…[I]t is not the meeting of a scientific society, but the collective of
professionals that gives the valid approval to an introduced innovation; such is either
perpetuated in print and practice, or carried away on the waves of Lethe.”724 This critique
actually called into question Unesco’s function in the international scientific community,
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since the heart of the organization’s program was dedicated to scientific planning and
international standard setting.725
Few went so far as denying the value of a formal classification altogether, but
many shared Wilde’s anxiety that horizon designations encouraged procrustean
classifications. Members of the Working Group shared this concern, including Simonson,
the top correlator in the U.S. Soil Conservation Service. His most significant critique of
the proposal focused on the proliferation of suffix symbols, the lowercase letters that
indicated additional diagnostic features of a master horizon (e.g. “m: strong cementation
or induration”). “It was easier to look at horizon designations than to read horizon
descriptions,” Simonson explained, “but the latter carry the actual information being
provided. Any horizon designation is an interpretation made by somebody…If the
interpretations are carried as far as they can be with the proposed suffixes, a number of
people will accept the interpretations as fact and not bother to check the descriptions.”726
The integrity of the system depended on not mistaking standardized categories for the
identity of unique soils. Dudal recognized the problem with suffixes, but resolved it by
emphasizing the necessity to “keep apart the description of a profile—which in most
cases has to be done by a local surveyor—from the taxonomic exercise based on the
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recognition and analysis of diagnostic characteristics.” 727 These are subtle, even
confusing distinctions, but the point was that the gap between the description of a soil and
its classification should be left exposed, not papered over.728
Simonson was committed to constructing a uniform international system,
however. Unlike Wilde, his solution to the procrustean dilemma was to more minutely
control field workers. Simonson warned that the twenty proposed suffixes “will give field
men more degrees of freedom in the choice of suffix letters than can be effectively
used”—in his experience, surveyors would find a way to use every symbol regardless of
the soils they encountered. Instead of facilitating collective empiricism by standardizing
the reporting categories of observers in the field, the symbols would produce the
dangerous illusion of uniformity. The leading British soil surveyor B. W. Avery agreed,
even suggesting that the definitions of horizons should forgo the interpretive temptation
of suffix designations altogether and instead “be written in operational terms, using
specific soil properties that can be identified with reasonable precision, as in the new
USDA classification.”729 To produce an objective view from above, scientists had to
submit to the discipline of the system. At the heart of this discipline was a rigorous
segregation of observation from interpretation.
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For correlating the classes of a classification, however, no degree of definitional
precision could replace observations in the field. Even the 7th Approximation admitted
that “the play of judgment furnishes a common denominator” for deciding how to
classify a particular soil.730 The work of correlation could not be performed over drafting
tables in an office in Rome. One of the axioms of soil science was that a complete
description of a soil required observation in situ, and so reliable correlation required field
work. For an experienced correlator, any trip to an unfamiliar area could turn into an
opportunity to correlate. Bad weather once caused Bramao’s and D’Hoore’s flight to San
Jose to reroute to Panama, where they were marooned for two days. It was a productive
detour—they teamed up with Point IV and Panamanian soil scientists for a field trip to
observe Reddish Brown Latritics, Red Latosols, Low Humic Gleys and other interesting
specimens. Since experts with experience on four continents were present, “a certain
amount of soil correlation…was accomplished.”731 Correlation was a field science, but an
intensely social one. Although opportunistic, this story evoked the essence of
intercontinental soil correlation: a few elite scientists, with knowledge of similar
environments in different places, standing beside a road cut or over a soil pit debating the
identity of a soil and the merits of their classifications. For participants in the Soil Map of
the World project, correlation meetings were the most exciting and rewarding part of the
experience.
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The World Soil Resources Office coordinated around twenty soil correlation
meetings.732 In theory, a series of continental meetings preceded intercontinental
meetings, but in practice, intercontinental correlation tended to occur through overseas
interlopers at continental meetings, international congresses or the mail. Experts
associated with the project also conducted a great deal of correlation through exchanges,
tours of areas with troublesome soils, and side-trips while on assignment. The formal
correlation meetings featured two distinct sets of practices: technical discussions around a
conference table and study tours.
In the discussions, representatives briefly reviewed their nation’s survey histories,
any small scale national maps and classification systems. Then the serious work began;
analysis of tricky soils, unique environments, and conceptual incompatibilities between
systems. The key document at these sessions was a correlation table, prepared by the
World Soil Resources Office. A correlation table listed the national classification systems
under discussion along the top row. Under these headings, it listed the hypothesized
classifications of particular soils in each system. For example, the correlation table for the
second European soil correlation seminar, held in Bucharest in 1963, proposed a
classification for soils according to the systems of Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, the
7th Approximation, the Dokuchaev Institute, and the FAO-ECA Soil Map of Western
Europe.733 The third draft of the intercontinental correlation table compared the units
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from the legend of the Soil Map of the World, the CCTA’s map of Africa, the Dokuchaev
Institute’s maps of Europe and Asia, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organization’s Australian map, and the 7th Approximation.734 The experts
debated the accuracy of the correlation table and negotiated resolutions to apparent
incompatibilities, which Dudal took into account in the next iteration of the correlation
table. The legacy of the international conversation remains visible in the mix of
traditional soil names held dear in some traditions, like Chernozems and Podzols, and
newer invented names like Xerosols from the 7th Approximation.
Some boxes in correlation tables were blank. Either no corresponding soil existed
in a region (e.g. Romania had Light brown steppe soils but Hungary and Bulgaria didn’t)
or the soil existed but was classified according to different criteria. Although natural and
cultural factors were both clearly in play, the whole project was based on the gamble that
the cultural differences were more significant. Guy D. Smith’s conclusion at the first
European correlation seminar in Moscow was thus fundamentally optimistic, both for the
scientific and internationalist components of the project: “The problems of correlation
arose mainly from different approaches to classification rather than to the fact that the
soils were different.” The same laws of nature applied to soil genesis in the United States
and Soviet Union, and so “reconciliation of present differences would be facilitated by
visits of Russian colleagues to the North American continent.”735
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Differences had to be reconciled in the field. On study tours, which had been
traditional components of international soil science meetings since the first Agrogeology
Conference in Budapest in 1909, scientists examined prepared profiles of typical or
particularly interesting regional soils. The second correlation meeting for North America
visited 26 profiles between Winnipeg and Vancouver and a Romanian tour observed 21
soils in a week-long loop through the Eastern half of the country. An Indian study tour
investigated just twelve soils, but was notable for flying participants to see the three
major soil regions of the country, around Delhi, Nagpur, and Mysore.736 Seeing the soil in
its environment was essential to definitive correlation work, but the camaraderie of the
field trips was also vital to another of the Soil Map of the World’s principal objectives, to
“strengthen international contacts in the field of soil science.”
A Report of a Correlation Study Tour in Sweden and Poland provides revealing
evidence of the importance of field work. The tour’s mission was to resolve confusion
over some of Northern Europe’s most common soils: Podzolized Soils, Grey Brown
Podzolic Soils, Brown Forest Soils, Psuedogleys and Chernozems. The one-week, 7,140
kilometer tour began and ended in Rome. Although the two FAO scientists did not have
time to stop for field work on the drive to Sweden, they did make note through the
windshield of the need to add a stony phase and an inclusion of Lithosols to a map unit
North of Florence. In Sweden, profile investigations and conversations with experts
resulted in six new mapping units, but generally confirmed the quality of the map. The
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map of Poland, however, turned out to require serious revisions. For example, Polish
scientists’ Pseudopodzols had been translated to Podzolized Soils on the FAO-ECA Soil
Map of Europe, which led to a classification of Humic-Ferric Podzols on the Soil Map of
the World when really they belonged in the Albic Luvisols! The travelers identified three
other misclassifications at the high categorical level used on the map, as well as various
other boundary issues and miscellaneous corrections. This was Europe in 1968—the most
densely settled, thoroughly surveyed continent. European scientists—from both the East
and West—had been producing collaborative international maps for at least four decades
and had already held ten international classification and survey meetings under the
auspice of FAO’s Soil Map of Europe. As the two scientists concluded, “first hand
observations” were critical to understanding the true pattern of soils.737
This comment, a soil science cliché, could be interpreted to undermine the whole
project. But the Swedish-Polish correlation tour could also be taken as demonstrating the
value of the process; making the map had revealed international misunderstandings and
instigated a productive conversation across the East-West divide that reconciled
differences. Like a dissertation, this process could be extended indefinitely. Every soil
map of the world was a draft, every comprehensive classification an approximation. But
eventually the map had to be published.
At the 9th International Congress of Soil Science in Australia in 1968, Bramao and
Kovda (who was elected president of the society at the meeting), presented the first draft
of the Soil Map of the World, and the ISSS passed a resolution calling for its immediate
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publication. Unesco published the complete set of maps over a decade, beginning with
the sheets for North and Central America and the Legend in 1972 and ending with the
explanatory volume for Europe in 1981.738 There was some irony in this order, since the
Soil Map of Europe had been projected to be the first printed in order to serve as a model
for the other areas. Of course, North American experts only had to blend the viewpoints
of two national soil survey organizations (Mexico was relegated to the Central American
volume) instead of twenty-seven independent agencies. But it also turned out to be far
easier to produce schematic maps of Central America, Africa and South America, where
there were fewer data points, than to reduce the detailed view of Europe. More local
knowledge certainly made it increasingly difficult to capture the global view from above.
Like the faces of an unfamiliar race, most Tropical soils looked similar to an observer
from the North. But the absence of empirical data also justified the early publication of
volumes; the maps at least provided policy makers and researchers something to work
with.739
In the international soil science community, the map was hailed, and is still
remembered, as an intellectual achievement that demonstrated the power of international
scientific cooperation. In an article celebrating the 75th Anniversary of the ISSS, van
Baren described the Soil Map of the World as “one of the main contributions” of the
society.740 By Wilde’s criteria—use—the project was clearly a success, too. In the early
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1990s, the FAO-Unesco Soil Map of the World received the highest number of citations
of any documents in a Core Agricultural Literature Project.741 The classification
presented in the legend became the main rival as an international standard to the final
version of the U.S. Soil Survey Staff’s system, Soil Taxonomy, published in 1975.
In fact, FAO aggressively promoted the legend as an international standard, as the
organization’s African soil program illustrates. During the 1960s, the World Soil
Resources Office did not host any soil correlation meetings in Africa, but during the
1970s, FAO established international Soil Correlation and Evaluation Sub-Committees
for West and East Africa, which held seven meetings during the decade. These meetings
included the requisite Study Tour, but while soils were correlated, the definition of
classes in the legend was already fixed—the soils had to fit the preexisting categories.
African scientists had little opportunity to adapt the international classification to their
ends. Instead, following FAO officers’ suggestion, the Sub-Committees recommended
that all national surveys—which had inherited the French system, ad hoc British
practices, or dabbled in the 7th Approximation—adopt the legend as a common reference
point.742 Many nations produced national soil maps using the legend.743 The common
currency enhanced the mobility of scientists as well as knowledge; it enabled
international experts to move quickly from project to project around the world. And for
experts from developing countries especially, competence in the use of this currency was
741
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the price of admission to the cosmopolitan community of experts and the career
opportunities this afforded.
Despite the competition suggested by FAO’s proselytizing, Soil Taxonomy and
the FAO-Unesco classifications were intellectually quite compatible. “To keep the
system ‘natural,’” the volume accompanying the Legend explained, “the differentiating
criteria are essential properties of the soil itself.”744 U.S. government soil manuals
provided many of the operations for defining these properties. But there was a key
difference between Soil Taxonomy and the legend—the legend was essentially monocategorical. Instead of a six-tiered hierarchy, the legend only listed Soil Units, which
were equivalent to the American’s Great Groups. According to the history of the project
provided with the Legend, agreement could not be reached on the criteria for further
subdivision. Should lower categories be based on properties reflecting zonality,
evolution, morphology, ecology, geography? In fact, I have found no evidence that
participants even attempted to define lower categories. To do so would have jettisoned
the critical advantage of small scale mapping for the internationalist agenda; mutual
understanding was easier when the details were blurred and the categories broad.
Each volume of the map, however, also included a thick appendix of descriptions
of typical profiles. These descriptions demonstrated the soil science community’s prized
epistemic virtues of precision, detail, and quantification. Thick qualitative descriptions of
soil morphology were complemented by horizon depth measurements to the centimeter,
color values keyed to the Munsell color chart (e.g. “yellowish brown [10yr 5/8]), particle
size distribution calculated to a tenth of a percent, and a battery of chemical tests. The
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minimum size of an area delineated on a 1: 5 million map, on the other hand, is about
100,750 hectares.745 A gap several orders of magnitude wide separated the intensive
detail of the profile descriptions from the extensive perspective of the map. The monocategorical nature of the classification meant that the sense of groundedness provided by
the profile descriptions was slippery; there was no taxonomic ladder to descend from the
general properties of Soil Units to the specific properties of soil individuals. The patterns
revealed by the global view from above applied to no place in particular.
Despite—or, rather, because—of this gap, the Soil Map of the World quickly
proved to be a useful instrument of development planning. The sheets of the map were
presented as basic scientific documents. Their application required skilled interpretation
for a particular purpose. The volumes of the Soil Map of the World included extremely
small scale maps of the area’s bioclimatic regions, surface geology, physiographic
regions, and potential natural vegetation. By superimposing these thematic maps on top
of the soil maps, experts could estimate the potential and suitability of land for various
types of agriculture. This practice of isolating components of the environment and then
reconstructing a simplified version of the whole perfectly illustrates the perpetual
movement between analysis and synthesis that produced the view from above.
According to accepted practice, valid interpretation required objective
description; that is, the maps themselves should illustrate natural classifications. As
shown in Chapter Four, however, values and theories—interpretations—were deeply
embedded in the bioclimatic and natural vegetation maps in particular. Bioclimatic maps
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were constructed to be useful for specific agricultural regimes; potential vegetation maps
portrayed a fictional natural world without humans. Soil maps themselves embedded
theories about which properties were significant indicators of soil genesis and behavior
under cultivation--and there was no soil unit for concrete. Re-enforcing this issue of
compounding interpretations, these same types of thematic maps often had been used to
infer the soil patterns in the first place. Thus, the interpretive methodology risked creating
a closed, self-referential system.
This possibility recalls William Cronon’s classic analysis of the commoditization
of nature resulting in the production of a “second nature.” In this second nature, corn and
cows were transformed into standardized units that could be rapidly sorted, transported,
and traded. Second nature maintained tenuous ties to the peculiarities of soils and the
cycles of seasons. It was most clearly manifested in the market, a place where
abstractions representing the future harvest of a region hundreds of miles away could be
bought and sold instantaneously.746 In a similar sense, a key objective of the Soil Map of
the World was to enable knowledge to travel effortlessly. My earlier reference to the
categories of the legend as currency was meant as something more than an analogy;
money represents the ultimate instantiation of fungible information.747 Following the
logic of the Soil Map of the World to its conclusion, it clearly can be understood as part
of the long-running commoditization of nature.
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This point was emphasized in one of the early extensions of the Soil Map of the
World project at FAO, an effort to develop a system of global land evaluation. For the
soil scientist who headed this project, Smyth, a global system of land capability
classification was a natural application of the map, and the Soil Map of the World project
provided an organizational model, too. The map units had to reflect far more variables
than simply soil characteristics, of course. Advising an expert devising a capability
classification in Pakistan, Smyth wrote, “A comparison of ‘land capability’ between
Iceland and Timbuktoo…can only be expressed meaningfully in terms of money (indeed
in terms of somebody else’s money—dollars preferably) for land capability in such
different economic, cultural and agricultural environments does not appear to have any
other common denominator.”748 This comment provides insight into why FAO policies
were extraordinarily hostile to subsistence agricultural. The answer to this question may
seem so obvious that it need not even be asked: subsistence agriculture did not produce
the surpluses necessary to fuel industrialization, and thus by definition did not contribute
to development. But FAO officers often denigrated substance practices in places where
they had no better alternative.749 Along with longstanding cultural prejudices, a subtler
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bureaucratic imperative was also at play. Non-market production was difficult to account
for, to incorporate into national and global surveys. In fact, Smyth was often skeptical
about the possibility of devising a uniform system; his comment here was in the context
of a recommendation to keep the terms of the capability classification relevant to the
local context. But for FAO’s goal of establishing itself as the center for global
agricultural planning, dollars were the unit that made sense.750
This focus on planning suggests that although the Soil Map of the World was part
of the purposeful commoditization of nature, it did not reflect an abiding faith in the
unfettered market. Indeed, FAO’s first practical use of the map came in the context of its
Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development. This top priority project sought to
make a global survey of current agricultural resources versus population needs in the
mid-1960s, and then project needs in 1975 and 1985 given population growth projections.
In addition to current agricultural statistics, the plan provided potential productivity
estimates; for example, the production index for Afghanistan in 1963 was 2.3, but its
potential was 7-8. In developing countries for which few data were available, FAO relied
on the Soil Map of the World and the database assembled in the World Soil Resources
Office.751 Developing countries, of course, were the places where huge areas of the map
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were based on general information and, therefore, the problem of circular inferences most
severe.
The Soil Map of the World and the data collected in the World Soil Resources
Office were important in the production of many other small scale interpretive maps, too.
These included not only a new FAO-Unesco-WMO Map of World Distribution of Arid
Regions for the UN Conference on Desertification, but also maps of future worlds; for
example, FAO Potential Population Supporting Capacities Maps of Africa under varying
levels of agricultural inputs; United Nations Environment Program-FAO-Unesco-WMO
Desertification Map of Africa; and a Soil Degradation Map of Northern Africa.752 These
were the maps that UN agencies used to amplify the myth of desertification in order to
compel state intervention in peasant agricultural practices and boost their own
bureaucracies.753
These interpretive maps did not merely visualize global resource inventories.
They did not function as analogy generators intended to facilitate knowledge transfer.
Their speculative nature was not justified by invoking their heuristic value. Indeed, none
of these maps included reliability cartograms. Instead, they fulfilled the promise of
scientific map making; they made predictions. Interpretation put the map in motion; it
transformed the map from a metaphor of the world to a dynamic model of it. Ideally, the
model’s predictive value increased as more and more layers of thematic maps were
superimposed on top of each other. But it was also possible that the vivid patterns of the
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Soil Map of the World blurred as bioclimatic and potential vegetation, geologic and
geomorphologic, land-use and population maps piled up. With the increasing density of
data, the bright colors of the individual maps turn to black. The view from above projects
a Rorschach blot.
Conclusion
The history of the Soil Map of the World illuminates how international,
bureaucratic and disciplinary politics, scientific theories and practices, and the natural
environment interacted to produce a global view from above. More than the map, the
legend represented the project’s most remarkable accomplishment; an international
classification system that provided a common currency for exchange between national
soil science communities. The World Soil Resources Office facilitated the international
negotiations necessary to produce the legend. At the international level, not only soils but
also national classification systems were the objects of correlation. The process of
correlation, which explicitly valued blending the viewpoints of elite experts who
represented diverse national traditions and interests, resonated with the epistemic virtues
of the view from everywhere. The highly standardized, precisely quantified, operational
definitions this process produced, on the other hand, were designed to reduce the
interpretive freedom—to eliminate the subjectivity—of observers in the field. This rigid
procedural objectivity, in which truth was understood to reside in the universal laws of
nature, reflected the values of the view from above. The Soil Map of the World project
thus illustrated the complementary roles of the view from everywhere and the view from
above in the co-production of international science and international institutions.
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The small scale of the map was critical to the production of a global view from
above. The high categorical level at which the legend divided Soil Units allowed
scientists to elide disagreements over the relative significance of the factors determining
soil genesis and behavior. As importantly, the schematic nature of the map allowed
scientists to map soils they had never surveyed. The monocategorical quality of the
classification accurately reflected a gap between the broad patterns revealed on the map
and the intricate patterns of detailed soil surveys. The global view from above necessarily
applied to no place in particular.
The small scale of the map also correlated with the small size of the international
soil science community. There was a certain irony in the fact that this new, increasingly
esoteric international language was understood by just some thousands of people. In
terms of both objectives and process, this was a quintessentially elite cosmopolitan
project. It was designed to enhance the mobility of scientific facts and experts, to uproot
scientists from their local environments. The global view from above was produced by
and for people who belonged no place in particular.
The cosmopolitan nature of the project was both its strength and its weakness.
The publication of the Soil Map of the World was part of an ongoing process of
international scientific exchange and integration. The map and the legend have undergone
continuous revision and extension. As national soil survey projects tested it through use,
for example, they soon developed a lower category to enable more detailed mapping.
More importantly, the whole system had been digitized, which offers new creative
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possibilities, as well as new imperatives for international standardization.754 As a
platform for international scientific research, the Soil Map of the World and projects like
it empowered international organizations to produce an ever more compelling view from
above of a fragile, interdependent global environment. These projects taught members of
an international scientific community to see the world in the same way. They produced
what political scientists have termed epistemic communities—transnational networks of
experts with shared values and understandings of causality that can play a key role in
international policy coordination.755 Members of an epistemic community found similar
patterns in the Rorschach blots of the global view from above.
Yet these were intellectuals who articulated with no public. In fact,
internationalization ineluctably disassociated ideas and intellectuals from their local
context. In part, because international organizations and epistemic communities were not
embedded in a popular world community—what mid-twentieth century social scientists
would have called an organic community—they lacked the ability to galvanize social
movements capable of compelling action.
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Despite the environmental and sociological disjunctures between the global and
the local, it would be a mistake to conclude that the world scale was merely an illusion.
This would be equivalent to claiming the local scale was irrelevant because it could not
be seen from high above. True, in an ideal functional world, the local and global scales
would telescope seamlessly into each other; local and global patterns could be deduced
from each other. But we live in a dysfunctional world—a world in which enduring
patterns are nevertheless unpredictable. In a historically determined world, scales are
connected, of course, but the connections are contingent. They have to be worked out
from below and from above each time, as I have attempted to do here in describing how
the map was made. Given the necessary disjunction between scales, the Soil Map of the
World was a tremendous accomplishment. It could not compel action, but it did
contribute to the construction of a global environment about which it was possible to
debate issues of aesthetics, equity, and sustainability.
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Conclusion
During its first quarter-century, world history transformed Unesco. In 1947,
Unesco was an organization of three dozen member states; by 1972, that number had
risen to 132. Most of this increase, of course, was an effect of decolonization. In 1974,
Amadou Mahtar M’Bow of Senegal was elected Director-General, the first African head
of a UN specialized agency. Although the United States still contributed 30 percent of the
budget in 1970, its influence had been deeply eroded by successive administrations’
indifference and Cold War obsessions. Unesco increasingly came to be seen as the UN
organization most representative of Third World agendas. UN agencies’ inclusive
organizational structure assured that Unesco represented more diverse national
perspectives in the early 1970s than it had in the late 1940s, and in this sense produced a
more authentic view from everywhere. The universalist aspirations of postwar
internationalists, however, had lost much of their appeal. As Chapter Five discussed, if
some still remembered the old rallying slogan “unity in diversity,” the emphasis of the
age was firmly on diversity.
Yet for all the assertions of particularism, the new nations reinforced the
consensus that the social and economic development of less developed countries ought to
be Unesco’s primary mission. In 1947, the budget had been almost 7 million dollars; by
1972 it had grown to nearly 45 million dollars (taking inflation into account, still more
than triple the 1947 budget), but this figure was more than doubled by extra-budgetary
funds from the UN Development Program. In this sense, the technological approach to
using science to improve the world had proven its ability to foster international
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cooperation. Indeed, the most impassioned appeals to recognize that the planet was One
World came from renewed Malthusian fears of natural resource depletion and
environmental degradation. In 1966, the first photographs of the planet from space
provided a vivid image of what the economist Kenneth Boulding (who had been one of
the presenters at Quincy Wright’s 1947 World Community conference) famously called
“spaceship Earth.”756 No better symbol of the power of the view from above could be
imagined.
There was an obvious conflict between poor countries insistence on rapid
economic development and international environmentalists’ calls to recognize the
world’s inherent “limits of growth.” This confrontation came to a head, and was partially
resolved, in preparations for the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, better
known as the Stockholm Conference. Developing countries insisted that Western
environmentalists’ concerns about pollution and wilderness degradation, which less
developed countries perceived to be problems of prosperity, not be used as an excuse to
walk away from commitments to development goals. Following the logic of the view
from everywhere, the organizers blended the interests and viewpoints of diverse
participants in the work of preparatory commissions and meetings to produce a
framework that integrated environmental and development objectives. This inclusive
agenda required the integration of social and economic expertise with knowledge of
natural ecosystems. The Stockholm Conference is remembered as “the single most
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influential event in the evolution of the international environmental movement.”757 It
resulted in the creation of the UN Environment Program, and in retrospect provides a
useful birth date for the idea of “sustainable development.” Participants (and many
historical accounts) celebrated the radical novelty of the ideas and of the organizational
process of the Stockholm Conference.758
And yet while the emphasis on pollution and the awareness of threats to oceans
were new, in many ways the Stockholm Conference represented a return to the ideas of
the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of
Resources (UNSCCUR) at the start of the UN’s development program. At UNSCCUR
conservationists had struggled to manage the tension between the exploitation of
resources for economic growth and the protection of nature for the maintenance of
ecological equilibrium. The themes of interdependence and balance, sustainable growth,
and the need to integrate scientific knowledge of nature with social and economic
expertise animated USCCUR. Even the more romantic concerns of the new
environmentalist movement were included at Unesco’s partner Nature Protection
Conference. And the innovative set of pre-conference commissions and meetings, which
sought to facilitate popular participation in the Conference, recalled Unesco’s early
experiments with international conferences. In fact, Unesco provided a sort of bridge
between UNSCCUR and the Stockholm Conference, between scientific conservation and
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sustainable development. It was no coincidence that in 1968, Unesco hosted an
intergovernmental Biosphere Conference that anticipated the ideas and values promoted
at the Stockholm Conference. In this respect, it was also notable that developing
countries succeeded in adding desertification and soil erosion to the Stockholm agenda.
Unesco’s environmental sciences and natural resources programs helped maintain a space
for the reproduction of these ideas in the international community during the
determinedly optimistic development regimes of the 1950s and early 1960s.
My point is not that there was nothing new under the sun—clearly the world was
an extraordinarily different place in 1972 than it had been in 1946. But it was revealing
that sustainable development was essentially recycled resource conservation. Ironically,
given the explicitly linear model of time envisioned by development theorists, there was a
cyclical pattern to development thinking, and a bias against acknowledging intellectual
debts to the recent past. The cyclical pattern was driven by the perceived failure of
development, which increased pressure to proclaim the novelty of new programs.
Furthermore, disappointing results were often blamed on failure to take social or cultural
or environmental variables into account—failure to grasp the true interdependency of
everything. Correcting the problem, therefore, justified expanding the functional mandate
of the program—and the development bureaucracy. The cyclical pattern of development
thought and the expansion of the international development bureaucracy were, in part, a
product of the perceived failures of technical expertise.
But the history of science at UN agencies was not just a history of failures. As
Chapter Six showed for the particularly difficult case of soils, UN agencies played a key
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role in the production of a global view from above, which was critical to making the
global environment an object of policy (and public) debate. When policy-makers,
journalists, scholars, and activists seek global or internationally comparable
environmental, health, economic, and social data, as likely as not their source is a UN
product. The categories of international surveys, censuses, and maps set the terms of
debate; indeed, they structure perceptions of global reality. As much as a dense network
of weather stations or hundreds of thousands of detailed soil surveys, this
accomplishment depended on the reproduction of a transnational scientific community.
Producing these communities of shared norms and values, methodologies and
classifications—what political scientists call epistemic communities—was a core
objective of Unesco and the other UN functional agencies.
In this sense, the functionalist theory of international organization was validated;
the technological approach did produce transnational communities of experts and an ever
growing network of international institutions. But here it is important to note that the
concept of epistemic communities was a direct intellectual descendent of
functionalism.759 This was a regressive evolution, however; the theory of epistemic
communities was essentially the elitist skeleton of functionalism. The transformative,
explicitly normative ambition to produce a popular world community had been stripped
away.
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This scaled back ambition reflected reality. The international networks that
connected experts intersected with national governments and international secretariats,
but while the three UNs might be densely interwoven, no popular world community
emerged. Indeed, even the ideal of such a world community lost its vividness. Ironically,
popular anxiety over the manipulative power of social engineers contributed to the
postwar rupture between intellectuals and the public, especially in the United States. But
more fundamentally, decolonization and the Cold War assured that nationalism, not
utopian dreams of world community, imbued the minds of men.
The technological strategy produced an intellectual community that articulated
with no public. Perhaps this elitism was an inherent byproduct of cultivating
cosmopolitan communities. But it was a weakness, nevertheless. Like a disembodied
head, international experts could produce ever more convincing descriptions of an
interdependent world facing global environmental, economic, and social crises, but they
lacked the ability to act.760
Writing at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, my interest in
idea of a world community—of “the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind”—is
historical. It seems to me the dream of another world entirely. I can analyze it, but,
although I have tried, I cannot dream it. I doubt another sixty more years of globalization
will help. Perhaps a Third World War—or a Martian invasion—would do the trick.
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